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This interdisciplinary study in comparative literature reconceptualizes hypnosis as an aesthetic 
activity in light of the phenomenology of novel reading, literary theory, and narrative ethics. It 
begins by tracing the history of hypnotism in the medical literature, from Mesmer, Puységur, 
Bernheim and Charcot to Sigmund Freud, and in nineteenth-century fiction, from Balzac, Poe, and 
Flaubert, to Maupassant, Doyle and Du Maurier. It then turns to contemporary literary theory to 
examine the common aesthetic features of the novelistic and hypnotic imaginations. Centered on 
the concepts of aesthetic illusion, absorption-immersion and distance, activity and performativity, 
it strives to correct misconceptions of the hypnotic state that still portray it as one of pure passivity 
and receptivity, rather than activity, co-creation, and imaginative participation. By establishing 
hypnosis as a narrative, rather than purely dramatic-mimetic, practice, it draws out the ethical and 
therapeutic value of hypnotic and novelistic narration, and the autonomy of the hypnotic-
imaginative subject. The analogy between hypnosis and the act of reading fiction thus draws out 
similar forms of storytelling that enable an “unselfing” of the subject, opening up the individual to 
other lives, both actual and fictional. 
 
Primary Reader and Advisor: Yi-Ping Ong 















First, I would like to thank my advisor, Dr. Yi-Ping Ong, for her guidance during my years 
at Johns Hopkins University. I arrived in the United States in 2014 on a visiting research 
scholarship, intending to leave after a year. Professor Ong’s warm and brilliant pedagogic 
approach played a crucial part in my staying another five. Without her subtle balance of intellectual 
dexterity, human generosity, and sharp academic guidance, this dissertation would never have been 
written. I will never forget, nor will I ever be able to repay her for, all the time and energy that she 
so generously spent guiding me through the writing process, in addition to her encouragement and 
support during my graduate studies at JHU. She will hold a dear place in my heart for many years 
to come. Second, I would like to warmly thank Dr. Orna Ophir for igniting the analytic spark 
within me, helping me wade through the works of Freud, Klein and Bion during my graduate 
studies, and inviting me to present the earliest versions of Chapter 1 at the Richard Seminar in 
New York. My admiration for Dr. Ophir, who is a model on academic, therapeutic, and human 
levels is, put simply, unbounded. Whether she knows it or not, she has served as the figure of the 
good object throughout this process, and for this I am tremendously grateful. Further thanks extend 
to professor Jacques Neefs, whose warm supervision during the year I spent at the E.N.S. in 2018 
played a central role in the elaboration the second chapter of this dissertation. His sparkling wit 
and brilliant interpretations of nineteenth-century novels have been a true source of inspiration 
ever since our first encounter in 2015. 
 
 iv 
I would also like to express my gratitude to my fellow conscripts, the graduate students of 
JHU and beyond, whose support and sympathy helped me make it through these last 6 years. 
Among them, Hale Sirin, Paula Marchesini and Jacob Levi hold a special place in my heart. A 
huge thanks to Paula Marchesini, Samuel Kunkel, Mylene Charon, and my sister, Marianne 
Bergeret for their invaluable readings of my chapters. I will make it up to them somehow. Evident 
thanks go to my family, for their unfailing optimism and encouragements (the geographic distance 
never kept them away from my heart), and to the Gilgores, for their kindness and their emotional 
support. Finally, I would like to thank my partner and friend, Jarrett Gilgore. He knows why, and 
I will miss him dearly.  
Additionally, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to the Passow family for the 
research scholarship that allowed me to complete this dissertation during the 2020 pandemic and 








































































 One does not experiment on subjects; one plays a game with them. 
—Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen, (2009). 
 
 
I have no doubt that he has some new mesmerist or… trickster of some sort whom he is 
going to exhibit to us. 
—Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, (1895). 
 
 
Novels were held suitable for women, because they were seen as creatures of the 
imagination, of limited intellectual capacity. 
—Martyn Lyons, (1995). 
 
 
Then, [Cézanne] would step back a little, and judge, his eyes settling on the objects; slowly 
circling round them, combining, penetrating, taking hold of them. They would fix 
themselves on a point, with terrible intensity—"I cannot tear them away, he said one day… 
They are so stuck to the point that I am staring at, that I feel like they might start bleeding." 
Minutes, sometimes a quarter of an hour, would pass. A kind of sleep seemed to take hold 
of him. He would sink into the utmost depths of reason and reality, where man’s will, 
perhaps, meets the will of things, and regenerates itself, becomes absorbed in them. 
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The master had but to look at him, when this young man would fling himself back as though struck by 
lightning, place his hands rigidly at his sides, and fall into a state of military somnambulism, in which it was 
plain to any eye that he was open to the most absurd suggestion that might be made to him. He seemed quite 
content in his abject state, quite pleased to be relieved of the burden of voluntary choice. Again and again he 
offered himself as a subject and gloried in the model facility he had in losing consciousness. So now he 
mounted the platform, and a single cut of the whip was enough to make him dance to the Cavaliere's orders, 
in a kind of complacent ecstasy, eyes closed, head nodding, lank limbs flying in all directions.1  
 
This excerpt, taken from the final pages of Thomas Mann’s Mario and the Magician, contains a 
rich concentration of the central myths and misapprehensions traditionally associated with the 
experience of hypnotism. In the popular imagination, the hypnotic subject is often portrayed as 
being in a potentially dangerous state of passivity, a “trance” which turns the individual into an 
automaton and places them at the mercy of another human being’s discourse and will. In Mann’s 
text, stage hypnotism is depicted as public humiliation inflicted upon helpless victims by Cipolla—
a crippled and ill-tempered magician, who goes by the nickname Cavaliere.2 In the passage cited 
above, audience members watch as the young man on stage is put into a state of oblivious, military-
like submissiveness, which takes away his deliberative, critical faculties. With his powers, the 
hypnotist seems to have stolen the subject’s ability to give conscious assent to the actions that he 
carries out before the audience’s hungry gaze. 
At the climax of the hypnotic performance, we find several audience members dancing 
tirelessly beneath Cipolla’s command, in a state of blissful, ecstatic unconsciousness. It is no 
surprise, then, that Cipolla’s character was taken to represent the dangers of the rise of nationalist 
and fascist ideology in the 1920s and 1930s. This is especially evident in the text’s depictions of 
the youthful audience members in the town of Torre di Venere, who display a mixture of brute 
ignorance and patriotism, indicating their vulnerability to the dangers of politically seductive or 
suggestive discourse.3 Cipolla’s dictatorial behavior is further emphasized by the fact that his stage 
accessory is not a magic wand but a whip, “the insulting symbol of his domination, before which 
 
1 Thomas Mann, Mario and the Magician, trans. H. T Lowe-Porter (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1931), 66. 
2 The participants are selected from an enthusiastic and ignorant audience, composed of “the manhood of Torre di 
Venere ... sundry, fisherfolk, rough-and-ready youths,” as well as the educated narrator and his family. Mann, 24. 
3 “It was only too easy to see why he obeyed. After all, obedience was his calling in life.” Ibid. 
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we all cowered, drowned out every sensation save a dazed and outbraved submission to his 
power.”4  
For many critics, the “generally supine behavior” of Cipolla’s audience points ultimately 
to their passivity and moral inertia in the face of the forces of the irrational.5  
Comprised of “one long series of attacks upon the will-power,” hypnosis in Mann’s text is 
depicted as a state of somnambulism that produces a “loss or compulsion of volition” and 
transforms Cipolla’s volunteers into mere “tools,” “puppets on the stage.”6 The hypnotic relation 
or rapport at the heart of all hypnotic phenomena is represented as one of domination and coercion, 
rather than cooperation or collaboration.7 Having this “stream of influence… imposed on [them],” 
hypnotic subjects are reduced to being “perfectly passive,” playing “the suffering, receptive, 
performing part” on stage and demonstrating “the most unconditional and utter self-abnegation.”8   
Furthermore, in Mann’s novella, the audience’s uncritical enthusiasm and enjoyment of the 
hypnotic performance is reminiscent of the affective contagion noted in crowd psychology, of the 
 
4 Mann, 60. The “riding-whip with a silver claw-handle” that “whistles” and “cut[s] through the air” suggests that 
Cipolla—who has “the hairdressing of an old-fashioned circus-director”—treats the audience like animals to be tamed. 
He rides his volunteers like horses—hence the name Cavaliere—holding his “instrument” which “did much to keep 
rebellion from becoming overt.” Ibid., 29; 43; 35; 48.  
5 Nicholas Martin, “Thomas Mann’s Mario und der Zauberer: ‘Simply a Story of Human Affairs’,” in The Text and 
Its Context: Studies in Modern German Literature and Society, ed. Nigel Harris and Joanne Sayner (Oxford and Berne: 
Peter Lang, 2008), 165-76. 
6 Mann, Mario and the Magician, 50; 69. This passage occurs at the climax of the novella, after an escalation of 
dramatic tension: in the second part of his performance, Cipolla the magician shifts from performing harmless tricks, 
which involve cards and numbers, to carrying out increasingly complex hypnotic phenomena such as catalepsy, 
hallucinations, paralysis and somnambulism on the members of his audience. As the text and performance unfold, 
hypnosis is described as a “capacity for self-surrender … for the most unconditional and utter self-abnegation,” a “lost 
freedom of action,” a “drunken abdication of the critical spirit” and “yielding to another person’s will.” Ibid., 17; 62; 
65; 68. Its moral dangers lie in the threat posed to the autonomy of the modern, rational, self-aware and self-possessed 
subject. Leading to manipulation, dispossession, and loss of critical faculties, it threatens the individual’s ability to 
constitute him or herself as a subject of both action and enunciation. Because the insidious hypnotic “violation” of the 
subject occurs on the level of the psyche—it is invisible and impalpable rather than physical—it is reminiscent of the 
demonic possessions reported during the early modernity of the pre-Enlightenment era. 
7 The hypnotic relation is described with a military lexical field, as a “challenge,” a “duel.” Cipolla dominates all 
members of the audience, even—especially—those who try to resist: “One saw it waver, that strength of purpose, 
beneath the repeated summons and whip-crackings.” In the case of one subject who does attempt to consciously resist, 
the “struggle” is described as a “heroic obstinacy, a fixed resolve to resist” that “needs be conquered … a gallant effort 
to strike out and save the honour of the human race.” This reinforces the climactic ending of the text, where Mario, 
initially described as a “poor bewildered, victimized creature,” commits the final tragic act of shooting the hypnotist, 
putting an end to the latter’s life and “evil” performance. Mann, 10; 15; 67; 22; 27.  
8 Mann, 52. Cipolla defines hypnosis as the operator acting through the subject: “it was not the automatons up there 
who danced, but himself.” This explains the irresistible dimension of hypnotic suggestions: yielding is described as a 
form of relief and, in a sense, as the only remaining act of freedom for the subject: “Who wants to torture himself like 
that? Is forcing yourself your idea of freedom? … What a relief to give way.” Ibid., 23, emphasis added. 
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dangerous influence of rhetorical discourse on the hypnotized mob, whose passions are easily 
stirred: “the applause was like a patriotic demonstration.”9  
In political readings of Mann’s text, the links between popular representations of hypnosis 
and loss of conscious awareness justify the analogy between hypnotic trance and the dangers of 
totalitarianism. Indeed, “as George Orwell said, one of the aims of totalitarianism is not merely to 
make sure that people will think the right thoughts but actually to make them less conscious; this 
is exactly the course taken by Cipolla's gradually-increasing power over his audience.”10  
Conversely, not only is hypnosis depicted as a threat to the subject’s authority and 
autonomy, fascism itself becomes illuminated as a perverted form of “hypnotic” influence over 
the masses. Just as Cipolla’s cheap artistic performance is taken to represent the psychological 
workings of the mass appeal of fascist or Nazi seduction, the “hypnotic, irrational power of 
Mussolini’s or Hitler’s oratory” have also notoriously been underlined.11 Like the hypnotist, 
“Hitler’s overriding aim was to suspend the audience’s rational and critical faculties.”12 George 
Estabrooks, a leading mid-twentieth century authority on hypnosis, even affirmed that “Hitler’s 
emotional domination of the crowd … was only the attack of the stage hypnotist one step 
removed.”13 And indeed, an early convert to Nazism describes the effects of Hitler’s speeches as 
follows: 
I do not know how to describe the emotions that swept over me as I heard this man. His words were like a 
scourge. When he spoke of the disgrace of Germany, I was ready to spring on any enemy. His appeal to 
German manhood was like a call to arms, the gospel he preached a sacred truth. He seemed to be another 
Luther. I forgot everything but the man; then, glancing round I saw that his magnetism was holding these 
thousands as one. ... The intense will of the man, the passion of his sincerity conviction seemed to flow from 
him to me. I experienced an exaltation that could be likened only to religious conversion.14 
 
9 Mann, 55. As noted above, the audience’s mindset underlines the appeal of the dehumanizing and demagogic 
processes used in fascist ideology. See Martin, 167. Cipolla’s hypnotic performance, in this context, can be considered 
“an image of the Fascist leader's aestheticizing of politics.” Alan Bance, “The Narrator in Thomas Mann’s Mario und 
der Zauberer,” Modern Language Review 82 (1987): 397; 390. 
10 Bance, 390. 
11 Martin, 167-8. 
12 Ibid., 173. 
13 G. H. Estabrooks, Hypnotism, rev. ed. (New York: Dutton, 1957), 120-121. Indeed, as Martin observes, the theatrical 
dimension of Hitler’s speeches in the 1920s resembles that of Cipolla’s stage hypnosis performance: “Nazi ritual 
began in the sweaty, smoky beer halls and circus tents of Munich, where Hitler gave his first speeches in the early 
1920s. The subsequent addition of technical paraphernalia, such as elaborate lighting and sound effects, merely 
intensified the Führer’s presence, and the later mass rallies at Nuremberg differed only in degree from the earliest 
gatherings of the faithful. … Hitler regarded oratory as an art-form from the outset, remarking as early as 1922 that 
he had mastered it. However, he realised that he could add an extra dimension to the traditional view of oratory as 
purely rhetorical skill, namely, the theatrical power of gesture. Hitler treated each speech as a dramatic performance.” 
Martin, 173.  




In this disquieting description of a “Dionysian abandonment of the self and its critical faculties,” 
every member of the crowd seems to give in to a perverted form of the oceanic feeling.15 Subjects 
undergo a perilous loss of identity and individuality, assuming an irrational, collective personality. 
In Mann’s text, this tendency is observed with “horrified fascination” by the narrator, who 
believes himself to be detached from the rest of the audience.16 However, during the performance, 
Mann’s narrator himself “gradually loses his separateness from the audience, and thus the 
protective armor of his questioning, independent consciousness.”17 As Ingrid Walsoe-Engel 
argues, his inability to leave the hypnotic show after the interlude reveals that “[his] identity has 
merged with that of the audience,” as his attention becomes increasingly focused on Cipolla’s whip 
and brandy-glass—the “visual stimuli for the hypnotic process.”18 While claiming to be detached 
and knowledgeable about the nature of hypnosis, the narratorial perspective itself is not immune 
to the suggestive influence and seductive force of Cipolla’s powers: “the spectator becomes victim 
as his identification with Cipolla confirms his seduction.”19  
As Alan Bance has noted, Mann’s text is thus not “a simple political allegory” but also a 
statement of the artist’s own struggle with the relationship between literature and political 
responsibility, that poses the question of the influence of art on the recipient.20 In Mario and the 
Magician, hypnotic discourse can stand in for the dangers of fascism because it both uses and 
displays the seductive powers of art and language, of poetic and rhetorical discourse. When 
considered as a form of cheap entertainment,21 hypnosis is the mirror image of art which has 
 
15 Martin, 174. 
16 Ibid., 174. For fin-de-siècle descriptions of crowd psychology, see Chapter 2. See Gustave Le Bon, Psychologie des 
foules. (1895; Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1963); Gabriel Tarde, Les lois de l'imitation études sociologique 
(1890; Paris: Alcan, 1921). See also Sigmund Freud, Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego,” in The Standard 
Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XVIII (London: Hogarth Press and the 
Institute of Psychoanalysis, 1955), 65-144. Hereafter referred to as SE. 
17 Ingrid Walsoe-Engel, “Thomas Mann's Narrative Sorcery: The Structure of ‘Mario und der Zauberer,’” Colloquia 
Germanica 22, No. 3/4 (1989): 254. 
18 Walsoe-Engel, 255. 
19 Ibid., 258. 
20 Bance, 286. “Cipolla is a fellow-artist or “brother artist,” a term Mann was later to use to characterise Hitler.” 
Martin, 170. Indeed, in his essay Bruder Hitler (1938), Mann writes that the dictator is “[e]in Künstler, ein Bruder.” 
See Thomas Mann, Bruder Hitler, in Essays, vol 4, ed. H. Kurzke and S. Stachorski (Frankfurt: S. Fischer, 1995), 
305-12.  
21 The hall in which Cipolla’s performance takes place is “among the proletariat… not much more, actually than a 
wooden shed…with a turreted entrance, plastered on either side with layers of gay placards.” Mann, 23. 
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prostituted and degraded itself.22 In its literary representation of hypnosis, Mann’s text 
simultaneously addresses and reveals the misuse of art as a tool of political seduction. In this sense, 
hypnosis serves as a magnifying tool, pointing to the moral dangers inherent to all artistic creation: 
its vulnerability to misuse, and its possible subordination to underlying ideological purposes.  
In addition to its political aspect, the text has an additional aesthetic and psychological 
interpretation that sheds further light on the nature of both hypnotic and aesthetic experiences.23 
The claim made by Mann himself, that his novella had not been properly appreciated as a “self-
critical exploration of the psychology of the artistic process”24 is quite significant: not only does 
Cipolla’s performance stand in for the aesthetization of the political, his death is also “a warning 
to the artist against narcissistic arrogance.”25 As Bance notes, “what is unambiguously 
demonstrated” in Mann’s text is that “in the hands of the artist, the relationship between insight 
and political responsibility is sufficiently complex to make him an unreliable guide when it comes 
to a political crisis.”26 Cipolla’s power, like fascist discourse, is dangerous because it “can ‘induce 
in even the intelligent, cultured, critical observer a sense of fascinated helplessness.”27 Indeed, as 
previously noted, the narrator himself seems to gradually become complicit and seduced, as “he 
begins to identify more and more with Cipolla, enjoying the humiliations of the citizenry of 
Torre.”28 For all his “breadth of culture and his reasoning power,” the narrator is “as helplessly 
drawn into the sphere of Cipolla's magic as the others around him are”; he has become “a part of 
the malaise which he deplores.”29 Therefore, although critics like Walsoe-Engel claim that this 
seduction is not to action but to “paralyzed spectatorship,” on the contrary, the hypnotic 
 
22 Its “base” and popular nature is underlined in contrast to the intellectual and aesthetic snobbism of the narrator, 
toward the Italian “Middle-class native.” Mann, 13. Mann’s narrator “places the barrier of his educated culture 
between himself and the world,” in a manner both “condescending and ironic.” Bance, 391. 
23 In a letter to Louis M. Grant, Mann’s retrospective assessment of the text described it as “simply a story of human 
affairs which should interest the reader for its own sake and not for some hidden meaning” (See Mann, “Letter to 
Louis M. Grant, 14 October 1949,” DD, II, 372 372). As I will show in Chapter 4, in this seeming contradiction lays 
the “trickery” of fictional prose and its similarity with modern, indirect hypnotic suggestions: both convey—
ambiguous, nondogmatic—messages by simultaneously claiming not to do so.  
24 Quoted in Martin, 165. 
25 Bance, 395. 
26 Ibid., 397. “The civic virtues claimed by the narrator in his parental role and his stance of Guardian (in a wider 
metaphorical sense) are at odds with his neutral, not to say irresponsible, aesthetic drive to produce a 'performance' of 
his own that does justice to the fascinating performance of his fellow-artist, Cipolla.” Bance, 396. 
27 Ronald C. Speirs, “The Embattled Intellect,” ‘The Embattled Intellect: Developments in Modern German Literature 
and the Advent of Fascism,” in Fascism and European Literature, ed. Stein Ugelvik Larsen and Beatrice Sandberg 
(Berne: Peter Lang, 1991), 35. 
28 Walsoe-Engel, 254. 
29 Bance, 398. 
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performance reveals the very impossibility of pure, detached spectatorship.30 In this sense, Mann’s 
novella is an investigation of the psychology of the artistic process—including of its own—that 
reminds the reader of the inescapable nature of suggestion and influence, and of the powers, both 
fascinating and dangerous, of artistic representation.  
Especially noteworthy for the purposes of this study is the hesitation in the narratorial 
discourse about the nature of hypnosis, which underlies the tension between his educated 
knowledge or rationality on the one hand and his fascination or susceptibility on the other. Indeed, 
like the fin-de-siècle literary representations of hypnosis to be explored in Chapter 2, Mann’s text 
vacillates between a credulous view—which identifies hypnotic phenomena as manifestations of 
the occult—and a skeptical view—which dismisses it altogether as charlatanry. This 
indecisiveness can be traced throughout the history of hypnotism: from its origins in the work of 
Franz Anton Mesmer, to the present day.31  
Indeed, the narrator describes hypnosis as a “natural-unnatural field” which spans “from 
the unimpressive at one end of the scale to the monstrous at the other.”32 Cipolla is said to rely on 
“powers which in human nature are higher or else lower than human reason: on intuition and 
‘magnetic’ transmission; in short, upon a low type of manifestation.”33 Throughout the text, these 
”powers” walk the fine line between the explainable and the unexplainable, alternating between 
manipulative deception and “the most extraordinary displays of clairvoyance.”34 Despite the 
narrator’s “knowledgeable” explanations, hypnotic phenomena remain caught in this undecidable 
no-man’s-land throughout the text: they are characterized by a “dubious amalgam” of the 
ordinary—commonplace and uninteresting to the educated observer—and the occult.35  
 
30 Walsoe-Engel, 246. 
31 On the one hand, Cipolla’s audience “conceded his possession of strange powers-strange whether for good or evil.” 
On the other, “we began to have our suspicions that the man was sailing under a false flag, only we did not yet know 
which was the right one.” As the narrator points out, “Our feelings for Cavaliere Cipolla were of a very mixed kind, 
but so were the feelings of the whole audience, if I mistake not, and nobody left.” Mann, 48; 36; 57. 
32 Mann, 60. 
33 Mann, 50. Hypnosis is thus opposed to the “objectivity” of the medical field and the hypnotist to its representant, 
the medical Doctor: the “faithful and honest servant of science” (9). To reinforce the antiquated aspect of hypnosis 
and link it to superstition, references to Medieval phenomena of mass hysteria are also present, for example when the 
“long-toothed Anglo-Saxoness in a pince-nez left her seat of her own motion to perform a tarantella in the centre 
aisle.” Ibid., 69. 
34 Ibid., 54. Descriptions of the hypnotist obey a similar alternating movement, as the operator is either portrayed as 
superhuman—“Our lord and master”—or subhuman, dehumanized—“the weird creature,” whose “grotesque and 
dipping stride” forces his to use his “mental and spiritual parts” to “conquer life.” Ibid., 56; 3; 36; 33. 
35 See Mann, 51. One of my goals in this thesis is to resituate hypnotism in the complex middle-ground which is often 
omitted from binary oppositions that systematically pulls hypnosis toward one of these two extremes. 
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This mysterious aura proves to be essential, however, to both narrator and performer. 
Indeed, without it, the seemingly powerful foundation on which the success of Cipolla’s tricks 
depends might begin to crumble. As long as the mystery of his power remains intact—that is, 
rationally inexplicable—the Cavaliere can maintain his sway over the audience. Similarly, as long 
as the practice of hypnosis remains obscure, the text itself, having become invested with its own 
hypnotic power to represent the unexplainable, can sway the minds of its recipients. In this sense, 
the description of the children’s obliviousness toward the “seriousness”36 of the situation also 
points to the reader’s own potential failure to grasp the serious effects of artistic representation 
and fictional narratives in the actual world: “luckily for them, they did not know where the comedy 
left off and the tragedy began; and we let them remain in their happy belief that the whole thing 
had been a play up till the end.”37  
By representing the perverse enjoyment of Cipolla’s audience, the text implicitly addresses 
the reader, reminding her not to grow complicit with the potentially distorting effects of the 
seductive work of art. It invites us to remain “awake” rather than drift off and become “lost in a 
book,”38 losing the critical abilities that make us competent readers, good citizens or ethical agents, 
self-possessed and rational human subjects.  In this sense, hypnosis is not just the object of political 
criticism; it is also an instrument of self-examination for both artist and reader. 
Nevertheless, Mann’s text relies on an oversimplification of hypnosis, which depicts it as 
the domination of a sadistic operator over a purely receptive, passive, quasi-subject, a mere 
automaton. In what follows, I will offer a more nuanced understanding of the hypnotic experience 
than that offered by the narrator of Mario and the Magician, which, as I will argue, requires an 
examination of hypnotic responsiveness in aesthetic terms.  
Indeed, a cross-comparison between hypnosis and art will allow us to reconsider long-
standing assumptions about the nature of hypnotic practice, which is still often associated with 
 
36 “Thank goodness, they lacked understanding for the disreputable side of the entertainment, and in their innocence 
were perpetually charmed.” Significantly, the children are regularly described in a vocabulary also used to qualify the 
“good” hypnotic subject: “went into raptures at the festive sight”; “absorbed in the joys of the life on the beach”; “A 
conjuror! The bare announcement was enough to turn our children's heads,” etc. Ibid., 70; 7; 8; 22. 
37 Ibid., 3. This contrasts with the absence of humor of Cipolla himself, who has “not a trace of personal jocularity or 
clownishness in his pose, manner, or behaviour. On the contrary, there was complete seriousness, an absence of any 
humorous appeal” in him. 27, emphasis added. The tension between the serious and the non-serious is at the heart of 
my analysis of hypnotic discourse and is developed in its linguistic, ethical and aesthetic implications throughout this 
thesis.  
38 See Victor Nell, Lost in a Book. The Psychology of Reading for Pleasure (New Haven and London: Yale University 
Press, 1988).  
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deception, popular culture, mind-control, and cheap entertainment.39 This comparison will reveal 
that the ongoing fear and contempt for hypnosis are comparable to the criticism of poetic 
discourse—that can be traced back to the “Ancient Quarrel” between the poet and philosopher40 
—and of the novelistic genre when it emerged in Modernity.  
To correct the misconceptions about hypnosis that still prevail to this day, two preliminary 
shifts are necessary. First, one must acknowledge the dramatic transformation that hypnotic theory 
and practice underwent during the twentieth century, from the traditional authoritarian methods of 
the nineteenth century to the emergence of indirect, permissive models of hypnotherapy after 
World War II. Then, one must uproot hypnosis from the usual contexts in which it is examined, 
such as musical hall stages, criminal courts, medical amphitheaters, mass hysteria cases, mob 
mentality, and propaganda speeches. In these settings, the purported pathological nature and 
moral-political dangers of hypnosis are dramatically overemphasized. However, when it is 
examined in relation to aesthetic creation and reception, the ubiquity of hypnosis—which also 
appears in the numerous absorptive and suggestive processes of ordinary psychological 
experience—and its therapeutic and ethical value, become apparent.  
 
i. Main Argument and Goals 
 
The central argument of this work is that hypnosis should be thought of as being, at heart, 
a form of storytelling; and conversely, that storytelling can be thought of being, at heart, hypnotic 
in nature.  
 
39 As historian Mark Micale argues, “it would be a mistake to exclude from historical consideration theories and 
practices that the medical sciences of our own day judge to be wrong, silly, unscientific.” Mark Micale, The Mind of 
Modernism: Medicine, Psychology, and the Cultural Arts in Europe and America, 1880-1940 (Stanford, California: 
Stanford University Press, 2004), 10. Indeed, many parapsychological fields of experimentation and inquiry 
“contributed mightily to the constitution of modern psychological medicine,” and hypnotic suggestion can and has 
serve[d] as a naturalizing explanation of these otherwise seemingly supernatural phenomena. Ibid., 11. However, 
because of its historical association with the occult and spiritualism hypnosis still often fails to qualify as a “serious” 
object of study in the aesthetic field, as well as in mainstream therapeutic practice. This study helps to further 
contribute to its naturalization and legitimization in both of these fields.   
40 See Plato, Republic, 607b5–6. For a discussion of the relation between poetry, philosophy and technè, see Susan, 
B. Levin, The Ancient Quarrel between Philosophy and Poetry Revisited: Plato and the Greek Literary Tradition 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 127-150. See also Patrick Hayes and Jan Wilm, eds., Beyond the Ancient 
Quarrel: Literature, Philosophy, and J.M. Coetzee (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017). 
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My aim in this thesis is thus to construct and test out an analogy between the hypnotic state 
and the act of reading fiction, and thereby, between the hypnotic and novelistic imagination. More 
specifically, my aim is to track the aesthetic concepts—such as fictionality, aesthetic illusion, 
narrativity, character, plot, perspective—at the heart of hypnosis, and to shed light on the 
continuous reemergence of hypnotic concepts—such as absorption, dissociation, suggestibility, 
and rapport—both in the history of medicine and psychoanalysis, and in literary theory. To do so, 
I will not limit my inquiry to explicitly thematized literary representations of hypnosis. Rather, I 
will uncover the various, structural, “hypnotic” processes at work in literary texts, and 
simultaneously, illuminate the various “literary” aspects that operate in hypnotic discourse. In 
other words, highlighting the hypnotic (suggestive, absorptive, and immersive) dimension of our 
modes of relating to aesthetic objects—and to novels in particular—will, in turn, reveal the 
aesthetic (active, imaginative, and narrative) dimension at the heart of hypnotic experiences.  
To construct my analogy, I will thus reconceptualize hypnosis in light of the aesthetic 
experience of reading, and redescribe the act of reading novelistic texts in light of this historical 
reimagining. By drawing out the analogy between hypnosis and reading, I hope to cast a new light 
on the relations between hypnotic subjects-suggestions-operators, and novelistic readers-texts-
narrators-authors, bringing to the foreground the suggestive and potentially transformative 
potential of fictional utterances, their ability to say, show and do something in the real world. By 
describing hypnosis as an aesthetic illusion, I aim to reconceptualize the “trickery” inherent to both 
hypnotic and aesthetic experience, underlining not only its inevitability, but also its value and 
benefits.  
While it does take into consideration the level of artistic creation and the discourse of the 
hypnotist and narrator, my study of the relation between hypnosis and aesthetics will focus heavily 
on the activity of the “recipient,” identifying the similarities between the capacities mobilized in 
the reader and the hypnotic subject.  My contention is that in both hypnosis and novel reading, an 
experience of aesthetic “recentering” occurs, where the recipient temporarily diverts their attention 
away from the immediate environment and becomes immersed in a fictional universe. The process 
of absorption and dissociation at the heart of the hypnotic experience and the temporary “willful 
suspension of disbelief” of fictional reception can thus be thought to be mutually illuminating.41  
 
41 See Coleridge’s use of the phrase in his account of the origin of the Lyrical Ballads in Chapter XIV of the Biographia 
Literaria: “In this idea originated the plan of the Lyrical ballads; in which it was agreed that my endeavours should 
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Rather than a mere state of gullibility or an absence of critical faculties, fictional-hypnotic 
suspensions of disbelief constitute forms of willful receptivity and active responsiveness. In both 
hypnosis and novelistic recentering, the subject is invited to imagine “what it is like being a 
different type of organizing centre within fields of experience that are different from those of which 
[we] have direct personal knowledge or acquaintance.”42 Because they modify the context of our 
experience and temporarily determine our intentionality or thought-content, in both hypnosis and 
novel reading, “‘I’ can be changed.”43 As I will argue, the forms of understanding which stem from 
this process of aesthetic-hypnotic recentering can be conceptualized as a kind of “unselfing,” 
which enables valuable transformations in the subject. The “loss of self” which occurs in reading 
and hypnosis should thus be rethought, as a potentially enriching form of self-discovery and self-
transformation, rather than mere dissolution or dispossession.   
From this preliminary formulation, two central stakes of this project can be drawn out. First 
of all, from a literary perspective, this study of hypnosis serves to excavate two ancient  problems: 
that of mimesis on the one hand,44 and of the “Ancient Quarrel” on the other.45 By 
reconceptualizing the suggestive nature of fictional-hypnotic utterances as potentially beneficial, 
my goal is to portray hypnosis as a “serious” and aesthetically significant activity.46 In this sense, 
myths about hypnotic passivity must be dispelled, just as eighteenth- and nineteenth-century 
concerns about novelistic corruption and the “irrationality” of the—often female—reader were.47 
 
be directed to persons and characters supernatural or at least romantic; yet so as to transfer from our inward nature a 
human interest and a semblance of truth sufficient to procure for these shadows of imagination that willing suspension 
of disbelief for the moment which constitutes poetic faith.” Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, ed. G. 
Sampson and A. Quiller-Couch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1920), 52. 
42 Ciarán Benson, The Absorbed Self. Pragmatism, Psychology and Aesthetic Experience (New York: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf, 1993), 162. 
43 Benson, The Absorbed Self, 162. 
44 Through the reexamining the question of immersion into fictional worlds and the aesthetic-realist illusion, this 
project reexamines the power of novelistic prose to create illusory experiences that produces “truths” through tricky 
or deception. By underlining the active dimension of hypnotic responsiveness, it argues against descriptions of 
hypnotic “mimetic” behavior as pure passivity. Furthermore, just as Aristotelian philosophy helped rehabilitate 
mimesis against Platonic conceptions of art, its reemergence in the context of contemporary discussion of hypnosis 
will help reveal the therapeutic-ethical value of hypnotic narratives and their role in the constitution of the good life 
in Chapter 4. 
45 Indeed, my goal is to show how, through their ability to “stir the passions,” literary and hypnotic discourse produce 
transformative, that is, valuable, rather than corruptive, effects on their recipients. 
46 Here, the term “serious” is used in the sense in which Searle speaks of fictional utterances. See John Searle, “The 
Logical Status of Fictional Discourse,” New Literary History 6 (1975): 321.  
47 See for example: “In the eighteenth century, the novel was not regarded as a respectable art-form, but in the first 
quarter of the nineteenth century … it became the classic literary expression of triumphant bourgeois society.” Martin 
Lyons, “New Readers in the Nineteenth Century: Women, Children, Workers,” in G. Cavallo and R. Chartier, eds., A 
History of Reading in the West (Amherst and London: University of Massachusetts Press, 1999), 314. 
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Secondly, a contemporary study of hypnosis will allow to reemphasize the value of the “non-
rational,” on both aesthetic and therapeutic levels. However, as we shall see, this neither involves 
reverting to the discourse of Romanticism, nor carrying out an apology of madness in the spirit of 
the Surrealists. Rather, it aims to underline the “sanity” and non-pathological dimension of 
hypnotic trance, the therapeutic value of manipulating unconscious mental processes and 
representations, and the cognitive value of our emotional responses. In the field of literary theory, 
moving beyond the “Ancient Quarrel” in this manner enables us to further reconcile the affective 
and cognitive dimensions of human understanding and aesthetic reception, such as reading fiction. 
From the perspective of the history and theory of psychotherapy, the reexamination of the 
therapeutic value of hypnosis further underlines the limits of biophysiological, positivist, neuro-
cognitivist, and reductively rationalist, paradigms. It brings to the fore the value of therapeutic 
models that use the potential of evocative, fictional, immersive and metaphorical discourse and 
storytelling, rather than analytic or cognitive insight, or psychiatric pharmacology. 
 
ii. Reading in Trance: The Hypnotic Dimension of Novelistic Reception 
 
This thesis comprises a comparative study of medical and fictional literature about 
hypnosis, from the early nineteenth century to the present day, in both anglophone and 
francophone contexts. It proposes close readings of literary texts and an intellectual history of 
hypnotism, working with the assumption that the art-science relation during the nineteenth century 
was “mutually originative and reciprocally enriching.”48 
As indicated previously, one of my goals is to offer a reconceptualization of hypnosis that 
can allow us to redescribe the act of reading novels. Rather than adhering to a formalist conception 
of the text in which the latter remains cut off from the world, this study emphasizes the connections 
between the text and the—empirical—reader. The perspective I adopt throughout thus considers 
the psychological and affective dimensions as central components of the reading process, and 
absorption and immersion as key factors in the phenomenon of aesthetic responsiveness.  
Furthermore, this project does not follow the methods of reading characteristic of the 
hermeneutics of suspicion. It does not propose a symptomatic mode of reading literature in which 
latent meaning and unconscious fantasy are excavated from beneath the surface of the text. Rather, 
 
48 Micale, The Mind of Modernism, 3. 
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by using the “hypnotic unconscious” as a starting point, it reveals the immersive, absorptive 
dimension at the heart of the artistic experience and examines what the text does to the reader, and 
conversely, what the reader does in receiving it, taking into consideration the psychological, 
affective, and unconscious dimension of readers’ responses. It takes seriously—and is sympathetic 
toward—reading for pleasure, naïve reading, and affective forms of reading. It thus extends the 
scope of “reding novels” beyond the technical competencies of professional or academic readers, 
which often involve forms of critical and affectless distance.49 In this sense, it strives to rehabilitate 
what was once pathologized, including the “reading trance” of the non-professional reader. It “lets 
stories breathe,” as Arthur Frank puts it, in order to better observe their impact on the actual world, 
and illuminate the aesthetic-psychology relation in a reparative manner.50  
From a methodological point of view, my analogy between hypnosis and novelistic reading 
also draws on several literary theoretical and critical traditions, which are interwoven throughout 
the following chapters. These traditions yield rich concepts that illuminate various aspects of the 
hypnotic-novelistic imagination. First of all, reader-response theory, as well as pragmatist and 
phenomenological aesthetics, which shift the emphasis from the written text to the role of the 
reader, enables us to rethink the role of the hypnotic subject as the interpretative, “realizing” and 
creative consciousness who, like the reader, actualizes and concretizes the operator’s hypnotic 
utterances or “text.” As John Dewey puts it, in the aesthetic realm, “to perceive, a beholder must 
create his own experience,” a claim that applies to hypnosis and novel reading alike.51 Without the 
subject’s active performance—her “filling in the gaps” or realizations (konkretisiert) of the 
hypnotic-novelistic work—there would be no “work” at all.52  
As Wolfgang Iser shows, just as “the stars in a literary text are fixed; the lines that join 
them are variable.”53 As I will argue, hypnosis functions in a similar way: without the subject’s 
interpretative and performative acts, without the process by which she “actualizes the virtual 
dimension” of the suggestions, hypnosis would be a mere failure in communication, or a collection 
 
49 Of course, all academic reading is not incompatible with emotional responsiveness to texts. 
50 Arthur Frank, Letting Stories Breathe. A Socio-Narratology (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 
2010). See also Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, “Paranoid Reading and Reparative Reading,” in Touching Feeling: Affect, 
Pedagogy, Performativity (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003); Stephen Best and Sharon Marcus, “Surface 
Reading: An Introduction,” Representations 108, no. 1, (2009): 1–21. 
51 John Dewey, Art as Experience, (New-York: Minton, Balch and Co), 54. 
52 See Roman Ingarden, Vom Erkennen des literarisehen Kunstwerks (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1968), 49. 
53 Wolfgang Iser, “The Reading Process, a Phenomenological Approach,” in Reader-Response Criticism: From 
Formalism to poststructuralism, ed. Jane P. Tomkins (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University press, 1989), 297. 
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of false or failed descriptive or declarative utterances.54 Like reading, which can be defined as the 
interaction between two consciousnesses that makes the book “exist outside itself,” the co-creative 
hypnotic relation, the intersection between the mind of the subject and of the operator, creates the 
hypnotic phenomena.55 Indeed, hypnotic effects emerge out of collaboration, not coercion.  
Furthermore, as Ingarden has shown, the fictional world is a “purely intentional correlative 
of a complex of sentences,” the sum of which is “the world presented in the work.”56 Like 
literature, hypnosis can also be thought of as creating a world extending beyond the perceived 
sentences, created out of “intentional sentence correlatives” (intentioinale Satzkorrelate).57 
Conversely, like hypnosis, reading fiction involves turning the attention away from our ordinary 
lives and adopting a different mode of attention than that which operates in our everyday relation 
to the natural world. In this sense, phenomenological literary criticism can help illuminate how the 
temporary suspensions of disbelief involved in hypnotic and literary immersion are comparable to 
a specific kind of epochē or bracketing of the natural attitude.58  
Because hypnotic discourse is often considered as a form of influence that stems from a 
specifically “hypnotic” use of language, in this thesis, I will also draw on the conceptual 
framework of Speech Act theory. By reconceptualizing hypnotic suggestions in light of the 
illocutionary and perlocutionary force of the operator’s utterances, my aim is to show that hypnotic 
power should not be located in the person of the hypnotist. By using Speech Act theory to describe 
hypnotic suggestions, I will show that hypnotists do not manipulate individuals, but simply use 
words, whose hypnotic “power” stems from the context in which they are uttered, and the way in 
which they are—actively—received and interpreted by the listener, rather than from the intention 
of the speaker. Indeed, the felicity of hypnotic utterances greatly depends on the imaginative and 
interpretive capacities of the recipient, which underlines the active role of the hypnotic subject.  
As I will show, hypnotic utterances share similarities with fictional discourse, as both tend to 
violate ordinary speech conditions and share a comparable, “serious-nonserious,” ontological 
status.  
 
54 Iser, “The Reading Process,” 279. 
55 Georges Poulet, “The Phenomenology of Reading,” New Literary History 1, No. 1 (October 1969): 54. 
56 Ibid., 29.  
57 Ingarden, Vom Erkennen des literarisehen Kunstwerks, 29. 




Finally, in this dissertation, I will also use narrative ethics and post-Wittgensteinian moral 
philosophy and literary criticism, in conversation with narrative psychiatry and psychotherapy,  to 
underline the therapeutic and ethical value of fictional narration, in terms that elucidate the 
transformative potential of hypnotic and novelistic “restorying.” By bringing hypnosis and the 
novel together under a common “narrative” umbrella, I will show the ethical value of hypnotic-
novelistic narratives lies in the subject’s engagement with fictional stories, and the modes of 
attending that stem from it. Drawing on authors such as Iris Murdoch, Cora Diamond, and Martha 
Nussbaum, I hope to illuminate the ethical-therapeutic value of hypnosis (in its divergence with 
cognitive therapeutic models) in the same way that they underline the moral value of the novel (as 
opposed to the philosophical essay). 
 
iii. Conceptual Map: A Few Definitions 
 
Hypnosis. 
The Oxford Handbook of Hypnosis notes that there are two distinct elements in a hypnotic 
situation: “hypnosis-as-product” and “hypnosis-as-procedure.”59 The first term refers to the “state” 
of hypnotic trance, to the alteration or modification of the subject’s state of consciousness, which 
can either be induced or appear spontaneously.60 The ancestors of hypnosis in this first sense are 
the theories of “somnambulism” developed in the nineteenth century, as well as the works 
produced during the “magnetic crisis” of the late eighteenth century in Europe.61  However, special 
attention must be accorded as well to the various trance rituals found in “primitive” or “shamanic” 
societies and religious mysticism.62 As Brian Inglis notes in Trance: a Natural History of Altered 
States of Mind, the extreme variation in quality, duration and characteristics of trance states as well 
as the historical and cultural specificities of their different manifestations and contexts complicates 
the production of a unified definition.63 Furthermore, some theorists of hypnosis consider the very 
 
59 Amanda J. Barnier and Michael R. Nash, “Introduction,” in The Oxford Handbook of Hypnosis: Theory, Research 
and Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 6. 
60 As we shall see in Chapter 1, the very existence of such a “state” is still object of theoretical debates. 
61 See: Robert Darnton, Mesmerism and the End of the Enlightenment in France (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1968). 
62 For example, David Dupuis has shown the impact of “suggestion” on the nature and content of hallucinated material 
in the context of ayahuasca trance ceremonies in South America. See David Dupuis, “Apprendre à voir l’invisible. 
Pédagogie visionnaire et socialisation des hallucinations dans un centre chamanique d’Amazonie péruvienne,” 
Cahiers d'Anthropologie Sociale 17 (2019): 20-42. 
63 Brian Inglis, Trance: a Natural History of Altered States of Mind (London: Grafton, 1989). 
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concepts of “trance states” or “depth of trance” as problematic, since “no stable physiological 
marker has been found that will reliably identify the ‘trance state’ and its putative ‘depth’ across 
different conditions of responding to suggestion.”64 Trance states are the product of verbal or 
nonverbal—musical, rhythmical, physiologically or chemically induced—suggestions, which 
explains the classic definition of hypnosis as a verbally created state of modified consciousness or 
absorption of the attention, leading to the production of various hypnotic phenomena. Whereas it 
remained considered as a pathological state for much of the nineteenth century, it is now agreed 
upon that hypnosis is a natural but induced psychological state.  
The Oxford Handbook states that “we now think of hypnotizability as a cognitive skill, and 
we generally think of skills as things that can be acquired, refined and perfected through 
experience.”65 Just as the history of psychiatry can be considered as the branch of the medical 
sciences most “marked by the phenomenon of rising and falling diseases,” the evolution of 
hypnotic trance phenomena reveals their historical and cultural malleability.66 The definition of 
the hypnotic trance state as the product of suggestion reveals the ebb and flow, the rise and fall in 
intensity of the fears and expectations that fluctuate throughout history and delineate, via hypnosis, 
the limits of the sane, the normal or the rational.67 By using hypnosis to trace the contours of “self-
possession” and, ultimately, “sanity,” they shield the latter from their feared Others—the 
pathological, the absent, the irrational, loss of self, and dispossession.68  
 
64 Michael Heap, Richard Brown and David Oakley, “High Hypnotizability,” in The Highly Hypnotizable Person. 
Theoretical, experimental and clinical issues (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), 11. 
65 John F. Kihlstrom, “The Domain of Hypnosis, Revisited,” in The Oxford Handbook of Hypnosis, ed. Barnier and 
Nash (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 30. 
66 After the nineteenth century, “the decline of hysterical conversion reactions within industrialized and Westernized 
populations has been accompanied by a rise in depressive and narcissistic disorders.” Micale, “On the ‘Disappearance’ 
of Hysteria. A Study in the Clinical Deconstruction of a Diagnosis.” Isis 84, no. 3 (September 1993): 500. 
67 For some historians, the impact of suggestion also has a crucial part to play in the constitution of mental illness and 
the diagnoses which describe and shape them. “Too little emphasis has been given … to the process of nosological 
shift and nosographical drift as forces in the history of psychiatry and particularly as factors explaining the recurrent 
phenomenon of rising and falling nervous disorders.” Micale, “On the ‘Disappearance’ of Hysteria,” 524. In particular, 
the diagnosis of hysteria, as French psychiatrist Henri Ey has observed, is “the prototype of a nosographical concept 
(ailment, syndrome, or symptom) that is undermined in turns by inflation or an equally excessive restriction” Ey, 
“Introduction a étude actuelle de l’hystérie (historique et analyse du concept)," Rev. Prat. 14 (1964):1417. 
68 As Freud writes, “The loss of consciousness, the ‘absence’, in a hysterical attack is derived from the fleeting but 
unmistakable lapse of consciousness which is observable at the climax of every intense sexual satisfaction, including 
auto-erotic ones. ... The so-called ‘hypnoid states’—absences during day-dreaming—, which are so common in 
hysterical subjects, show the same origin.” Sigmund Freud, “Notes upon a Case of Obsessional Neurosis,” (1909), in 
SE, 10:233, our italics. See also the relation between madness and the concept of pharmakon, in Jacques Derrida, 
“Cogito and the History of Madness," 1963, in Writing and Difference, translated by Alan Bass, (London and New 
York: Routledge, 1978), 36-76.  
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As I will argue, behind these fears lays the activity and creative inventive capacities 
inherent to modified states of consciousness, which are overshadowed by fears that exclude it from 
the domain of cognition and of the “serious.” It is for this reason that François Roustang, in his 
seminal work Qu’est-ce que l’hypnose?, describes hypnosis as a “paradoxical waking state” (veille 
paradoxale), in order to emphasize the dynamic, active creativity of the hypnotic subject and to 
distinguish the hypnotic state from the state—and lexical field—of sleep.69 Roustang’s theory of 
hypnosis aims to emphasize the depth and potentiality for self-knowledge and self-transformation 
inherent in hypnotic states, in contrast to the narrow scope and capacities of ordinary “waking” 
consciousness. By rehabilitating the creativity at the foundation of hypnotic trance states, the 
boundaries between the serious and the non-serious, thought and non-thought, are forced to shift, 
so that the non-rational and non-conscious can count as forms of thinking, albeit affective, 
metaphorical, or irreducibly non-propositional.70 
In its second sense, “hypnosis as procedure”—sometimes called hypnotism—refers to the 
technè or practice by which the state of hypnosis is formally induced by an operator, either in the 
context of entertainment or in the therapeutic setting. This second meaning designates the formal 
or artificial recreation of the state evoked in the first. Nevertheless, a formal induction is neither 
therapeutically essential, nor necessary for the creation of hypnotic phenomena. Indeed, hypnosis 
can be carried out covertly or spontaneously without a ritualized procedure or explicit mention of 
its induction. As I will show in Chapter 1, the formal and technical aspects of “hypnosis as 
procedure” underwent a dramatic shift after the birth of psychoanalysis, moving from old 
authoritative models based on direct suggestion and inherited from eighteenth- and nineteenth-
century magnetism, to the more indirect, permissive and poetic techniques that appeared during 
the mid-twentieth century.71  
 
69 François Roustang, Qu’est-ce que l’hypnose? (Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1994), 18. 
70 Cognitivist theories of hypnosis, although they eschew the question of the artistic creativity of the hypnotic subject, 
emphasize the cognitive dimensions of the mental operations occurring during hypnotic trance: “Even the ideomotor 
phenomena of hypnosis are cognitive in nature, because the motor behaviors follow from suggestions for perceptual 
change. …The behavioral responses by which we measure hypnotizability follow from suggestion-induced changes 
in perception and memory.” John F. Kihlstrom, “The Domain of Hypnosis Revisited,” in The Oxford Handbook of 
Hypnosis: Theory, Research and Practice, ed. M. Nash and A. Barnier (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 28. 
71 A typical modern hypnotherapy session is structured in three parts: a clinical assessment, the (optional) formal 
induction of a state of hypnosis, and the “therapeutic work” carried out either by suggestive methods for general 
symptom removal, or in the case of more in-depth, psychodynamic uses of hypnosis, by working through primary 
process material which emerges during the hypnotic trance. 
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That said, two contemporary definitions of hypnosis deserve mention for their clarity. First 
of all, John F. Kihlstrom defines the term as:  
A process in which one person, designated the hypnotist, offers suggestions to another person, designated the 
subject, for imaginative experiences entailing alterations in perception, memory and action. In the classic 
case, these experiences are associated with a degree of subjective conviction bordering on delusion, and an 
experienced involuntariness bordering on compulsion. As such, the phenomena of hypnosis reflect alterations 
in consciousness that take place in the context of a social interaction.72 
 
Second, Herbert and David Spiegel define hypnotic trance as:  
 
A psychophysiological state of aroused, attentive, receptive focal concentration with a corresponding 
diminution in peripheral awareness [in which] an individual enters a state of sustained, attentive, receptive 
concentration, in response to either an inner signal or a signal from another person, that activates this capacity 
for a shift of awareness and permits more intensive concentration in a designated direction. … Formal 
hypnosis differs from spontaneous trance in that it is contextually an interpersonal mode of communication. 
The subject maintains a sensitive, attentive responsiveness to an operator during the trance state. Technically, 
the authentic hypnotic experience can be defined as formal hypnosis only when it is knowingly induced by 
the operator; responded to by the subject in a sensitive, disciplined way; and terminated by the operator’s 
signal. … In reality, all hypnosis is a form of self-hypnosis.73 
 
Both of these definitions underline the conventionality of the hypnotic contract. Occurring in this 
specific context of a communicative and thus social relation or rapport, the hypnotic state can be 
defined as a change in subjective experience, which creates alterations in perception, sensation, 
emotion, thought, belief and/or behavior, both caused and measured by the subject’s responses to 
given verbal—and/or nonverbal—suggestions, but which can only be made possible due to the 
preexisting context and implicit agreement between operator and subject. These are implicitly 
defined as roles, and, in principle, reversible positions. 
Finally, in this thesis, a third, much more extensive sense of the term “hypnosis” will be 
frequently mobilized, to refer to the suggestive, mimetic, absorptive or affectively “contagious” 
phenomena underlying all intersubjective relations—especially in the therapeutic context—as well 
as aesthetic reception.  
 
 
72 Kihlstrom, “The domain of hypnosis revisited,” 21. This definition served as a starting point for the ‘consensus’ 
definition of hypnosis crafted by the American Psychological Association’s Division 30, the Society for Psychological 
Hypnosis, in 1993.   
73 Herbert Spiegel and David Spiegel, Trance and Treatment. Clinical Uses of Hypnosis, 2nd ed. (Washington D.C. 
and London: American Psychiatric Publishing, 2004), 35. As Spiegel and Spiegel explain, the capacity for this state 
varies among individuals and is relatively fixed throughout the adult life cycle. It can be invoked in three ways: 
spontaneously, in response to a signal from another person (formal hypnosis), and in response to a self-induced signal 
(self-hypnosis). Furthermore, a spontaneous trance can be either internally aroused (e.g., daydreaming, fugue state…) 
or instigated by external cues (e.g., fear, seduction, intense concentration). 
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Contemporary Theories of Hypnosis. 
Although I will focus primarily on its therapeutic dimension in this thesis, most 
contemporary research on hypnosis concerns the experimental observation of hypnosis based on 
standard hypnotizability scales, and constructed with predetermined scripts or protocols in the 
laboratory setting. These attempts to measure and provide reproducible conditions for the hypnotic 
experience—which can be traced back to the end of the eighteenth century—are strongly opposed 
to the way in which hypnotherapy is practiced today. Whereas the former strives to identify 
objectively observable criteria and “states,” the latter is based on flexible, or relatively atheoretical, 
frameworks which emphasize the specificity of individual cases, adapting its induction methods 
to each unique subject. Although they are not the primary concern of the practitioner (who focuses 
on the effects rather than the causes of hypnotic phenomena), the main theoretical models of 
hypnosis must be mentioned here, as they shed light on the tension which still plagues it to this 
day.  
These explanatory tendencies, which are still in competition, can be distinguished into 
three broad models: the cognitive, social, and psychoanalytic explanations of hypnotic phenomena. 
These three categories can also be grouped into two opposing conceptions of hypnosis, which are 
often referred to as the “state” vs. “non-state” models.74 Although it is not my purpose to resolve 
the tensions between these competing models of hypnotic phenomena, in this thesis, I will be 
mainly adopting social-psychological and psychoanalytic perspectives, rather than a purely 
cognitivist approach. Indeed, as I will show in Chapter 1 and as the Nancy school already 
demonstrated during the fin-de-siècle heyday of hypnotism, the contextual and individual 
variations in hypnotic phenomena, the tremendous divergence in results that stem from different 
manners of suggesting and from the experimental context, pose significant challenges to purely 




74 In this case, the psychoanalytic model becomes grouped into the “state” category. For a detailed account of these 
three theories, see Chapter 1.  
75 Similarly, as Spanos has shown, against the cognitivists, all hypnotic phenomena vary “according to the context and 
the formulation of the suggestions and thus reveal how the subject interprets the experimenter’s expectations.” Léon 
Chertock and Isabelle Stengers, A Critique of Psychoanalytic Reason: Hypnosis as a Scientific Problem from Lavoisier 
to Lacan, trans. Martha Noel Evans (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992), 247. 
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The hypnotic unconscious—both pre- and post-Freudian—needs to be distinguished from 
other psychoanalytic theories of the unconscious, especially the Freudian topographical model and 
the Lacanian conception of the unconscious as structured by language.76 Despite the diversity of 
the theoretical models which have attempted to describe it since the nineteenth-century, the 
specificity of the hypnotic unconscious is that it is based not on repression but on automatism.77 
One of the commonly agreed upon criteria for a response to qualify as hypnotic is that it is 
experienced by the subject as occurring automatically, without the intervention of conscious 
volition or deliberate decision.78 As Kihlstrom points out in the Oxford Handbook of Hypnosis, 
Hypnotic experiences take place in imagination, but they do not have the same experiential qualities as 
ordinary mental imagery. Mental images are deliberately, consciously constructed, while hypnotic 
experiences are generally accompanied by an experience of involuntariness. It is this experience of 
involuntariness, not the vividness of mental images, that gives hypnotic experiences their hallucinatory 
quality.79  
 
Although during the nineteenth century, the hypnotic unconscious was strongly linked to the 
phenomenon of dissociation, in modern practices influenced by recent findings in neuroscience as 
well as social and cognitive psychology, it is thought to encompass all of the information which 
habitually lies outside of conscious awareness—whether perceptual, physiological, emotional, 
fantasized, mnemonic, etc.80 It can be considered as synonymous with the “non-conscious,” rather 
 
76 The hypnotic unconscious is not merely constituted of repressed mental representations or linguistic significations, 
but also includes the somatic, physiological dimension with which the unconscious can speak with—or through—the 
body not merely through “symptoms,” but in carefully controlled, induced manners. This can be seen in the induction 
of ideomotor phenomena, which are the artificial but non-pathological equivalent of the psychoanalytic “symptoms,” 
that also speaks with and through the patient’s body. 
77 A notion which received its deepest early theoretical treatment in the work of Pierre Janet, but as we shall see in 
chapter 1, can be traced further back in the history of medicine. See Pierre Janet, L’Automatisme Psychologique: Essai 
de psychologie experimentale sur les formes inférieures de l’activité humaine (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1889).  
78 A “successful” response to hypnotic suggestions is experienced by the subject as having “a quality of involuntariness 
or effortlessness.” Heap et al, 2001, 3. The term “experienced” here is crucial: what matters is that the subject believes 
that the phenomenon is occurring independently from their own volition, not that it actually is. 
79 Kihlstrom, 28. In recent years, “the theoretical battleground in hypnosis has shifted, from explaining response to 
hypnotic suggestions in general, and debating the mechanisms of various hypnotic suggestions in particular, to 
accounting for subjects’ experience of involuntariness in response to hypnotic suggestions.” Kihlstrom, 35. 
80 Beginning in the 1970s, cognitive psychologists began to elaborate a technical concept of automaticity grounded in 
the framework of information processing and “limited-capacity models of attention.” See for example D. LaBerge and 
S. J. Samuels, “Toward a theory of automatic information processing in reading,” Cognitive Psychology 6 (1974): 
293–323; M. I. Posner and C. R. Snyder, “Attention and cognitive control,” in Information Processing and Cognition: 
The Loyola Symposium, ed. R. L. Solso (New York: Wiley, 1975), 55–85. In this framework, automatic processes are 
“involuntary in the same way that reflexes and instincts are involuntary.” Kihlstrom, 35. With the work of Bateson et. 
al. and the emergence of neuroscientific and non-psychoanalytic explanations of unconscious mental phenomena, the 
hypnotic unconscious is also often conceptualized in terms of mental “processing”—“computing” in this sense 
becomes a contemporary version of the automatism already theorized by Janet. Significantly, in contemporary 
paradigms and unlike what was found in fin-de-siècle conceptions of the hypnotic unconscious as inferior and 
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than the repressed. On the other hand, dynamic and psychoanalytically oriented theories of 
hypnosis consider the hypnotic unconscious as constituted of primary mental processes—as a 
reservoir of memories and symbolic or metaphorical representations, associations, fantasies and 
complexes that can be utilized or worked through in the therapeutic context after the induction of 
a hypnotic trance. Theoretical models inspired by the work of psychiatrist Milton Erickson also 
consider the unconscious as a source of skills, resources and learning capacities to be worked 
with—rather than through or against—as an interlocutor or an ally.81 In the therapeutic setting, the 
induction of a hypnotic state is considered as a means to access unconscious material and bring it 
into awareness for it to be worked through, regardless of the ontological status attributed to the 
material in question.  
In the context of the hypnotic interaction, the term designates the instructions given by the 
operator to the subject, either by command or by indirect, permissive evocation, of a desired 
physical, emotional or mental state—such as catalepsy or numbness, negative or positive 
hallucinations,82 paralysis or movement, amnesia or remembering, analgesia or hypersthesia, etc.83 
Bernheim’s classic account defines suggestion as “an idea transformed into an action.”84A study 
of contemporary hypnosis reveals that the phenomena which used to be considered in the 
 
automatic, the hypnotic unconscious today is not opposed to cognitive operations, even if these are considered as 
“lower” capacities.  
81 Traditionally, hypnotherapists use a wide array of metaphorical and technical means to “communicate” with the 
unconscious, spanning from symbolic material (images, etc.) to physiological reactions of the body (ideomotor 
phenomena). Many practitioners use the speech and narration of the patient, who is not asleep and retains full use of 
their linguistic abilities during the hypnotherapy session. 
82 A list of common suggestions used today are ideomotor suggestions, which induce movement of body parts such as 
the twitching of a finger, arm levitations etc.), ideosensory suggestions (inducing sensations of coldness, warmth, 
numbness, etc.), inhibition of movement (also referred to as “challenge suggestions” in the experimental literature) 
such as paralysis or catalepsy, hallucinations (visual, auditory, kinesthetic, olfactory or even gustatory). “Negative” 
hallucinations refer to the subject being unable to perceive an existing, perceptible object, while “positive” 
hallucination involve the experience of an object which is absent and imperceptible to exterior observers. Simple 
suggestions can be combined to create more complex phenomena such as amnesia (post-hypnotic or not), time 
distortion, regression or futurization, as explored in Chapter 4.  I don’t think this is essential information here, if you’re 
going to talk about it in chapter 4.  I’m sure you define all of this there 
83 A suggestion can be given consciously or unconsciously, intentionally or unintentionally, but also verbally or 
nonverbally. Suggestions given by another are sometimes called “heterosuggestions,” as opposed to the 
autosuggestions which the subject can give to himself. Autosuggestion is conceived in some models as the foundation 
of all hypnotic phenomena, in which case “all suggestions are auto-suggestions.” See Émile Coué, Self Mastery by 
Conscious Autosuggestion (New York: American Library Service, 1922). In the medical literature of the nineteenth 
century, the term “suggestion” customarily refers to the already executed suggestion, that is, to the successful response 
or performance by the subject, in addition to the utterance of the operator. These various senses can lead to subsequent 
confusions regarding the use of terms such as “suggestive” in the literature.  
84 Hippolyte Bernheim, Suggestive Therapeutics, A Treatise on the Nature and Uses of Hypnotism, trans. Christian 
Herter. (1889; New York: London Book Company, 1947), 138. 
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nineteenth-century models as pathological and constitutive of the hypnotic state, such as 
posthypnotic amnesia, hallucination or dissociation, were merely induced, that is, suggested by 
hypnotic discourse. What was thought of as being merely observed, was in fact created. What was 
pathologized has now become legitimized as natural and psychological. “Symptoms” such as the 
protolanguage of hysteria and its conversion symptoms, can now considered as mere hypnotic 
phenomena, produced by the active performance of a subject who, consciously or not, carries out 
“serious” games of make-believe and proves to be highly skilled in exercising imaginative and 
creative capacities.85 Due to a ubiquity of suggestion in the extensive sense, hypnosis can therefore 
be thought of as a magnifying mirror, which reveals the underlying, suggestive, nature of human 
interaction, including in the experimental setting: “What Bernheim and Delboeuf observed in the 
enlarging mirror of hypnosis and hysteria is a looping [magnifying] effect that can be observed in 
any experimental or clinical situation, no matter how controlled it may be.”86 In experimental 
settings, the subject’s responses to hypnotic suggestions are measured by various standardized 
hypnotizability scales, which often propose an hypnotic induction followed by a list of increasingly 
“challenging” suggested phenomena to be accomplished by the subject.87 However, as Léon 
Chertock and Isabelle Stengers have demonstrated, unlike behavioral psychology, whose objects 
must be directly and methodically observable and measured, when it comes to hypnosis, the whole 
experimental protocol is based on the suggestive nature of the hypnotic relation between subject 
and operator, thereby revealing not only the impossibility of neutral observation but also the 
irreducible suggestive core at the heart of the experimental relation.88  
 
85 For example, post-hypnotic amnesia can be induced, often by diverting the attention away from previous content. 
Similarly, dissociation is created by alternating and describing contrasting aspects of two different points of view or 
by focusing the attention of a “reality” (imagined or perceived) which diverts away from the present or immediate 
surroundings. What was once considered as pathological can thus be rehabilitated as natural and psychological. Rather 
than signs of weakness, disfunction or pathology, they reveal sensitive and strong—but subtle—aesthetic and 
imaginative capacities in the subject. 
86 Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen, Making Minds and Madness, From Hysteria to Depression (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), 120.  
87 See R. E. Shor and E. C. Orne, Harvard Group Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility (Palo Alto, CA: Consulting 
Psychologists Press, 1962); A. M. Weitzenhoffer and E. R. Hilgard, Stanford Hypnotic Susceptibility Scale, Forms A 
and B (Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press, 1959). 
88 “How is one, then, to measure a behavior ‘objectively’ if the very context in which the behavior is obtained … 
contributes to determining it? We see here the problem of the artifact, classic in all experimental science, is 
‘dramatically’ illuminated by hypnosis. … How can the experimenter objective the fact that he himself is integrated 
in the experiment in an essentially subjective mode? … Experimental reason discovers that the ‘heart’ [coeur] which 
it wished to objectify, is the very condition of this objectification.” Chertock and Stengers, 240. 
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  In a broad sense, suggestions can also be thought to be omnipresent in ordinary life, as any 
phenomenon which influences a subject.89 When we speak of the “suggestive” dimension of a text 
or work of art, we refer to its ability to affectively or cognitively impact the recipient. The 
suggestive dimension of literature thus concerns both its persuasive dimension—its cognitive 
content, the propositional knowledge which might be inferred from it—and its mimetic, affectively 
“contagious” dimension—its conscious or non-conscious emotional impact on the reader. When 
considered in aesthetic terms—especially within the framework of literary theories that take into 
consideration the experience of the subject, such as reader-response theory or phenomenology—
it becomes apparent that hypnotic suggestions function in similar ways as literary texts. Indeed, as 
Stanley Fish has argued, a literary text or utterance is “not an object, a thing-in-itself, but 
something that happens to, and with the participation of the reader.”90 
 
Dissociation 
Crucial for our purposes is the conception of hypnotic dissociation which emerges from 
the modern conception of suggestion. Rather than the key pathological symptom demonstrated by 
hysterical subjects and patients suffering from dissociative or multiple personality disorders,91 
hypnotic dissociation can be reconceptualized as an induced phenomenon. It can also be conceived 
as encompassing the non-pathological, dynamic process of temporary (re)directing the subject’s 
mobile attention away from immediate surroundings and towards a given object. Dissociation does 
not necessarily always involve a pathological splitting of the subject. It is merely the mirror 
opposite of absorption:92 becoming immersed in x involves turning away from y. In this sense, 
association and dissociation can be considered as natural psychological phenomena which both 
pertain to the functioning of ordinary consciousness and vary as a function of the object of 
 
89 “Suggestibility” is the ability to be influenced by a suggestion, regardless of the state of consciousness of the subject. 
“While hypnosis may enhance suggestibility, at the very least it is clear that suggestibility is something that also occurs 
in the normal waking state.” Kihlstrom, 38. Suggestibility is distinct from hypnotizability or hypnotic “susceptibility,” 
which adds the trance state component to suggestibility. As Bernheim and Janet have shown and we explore in Chapter 
1, suggestibility can occur without trance, and conversely, the trance state can exist without suggestibility. See 
Bernheim, Suggestive Therapeutics, 78. 
90 Stanley Fish, “Literature in the Reader, Affective Stylistics,” New Literary History 2, no. 1 (Autumn 1970): 125. 
91 Indeed, it is important to distinguish between dissociation induced by hypnotic suggestion and preexisting 
dissociative disorders. See François Roustang, “Se dissocier : mais comment faire autrement?,” Hypnose et thérapies 
brèves 7 (2007): 28-39. 
92 This is why this thesis does not focus extensively on the concept of hypnotic dissociation. Rather, it is centered on 
the notion of absorption which will be defined further on and contributes to the de-pathologizing of the hypnotic state. 
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attention. Depending on the way by which it is induced, hypnotic dissociation can be temporal, 
spatial, proprioceptive, between various body parts, aspects of the personality, and so on. The 
suspension of disbelief occurring in reading novels, for instance, involves dissociation away from 
the immediate surroundings of the reader, and association toward the fictional world. Attention 
can become fully immersed or move back and forth between both without losing its ability to 
distinguish between the real and imaginary worlds.  
 
Absorption 
As stated above, absorption—rather than dissociation—is the central concept used in this 
thesis to bridge the gap between the medical-therapeutic uses of hypnosis and its aesthetic aspects. 
Like “hypnosis” and “dissociation,” the term has two senses which often become conflated and 
must be distinguished. First, it carries a nineteenth-century, pathologizing sense—as seen in 
representations of the daydreamer or monoideism—as well as a modern, naturalizing conception: 
we become absorbed regularly in various objects, both ordinary and aesthetic.  
In my analysis of hypnotic and aesthetic absorption, I am greatly indebted to Ciarán 
Benson’s concept of aesthetic “re-centering,” developed in The Absorbed Self,93 which defines 
aesthetic absorption as a dynamic process during which the self becomes other—without 
completely losing itself94—by temporarily immersing in its object of attention. According to 
Benson, “if there are different types of experiential field, and if there are different ways for self to 
be centered within such fields,” aesthetic absorption is best understood, not as a simple obliteration 
of self or blind passivity, but as a “transition/transformation of one form of centeredness into 
another.”95 Like hypnosis, aesthetic experiences such as novel reading “alter the context of I” and 
invite it to “temporarily occupy” other points of view, which brings about aesthetic re-centering. 
 
93 Situating himself in the lineage of Richard Wollheim’s attempt to “repsychologize” the theory of art, Benson’s aim 
is to propose a psychology of aesthetic absorption informed by pragmatist aesthetics—namely those of Dewey, Pierce, 
and James—, social constructivism, and developmental psychology. Benson’s highly valuable analysis is based on a 
constructivist, non-referential theory of the self. In this framework, “I” can be defined as a succession of changing 
plural points of view. As Benson notes, points of view—which are always limited and perspectival—are inherently 
relational, “always on or about something … constituted and sustained by interaction with the world … labile and 
mobile.” Benson, 122. In this sense, no single abiding point of view can be said to exist. In this context, selfhood is 
constituted in relation to what is other than oneself, throughout the plurality of its points of view and objects. 
94 Indeed, during aesthetic absorption, there continues to be a “residual awareness” of myself as a spectator, listener 
or reader, “an awareness which is a central logical requirement for its being esthetic.” Benson, 97. As we shall see in 
Chapter 3, without this implicit awareness of myself as observing, the distance necessary for aesthetic experience 
would not be possible.  
95 Benson, The Absorbed Self, xi. 
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Benson’s account, in which aesthetic experiences “can be occasions for self-transcendence and 
therefore self-change” is valuable because it makes space for the ethical value of aesthetic 
absorption, which will occupy us in Chapter 4.96 
 
Mimesis 
The term “mimesis” will be used in two senses: aesthetic and hypnotic. While the former 
designates a notion of representation which can be traced back to antiquity and the distinction 
between mimesis and diegesis, the latter refers to the specifically hypnotic dimension underlined 
by historians of medicine, which originates with—and reinforces—a conception of the hypnotic 
subject as absent to him or herself, as a passive automaton.97 It refers to the “blind” suggestibility 
of the hypnotic-hysteric subjects who imitate or reproduce symptoms and relive or mime 
pathogenic scenes—rather than remembering or narrating traumatic events as past. As I will argue, 
such mimetic conceptions of the hypnotic subject places them either in the category of the non-
subject, or of the actor, trickster, and simulator. In this dissertation, it is my purpose to nuance such 
conceptions and underline on the contrary the strong aesthetic—and active—capabilities required 
to produce hypnotic phenomena, which are irreducible to pure imitation, illusion or deception, and 




Finally, as indicated by the main title, in this work, I intend on underlining the similarities 
between hypnosis and the novel by focusing on the notion of imagination. The imaginative faculty 
in question can be either that of the creator (the author, text, operator or suggestion), or of the 
recipient (the reader or hypnotic subject). Although the former comes into play in my analysis, I 
 
96 Benson, 121. 
97 See Ruth Leys, Trauma, a Genealogy (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press 2000); Mikkel Borch-
Jacobsen, The Freudian Subject (Stanford: Sandford University Press, 1988) and The Emotional Tie: Psychoanalysis, 
Mimesis, and Affect (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992); Nidesh Lawtoo, The Phantom of the Ego (East 
Lansing, Michigan: Michigan State University Press, 2013). 
98 See for instance Borch-Jacobsen: “Repeating in statu nascendi … is manifestly not remembering; it is not narrating, 
re-presenting a past event as past; it is … reliving the event with the intensity of the first time, by repeating it in the 
present.” As they relived or “mimed” the pathogenic scenes in the cathartic treatment, “hysterics did not remember 
anything, did not narrate anything: they relived and acted out roles, and this not on the mode of phantasmatic 
representation (Vorstellung) but on that of acting out (Agieren). … They mimed affects, body and soul,” but Borch-
Jacobsen, Le Lien Affectif (Paris: Aubier, 1991), 75-76, our translation. 
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will focus principally on the latter, that is, on the novel reader and hypnotic subject’s similar 
activity of imaginative responding. In this context, I will use “imagination” to refer to the capacity 
to mentally create what is not-actual, either by the means of visual images (as in the mental imagery 
occurring in hypnosis)99 or by non-visual (that is, verbal, internal-auditory or conceptual) cognitive 
means, as when one conceives of a scenario without the intervention of any visual imagery or 
imaginal material.100  
Secondly, I will be mobilizing the imagination in the sense of the sympathetic or, as I will 
refer to it in Chapter 4, the “projective” imagination,101 designating the faculty which allows the 
subject, both in novel reading and hypnosis, to relocate their center of experience by projecting it 
into other, imagined—fictional or real—lives. In this second sense, imagination is linked to the 
concepts of sympathy or fellow-feeling, as they was theorized in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, as well as the German notion of Einfühlung (feeling into), which was introduced into 
English in 1909.102 This double aspect of the imagination—sensory and sympathetic-—is at the 
heart of the aesthetic-immersive and ethical-projective similarities shared by hypnosis and the 
novel. Both involve a de-centering followed by a re-centering or relocation. The initial decentering 
corresponds to the aesthetic, immersive phase of entry into the fictional universe (opening the 
book, formally conducting a hypnosis induction), while the second phase (re-centering into other 
lives or possibilities for life) corresponds to the therapeutic-ethical potential opened up by the 
novelistic-hypnotic narratives.       
 
iv. Reimagining Hypnosis 
 
99 For an anthropological-ethnographic review of practices of “cultivation of mental imagery,” see Richard Noll, 
“Mental Imagery Cultivation as a Cultural Phenomenon,” Current Anthropology 26, no. 4 (August-October 1985): 
443-61. 
100 The fact that imagining is not an exclusively visual phenomenon is important both in hypnosis, -where hallucinatory 
experiences do not always involve visual hallucinations100-, and in novel reading -where the reader can “picture” the 
fictional world by becoming immersed in it and getting a “sense” or “feel” for the temporary “existence” of its objects, 
without this necessitating the production of detailed visual representations of this world and its objects. 
101 For the difference between the concept of projective identification in psychoanalysis and the projective imagination, 
see Chapter 4. 
102 See Eric Schliesser, Sympathy: a History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 286-322. See also Jeanne M. 
Britton, Vicarious narratives: a literary history of sympathy, 1750-1850 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019). In 
this work, Britton shows how works of sentimental and gothic fiction published between 1750 and 1850 generate a 
“novelistic version” of Adam Smith’s theory of moral sentiments and sympathy, by shifting narrative perspectives, 
manipulating traditional narrative forms such as epistolary fiction or embedded tales and new publication practices. 
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As indicated previously, the primary goal of this thesis is to reconceptualize hypnosis 
through the lens of literary theory. While the history of hypnosis leading up to the invention of 
psychoanalysis has received considerable scholarly attention, the exploration of its relations with 
aesthetics, especially after the turn of the twentieth century and in relation to the novel, remains 
largely unexplored. Hypnosis frequently appears in cultural histories of the unconscious and of 
“psychological Modernism,”103 as well as histories of psychiatry which tend to consider it as a pre-
Freudian phenomenon, often restraining its function to a mere stepping stone on the way toward 
the emergence of the Freudian unconscious.104 In this context, psychoanalysis is often taken to 
have put an end to the use of hypnosis as a means to explore unconscious mental processes, thereby 
implying that hypnosis ends where analysis starts off. Such a conclusion, however, overshadows 
the remaining parts of the history of hypnosis, which continues after the Second World War, as 
well as its independence, as an historical object, from the “birth of psychoanalysis.” As Mark 
Micale observes in The Mind of Modernism, an “astonishing share” of the scholarship studying 
aesthetic and psychological modernism “continues to take the form of influence studies of 
psychoanalysis in which Freud—and occasionally Jung—are presented as the sole exemplars of 
psychological Modernism.”105 Far from espousing such a viewpoint, my study of hypnosis aims 
to shift attention away from “Freudocentric” accounts of the history of the unconscious and toward 
acknowledging the diversity of  early dynamic psychiatry, both before and “around” Freud.106 
Classic histories of hypnosis which focus on it as their sole object, such as those of Henri 
Ellenberger or Alan Gauld, propose valuable and detailed accounts of the emergence of hypnosis 
from the older, magnetic model, and its determining role in the birth of psychoanalysis.107 Often 
 
103 This term includes a cluster of disciplines, including psychiatry, neurology, psychology, psychoanalysis, the 
philosophy of mind and parapsychology. See Micale, The Mind of Modernism, 18.  
104  For instance, “the techniques of modern psychotherapy originated in large measure with the hypnotic and 
suggestive therapeutics of the 1880s and 1890s.” Micale, Ibid., 12. See Andreas Mayer, Sites of the Unconscious. 
(Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2013), where hypnosis is considered as a dematerialization of 
magnetism, but also as a step on the way towards the immaterial and psychological psyche, inaugurated by Freud.  
105 Micale, Ibid, 7. 
106 Ibid., 7. Indeed, recent psychiatric historiography has established that, “for all of its eventual cultural influence, 
which was immense, psychoanalysis was only one of many emerging models of mind that comprised the coming of 
early dynamic psychiatry and that contributed to the constitution of the modern psychological self.” Ibid., 7, emphasis 
added. As Micale argues, these “earlier Freudocentric accounts, which were typically written during the second and 
third quarters of the twentieth century by American and central European psychoanalyst-historians, now require 
revision.” Conversely, “our understanding of freudianinsm as a historical formation” can be “greatly enriched by 
placing it in this larger contemporaneous intellectual environment.” Ibid., 10. 
107 See Henri Ellenberger, The Discovery of the Unconscious. The History and Evolution of Dynamic Psychiatry (New 
York; Basic Books, 1970); Alan Gauld, A History of Hypnotism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); 
Adam Crabtree, From Mesmer to Freud. Magnetic Sleep and the Roots of Psychological healing (New Haven and 
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in the history of psychiatry, hypnotism is examined and conceptualized in close relation to the 
explosion of interest which centered on the formation of hysterical psychogenic physical 
symptoms at the end of the nineteenth century. Although highly valuable, these studies tend to 
lead to a confusion between hypnosis and the hysterical manifestations which characterized it 
during its fin-de-siècle heyday. This juxtaposition reinforces the pathologization of hypnosis by 
failing to center attention on its other, non-pathological aspects.108 Applied to contemporary 
therapeutic practices, this results in systematically reducing hypnosis as a tool exclusively destined 
for use in trauma recovery, which tends to overshadow its numerous alternative potential uses.109 
In contrast, with this study, I wish to undertake a depathologized examination and history of 
hypnosis, which sheds light on the history of aesthetic absorption, shifting it from the pathological 
to the therapeutic and ethically valuable. Despite their highly valuable contributions, these 
historical studies, whether they center on hypnosis or mention it in passing, rarely place emphasis 
on the contemporary, post-twentieth century period. They tend to consider hypnosis as an 
historically circumscribed phenomenon, rather than a suggestive, affective process at the heart of 
all intersubjective relations, and fail to grasp the survival of hypnosis well after its “death” caused 
by the emergence of psychoanalysis.  
This is not to say that I intend to set up a strong opposition between hypnotic and 
psychoanalytic models. Both historians and theoreticians of hypnosis often focus on the 
divergences between hypnotists and psychoanalysts. This divisive perspective can be found in 
histories of early psychoanalysis on the one hand, which locates the identity of the latter on the 
“death blow” with which the Freudian model detached itself from the murky waters of the 
hypnotic; but also in contemporary theories of hypnosis—especially those inspired by 
 
London: Yale University Press, 2009); M. Tinterow, Foundations of Hypnosis (Springfield, IL: Charles C Thomas 
Publisher, 1970). 
108 For the numerous, extensive histories of the complex relations between hypnosis and hysteria, see for example 
Georges Didi-Huberman, Invention of Hysteria, Charcot and the Photographic Iconography of the Salpêtrière, 
(Cambridge, MA; London: The MIT Press, 2003); Mark Micale, Approaching Hysteria (Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1995) and The Mind of Modernism: Medicine, Psychology, and the Cultural Arts in Europe 
and America, 1880-1940 (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2004); Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen, The 
Freudian Subject (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988) and Making Minds and Madness, From Hysteria to 
Depression (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Elaine Showalter, Hystories: Hysterical Epidemics and 
Modern Culture (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997); Lilian Furst,  Before Freud, Hysteria and Hypnosis 
in Later Nineteenth-Century Psychiatric Cases (Lewisburg PA: Bucknell, 2008); Sander Gilman, Helen King, Roy 
Porter, G. S. Rousseau, and Elaine Showalter, Hysteria Beyond Freud (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1993). 
109 See Ruth Leys, Trauma, a Genealogy (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2000). 
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neuroscience and cognitive psychology—which define the hypnotic unconscious by 
systematically opposing it to the analytic unconscious. In both cases, the common ground between 
hypnosis and psychoanalysis is overlooked, which leads some thinkers not only to adopt anti-
psychoanalysis stances, but also to eschew a “common grounds approach” and neglect the 
hypnotic dimension which, as I will argue in Chapter 1, can be thought to reside at the heart of all 
therapeutic relationships, including psychoanalysis.110  
My contention is that one must take Mark Micale’s invitation to “move beyond Freud” 
further, not only by examining dynamic psychotherapy in its broader context and all of its variety, 
but also by reconceptualizing hypnosis as a naturalized, non-pathological phenomenon, freeing it 
from “hysterocentric” accounts on the one hand—which overshadow its aesthetic, narrative, 
imaginative and therapeutic aspects—and from neighboring parapsychological practices on the 
other, which conflate it with the occult. Both of these approaches continue to dominate historians’ 
main ways of apprehending it.  
Literary histories which include hypnosis are often centered on the Victorian era and focus 
on the relations between hypnotism and spiritualism or the occult. These approaches also tend to 
restrict the practice to its fin-de-siècle cultural manifestations, and fail to seize the anti-mimetic 
dimension at its core, buying into, rather than unearthing, the narratives on which it was founded 
at the time.111 Literary histories of the occult often include hypnosis among other 
parapsychological practices and group it together with its ancestor, magnetism, often under the 
label “mesmerism.” The consequence is that the clear distinction between the “magnetists” of the 
early nineteenth century, and the “hypnotists” of the end of the century becomes blurred. The 
distinction between the earlier—materialists and fluidist—conceptions and the later, 
psychological, theories of hypnosis fails to appear clearly.  
Similarly, literary studies of neighboring concepts—such as monoideism, sympathy, 
telepathy, dissociation, multiple personalities or possession112—usually seize upon just one aspect 
 
110 See François Roustang. Psychoanalysis Never Lets Go, trans. Ned Lukacher (Baltimore and London: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1983); Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen. The Emotional Tie: Psychoanalysis, Mimesis, and Affect 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992). 
111 See for example Alex Owen, The Place of Enchantment: British Occultism and the Culture of the Modern (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2004); Albert Caillet, Manuel bibliographique des sciences psychiques ou occultes, 3 
vol. (Paris: Librairie Lucien Dorbon, 1912);  Churton Tobias, Occult Paris: The Lost Magic of the Belle Époque 
(Rochester: Inner Traditions, 2016).  
112 See for example Marina Van Zuylen, Monomania: The Flight from Everyday Life in Literature and Art (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2005); Lilian Furst, Idioms of Distress: Psychosomatic Disorders in Medical and 
Imaginative Literature (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003); Nicholas Royle, Telepathy and 
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of hypnosis, rather than grasping it in its entirety and technical specificity. Hypnosis in our sense 
runs across all these studies, but also extends beyond their scope. Furthermore, the central role of 
suggestion or autosuggestion as a naturalizing explanation for the whole spectrum of occultist 
phenomena and techniques is not always made apparent and often, hypnosis is dismissed as yet 
another form of occultism. By using the precise conceptual and technical vocabulary stemming 
from the medical literature and used by hypnotists themselves, my goal is to draw out the 
specificity of hypnotism as a psychological, rather than supernatural phenomenon, and to transpose 
this precision into the domain of literary studies. 
As Micale argues, “the links between the arts and psychiatry are closer than those between 
the arts and any other branch of medicine; and arguably, in no period were they closer than during 
the turn of the last century.”113 A history of hypnosis at the intersection of medical and literary 
perspectives, which also puts it into dialogue with literary theory, can thus illuminate their 
respective blind spots and reveal their common aspects, bridging the gaps between literature and 
actuality, form and world, the textual and the psychological, the aesthetic and the therapeutic.114  
When it is examined in aesthetic terms, hypnosis finds itself at the center of a cluster or 
web of genres, wherein each poses specific questions and problems of their own.115 In relation to 
 
Literature: Essays on the Reading Mind (Oxford, UK; Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1991); Jill Galvan, The 
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(Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1993); Brigid Lowe, Victorian Fiction and the Insights of Sympathy. An 
Alternative to the Hermeneutics of Suspicion (London; New York; Delhi: Anthem Press 2007); Stefan Andriopoulos, 
Possessed: Hypnotic Crimes, Corporate Fiction, and the Invention of Cinema (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 
2008). 
113 Micale, The Mind of Modernism, 2. 
114 See John Dewey, Art as Experience (New-York: Minton, Balch and Co, 1934) and Richard Wollheim, Painting as 
an Art (London: Thames and Hudson, 1987). See also Micale’s mention that aesthetic and medical Modernism both 
invent and center on the psychological, but that the fin-de-siècle was the last period where in Europe, physicians 
“routinely received both scientific and humanistic formations.” Micale, 4. Indeed, as historian George Rousseau 
writes, it was not uncommon for Victorian and Edwardian doctors to “write prolifically throughout their careers: 
medical memoirs and autobiographies biographies of other doctors, social analyses of their own time, imaginative 
literature of all types. “See George Rousseau, “Literature and Medicine: Towards a Simultaneity of Theory and 
Practice,” Literature and Medicine 5 (1986): 152-81. 
115 Despite their strong degree of overlap with hypnotic phenomena, in this study, I will not be proposing an 
anthropological examination of the therapeutics of trance states outside of Western history of medicine and psychiatry, 
such as meditation, trance and shamanic rituals. Neither will I be proposing psychoanalytic readings of literary texts 
to underline the common narrative dimension of novelistic texts and therapeutic change, as do Barbara and Richard 
Almond in The Therapeutic Narrative. Fictional Relationships and the Process of Psychological Change (1996) for 
instance. Rather, my scope of inquiry is situated at the intersection between hypnotic discourse and the aesthetic 
domain, both before and after Freud.  
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music, it raises questions about crowd psychology and the contagion of affect.116 In relation to 
theater, it brings about doubts about authenticity, suspicion of artifice in the actor-subject.117 In 
relation to the pictorial and visual arts, it poses the question of immersive illusion, of absorption 
and theatricality.118 In relation to poetry, it awakens the ancient demons of the entrancement and 
intoxicating powers of poiesis, denounced by Plato, which I will address in Chapter 1. The 
examination of each genre in turn produces a new definition of hypnosis, the concept of which is 
in perpetual excess of all final categorization. As they do across history, the conceptions and 
manifestations of hypnosis mutate and are redefined depending on the object in relation to which 
it is examined.  
In this thesis, I will draw out—and test out—an analogy between hypnotic states and the 
act of reading narrative literature. Unlike what would likely occur in a classic literary history of 
hypnotism, the latter is not examined as a mere object of aesthetic interest or representation, but 
as one of the structural components of all aesthetic experience. I will focus especially—but not 
exclusively—on the novel, a genre hitherto unexplored in relation to hypnosis, addressing a gap 
in the scholarship by elucidating the ubiquity of narrative concepts, structures and theoretic 
framework in contemporary psychotherapeutic settings.119  
 
116 See our analysis of Du Maurier’s Trilby in Chapter 2 and Nidesh Lawtoo’s analysis of Nietzsche’s relation to 
Wagner’s “hypnotic” powers, in “Nietzsche’s Mimetic Patho-logy,” in The Phantom of the Ego, 27-84. 
117 See the debates between the Nancy and Salpêtrière schools of hypnosis and the question of hypnotic simulation 
explored in Chapter 1. 
118 See Michael Fried, Absorption and Theatricality: Painting and Beholder in the Age of Diderot (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1980), and our analysis of Gombrich’s Art and Illusion in Chapter 3. 
119 The history of hypnosis also helps reemphasize the early appearance of the relationship between therapeutics and 
self-narration, which the genre of the novel further participated in during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
Indeed, a central characteristic of the psychodynamic therapeutics of the late nineteenth-century was their use of 
language as their main curative agent: of “the spoken word, (rather than, say, water, massage, electricity, drugs, or 
physical restraint).” Micale, The Mind of Modernism, 6. Hypnosis can be thought of as a “talking cure” in two senses. 
In older models, healing occurs with the direct suggestions, the spoken word, of the therapist. In modern, twentieth-
century hypnotherapy and onward, healing occurs through the hypnotic re-narration of the patient’s life-narrative.  
Although the therapeutic use of the spoken word can be traced back to Greed antiquity, during the 19th century, the 
subject of study, method of inquiry and case-historical style of psychiatry became “much more literary and narrative.” 
Micale, 7. Affected by the emergence of dynamic models of mental functioning, the new case histories of the 1890s 
centered on the inner mental life of the patient, their story. Their new aim became representing individual emotional 
experience and intrapsychic subjectivity, a new goal which required new narrative strategies. Ibid., 6. After the patient 
tells their story during the clinical encounter, the therapist reworks it into a medical narrative “intended to convey a 
story of a single ever-changing mental personality of the time—a kind of psychiatric Bildungsroman.” Ibid. This 
justifies the value of examining hypnosis in conjunction to the novel rather than poetic form—which resembles 
hypnotic trance but lacks the narrative dimension of hypnotherapeutic storytelling. For the origin of the therapeutic 
use of spoken language, see Pedro Laín Entralgo, The Therapy of the Word in Classical Antiquity, trans. L. J. Rather 
and John M. Sharp (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970). 
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Indeed, the genre of poetry has been compared more frequently with hypnosis than has the 
novel, due to the rhythmic qualities and musicality of poetic form.120 At the turn of the century, 
the French Surrealist movement famously celebrated the creative possibilities offered by hypnotic 
trance and automatic writing, unifying what the nineteenth-century medical discourse had clearly 
distinguished: madness, automatism and creative genius.121 Despite its apparent fit for my 
purposes, in this study, I will not be focusing on this poetic aspect of the hypnosis-aesthetics 
interaction, for two reasons. First of all, the Surrealists’ interest in hypnotism was not always 
clearly distinguished from magnetism and hysteria, which they famously celebrated for being the 
“greatest poetic discovery” of the nineteenth century.122 Second, their strong focus on automatism 
and on the irrational dimension, on the mysterious depths of trance states, tends to pull hypnosis 
away from the naturalized, psychological, cognitive and narrative dimensions that I wish to 
examine here.123 The Surrealists’ poetic interest in hypnotic trance thus selects and illuminates a 
different aspect of the hypnotic object than those that are at stake in my study.   
Both the hypnotic and the novelistic imagination lead to transformation or transcendence 
of the self, in and through redescriptions of the everyday, a process which is irreducible to mere 
escapism.124 Examining hypnosis in light of narrative fiction is crucial because, like hypnosis, 
fiction can serve as an “extension” of our lives. As Wolfgang Iser notes, novelistic literature is 
able to “broaden” our reality, allowing the reader-participant to “see what he would not have seen 
in the course of his everyday life,” to “grasp something which has hitherto never been real for 
 
120  See for example Edward D. Snyder, Hypnotic Poetry; A Study of Trance Inducing Technique in Certain Poems 
and its Literary Significance (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1930).  
121 See André Breton, Les Manifestes Du Surréalisme, Suivis De Prolégoménes Manifeste Du Surréalisme Ou Non. 
(Paris: Éditions du Sagittaire, 1947). 
122 See Louis Aragon and André Breton, “Le Cinquantenaire de l'hystérie (1878-1928),” La Révolution surréaliste 11, 
(1928): 20-22; André Breton and Philippe Soupault. Les Champs Magnétiques (Paris: Galimard, 1967). See also 
Frédéric Gros, Création et Folie: Une histoire du jugement psychiatrique (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 
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123 Alexandra Bacopoulos-Viau has shown, for example, how “by stripping his system of the ‘marvelous’ (le 
merveilleux), Janet removed from his theory “the potential for seeing in automatic manifestations of the mind a source 
of exalted creativity,” which explains why Breton never publicly acknowledged his indebtedness to him, and in the 
end even considered Janet’s a “sterile” science of the mind. See Alexandra Bacopoulos-Viau, “Automatism, 
Surrealism and the making of French psychopathology: the case of Pierre Janet,” History of Psychiatry 23, no. 3 
(2012): 260. 
124 By underlining the ethical value of hypnotic narrative, I hope to underline the narrow moralism of critics who 
accuse it of leading to delusion and dangerous entrancement. On the contrary, like good art (as defined by Iris Murdoch 
in Chapter 3), when used well, it can help dissolve denial and help the individual apprehend the see reality more 
clearly. 
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him,” to “transcend the limitations of their own real-life situation.”125 Furthermore, like 
hypnotherapy, fiction allows us to test our moral values with “minimal cost to ourselves and 
others,” to vicariously experience complex situations, emit judgments or acquire insights “without 
having to live in the situations which occasion them.”126 In this sense, both hypnosis and novelistic 
literature can be considered as therapeutic or moral laboratories in which the reader-subject can 
“take on, and explore, in a playful way and without the consequences this could have in real life, 
personalities and patterns of behavior that would be impossible or unsuitable in reality.”127  
Other critics have emphasized the value of fictional narrative in improving our actual lives 
in ways that bring it close to hypnosis. In Empathy and the Novel, for example, Suzanne Keen 
proposes that literary narratives have a stronger impact on the reader’s empathetic responses 
because their very fictionality acts as a defense which releases readers from “obligations of self-
protection through skepticism and suspicion,” thereby disarming the layers of cautious reasoning 
which characterizes ordinary cognition.128 It is because the very nature of fictionality “renders 
social contracts between people and personalize characters null and void” that it might allow us to 
internalize the experience of empathy in a way that “promises later real-world responsiveness to 
others’ needs.”129 It is in a similar sense that hypnotherapy, by allowing the subject to experience 
“fictional” situations, can serve as a training ground for future action.130 Just as the 
hypnotherapeutic setting strives to create a balance between immersion and emotional security, 
fictional representations, as Alison Denham shows in Metaphor and Moral Experience, allow us 
to engage with moral concerns in a manner which is “both suitably involved and suitably 
detached.”131 Like a successful hypnotherapy session, the reading of a novel stipulates that “we 
must be sufficiently involved to grasp what it would be like to occupy a certain point of view, but 
 
125 Wolfgang Iser, The Act of Reading; A Theory of Aesthetic Response (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
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in doing so we are not yet so confined and committed … that we are unable to assess it from 
without.”132 Exploring moral and therapeutic aspects through fictional narratives therefore allows 
for more freedom and less constraints—physical, temporal, socio-economic, political and 
affective—than in our ordinary lives, providing access to experiences, both internal and external, 
which would otherwise remain out of reach. 
By bringing these valuable ethical and therapeutic aspects of fictional narration to the 
forefront, a study of contemporary hypnosis and the novel—which extends beyond nineteenth-
century gothic and Victorian literature—emphasizes the imaginative, active responses of hypnotic 
and novelistic subjectivity, redistributing “power” away from the author-operator, back towards 
the recipient’s performance and aesthetic capacities. Furthermore, rather than track the parallel 
histories of hypnosis and its representations in the novel, my goal in this thesis is to examine how 
the history of the novel can shed light upon the history of hypnosis: both can be thought of in 
parallel, in the massive shift or transformation they underwent with the advent of modernism and, 
most importantly, the “end of realism” at the turn of the twentieth century.133  
Whereas in most histories of hypnosis, the practice is said to undergo a crisis and “end” 
with the birth of psychoanalysis—which, in a sense, can also be thought of as the end of its “realist” 
period, that is, the period in which it remained unquestioned as a direct mode of access of the 
human psyche—my goal is to show that it did not disappear but rather, had to transform and 
adapted to what might constitute, following our analogy with the history of the novel,  its twentieth 
and twenty-first century modernist and postmodern forms.134  
As with the novel, the development of indirect hypnosis (especially in the Ericksonian 
branches) demonstrated a greater concern for formal and technical experimentation, and an 
increased focus on the role of the subject. In this context, hypnotic discourse began to make space 
 
132 Ibid., 339. 
133 The “end of realism” is sometimes associated with the collapse of the Naturalist movement at the end of the 1887, 
and generally linked to the stylistic innovations of the novelists at the beginning of the twentieth century. See Michel 
Raimond, La Crise du Roman. Des lendemains du Naturalisme aux années vingt (Paris: José Corti, 1966), 67. 
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“‘Credulous’ and ‘skeptical’ views of hypnotic phenomena: A review of certain evidence and methodology,” 
International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 8 (1960): 73-101. Hypnotic “modernism,” on the other 
hand, would begin after the Second World War, with the emergence of indirect, permissive models of hypnosis, in 
which the focus shifted from the material power of the operator to the linguistic potential of hypnotic utterances. 
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for anti-mimetic distance at the heart of the practice: subjects were allowed to drift in and out of 
trance, to self-reflectively comment upon their experience, without the “spell” of hypnosis being 
threatened or taken to be broken: the conventional, contractual, participatory and linguistic 
dimension of the practice became not merely explicit and acknowledged, but also strategically 
used, whereas in previous, nineteenth-century models, its technical—or formal—aspects remained 
concealed, in a process similar to the realist illusion. Like the modernist aesthetics of the twentieth-
century novel, hypnotic form began to gain in flexibility, commenting upon its own workings, 
becoming self-reflective as it unfolds, no longer needing to cover its tracks or base its efficacy on 
the “power” of its creator.  
Finally, as I will argue in Chapter 4, with the advent of postmodernist thought in the 
humanities and the narrative turn in psychotherapy, hypnosis, like the novel, also adapted to the 
“crisis in representation” and to skepticism about the very possibility of unearthing pathogenic 
memories, taking its own narrative turn. In this way, it further acknowledges its status as a complex 
practice of language games, a form of serious play whose medium is linguistic and whose efficacy 
lies in the subject’s activity. Just as the genre of the novel does not disappear, but rather evolved, 
the practice of hypnosis does not vanish after the birth of psychoanalysis, but rather, adapts and 
finds new forms for itself.135 In this sense, contemporary hypnosis as it is practiced today need no 
longer be confused with its nineteenth-century manifestations. On the contrary, it can be conceived 
as a narrative and linguistic practice which is compatible with the postmodern framework, 
considering itself as both “mere storytelling,” and yet, as a serious form of play and meaning 
making. This isn’t to say that hypnosis should be reduced to mere word play and endless chains of 
signification and distancing effects, but rather that its essence, like that of the novel, lies not in the 
magical power of its creator, but in the interaction of its medium and recipients. As I will argue in 
Chapter 3, the analogy between hypnosis and the act of reading, although it best applies to realist 
genres, can be carried into the discussion of modernist and postmodern texts—provided that we 
extend the term “hypnosis.”  
By extending the scope of my inquiry beyond mere representations of hypnosis in fiction, 
my aim is also to uncover the hypnotic structures and processes at the heart of the activity of 
 
135 See for example the dissemination of “Neurolinguistic Programming” in popular culture, which originated in 
Richard Bandler, John Grinder and Andreas Steve, Frogs into Princes: Neuro Linguistic Programming (London: Eden 
Grove Editions, 1990). 
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aesthetic creation and reception, especially in the immersive experience of reading narrative 
literature. Unlike histories of hypnosis which tend to neglect the anti-mimetic distance—the self-
awareness and self-possessio— at the core of hypnotic phenomena, my analogy with the act of 
reading makes these apparent by bringing to the forefront the active capacities engaged by the 
subject. Although I frequently focus on the immersive power of realist aesthetics, as will be made 
clear in Chapters 3 and 4, my theoretical framework and literary corpus will also extend the 
analogy between hypnotic and novelistic imaginations to modernist and postmodern texts. In this 
way, preconceptions about both hypnosis and absorptive reading can be revised: just like hypnotic 
experiences are not restricted to hysterics but can occur in self-aware, self-possessed, non-
pathologized subjects, conversely, immersive reading is compatible with non-realist literary texts 
and need not be confined to the nineteenth century novel.136 Therefore, while this study follows 
Micale’s intention of exploring the cultural affinities and “complex cultural interface” between 
aesthetic and psychological Modernism, it also goes beyond Modernism, extending the scope of 
inquiry to twentieth-and twenty-first century texts and literary theory, and subjecting my argument 
about the hypnotic nature of aesthetic experience to the test of anti-mimetic aesthetics, postmodern 
discourse and post-psychoanalysis therapeutic theory. 
 
v. Layout of chapters. 
 
In Chapter 1, I trace the history of hypnosis from Mesmer to Freud and beyond. This 
historical account emphasizes the historical evolution of the characteristics of trance states, which 
fluctuate in conjunction with fears and expectations of those who experience and induce them. As 
Anne Harrington notes:  
 
The understandings of hypnosis are not just changing over time. The mental and physiological experience of 
hypnosis—what it is—is changing too; and changing in ways that clearly reflect changing social expectations 
and mores.137 
 
In the West, hypnotic trance states evolved from the initial Mesmeric “magnetic crisis”—
considered by historians as a secularized form of demonic possession and religious exorcism138—
 
136 As explained in Chapter 3, although I frequently focus on nineteenth-century realism, the examined corpus does 
not limit itself to a specific genre, the underlying hypothesis being that my analogy can also be applied to genres which 
seem to value formal experimentation over the aesthetic illusion and mimesis. 
137 Anne Harrington, The Cure Within: A History of Mind-Body Medicine (New York and London: Norton & Co., 
2008), 22. 
138 As Harrington puts it, Mesmerism is the “partial secularization of the demonic possession narrative.” Ibid., 26. 
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to the calm, peaceful states of somnambulism described by the Marquis de Puységur, and into the 
psychological state of hypnotism after its theorization by James Braid in the 1850s. Hypnotism in 
this sense is a dematerialization of previous models, that debunked Mesmer’s cures as products 
“not of fraud but of the imagination.”139 During the “Golden Age” of hypnosis of the 1880s, trance 
phenomena blended with the pathological manifestations of the hysteric crises, before 
transforming once more into the calmer, more introspective and internalized states of absorption 
occurring within the safety and closed space of twentieth and twenty-first century therapeutic 
offices.140 
In Chapter 2, I examine the literary representations of hypnosis in the nineteenth century 
and the ways in which they were not only influenced by, but also distortions of, the medical 
discourse of the time. The literary history of the naturalization and psychologization which lead 
from magnetism to hypnotism reveals how both popular and medical reactions to the practice 
evolved almost hand in hand, from fascination to anxiety and finally, scientific legitimacy, before 
the birth of psychoanalysis put an end to its heyday and the practiced seemed to disappear. The 
central tension inherent to nineteenth-century representations of hypnotism revolves around a 
constant alternation between materialist and spiritualist interpretations of the phenomenon. This 
alternation, as I argue, still haunts hypnosis to this day, in the debates opposing “state” and “non-
state” approaches, “mimetic and “anti-mimetic” explanations of the nature of hypnosis. 
In Chapter 3, I extend the scope of inquiry beyond the fin-de-siècle and explicitly formulate 
the analogy between the hypnotic state and the act of reading fictional literature. Moving from the 
historical to the aesthetic domain, I use Speech Act theory and contemporary literary criticism to 
examine the shared formal qualities of hypnotic and fictional utterances. Conversely, using the 
concept of illusion in a non-pejorative way, I reexamine the immersive, absorptive core at the heart 
of the aesthetic experience and novel reading. From this cross-comparison, both hypnosis and 
literary narratives can be described as forms of possible-world-creation, in which the nature of 
fictional participation lies in the interplay and dynamic back and forth between immersion and 
distance, mimesis and anti-mimesis. In doing so, I hope to clearly reconceptualize the experience 
 
139 Ibid., 26. For the dematerialization in the history of hypnosis, see Andreas Mayer, Sites of the Unconscious 
(Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2013).  
140 Conversely, Martyn Lyons describes the 1890s as the “golden age of the book in the West.” Lyons, “New Readers 
in the Nineteenth Century: Women, Children, Workers,” in A History of Reading in the West, 313.  
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of the hypnotic subject as active, participatory, and creative rather than passive, purely mimetic, 
and receptive. 
Finally, in Chapter 4, I turn to the therapeutic and ethical impact of fictional narratives—
novelistic and hypnotic—on the reader. Arguing that hypnosis should not be reduced to a dramatic 
experience, I underline its narrative aspects by comparing hypnotic regression and futurization to 
metaphorical forms of storytelling, which transpose the ethical-imaginative capacity of 
“sympathetic imagining” from the novelistic to the therapeutic setting. This juxtaposition 
highlights the similarities between psychodynamic uses of hypnotherapy and psychoanalysis, once 
both practices are understood to share a common narrative orientation brought about by the 
narrative turn in psychotherapy. In this chapter, I use narrative ethics to argue that hypnotherapy 
and novels cultivate two ethical capacities in the recipient: “unselfing” or reorienting of the 
attention, and “decentering” or projective imagination, both of which allow individuals to think 
themselves into other lives, as well as the lives of others. Rather than impose dogmatic or 
paraphrasable content upon their recipients, both literary and therapeutic narratives teach us modes 
of self-transformation by gesturing towards new ways of looking at the world, which may then be 
transposed into actuality and participate in the individual’s pursuit of the “good life.” The 
conceptions of hypnosis in the discourse of Thomas Mann’s narrator at the beginning of this 
introduction completely overlooks the tremendous aesthetic, therapeutic and moral value of 



















Chapter 1. The History of Hypnotism: Dynamics of 
Separations and Continuities. 
 
As a philosophical problem, hypnotism constitutes a mysterious crossroads. Regardless of its 
various theorizations, its observable effects systematically complicate the relations between the 
material and the spiritual, the somatic and the psychological, the conscious and the non-conscious, 
the active and the passive, the rational and the affective, the real and the imaginary. In each of its 
various historical manifestations, it destabilizes preexisting conceptions of such binaries, as well 
as the relations between the freedom and heteronomy of the subject. Although hypnosis is born 
from the interaction of all these factors listed above, proponents of opposing schools generally 
attempt to “pull” it toward one pole rather than another, struggling to settle the matter once and for 
all. Indeed, while the empirical efficacy of hypnosis was recognized very early on, the question of 
its cause—the nature of the hypnotic state—posed serious theoretical and practical challenges from 
the very beginning of its history. Indeed, a long-lasting debate about the nature and existence of 
the hypnotic state was born out of the findings of the 1784 Royal Commission. Chaired by 
Benjamin Franklin, the commission was appointed to investigate the nature of Franz Anton 
Mesmer’s magnetic cure, and to determine whether the existence animal magnetism should be 
recognized or dismissed as a product of the imagination.141 As I will argue in this chapter, the 
debates that stemmed from these late eighteenth-century investigations of animal magnetism, 
which posed considerable challenges to the emergent “experimental reason” of the time, have been 
replayed in various forms throughout the last two centuries and can still be found today, in the 
opposition between cognitive and social explanations of the nature of hypnotism.142   
 
141 The final commission that began its meeting in March 1784 was composed of five members from the Academy of 
sciences and four from the Faculty of Medicine—among whom, Benjamin Franklin, A. L. Lavoisier, and J. S. Bailly, 
a well-known astronomer of the time, who served as the secretary for it, and J. L. Guillotin.  
142 As Léon Chertock and Isabelle Stengers have shown, although experimental research on hypnosis has by now 
become a common phenomenon, “the controversies surrounding that research,” are still unresolved, and “teach us less 
about hypnosis itself than about the price the experimental ideal requires a phenomenon to pay if it is to become an 
object of study.” Chertock and Stengers, xi. Indeed, if suggestion—which “puts the ‘truth’ in question,” 
problematizing the very possibility of constructing a theory “on the basis of experiment or experience”—permeates 
all human interaction, the laboratory setting is not exempt from its influence, especially when the observation of the 
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As it replays this debate in its various forms, the controversial history of hypnotism follows 
a gradual process of “dematerialization,” which originates in Mesmer’s animal magnetism—itself 
a naturalization of religious exorcism—and Puységur’s magnetic sleep, both of which posited the 
material existence of a magnetic fluid.143 It was only in the 1840s, when Scottish surgeon James 
Braid proposed his theory of neurhypnotism, that it began to be conceived as a psychological, 
rather than purely material, phenomenon. This paved the way for the fin-de-siècle heyday of 
hypnotism which thrived in France in the 1880s, in the competing Nancy and Salpêtrière schools, 
as well as the work of Pierre Janet. At this time, hypnosis, which was considered a serious scientific 
tool, mainly used to investigate the phenomenon of hysteria, played a seminal role in the 
theorization of a non-Freudian psychic unconscious. At the turn of the century, the emergence of 
psychoanalysis led to what is often thought of as the end of hypnotism. This “death blow” was 
caused by Freud’s attempt to establish the scientific dimension of psychoanalytic theory by 
breaking away from the magical, regressive and dependency-generating aspects of its “primitive” 
parent, hypnosis. After examining which aspects of hypnosis did in fact “die” with this break, I 
will argue that unlike what is often assumed, hypnosis survived the birth of psychoanalysis and 
lives on, both as an autonomous practice and as the suggestive-affective phenomenon at the “heart” 
of all therapeutic relations. By retracing the history of hypnosis, from late eighteenth-century 
animal magnetism to twenty-first century hypnotherapy, I hope to bring to the fore the dynamics 
of continuities and separations that constantly reemerge under its various historical manifestations 
and account for the “fascinating” aura of mystery still associated with it to this day. 
1.1. A Gradual Dematerialization 
 
1.1.1. Immemorial Origins 
 
In Principles of Psychotherapy (1924), Pierre Janet deplores that “today, the study of 
hypnotism is suffering an eclipse,” an event which, as he notes, “has already happened several 
 
subject’s inner experience is involved. Just as the standards of “experimental reason” that the commissioners claimed 
to be applying were “anything but neutral,” because of its very nature, the hypnotic state is difficult to constitute as an 
object of experimental study. Chertock and Stengers xvi, xi. For Chertock and Stengers, this explains why hypnosis 
has until now successfully eluded the “partition” of disciplines: “Neither biology nor psychology nor sociology has 
succeeded … in submitting hypnosis to its categories, that is, in ignoring the remainder overflowing [from] these 
categories.” Chertock and Stengers, A Critique of Psychoanalytic Reason, 204. 
143 See Andreas Mayer, Sites of the Unconscious (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2013), 75.  
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times.”144  Nevertheless, as he argues, interest in hypnotism will certainly “reappear under the 
same or under a related form, for it contains the germ of important therapies.”145 In this section, 
we will follow Janet’s optimistic observation, assuming that this hypnotic “germ” can be found at 
the heart of a wide array of culturally and historically specific phenomena involving “modified” 
states of consciousness and suggestibility. Indeed, “trance” states exist in a variety of settings, 
ranging from religious and secular rituals to the phenomena of mass hysteria, from miraculous 
healing practices to those based the placebo effect, as well as in various absorptive, mystical and 
aesthetic experiences. While it is not in the scope of this project to turn to historical, 
anthropological or ethnological studies of trance practices, the brief overview which follows will 
shed light on the early origins of hypnosis. In this discussion, I will examine various states that 
can be considered as “ancestors” hypnotism, which undergo serious attacks whenever they 
appeared in cultural frameworks that value reason and knowledge over the passions—whether in 
Greek antiquity or France during the Enlightenment. I will begin by examining the case of Plato’s 
Ion, where trancelike states of “inspiration” are used to explain the source of poetic discourse. 
Unlike the famous condemnation of the poets found in the Republic,146 Plato’s Ion conveys the 
mix of fascination and mistrust that carried on into later centuries and went on to characterize both 
artistic creation and hypnotic discourse in modernity.147 Then, I will discuss the work of Franz 
Anton Mesmer, whom Henri Ellenberger describes as the “Columbus” of dynamic psychiatry, and 
ancestor of hypnosis.148 Mesmer’s theory of animal magnetism can be considered as the material 
origin from which hypnosis emerged later on, as a psychologized and dematerialized phenomenon. 
In both cases, the various fears and fascinations which surrounded these early origins of hypnosis 
are directly linked to its association with the irrational and the “primitive,” to the threat which it 
seems to pose to the self-possessed subject of philosophical or scientific inquiry.149   
 
 
144 Pierre Janet, Principles of Psychotherapy, trans. H. M. and E. R. Guthrie (New York: The Macmillan 
company,1924), 148. 
145 Ibid., 148. 
146 See Plato, Republic, 597e3–4, 6–7. 
147 Plato, Ion, in The Dialogues of Plato, trans. Benjamin Jowett (New York: Random House, 1937), 1: 423-4. Plato’s 
description of the rhapsode and divine inspiration can be considered as one of the theoretical origins of the suspicion 
and skepticism that became directed against both hypnosis and artistic creation in Western modernity.   
148 Ellenberger, The Discovery of the Unconscious, 57. For Ellenberger, “the emergence of dynamic psychiatry can be 
traced to the year 1775, to a clash between the physician Mesmer and the exorcist Gassner.” Ibid., 53. 
149 For example, Ellenberger opposes “primitive healing” to “scientific therapy” in his discussion of shamanic healing 
practices. Ibid., 47. 
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1.1.1.1.  Poetic inspiration: Plato’s metaphor 
 
In the tradition of Western philosophy, aesthetic absorption—which as I argue, is a central 
component of the hypnotic experience—is often portrayed as an obstacle on the road towards 
knowledge and truth. Such fears can be traced back to Plato’s attack on poiesis, in the context of 
the “ancient quarrel” between philosophy and poetry to which he refers in the Republic.150 
However, although Plato’s opposition between philosophy and both rhetoric and poetry is 
developed in other dialogues—such as the Phaedrus, the Gorgias, and books II, III and X of the 
Republic—in the Ion (380 B.C.), the “hypnotic” power of artistic creator, interpreter and spectator 
alike is rendered through the use of what Kieran Murphy refers to as the “magnetotrope,” and is 
therefore especially relevant to our purposes.151 Indeed, in Plato’s famous metaphor of the 
magnetic rings, the central anxieties stemming from the suggestive power of poetic discourse are 
crystallized in an image that blends together the forces of inspiration, magnetism and possession. 
Much like hypnosis, the mysterious power at the origin of poetic discourse is both admired and 
feared, as it seems to deprive the individual of his autonomy and cognitive capacities.  
In the dialogue, Socrates’ aim is to show Ion that the rhapsode and poet are not guided by 
rules of art, but by inspiration.152 Indeed, lacking the techne that would provide them with adequate 
knowledge of the specialized art or skill of which they speak (techne kai episteme), neither Ion nor 
 
150 Plato, Republic, 607b5–6. 
151 In this thesis, the term “magnetotrope” refers to the metaphors and similes gravitating around magnetism, which 
are often transposed outside of the medical field, into to other areas of human existence. Kieran Murphy, who coined 
the term and considers it as a specific, nineteenth-century phenomenon, defines it as the “new magnetic trope that can 
be traced throughout the nineteenth century in the various magnetic analogies that evolved in discourses attempting 
to convey the nature of vital and cognitive force.” See Kieran Murphy, “Electromagnetic Thought in Balzac, Villiers 
de Isle-Adam and Joseph Breuer,” SubStance 40.2 (2011): 127. 
152 Ion is of course not a poet himself but a rhapsode, that is, both a reciter and exegete of Homer’s text, claiming to 
be “able to speak about Homer better than any man.” Although Socrates notes in the opening lines of the dialogue, 
that “no man can be a rhapsode who does not understand the meaning for the poet,” he later on defines the rhapsode 
as “an interpreter of an interpreter,” which recalls the famous description of the work of art as a mere copy of a copy, 
from the Republic. Plato, Ion, 530c; 535a.  
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Homer can, strictly speaking, claim to know what he is talking about.153  Both poet and rhapsode, 
then, speak not from knowledge, but from divine inspiration.154  
In Socrates’ description, poetic inspiration is a state akin to madness, in which creators and 
interpreters are “not in their right mind.”155 Furthermore, possession and inspiration are the 
conditions for poetic creation: only when the poet—whether epic or lyric—is “out of his senses” 
and “the mind is no longer in him” can he compose his “beautiful poems.”156 However, the men 
who “utter these priceless words in a state of unconsciousness” are not the true speakers of these 
words; they are and “possessed” by the God who speak through them.157 The same occurs in the 
case of the interpreter. When performing, Ion acknowledges that he is “besides himself” and 
admits: “at the tale of pity my eyes are filled with tears, and when I speak of horrors, my hair 
stands on end and my heart throbs.”158 Affect takes on an infectious quality, circulating freely and 
directly from Homer’s “tale” to the rhapsode, and from the rhapsode to the spectator. Like the 
hypnotic subject in the midst of a hallucinatory experience, during his recitation, Ion’s soul 
“seem[s] to be among the person or places of which [he] is speaking.”159   
To describe the manner in which divine inspiration affects and passes through the poets 
and their interpreters, Plato uses the image of a magnet to which several iron rings are suspended, 
which form a chain where each rings derives its power of attraction from the original divine 
“stone.”160 In this description, the magnet represents the original divine inspiration or Muse, whose 
influence then passes through its chain of “representants.”161 In this description, Socrates’ 
vocabulary emphasizes the power of “attraction” of the magnet, its ability to “impart” and circulate 
 
153 As Socrates playfully asks, “Are you also, Ion, the best general in Greece?” Plato, Ion, 541a. The topics that the 
rhapsode and poet speak of but to not fully know include war, human society, the gods and their intercourse with men, 
and so on. Furthermore, as Socrates observes, Ion speaks of Homer “without any art or knowledge” because “if [he] 
were able to speak of him by rules of art, you would have been able to speak of all other poets [that is, not only 
Homer]; for poetry is a whole.” Ibid., 532c.  
154 “The gift which you possess of speaking excellently about Homer is not an art, but, as I was just saying, an 
inspiration; there is a divinity moving you”; “all good poets, epic as well as lyric, compose their beautiful poems not 
by art, but because they are inspired and possessed.” Ibid., 533e. 
155, Ibid., 534a. 
156 Ibid., 533d. 
157 Ibid., 534e. 
158 Ibid., 535c. 
159 Ibid., 535c. 
160 “The stone which Euripides calls a magnet . . . not only attracts iron rings, but also imparts to them a similar power 
of attracting other rings; and sometimes you may see a number of pieces of iron and rings suspended from one another 
so as to form quite a long chain: and all of them derive their power of suspension from the original stone.” Ibid., 333e. 
161 “the spectator is the last of the rings which, as I am saying, receive the power of the original magnet. ... The 
rhapsode like yourself and the actor are intermediate links, and the poet himself is the first of them.” Ibid., 535e.  
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its mysterious force through men, who simply “receive” and “take” in the inspiration. These 
images of conductivity and receptivity portray men as mere passive vessels for the divine.162 
Furthermore, this receptivity is transformed into dispossession, as God “takes away” the minds of 
poets and “uses them as his ministers.”163 This suggests the complete heteronomy of the possessed 
poet and rhapsode, which can also be felt in the physicality of the vocabulary used to convey the 
effects of inspiration on the recipient: “there is a divinity moving you,” “God sways the souls of 
men in any direction which he pleases,” every poet is “taken hold of.”164 In the order governing 
this great chain of dependence, where “one man hang[s] down from the other,” the poet exerts the 
strongest influence in the human realm, as Socrates reminds Ion that “the greater number are 
possessed and held by Homer. Of whom, Ion, you are one, and are possessed by Homer.”165 
Although he too is but a mere vessel, Homer thus appears as the greatest magnetizer of all, and Ion 
as one of his multiple “subjects.” In this sense, the rings do not merely follow each other in a linear 
fashion. Rather, the magnetic relation is also one of subjection and subordination.166  
Finally, Socrates reminds Ion of his own “hypnotic” powers. Indeed, his performance 
imposes similar effects (and affects) on most of the spectators.167 Whereas he is initially reluctant 
to admit that he himself is mad during the performance, Ion ends up agreeing with this point: “I 
look down on them and behold the various emotions of pity, wonder, sternness stamped upon their 
countenances when I am speaking.”168 The consequences which emerge from this description of 
inspiration point to the dangerous effects of (dis)possession inflicted by poiesis onto the spectator, 
the “last of the rings” in the chain.169 This turns the pedagogical potential of art into a threatening 
affective contamination spreading from the poet to the rhapsode or actor, to the public.170 
 
162 Ibid., 533d-e. 
163 Ibid., 534d; emphasis added 
164 Ibid., 536a-c, emphasis added. This lexical field of physical possession and movement will run through numerous 
ulterior descriptions of magnetic sleep and hypnosis. 
165 Ibid., 536e. 
166 In the text it is also described as a “vast chain of dancers and masters and under-masters.” Ibid., 536a. 
167 Ironically, the manner in which Ion acknowledges the truth of the Socratic analysis is not by making an explicit 
appeal to reason, but by admitting that his soul has been “touched” by the philosopher’s words: “SOCRATES: Am I 
not right, Ion? ION: Yes, indeed, Socrates, I feel that you are; for your words touch my soul, and I am persuaded that 
good poets by a divine inspiration interpret the things of the Gods to us.” Plato, Ion, 535a. The “poetic” or “literary” 
dimension of the platonic dialogues has been underlined by numerous critics, including Iris Murdoch, who in “Art 
and Eros” and “Above the Gods,” even proposed her own attempt at writing philosophical dialogues in the platonic 
style. See Iris Murdoch, Acastos: Two Platonic Dialogues (London: Chatto and Windus, 1986). 
168 Plato, Ion, 535e. 
169 Ibid., 353e. 
170 Worth noting here is the contract between the role of affect in platonic descriptions of art and the notion of catharsis, 
both in its original Aristotelian formulation and in the work of Gotthold Lessing, as well as its medical reinterpretation 
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Paradoxically, despite the dangers of possession and loss of self, without state of inspiration is 
necessary for there to be any poetic creation at all. Indeed, without this dispossession, the 
production of poetic discourse cannot occur: “there is no invention in [the poet] until he has been 
inspired and is out of his senses. … When he has not attained to this state, he is powerless and is 
unable to utter his oracles.”171  
Furthermore, rather than unequivocally condemn and dismiss poetic discourse altogether, 
the Ion simultaneously hints at its value and beauty, when Socrates describes the poets as “sacred 
and winged” beings, who are able to draw “milk and honey” with their “beautiful” and “noble” 
words.172 Despite its condemnation of poetic discourse as a diversion away from truth, the platonic 
image of the magnet thus also anticipates the ambivalence at the heart of nineteenth-century 
conceptions of magnetic somnambulism, by depicting the relations between magnetic attraction 
and an impalpable—yet real—force which acts upon the subject and seemingly grants him 
capacities that can’t be attained in the “waking” state.  
As they were reworked throughout history, Platonic anti-mimetic discourse and attacks on 
poiesis mainly reappear in arguments that focus on the dangers, rather than the value, of hypnotic 
“dispossession.” Most of all, they can be found in late nineteenth-century conceptions of the 
hypnotic—and hysteric—subject as a simulator, to which we shall return further on in this chapter. 
However, as this initial ambiguity in the Ion indicates and as Ruth Leys has shown, although the 
history and theory of hypnotism oscillate between mimetic and anti-mimetic discourse, the practice 
encompasses both ends of the mimetic spectrum and cannot be pulled toward one side once and 
for all.173 
 
1.1.1.2. The Therapeutics of Trance States 
 
Despite this theoretical oscillation, on a practical level, the curative power of trance states 
was acknowledged very early on, remaining generally without controversy: although the question 
 
by Jacob Bernays, and in Joseph Breuer and Freud’s early work on hysteria. See Aristotle, Poetics, trans. Anthony 
Kenny (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 23; 92; Jacob Bernays, “On Catharsis: From Fundamentals of 
Aristotle's Lost Essay on the ‘Effect of Tragedy’" (1857), American Imago 61, No. 3 (Fall 2004): 319-341; Joseph 
Breuer and Sigmund Freud, “On the Psychical Mechanism of Hysterical Phenomena,” (1893), in The Standard Edition 
of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. and trans. James Strachey, Vol. 2: 1-17 (London: Hogarth 
Press, 1961). Hereafter referred to as SE. 
171 Plato, Ion, 534b. 
172 Ibid., 534a. 
173 Leys, Trauma, 50.   
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of their causes remains unelucidated, that of their effects, or efficacy, is generally acknowledged 
and has been studies by historians and anthropologists alike, in a wide variety of modalities.174 
Indeed, collective trances have been used as a curative tool for centuries and in this sense, 
situate the origins of hypnosis much earlier than the Mesmeric model. For instance, the use of 
hypnosis has been traced back by some historians to Ancient Egypt: “we have reports of shamans 
using hypnotism in Egypt more than 5, 000 years ago.”175 Similarly, the Greek and Roman cult of 
Asclepius—which flourished from the fourth century B. C. and lasted until early Christianity—
has also been considered as a form of “practiced hypnotism.”176 Furthermore, trance states play a 
central role in shamanic possession rituals, which have been studied in a wide series of cultures, 
and rather than a “primitive” phenomenon, constitute—like hypnosis—highly complex, subtle, 
and codified practices which use absorption as a therapeutic tool.177 In fact, Henri Ellenberger has 
emphasized the continuity between dynamic psychiatry and ancient shamanistic practices, arguing 
that the psychological and sociological framework in which the shamanic ritual has therapeutic 
efficacy is similar to that of the modern, Western therapeutic contract. Indeed, both depend on 
several conditions, namely: “1) the healer’s faith in his own abilities, even if he knows that part of 
the technique depends on some kind of quackery. 2) The patient’s faith in the healer’s abilities … 
3) the disease, the healing method and the healer must all be acknowledged by the social group.”178  
In this sense, an analogy can be drawn between the possession ritual and modern day “re-
enactment of an initial pathogenic trauma,” whether it appears in the psychoanalytic transference 
neurosis or in the context of an abreactive, cathartic treatment.179  Ellenberger even compares the 
 
174 See Ellenberger, Discovery, 3-52; Claude Lévi-Strauss, “The sorcerer and his magic,” in Structural Anthropology 
(New York: Basic Books, 1963). 
175 George A. Agogino, “The Use of Hypnotism as an Ethnologic Research Technique,” in Plains Anthropologist 10, 
no. 27 (1965): 32. One reference “tells of Techatoha-em-ankh, who performed hypnotism at the court of the pharaoh 
Khufu in 3766 B. C.” Gibson, (1961), 17-18. The famous Harris papyrus, which was translated by Chalias in I860, 
presents a 5, 000 years-old account of another Egyptian hypnotist,” Lapponi (1907), 6, in Agogino, Ibid. 
176 Agogino, “The use of Hypnotism as an Ethnologic Research Technique,” 32. As Agogino explains in this passage, 
at specific cult centers, after being instructed in the healing power of the supernatural, patients were taken into the 
“hypnotic room” of the temple where “temple sleep” was induced “with hypnosis and auto-suggestion.” Ibid. 
177 Possession rituals are found in the shamanistic practices of North African, Sub-Saharan, Tibetan, and Siberian 
cultures, among others. Jean Rouch’s classic documentary, Les Maîtres Fous, which studies the possession ritual of 
the Hauka in Ghana—a ritual practice which appeared in the 1920s in reaction to British colonialism—emphasizes 
the complexity of such rituals, by showing how the Hauka ritual incorporates elements of the very urban modernity 
and imperialistic culture that it seems to reject. See Les Maîtres Fous, directed by Jean Rouch (1954, Paris: Éditions 
Montparnasse, 2005), DVD. For an analysis of Rouch’s film and its relation to mimesis, see also Michael 
Taussig, Mimesis and Alterity: A Particular History of the Senses (New York: Routlege, 1992). 
178 Ellenberger, The Discovery of the Unconscious, 12. 
179 Ibid., 12. 
 46 
shamanic healing ritual to the cure of psychosis, in which  the therapist strives to establish contact 
with the remaining healthy parts of the patient’s psychotic mind:  
Could not the therapist who gives psychotherapy to a severely deteriorated schizophrenic patient … by trying 
to reconstruct the ego be considered the modern successor of those shamans who set to follow the track of 
the lost soul, trace it into the world of spirits, and fight against the malignant demons detaining it, and bring 
it back to the world of the living?180  
 
Ellenberger also attributes religious mysticism, demonic possession and exorcism to trances states, 
produced by the unconscious autosuggestions of the individual or group. In this sense, trance states 
serve as the common denominator, the core principle of these various practices. At the end of the 
nineteenth century, this continuity was drawn out and reconceptualized by Charcot, who 
considered them as manifestations of hysteria, which became the new—pathologized—common 
denominator and emphasized the symptomatic, rather than potentially curative, dimension of 
trance.  
 
1.1.2. Imponderable Materiality  
 
Nevertheless, provided the scope of inquiry is restricted to Western modernity, the main 
origin of hypnosis is customarily associated with the work of Franz Anton Mesmer (1734-1815). 
As Ellenberger has shown in The Discovery of the Unconscious, the whole field of psychological 
healing, as it is understood today, can be thought to begin with the discovery of magnetic sleep in 
1784.181 As we shall see, although it is the Marquis de Puységur who must be credited for this 
latter discovery, without the revolutionary implications of Mesmer’s initial theory of animal 
magnetism, it never would have emerged. As Adam Crabtree has observed, by locating the 
ancestry of modern psychology in the invention of magnetism, Ellenberger’s pioneering work 
introduced an alternative historical ancestor for dynamic psychiatry, claiming that “all modern 
psychological systems that accept the notion of dynamic unconscious mental activity must trace 
their roots, not to Freud, but to those animal-magnetic practitioners who preceded him by a 
century.”182  
 
180 Ibid., 9. Nevertheless, this comparison with schizophrenia tends to pathologize, rather than naturalize the shamanic 
trance, and implicitly suggests an analogy between the hypnotic and psychotic states, which I would like to deconstruct 
in this thesis. 
181 Ellenberger, Discovery, 57-69. 
182 Adam Crabtree, From Mesmer to Freud. Magnetic Sleep and the Roots of Psychological healing (New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 2009), vii. 
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Despite its foundational dimension however, Mesmer’s “discovery” of animal magnetism 
is often remembered as a pseudo-scientific hypothesis that bordered on charlatanry and that, 
despite its popularity, never received the institutional recognition from the medical field that its 
author fervently hoped for. Indeed, as Ellenberger observes, although “both Columbus and 
Mesmer discovered a new world, both remained in error for the remainder of their lives about the 
real nature of their discoveries, and both dies bitterly disappointed men.”183 However, despite its 
lack of official recognition, Mesmer’s model was highly valuable in two respects.  
First of all, it reached an astounding degree of popular success in the 1780s by providing a 
mysterious, yet purportedly scientific way of curing patients, regardless of whether they belonged 
to the lower class or to the aristocracy, just a few years before the French Revolution.184 In addition 
to this potential threat posed to Ancien Régime social stratification, the Mesmeric model created 
a pivotal shift, away from older “intrusion paradigms”—which still explained pathology from 
without, by the interventions of spirits, demons or sorcerers—to an “organic paradigm,” which 
reduced disease to a series of internal, physiological dysfunctions.185 Crucially, according to Adam 
Crabtree, Mesmer’s work also planted the seeds of the “alternate-consciousness paradigm,” which 
would emerge almost a century later, once Mesmer’s materialism had been dismissed and the 
intrapsychic causes of mental disturbance established. In this sense, Mesmer’s work, despite its 
colorful exuberance, paved the way for the discovery of the unconscious, and ulterior accounts of 
the influence “of unconscious mental activity as the source of unaccountable thoughts or 
impulses.”186  
 
1.1.2.1.  Franz Anton Mesmer. The Primal Ancestor. 
 
A Materialist Perspective 
The initial elements of Mesmer’s theory of animal magnetism appeared in 1766, when—
after beginning a course in law at the University of Vienna in 1759 and switching to medicine one 
year later—he completed his doctoral thesis, Dissertatio physico-medica de planetarum influxu.187 
As Frank Pattie has shown, Mesmer’s thesis relied heavily on Richard Mead’s 1704 De imperil 
 
183 Ellenberger, 57. 
184 Mesmer arrived in Paris in February 1778. 
185 Crabtree, From Mesmer to Freud, vii. 
186 Ibid., vii. 
187 Franz Anton Mesmer, Dissertatio physico-medica de planetarum influx (Vienna: Ghelen, 1766). 
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solis ac lunae, according to which there are tides in the atmosphere and the human body, which 
are similar to ocean tides, but emanate from the stars.188 This initial conception of a generalized 
influence of celestial bodies on the human organism first took on the label of “animal gravity” in 
Mesmer’s work. It is worth pointing out that this notion was constructed on the trope of musical 
harmony and resonance,189 which helped  conceptualize the influence of one plane on another, and 
suggested, before the final formulation of the theory of animal magnetism, the existence and 
subtlety of invisible yet “real” influences, which were not exclusively thought on the mode of the  
pathological. Indeed, as Mesmer writes:  
One must not think that the influence of the stars on us only has to do with diseases. The harmony established 
between the astral plane and the human plane ought to be admired as much as the ineffable effect of universal 
gravitation by which our bodies are harmonized, not in a uniform and monotonous manner, but as a musical 
instrument furnished with several strings, the exact tone resonates which is in unison with a given tone.190  
 
Alongside with the invisible forces such as planetary motion, gravitation, centrifugal force, 
and later on, mineral magnetism, here the emphasis on the power of music contributes to a general 
worldview in which the invisible is not opposed to empirical efficacy, but on the contrary is 
endowed with properties and effects capable of acting on material bodies.191 This subtle influence, 
which Mesmer considered as “the very foundation of life itself, the principle by which organic 
bodies carry out their vital functions,” was then reworked nine years later into the concept of 
“magnetic fluid,” which shifted the lexical field away from the musical and toward the magnetic.  
As it is now widely known, for Mesmer, the inhibition of this vital force or fluid is 
responsible for creating pathological disorders and diseases in the subject. The shift from the 
gravitational to the magnetic was the outcome of Mesmer’s 1774 experimentations with magnets, 
especially those he conducted on his patient Francisca (Franzl) Oesterlin.192 As Mesmer observed, 
the application of magnets on Franzl‘s body, after a violent initial reaction, produced a relief of 
 
188 Frank Pattie, “Mesmer’s medical dissertation and its debt to Mead’s Imperio Solis ac Lunae,” Journal of the History 
of Medicine 11, no. 3 (1956): 278. 
189 In the 1760s while he will still in Vienna, Mesmer established a solid friendship with the Mozart family. Later on, 
he himself played the glass harmonica around the baquet, maintaining the esthetic and therapeutic dimension of his 
love of music intertwined in his medical practice, both Viennese and Parisian.  
190 Mesmer, Schreiben über die Magnetkur von Herrn Dr. A. Mesmer, trans. George Bloch, in Mesmerism: A 
translation of the Original Scientific and Medical Writings of F. A. Mesmer (Los Altos, CA: William Kaufman, 1980), 
14; 19. 
191 The invisible or imponderable is thus not to be confused with the imperceptible or the impotent.  
192 Mesmer became interested in the curative properties of magnets in June 1774, when he heard of Maximillian Hell—
a Jesuit priest—’s experiments involving the cure of stomach cramps with the use of an iron magnet. He then had Hell 
make the magnets which he used in his treatment of Franzl. 
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symptoms which lasted for several hours.193 For Gassner, the crisis was taken to be the evidence 
of possession, as well as the first step in the procedure of exorcism.194 Perceiving “currents of force 
that moved through Franzl’s body” while the magnets were in place, Mesmer believed to have 
discovered the empirical existence of animal gravity, as well as the means to control and use this 
natural force to reestablish the patient’s health.195 However, at this time, the curative properties of 
the magnet were still attributed to Maximilian Hell’s original discovery, and the healing power 
was attributed to the material object itself. In his 1775  “Letter on Magnetic treatment,” Mesmer 
therefore tried to shift the focus back toward the operator’s ability to manipulate the force, arguing 
that the magnet should not be considered as a cause or a curative agent in itself: “Steel is not the 
only substance that may be used to receive magnetic power. I have been able to magnetize paper, 
bread, wool, silk, leather, stone, glass, water, various metals, wood, men, dogs—everything that I 
touch. And these magnetized objects have produced the same effects on patients as have magnets 
themselves.”196 Rather than to the magnetized object—which is interchangeable and thus 
insignificant—the cause of the cure should be attributed to the magnetizer’s ability to channel, 
direct, and project the force that restores equilibrium in the magnetic “tides” of the body—the 
latter being the main magnet. Once clearly separated from mineral magnetism, Mesmer’s healing 
technique therefore “placed the physician and his body at the center of the cure,” as both catalyst 
and curative agent.197  
While as we noted higher up, Mesmer’s insisted on the non-pathological dimension of the 
magnetic currents circulating throughout material bodies, the ability to be magnetized—later on 
theorized as hypnotic receptivity—is linked to the pathological from the start. Indeed, the magnetic 
crisis serves to correct the blockages and imbalance in the suffering patient. Magnetism affects the 
body only when its natural harmony has been disturbed by illness. Although the fluid in itself is 
not linked to pathology, its obstruction and bad circulation, which are the conditions for the 
magnetic crisis to occur, are. Sensitivity to magnetism then diminishes when the state of health 
 
193 This initially violent reaction was then presented as the beneficial “magnetic crisis” which was thought to restore 
balance in the patient’s body. 
194 Ellenberger, 63. 
195 Crabtree, 6. 
196 Mesmer, “Letter on Magnetic Treatment,” 1775, in Tischner and Bittel, Mesmer unt sein Problem, (Stuttgart: 
Hippokrates Verlag, Marquart & Cie, 1941), 38, emphasis added. Here, Mesmer’s insistence on the physician’s touch 
recalls the powers of “healers of old” who, like the king of France, would “lay hands on the ill” and perform miraculous 
cures. See Crabtree, 7. 
197 Crabtree, 7. 
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has been restored, just as later on, nineteenth-century theorists argued that hypnosis could not be 
induced in healthy patients. As we shall see further down, the “mesmeric crisis” and its violent 
convulsions reappeared one century later in Charcot’s theory of grand hypnotisme and in late 
nineteenth-century pathologizing assimilation of hypnotism to hysteria. The infectious dimension 
of the magnetic crisis was especially feared and felt by the 1784 Royal commissioners and 
observers of Mesmer’s work, who noted the erotically charged and affectively contagious, 
collective dimension of the mesmeric crisis.198  
By attributing the power of animal magnetism to the operator rather than the bodies—
mineral or animal—through which it passes, Mesmer unknowingly inaugurated the long-lasting 
tradition in which hypnotic efficacy is taken away from the subject and placed in the hands of the 
all-powerful physician: 
When he would point his index finger at her, even though from some distance, she would actually fall 
senseless to the ground—and this would occur even when he was standing behind two closed doors or a wall. 
The same thing would happen when he would press on her image in a mirror or hold up a mirror to her. A 
similar effect was produced when he sprinkled a drop of water from his hand.199 
 
 Setting aside the theatrical and symbolic dimension of magnetizer’s authoritative gestures and 
their implications for the future of the therapeutic relation—pointing a commanding finger, forcing 
the subject to face her own reflection, sprinkling not holy, but magnetized water from above, and 
so on—here, one can note the dual nature of the magnetic fluid, which is both material, and yet 
seems to transcend the laws governing ordinary material  objects.200 Conveniently, its secrets lie 
in the hands of the individual capable of mastering the fluid, which seems not only to defy the laws 
of nature and “ponderable” objects, but also to be impossible to measure or quantify. In this sense, 
despite Mesmer’s insistence on its material dimension, an “experimental” study of the magnetic 
fluid seems especially difficult to conduct. This is especially the case as the technique varies 
depending on the patient in question, lacking the objective criteria and repeatable, systematic 
 
198 “Sometimes a crisis ignited in one patient induced similar crises in others in the group. A special room was set 
aside for those who were overtaken by convulsions or other violent forms of crises in an attempt to control this kind 
of psychic contagion” Ibid. 14. 
199 Mesmer, Schreiben über die Magnetkur, Appendix, 36, in Crabtree, 8. This passage refers to the early case of a 
sixteen-year-old girl suffering from arthritis and epilepsy whom Mesmer treated near Constance in the summer of 
1775.  
200 Indeed, it can be projected from a distance or behind closed doors, its efficacy does not seem to depend on the 
quantity of magnetic water, magnetic passes can be carried out on mirror reflections rather than on the actual body of 
the patient, etc. 
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procedures of orthodox medical treatment.201 Directed at will but only by the physician, not 
dependent upon physical contact, difficult to understand and observe, its unpredictable character 
makes it an unsuitable candidate as a serious scientific discipline.202 Rather, its curative powers 
depend on a leap of faith of sorts, in which one can either submit oneself to the esoteric knowledge 
of the magnetizer without question, or dismiss the practice as unscientific—which ultimately led 
the 1784 Royal Commission appointed by the king of France to their final verdict.  
 
Science or Charlatanism?  
In his attempts to distinguish it from the occultism linked to the thaumaturgical powers of 
ancient miracle workers—and despite his reputation in Europe as somewhat of a “wonder 
doctor”203—Mesmer insisted that his therapeutic technique, being endowed with the seriousness 
of physics, called for a broad scientific experimentation that would verify its laws and grant it 
official recognition. In this sense, it is no surprise that he emitted the opinion that Father Johann 
Joseph Gassner, the well-known exorcist who had visited the Lake Constance region one year 
before him and “demonstrated a striking ability to heal the sick,” was mistaken on the nature and 
cause of the phenomena operating in the “cures” he performed with his wooden crucifix.204 With 
his conception of disease as possession and exorcism as cure, Gassner can also be considered as a 
main ancestors of suggestive therapeutics, albeit clothed in religious language. Indeed, when 
facing an ill patient, Gassner would first determine whether the cause of the disease was organic 
or due to demonic possession, by a striking use of suggestion: invoking Jesus in Latin, he would 
command that “if the disease be of supernatural origin, the pain of it should increase.”205 If nothing 
happened, he considered the illness to be natural and sent the patient to a doctor. As Ellenberger 
observes, “in that manner, he felt his position to be impeccable, both from the viewpoint of 
Catholic orthodoxy and from that of medicine.”206 However, if the patient’s condition worsened, 
 
201“At present, Herr Doctor Mesmer makes most of his cures without any artificial magnets. Rather he carries them 
our purely by repeatedly touching the ill part of the body, sometimes directly, sometimes indirectly, as circumstances 
demand.” Mesmer, Schreiben über die Magnetkur Appendix, 13. This empirical need to vary the technique according 
to the “demands of circumstance” was one of the key problematic elements that led to the Commission’s condemnation 
of animal magnetism.  
202 Similarly, later on the unpredictable results of suggestive therapeutics would be used as an argument against the 
curative value of hypnotic suggestions. 
203 Crabtree, 7. 
204 Ibid., 8. Ellenberger describes Gassner as “one of the most famous healers of all time.” Ellenberger, 53. 
205 Crabtree, 8.  
206 Ellenberger, 55. 
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he would then proceed on to exorcism. As the Catholic clergy was divided on the nature of 
Gassner’s cures, in 1775 Mesmer was invited to Meersburg and observe Gassner at work, at the 
instigation of Maximilian Joseph III. The Munich Academy of Science then invited Mesmer to 
Munich to give his opinion about the priest’s healing method. Mesmer concluded that although 
the cures were genuine, they were explainable by animal magnetism. In his view, Gassner was 
honest but deluded: the true source of the cures he produced was “the healing power of nature 
itself.”207 Therefore, Mesmer’s encounter with Gassner served two purposes. First, it strengthened 
his own conviction that animal magnetism operates most powerfully and effectively through the 
organism of the physician,” the physician’s body being the best means to augment and control 
animal magnetism. Second, it reinforced the general framework with which Mesmer’s theory 
imposed a naturalization and secularization of previous occultism or religious explanations of 
pathology.208  
Nevertheless, despite his popular success and the trust he seemed to earn from religious 
authorities, Mesmer never obtained approval from the institutional medical authorities. When he 
arrived in Paris in February 1778, Mesmer he had a thriving practice, performing both individual 
and collective treatment—centered around the famous baquet.209 Although he yearned for support 
from of the orthodox medical establishment of Paris, “acceptance by medical men of stature eluded 
him.”210 When his hearing at the Academy of Sciences did not lead to recognition, he turned to the 
Société Royale de Médecine de Paris (founded in 1778 in competition with the Faculté de 
Médecine de Paris), which proved to be a failure also. Then after having sparked Delson’s 
enthusiasm in 1779, he presented a memoire to interesting physicians of the Faculté de Médecine, 
published eventually as the famous Mémoire sur la découverte du magnétisme animal, 
summarizing the theory and tracing the history of his practice and discovery of it. In his now 
radically materialist theory of animal magnetism, Mesmer strived to distinguish his curative 
technique from the occultism linked to the powers of ancient miracle workers, and understood it 
as being endowed with the seriousness of physics, calling for broad scientific experimentation to 
 
207 Crabtree, 9. 
208 Ibid. 9. 
209 The baquet cure refers to when Mesmer began incorporating curative baths into his technique, around 1775. 
Patients would sit around the baquet, which was filled with magnetized water, and either held hands or onto magnetic 
rods which would conduct the magnetic current into their bodies. 
210 Crabtree, 12. 
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verify its laws and functioning. In the Mémoire, twenty-seven propositions summarize the theory 
of animal magnetism as it was theorized and passed on to his disciples: 
1) There exists a mutual influence between the celestial bodies, the earth and animate bodies; 2) The means 
of this influence is a fluid that is universally distributed and continuous … capable of receiving, propagating, 
and communicating all impressions of movement; 3) This reciprocal action governed by mechanical laws as 
yet unknown… 8) the animal body experiences the alternate effects of this agent which insinuates them into 
the nerves 9) It particularly manifests itself in the human body by properties analogous to the magnet … 10) 
I decided to call it “animal magnetism” … 23) The facts will show, following the practical rules that I will 
establish, that this principle can heal disorders of the nerves immediately and other disorders mediately.211 
 
After the Royal commissioners’ report however, animal magnetism was officially condemned as 
being a product of imitation, touch and the imagination.212 As its secretary, J. S. Bailly, observed 
in the 1784 report: 
The commissioners, especially the physicians, made numerous experiments on different subjects, who, they 
themselves magnetized or whom they got to believe themselves to be magnetized. … In all of these 
experiments no differences were found other than those due to a varying degree of imagination. They are 
therefore convinced by the facts that the imagination by itself can produce the different sensations and cause 
the feelings of discomfort or heat … and have concluded that it necessarily enters strongly into the effects 
attributed to animal magnetism.213   
 
In another, secret report addressed to Louis XVI—published much later, in 1800—it animal 
magnetism was further condemned for its morally subversive dimension, especially regarding the 
question of the higher susceptibility attributed to women, who were thought to be more likely to 
succumb to the influence of the magnetizer and demonstrated signs of worryingly erotic behavior 
during the magnetic crisis.214 The fear of contagiousness of the magnetic crisis was thus strongly 
linked to the moral dangers associated with its observable characteristics, which reemerged in 
nineteenth-century explanations of hysteria and the pathologizing eroticization of the crise 
d’hystérie.215 
Rejected by orthodox medicine and engaged in deep conflict with most of his disciples, 
Mesmer ended his career on a disappointed note216 He left Paris in 1785 and, after wandering 
 
211 Mesmer, Mémoire sur la découverte du Magnétisme animal (Paris: Didot le jeune, 1779), 74-83. 
212 Jean-Sylvain Bailly, Rapport des commissaires chargés par le roi de l’examen du Magnétisme animal (Paris: 
Imprimerie Royale, 1784), 72-73. 
213 Bailly, Rapport des commissaires, 39-41. 
214 See Crabtree, 89-105. 
215 For instance, in Charcot patients, “many of the movements and poses of the [hysterical] crises were erotic in 
appearance and for some patients involved overt sexual pleasure.” Crabtree, 166. Stimulation of the “hysterogenic” 
points or zones—insensitive areas of the patient’s body, close to the ovaries or the breasts, could induce or arrest an 
attack. 
216 In particular, his conflict with Nicolas Delson—sometimes spelled D’Elson—was due to Mesmer’s “paranoiac 
delusions of grandeur,” his rigid insistence on keeping his technique secret and his numerous attempts to exercise sole 
proprietorship over his technique. Although he constantly reiterated his loyalty to Mesmer, Puységur’s elaboration of 
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around Austria, Switzerland and Germany for twenty-years, moved to Meersburg on lake 
Constance in 1793, where spent the rest of his life away from the public eye.  
Despite the 1784 condemnation, Mesmer’s disappearance and the upheaval caused by the 
French Revolution, the fascination for magnetism remained unscathed during the first half of the 
nineteenth century, especially in the provinces. Present in popular culture, medical and legal texts, 
as well as in the performances of stage magnetists, its various practices and theoretical branches 
permeated the first half of the century, often crossing boundaries from one domain to another. As 
the century progressed, the theorization of magnetism moved towards a growingly immaterial and 
psychological explanation of the original material fluid, shifting the focus towards the activity of 
the subject, and the faculties of the human psyche such as the will and the imagination, which the 
Royal Commission was the first to officially invoke in its explanation of the effects of magnetism. 
 
1.1.2.2. The Marquis de Puységur: Cutting the Cord 
 
One central turning point in this progression was the discovery of “magnetic sleep” by 
Mesmer’s disciple, Armand Marie Jacques de Chastenet de Puységur (1751-1825), who is 
considered to have “stumbled across the phenomenon that would radically alter psychological 
thinking in the western world” and thereby “gave birth to the alternate-consciousness 
paradigm.”217 Although Puységur remained faithful to Mesmer throughout his life, the discoveries 
which emerged from his practical experiments with magnetism led to one of the most important 
breaks with the mesmeric model and the emergence of the new concept of somnambulism.  
 
A Peaceful Sleep. 
In his 1784, Mémoires pour servir à l’histoire et au rétablissement du magnétisme animal, 
Puységur describes that his discovery of magnetic sleep occurred accidentally by inducing it in 
 
the theory of magnetic sleep was experienced as a strong betrayal from one of his most loyal followers. See 
Ellenberger, 67-69. 
217 Crabtree, viii. Pierre Janet is usually considered as the main theorist with whom the dual consciousness paradigm 
emerged, in the 1880s. For Crabtree however, the characteristics of magnetic somnambulism described by Puységur 
in 1811 (that is, isolation, where the subject is cut off from people and objects around him and in strong rapport with 
the magnetist; concentration, an “inner preoccupation … of such intensity that [the subject] cannot be distracted from 
it” and magnetic mobility, where he subject is subjected to the thoughts of the operator in a direct and compelling 
way), to some degree, “foreshadow the much later discussion of the nature of psychological dissociation.” Crabtree, 
312-3. 
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Victor Race, a twenty-three-year-old peasant from his estate, in an attempt at classic magnetism. 
Unlike the spectacular crisis of Mesmer’s patients, however, Victor “spoke, occupying himself out 
loud with his affairs. When I realized his ideas might affect him disagreeably, I stopped them and 
tried to inspire more pleasant ones. He then became calm . . .  The next day, no longer remembering 
my visit of the evening before, he told me how much better he felt.”218 This emphasis on the 
subject’s activity—which includes speech, movement, amnesia, and most importantly, “calm”—
marks the beginning of a shift away from the Mesmeric model. Indeed, while Mesmer held that 
the violent convulsive crisis was necessary for magnetism and healing, Puységur both observed in 
Victor and advocated for, this gentle crisis.219 For him, Mesmer’s crisis room220 “ought rather to 
be called a ‘hell of convulsions’ and ought never to have existed ... It is a pity that such an 
unfortunate practice has resulted from what was originally dictated by humane concern.”221 
Puységur therefore inaugurated a new, gentler, conception of the magnetic state. For him, the true 
crisis is “the calm and tranquil state which, to the onlooker, reveals a picture of well-being and the 
peaceful work of nature effecting a return to health.”222 This redescription is a striking advance, 
which was later on overshadowed by the Charcotian model, in which the trance state can be 
distinguished from the violence of pathology and the unnatural. In Puységur’s conception, 
magnetic somnambulism is founded on the analogy with natural somnambulism: although the 
former is artificially induced, both states “involve a sleep of the exterior senses” and a disregard 
of the exterior environment.223 However, this does not mean that the subject has fallen unconscious 
in the sense of a complete lack of awareness. Rather, “if [the subject] is aware of everything around 
him, he is not completely in the magnetic state. This state of demi-crisis is very common.”224 In 
 
218 Puységur, Mémoires pour servir à l’histoire et à l’établissement du magnétisme animal (Paris: Dentu, 1784), 28-
29. 
219 Ibid., 22. 
220 Mesmer had to use a separate room devoted to collective crises as he lacked sufficient time to devote to all patients 
individually. This practice of grouping together patients undergoing the crisis at the same time was later on taken up 
by various followers. 
221 Puységur, Mémoires, 97. 
222 Ibid., 97-99. 
223 Puységur, Recherches, expériences et observations physiologiques sur l’homme dans l’état de somnambulisme 
naturel et dans le somnambulisme provoqué par l’acte magnétique (Paris: J. G. Dentu, 1811), 76. 
224 Puységur, Du Magnétisme animal, considéré dans ses rapports avec diverses branches de la physique générale, 
(Paris: Dentu, 1820), 161-169. Similarly, Bernheim would later argue that depth of trance is not necessary for 
therapeutic success, and that a state of light trance can just as well lead to the successful implementation of a 
suggestion. 
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this sense, magnetic sleep resembles a calm, concentrated state of absorption, during which the 
relation between the subject ang magnetist is especially strong. 
Indeed, one of the key elements introduced by Puységur’s technique is that the induction 
of magnetic somnambulism results in the rapport between operator and subject (often compared 
to the mother-child relation in later theories225): “in this state, the ill person enters into a very 
intimate rapport with the magnetizer, one could almost say becomes a part of the magnetizer.”226 
As Adam Crabtree has observed, Puységur conceived this becoming part of the magnetizer “quite 
literally,” explaining that “the magnetizer can cause the magnetized to perform specific actions by 
a simple act of will: “the magnetized person, he believed, is functionally inseparable from the 
magnetizer.”227 The connection is so intimate that its description includes parapsychological 
elements, such as thought transference or telepathy: “I do not need to speak to him. I think in his 
presence, and he hears me and answers me. ... When he wants to say more than I believe prudent 
for the listener, I stop his ideas, his sentences in the middle of a word and totally change his 
thought.”228 The Somnambule is therefore “subordinated” to the magnetist, who not only leads 
him to perform a given action by a mere act of will, but can also instantly perceive, control and 
modify his very thoughts.229 Significantly, in this conception, rapport is transferable.230 Indeed, 
although the subject finds the approach of anyone else than the magnetizer very uncomfortable, 
the operator also has the power to “pass on this rapport” to others, thereby transferring the 
connection.231  In this way, the hypnotic relation—still theorized as magnetic rapport—circulates 
freely among individuals, which implicitly reinforces the idea of an objective phenomenon acting 
upon the subject, regardless of who is administering it.  
By using the Mesmeric concept of a “sixth sense,”232 Puységur then distinguished four 
important therapeutic activities linked to the phenomenon of clairvoyance that could be achieved 
 
225 See for example Jean- Luc Nancy, Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen and Eric Michaud, Hypnoses (Paris: Editions Galilée, 
1984); and from an analytic perspective, Sándor Ferenczi, “The Principle of Relaxation and Neocatharsis,” The 
International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 11 (1930): 428-443. 
226 Puységur, Suite des mémoires pour servir à l’histoire et à l’établissement du magnétisme animal (Paris and London: 
N.p. 1785), 17. 
227 Crabtree, 41, emphasis added. 
228 Puységur, Mémoires, 35-36. 
229 Puységur, Recherches, expériences et observations, 83. 
230 Just as hysterical symptoms would be later on in Charcot’s theory. 
231 Puységur, Mémoires, 205; 206. 
232 “Animal magnetism should be considered in your hands as a sixth artificial sense.” Mesmer, Précis historique des 
faits relatifs au Magnétisme animal jusques en avril 1781 (London: n.p., 1781), 24. Puységur also called this sixth 
sense “clairvoyance” or “clear seeing.” Puységur, Mémoires, 33. 
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with magnetic sleep: diagnosing one’s own illness, diagnosing illness in others, prescribing the 
treatment for an illness, and foreseeing its course, which he called pressentation.233 In this context, 
the strength of magnetic rapport is one of the clearest indications that the subject is in fact in a 
somnambulistic state. Most notably, Puységur believed that “his somnambulists experienced the 
strongest dependence and rapport when they were most ill.”234 Just as the Mesmeric crisis was the 
strongest in sick patients, for him the strength of rapport is proportional to the degree of illness in 
the patients. As the latter then progressed towards good health, the strength of rapport gradually 
decreased. As Adam Crabtree has observed, Puységur believed this variability to be “so consistent 
that the degree of rapport could be used as an index of the degree of illness.”235 And indeed, as his 
first subject Victor Race predicted, once cured, he was no longer magnetizable.236  
Another specificity of Puységur’s model is that it takes into account the controversial 
phenomenon that would later on be called “post-hypnotic amnesia” by late-nineteenth-century 
physicians. Already in 1784, Puységur noted Victor’s inability to recollect the events which 
occurred during his magnetic sleep, concluding that “the demarcation [between the waking and 
somnambulistic state] is so great that one must regard these two states as two different 
existences.”237 On the other hand, in magnetic sleep Puységur notes a continuity of memory: the 
subject is able to recall the content of both the waking state and of previous magnetic states: “in 
the magnetic state, [subjects] have both the idea and memory of everything that happens to them 
in the natural state, whereas in the latter state they do not remember anything that happens to them 
while in the magnetic state … with five senses, they cannot remember ideas formed with six.238 
Furthermore, these “different existences” present highly contrasting characteristics. In the 
magnetized state, subjects reveal extra-ordinary abilities or striking personality traits that are 
absent from their waking state: “When [Victor] is in crisis, I know no one as profound, prudent, 
or clear-sighted.”239 In a sense, Puységur’s reconceptualization of the magnetic—convulsive—
crisis as a peaceful somnambulistic sleep, not only depathologizes the state of artificial 
somnambulism, but also anticipates ulterior conceptions of the Unconscious as a reservoir of 
 
233 Puységur, Mémoires, 73; 87; 111; 180.  
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236 Puységur, Mémoires, 228. 
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239 Puységur, Mémoires 32-33Ibid., inspiration-dispossession, the poet is unable to create his work of art. 
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capabilities and potentialities, as opposed to libidinal, aggressive drives or persecutory 
tendencies.240  
 
An Act of the Will 
Puységur’s “cutting the cord” from the Mesmeric model precipitated the shift away from 
physicalism and toward focusing on the mental faculties involved in inducing magnetic sleep and 
healing: “When you magnetized him your goal was to put him to sleep, and you accomplished that 
solely by the act of your will. So now it is by an act of your will that you awaken him.”241 Although 
in Puységur’s model, man is still conceived as an electric animal-machine,242 he is also endowed 
with the will, a faculty on which a tremendous amount of emphasis is placed on, thereby 
broadening the gap with Mesmer: “Our electric organization is so perfect that with the help of the 
will alone we can produce phenomena which, while being very physical, have the air of the 
miraculous.”243 Indeed, unlike what was implied in Mesmer’s physicalist, materialist framework, 
for Puységur, once rapport has been established, the will of the operator is all that is necessary to 
“move” the somnambulist subject:  
When [the operator] wants to move a magnetic being [the somnambulist] by a simple act of the will, nothing 
more astonishing takes place than what happens in our ordinary actions. I will to pick up a piece of paper on 
the table; I order my arm, and my hand to take hold of it. Since the rapport between my principal driving 
force—my will—and my hand is very intimate, the effect of my will is manifested so quickly that I have no 
need to reflect on the operation.244  
 
The object-subject rapport is as immediate as the “rapport” between will and body part. In a 
material mechanistic world (“to move”), the will has the power to create physical effects, to be 
transferred, to act, in all of its immediate potency. The importance of the material fluid is thus 
overshadowed by the powers of the mind: “The direct communication of the will to the vital 
principle is no longer in doubt for us.”245 Taking into account this immediate and powerful relation, 
 
240 The fact that late nineteenth-century cases of grande hystérie demonstrated such exuberant convulsive movements 
can in this sense be considered as a scientific “regression,” away from Puységur’s somnambulistic model and back to 
the original Mesmeric paradigm. 
241 Puységur, Du Magnétisme animal, 161-169. 
242 This conception was common at the end of the eighteenth-century. See Julien Offray de La Mettrie, L'Homme 
Machine: A Study in the Origins of an Idea. (Princeton: Princeton U.P., 1960). 
243 Puységur, Mémoires, 13. 
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245 Ibid., 62. 
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in Du Magnétisme animal (1820), Puységur will then start to sketch out an ethics of the 
therapeutic—one might even say, psychotherapeutic avant la lettre246—relation:  
If one touches [magnetizes] an ill person without intention or attention, one effects neither good nor bad … 
There is only one way to magnetize usefully: that is strongly and constantly to will the good and the benefit 
of the ill person, and never to change or vary the will … The compassion which an ill person inspires in me 
produces a desire or thought to be useful to him. And from the moment I make up my mind to try to help 
him, his vital principle receives the impression of the action of my will.247 
 
The importance of paying attention to the practitioner’s own belief and value system, to the way 
in which their own intention and affects might influence the therapeutic relation, will reemerge up 
until two centuries later, in the emphasis on the hypnotherapist’s ethical responsibilities, affective 
congruence, and in models in which the affective nature of the therapeutic relation is strategically 
used. In any case, here one can note how “Puységur turned animal magnetism into a new and 
clearly psychological direction. He explicitly opposed a materialist philosophy of nature” and in 
the end, “believed that the phenomena of animal magnetism provided strong evidence against 
it.”248 Establishing the certainty or existence of the magnetic fluid is irrelevant to the process of 
healing—what matters is the effect, not the cause: “I do not know any longer if there is a magnetic 
fluid, an electric fluid, a luminous fluid, etc. I am only sure and certain that to magnetize well it is 
absolutely useless to know whether a single fluid exists or not.”249 The value of therapeutic efficacy 
has therefore overpowered the question of theoretical or scientific inquiry.250  
With this gesture—this “cutting the cord” with the mesmeric model—Puységur inserted a 
split into Mesmeric theory, between proponents of the fluidic model on the one hand, and of the 
psychological model on the other, both of which coexisted throughout the nineteenth century.251 
With his discovery of magnetic sleep, he paved the way for the discovery of hypnotism and its 
breaking away from the materialism of the mesmeric model. 
 
 
246 Crabtree for instance titles one of his sections about Puységur “Psychotherapy.” 
247 Puységur, Du Magnétisme animal, 153-155. 
248 Crabtree, 52. 
249 Puységur, Du Magnétisme animal, 155-156. 
250 Just as Mesmer underlined the importance of lived experience in the understanding required to comprehend animal 
magnetism—an understanding which both commissions lacked, as Chertock and Stengers have argued—Puységur 
invokes a similar argument about the question of magnetizing from a distance: “this is the kind of thing that it is 
impossible to prove by rational arguments and for which experience alone provides certainty. For that reason, it is to 
men who are aware of this small part of their power that I now direct some recommendations about the best way to 
use it.” Puységur, 1785, 112-113. 
251 Ellenberger, Discovery, 148. 
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1.1.3. The Power of the Imagination   
 
As George Makari has shown in Soul Machine, despite its scientific ambition, the 
materialist monism behind Mesmerism can be considered as a paradoxical “illusion” produced by 
the  Enlightenment, a form of “faith healing” that played into the beliefs of the more educated 
members of society in the illuminating power of science: indeed, in trying to rid the world of 
superstition, “the imagination of the enlightenment subject, schooled to accept invisible forces, 
had developed into a credulity for unseen material forces.”252 In the same way that Mesmer 
reframed Father Gassner’s “soul cures” as nervous ones, and that the Franklin commission 
reframed Mesmer’s nervous cures as mental ones, Puységur paved the way for a mental, 
dematerialized conception of magnetism to appear.”253 As Bertrand Méheust has noted, the 
nineteenth-century conception of magnetism then branched out into various schools, which can 
broadly be divided into four branches: the mesmerists, who held on to the materialist conception 
of the fluid; the spiritualists, who embraced the parapsychological and occult phenomena 
associated with magnetism; the psychofluidists, who followed Puységur’s middle-road between 
materialism and a purely mental conception, and the imaginationists, who inherited the conclusion 
from the 1784 commission but, rather than dismissing the phenomenon of magnetism altogether, 
argued that the powers of the imagination held potential which could be exploited therapeutically. 
It is the latter view which, as I will show in the next section, laid the groundwork for hypnosis 
proper to emerge in the second half of the nineteenth century.254 In this section we will briefly 
examine the theoretical position of three central figures in the transition from Mesmerism to 
hypnotism. This shift in paradigms created not only a change in induction methods and curative 
techniques, but also brought about a significant change in vocabulary, demonstrating that the 
dematerialization of the phenomenon occurred early on in the century. 
 
1.1.3.1. The Abbé Faria: Anticipations of the Powers of Suggestion 
 
 
252 George Makari, Soul Machine. The Invention of the Modern Mind (New York and London: Norton, 2015), 318. 
253 Makari, 315. The commission opened up a long line of controversies surrounding the nature of the curative power 
of magnetism, which ultimately spread a paradoxical counter narrative throughout the first half of the 19th century, 
ironically linking Mesmer’s theory to its polar opposite: spiritualism and the occult. We shall return to the spiritualist 
conception of magnetism and its literary representations in the second chapter.  
254 Bertrand Méheust, “Sous le magnétisme des romanciers, le magnétisme ‘réel’,” in Traces du mesmérisme dans les 
littératures européennes du XIXe siècle (Bruxelles: Presses de l’Université Saint-Louis, 2001), 39. 
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José Custodio de Faria (1755-1819)—also called the Abbé Faria—is a pivotal figure in the 
move from theories of magnetism towards hypnotism, and in substituting the power of suggestion 
to that of the imponderable fluid. In his 1819 treatise De la Cause du sommeil lucide, he defines 
“lucid sleep” as a form of natural somnambulism which is to be “developed with art, guided with 
wisdom, and cultivated with caution.”255  Denying the existence of the fluid, he believed the true 
cause of magnetism to be psychological. Developing a new vocabulary that moved away from the 
fluidic model, he used the concept of “concentration” rather than animal magnetism and the term 
“épopte” to refer to the somnambulistic subject. The most notable modification in the Abbé Faria’s 
model is his move away from Puységur’s contention that the will of the magnetizer is the cause of 
magnetic sleep and healing. With Faria, lucid sleep is explained by the effects of suggestion—
which he called “effects announced in advance—and the focus is placed on the abilities of the 
subject, not the operator. Indeed, Faria’s induction technique takes into account the effects of the 
operator’s words, rather than his will: “I seat them comfortably and energetically pronounce the 
word ‘sleep’ ...  I tell them to close their eyes and I always say that when I will forcibly pronounce 
the command to sleep they will feel a trembling all over and will fall asleep.”256 Here, the 
physicality of the Mesmeric model—which relied heavily on the sense of touch—is replaced by a 
more verbal relation, in which the operator’s commands require the subject’s active participation 
to succeed. Indeed, for Faria, there is no external agent involved in the effects of lucid sleep. 
Rather, the magnetizer uses suggestion to allow the subject to put himself into a state of sleep, even 
when the latter “has the false conviction that he needs an external agent to accomplish this.”257 
Furthermore, for Faria, the suggestions responsible for the healing powers of lucid sleep are 
effective “whether made in lucid sleep or in the waking state.”258 With this idea, Faria thus 
anticipates the Bernheimian theory of suggestion, indicating that the subject’s abilities are 
constantly available, rather than dependent on the state of trance.259  
 
1.1.3.2.  Cuvilliers: The New Vocabulary of the Imaginationists 
 
 
255 José Custodio de Faria, De la cause du sommeil lucide, ou étdue de la nature de l’homme (Paris: Mme Horiac, 
1819), 22.  
256 Faria, Ibid.,192-193. 
257 Crabtree, 123. 
258 Faria, De la cause, 51; 78. 
259 See Bernheim, “Suggestion in the Waking State,” in Suggestive Therapeutics, 78. 
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Similarly, Hénin de Cuvilliers (1755-1841) and his pivotal imaginationist position, according to 
which “it is truly the imagination that always produces the pretended magnetic phenomena,” and 
his rejection of the occult elements associated with animal magnetism brought about a similar need 
for a new vocabulary.260 As Adam Crabtree has observed, Cuvilliers developed—among others, a 
set of terms gravitating around the Greek hypnos:  
Somnambulists were called hypnoscopes (those who see while asleep), hypnologues (those who talk during 
sleep) and hypnobates (those who walk during sleep); the process of producing somnambulists was called 
hypnoscopie; and hypnocratie referred to the power that produced the effects of hypnoscopie.261  
 
Thus, the traditional attribution of the coinage of the term “hypnotism” to James Braid in 1842-43 
must be reconsidered in light of Cuvilliers’ earlier terms, which include hypnotisme, hypnotiseur, 
and hypnotiste.262  
As in Faria, with Cuvilliers we find the notion that the success of magnetic action is 
attributable to a shared self-delusion, both on the part of the magnetist—who believes he produces 
the magnetic phenomena by directing the fluid with the force of his will—and the operator—whose 
delusion makes the effects of magnetism “real.” In other words, the effects are caused by both 
subjects’ imaginations, “fired by the expectation of a particular outcome.” In this way, without 
realizing it, the magnetizer and subject “cooperate psychologically to produce the effect ... 
suggested by the words or actions of the magnetizer or by the context of the encounter, which 
creates the expectation of certain phenomena.”263 As we will note further down, this imaginationist 
position anticipates twentieth-century social-psychological theories of hypnotism that define 
hypnotic phenomena as the product of tacit cooperation between two individuals, engaging various 
modes of role playing and expectancies on the part of subject. With Cuvilliers, we get an early 
sense that the responses of the subject to the operator’s words and commands are the true “agent,” 
the actual cause of the—observable yet unexplainable—mysterious magnetic effects. From 
Puységur to Faria to Cuvilliers, with this shift from mesmerism to psychofluidism to 
imaginationism, the agent has shifted from an external material force—the fluid—to an external 
immaterial force—the operator’s will—to an internal psychological force—the subject’s 
imagination.  
 
260 Cuvilliers, Archives 5:55-57 in Crabtree, 125. 
261 Crabtree, 124. 
262 Ibid., 124, note 6. 
263 Ibid., 125. 
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 1.1.3.3. James Braid: From Magnetism to Neurypnology 
 
James Braid (1795-1860), the Scottish surgeon associated with the coinage of the term 
“hypnotism,” claims that his initial encounter with magnetism occurred in 1841 when he attended 
a demonstration by a mesmerist called Lafontaine, in Manchester. This encounter was initially 
tinged with skepticism, as Braid suspected magnetic phenomena were the result of “collusion or 
delusion, or of excited imagination, sympathy or imitation.”264 At a second demonstration that 
occurred six days later however, Braid observed that the magnetized subject was unable to open 
his eyes, which led him to elaborate his own theory—and induction method—of hypnosis, based 
on the phenomenon of eye fixation. With this theory, Braid challenged Lafontaine’s ideas and 
inaugurated a pivotal break away from the mesmeric model, which traditionally induced 
magnetism with a series of “passes,” that is, with gestures and movements serving to direct the 
fluid in a given direction. In Braid’s model, the fluid itself disappears completely, and hypnotism 
is both induced and explained by the effects of fixation on the subject’s brain and body:265  
The phenomena of mesmerism were to be accounted for on the principle of derangement of the state of the 
cerebral-spinal centres and … by a fixed stare, absolute repose of the body, fixed attention, and suppressed 
respiration, concomitant with the fixity of attention ... That the whole depended on the physical and psychical 
condition of the patient … and not at all on the volition, or passes of the operator, throwing out a magnetic 
fluid, or exciting into activity some mystical universal fluid or medium.266  
 
As magnetic sleep is a particular state of the brain and spinal cord, its phenomena can be explained 
by “the brain [having] an impressibility stamped on it which renders the patient subject to be acted 
on entirely through the imagination, and this is the grand source of the follies which have misled 
 
264 James Braid, Neurypnology, ed. A. Waite (London: G. Redway, 1899), 98. 
265 Braid’s method of eye fixation, which involves concentrating the gaze on a fixed point or a small, bright object 
about fifteen inches above the subject’s head until they experience considerable eye train, vibratory motion and 
eventually, temporary paralysis or catalepsy of the eyelids, is still used by hypnotists today and considered a classic 
hypnotic induction. It is worth noting, however, that eye fixation was already used by magnetists, including Mesmer 
in his own magnetic cures of the late 1700s, but was combined with a complex system of magnetic passes: “Mesmer 
would vary his passes according to the problem being treated. The Magnétisme à grand courant were passes which 
traverse the patient’s whole body, sweeping from the top down, hands placed in a pyramid shape, then back up. The 
Passes longitudinales were made from a distance, either with the pyramid shape of the fingers, or through wands of 
brass or iron.” Crabtree, 14. The Magnétisme à grand courant was also applied to a tree, with patients holding on to 
ropes tied to its branches. As we shall see in Chapter 2, this intricate system of magnetic passes and process of 
magnetizing a tree will be severely mocked in Flaubert’s Bouvard et Pécuchet. Significantly, Pierre Janet, who greatly 
admired the magnetists, still used a combination of verbal suggestions and passes well into the 1890s. 
266 Braid, Neurypnology, A. Waite edition (London: G. Redway, 1899), 101-102.  
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… the animal magnetisers.”267 The extraordinary power of an external agent—of the operator or 
the fluid—need not intervene in this explanation.  
In 1842, Braid published a central pamphlet titled Satanic Agency and Mesmerism 
Reviewed, in which he explains the nature and causes of mesmerism on the basis of purely 
psychological and psychological elements, using the terms neurohypnology and neurohypnotism 
to replace that of mesmerism, transposing the Greek the notions of “nerve” and “sleep” into 
English.268 With this new vocabulary, he described the subject as being under “hypnotic influence” 
and undergoing “hypnotic sleep,” and the process of producing the state as “hypnotizing.”269  In 
his seminal work Neurypnology (1843), he then confirmed the establishment of such 
terminology.270 After a period during which he experimented with “phreno-hypnotism,” in 1845 
Braid narrowed his focus, studying the way in which the physiological can be influenced by mental 
processes or “efforts,” both voluntary and involuntary.271 In this way, he participated in theorizing 
hypnotism in psychological terms, defining it as a state of concentrated attention and absorption 
of the mind on a given idea: 
The condition is essentially one of mental abstraction or concentration of attention, in which the powers of 
the mind are engrossed, if not entirely absorbed, with a single idea or train of thought, and concurrently 
rendered unconscious of, or indifferently conscious to, all other ideas or impressions.272 
 
In a sense, Braid’s new model thus anticipated the concept of monoideism which later 
appeared in fin-de-siècle explanations of dissociation, hysteria and the neuroses. Indeed, for Braid, 
the individual can suffer from the presence of “dominant” or “fixed” ideas, which impact not only 
the mind but also the body, in either beneficial or harmful ways.273 As a form of absorption 
 
267 Braid, “Animal Magnetism,” in Medical Times (March 12, 1842): 283. 
268 Braid, Satanic Agency and Mesmerism Reviewed (Manchester: Sims and Dinham, Galt and Anderson, 1842). As 
Adam Crabtree explains, this pamphlet was a response to a sermon that declared mesmerism to be the work of the 
devil. See also James Braid, “Neuro-hypnotism,” in Medical Times (July 9, 1842): 239. 
269 As Crabtree observes, this is “the first appearance in print of a terminology that would become standard, up until 
this day.” Crabtree, 158. 
270 James Braid, Neurypnology; or the Rationale of Nervous Sleep, Considered in Relation with Animal Magnetism 
(London: John Churchill, 1843). The adjective “hypnotic” concerns the state of nervous sleep, the verb to “hypnotize” 
refers to the induction of such sleep, to “dehypnotize” is to restore the subject from the state of nervous sleep, and the 
“hypnotist” is the one who practices hypnotism. See Braid, Neurypnology, 94. 
271 Braid, On Hypnotism. Neurypnology ed. A. Waite (London: G. Redway, 1899), 212. With “phreno-hypnotism,” 
Braid induced nervous sleep, before applying pressure or friction to the subject’s head in order to stimulate various 
“organs” of the brain.  
272 James Braid, Electrico-Biological Phenomena Considered Physiologically and Psychologically (Edinburgh: 
Sutherland and Knox, 1851), 6. 
273 As Crabtree indicates, Braid distinguished the general doctrine of the influence of dominant ideas on mental and 
physical processes—which he called monoideology, or psycho-physiology—from the condition in which the mind is 
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centered on a single idea, hypnotism can be used to generate new fixed ideas, or direct the patient’s 
attention away from detrimental ones. Indeed, it functions in a similar manner, by concentrating 
the mind on an idea or impression to the exclusion of others. This state of absorbed focus has 
physiological repercussions which explain the extraordinary effects and curative power of 
magnetism, which are due to the power of mental processes and suggestions on the body. Indeed, 
the mere direction of the attention onto an idea can bring about various bodily changes—such as 
the production of saliva, tears, lactation, blushing or palpitations from fear, and so on. In this way, 
as Adam Crabtree puts it, Braid attributed “all peculiar phenomena of memory, all apparently 
supernormal perceptions, all unusual physiological effects and all curative powers” to the subject’s 
state of concentrated attention, framing a conception of hypnotism in “purely psychological 
terms.”274  
Indeed, for Braid, hypnotism is neither an unnatural nor a supernatural state, but rather an 
amplification tool, a means of increasing—and thereby of controlling—the power of the mind over 
the somatic, which already exists in the natural, waking state. For Braid, hypnosis “merely enables 
us to control and direct the natural functions, either exciting them or depressing them, as required, 
with more certainty and intensity than the normal waking condition.”275 Indeed, 
Since it cannot be doubted that the soul and the body can mutually act and react upon each other, it should 
follow, as a natural consequence, that if we can attain to any mode of intensifying the mental power, we 
should thus realize, in a corresponding degree, greater control over physical action. Now this is precisely 
what my processes do—they create no new faculties; but they give us greater control the natural functions 
that we possess during the ordinary waking condition.276 
 
Hypnotism, then, is brought back into the realm of the natural. It helps create new fixed ideas by 
using the curative power of suggestion (or “expectant ideas”) and redirecting the attention:  
By our various modes of suggestion ... we fix certain ideas, strongly and involuntarily in the mind of the 
patient, which thereby act as stimulants or as sedatives, according to the purport of the expectant ideas ... For 
this purpose I feel convinced that hypnotism may be applied in the cure of some forms of disease with the 
same ease and certainty as our most simple and approved methods of treatment.277  
 
 
possessed by a dominant idea—which he called monoideism, or ideo-dynamic. See Braid, The Physiology of 
Fascination and the Critics Criticized (Manchester: Grant, 1855), 9-10; Crabtree 161. 
274 Crabtree, 160-1. 
275 James Braid, “Magic, Mesmerism, hypnotism, etc. historically and physiologically considered,” Medical Times 11 
(1844-1845): 297. 
276 Braid, “Hypnotic Therapeutics, Illustrated by Cases,” Monthly J. Medical Science 17 (1853):12. 
277 Braid, Ibid., 8. 
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Excluding diseases with a “purely organic” cause, Braid made frequent therapeutic use of hypnosis 
to cure or provide symptom relief in disorders which include physical symptoms.278 However, it 
is for his pioneering experimentation with hypnotic analgesia that he is mostly remembered for. 
Indeed, after inducing nervous sleep, Braid observed “low circulation and suppressed respiration” 
in the subject, during which “the blood, from being thus insufficiently arterialized, acts as a 
narcotic.”279 In this way, provided that “the attention has also been fixed in some particular train 
of thought, every other function becomes deadened in an extraordinary degree, so that severe 
operations and inflictions may be done in that state without the patient evincing any apparent 
consciousness of pain.”280 Braid also distinguished two “degrees” of hypnotism, one of which he 
described as a “sub- or half waking condition” and the other as a full state of hypnotism, also called 
“second conscious” or “double conscious,” which according to him is necessary for “the most 
striking phenomena” to take place.281 
Braid’s theory of hypnotism can therefore be considered as  the origin of the suggestive 
therapeutics that would develop at the end of the century, in the work of Hippolyte Bernheim and 
Pierre Janet.282 However, as Alan Gauld argues, although his work “foreshadows” the hypnotic 
and psychotherapeutic movements of the late nineteenth century,” it cannot be thought of as having 
“influenced” them, strictly speaking.283 Indeed, although his model—which attempted to produce 
scientific explanation of hypnotism that would also naturalize the occult—helped mitigate 
skepticism about magnetism in Great Britain and France in the 1850s, its effects did not last. As 
Gauld puts it, the “little bit of interest in Braidism” that appeared in the 1850s had already 
evaporated by the end of the 1860s.284  This is in great part due to the strong wave of spiritism—
 
278 For instance, although Braid claimed to have cured or ameliorated conditions like epilepsy, gout, menstrual 
disorders, constipation, headache, paralysis, spinal irritation and gout with hypnosis, when the cause of the condition 
is “purely organic,” hypnotic treatment cannot bring about a cure. See Braid, “Hypnotic Therapeutics,” 19; Crabtree, 
161-162; Gauld 286-287. 
Crabtree, 162. 
279 Braid, “Hypnotic Therapeutics,” 9. 
280 Ibid., 9. 
281 Braid, Ibid., 5; 26; Crabtree, 161. As we say, this notion of a “double” consciousness is already sketched out in 
Puységur’s model. By insisting on the importance of inducing a “full” state of hypnotism—later on called “deep 
hypnotic trance”—Braid disagrees with conceptions such as those of the Abbé Faria or Bernheim, for whom 
suggestions and suggestive therapeutics are also efficacious in the waking state. 
282 This can especially be felt in one of Braid’s more “psychological” cases, where a patient was suffering from 
“insanity” and “haunted with the idea of the personal presence of a departed relative.”  After having “a different idea 
excited in her mind” during hypnosis, she never experienced the “unwelcome apparition” again. See Braid “Hypnotic 
Therapeutics,” 19 and Crabtree, 162. 
283 Gauld, A History of Hypnotism, 286. 
284 Ibid., 288.  
 67 
which had developed in the United States—that, as Henri Ellenberger has shown, began flooding 
Europe, sweeping over England and Germany in 1852, and France in 1853. Although the advent 
of spiritism was important in the advent of dynamic psychiatry—as it provided “psychologists and 
psychopathologists with new approaches to the mind” and scientists and physicians strived to 
explain its manifestations—it also tied hypnotism to a series of paranormal and parapsychological 
phenomena—ranging from telepathy and clairvoyance to mediumship and table turning—that 
severely undermined its scientific pretensions.285  
As we shall see in Chapter 2, in both the popular and literary imagination, the association 
between magnetism, Mesmerism and the occult was systematically projected onto hypnotism, 
creating a confusion that late nineteenth-century literary authors frequently exploited in their 
fictional works.  
Due to the mid-century resurgence of occultist practices and spiritualism, from the 1860s 
to the 1880s, magnetism and hypnotism had thus “fallen into such disrepute that a physician 
working with these methods would irretrievably have compromised his scientific career and lost 
his medical practice.”286” It would take two decades for this period of decline of to end and for 
interest in hypnotism to be revived in the 1880s and 1890s,  a decade which is considered by 
historians as being the “heyday” and “Golden age” of hypnotism, proper.287  
 
1.1.4. The Golden Age of Hypnotism 
 
During this Golden age, hypnotism received sufficient institutional recognition and 
managed to separate itself from both the fluidist-materialist monism and the aura of 
supernaturalism linked to Mesmerism. In this way, during the fin-de-siècle period, it became the 
“royal road to the unknown mind.”288 During its decline, European psychiatry had in the meantime 
 
285 Ellenberger, 85. 
286 Ellenberger, 85. Indeed, in the second half of the century, the electromagnetotrope was no longer used to explained 
the functioning of the nervous system and the magnetists who continued to practice in the later part of the century 
were “for the most part either persons involved in occultisms of one sort or another, or unorthodox healers catering 
for a rather simple-minded clientele.” Gauld, 266. As Ellenberger notes, Auguste Ambroise Liébeault, to whom we 
will return further down, was among the few practitioners who dared experiment with hypnotism during this time. 
Nevertheless, according to Alan Gauld, if Braid influenced a school of thought, it was Charles Richet and the 
Salpêtrière school, rather than Liébeault and the Nancy school which emerged from it. See Gauld, 288. 
287 The decline of mesmerism-hypnotism occurred against a background “rather brash” medical and scientific 
materialism which culminated in the 1870s while “the last remnants of romantic nature-philosophy sputtered fitfully 
toward the horizon.” Gauld, 297. 
288 Ellenberger, 112. 
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taken a turn towards purely organic approach, with a strong emphasis on neurophysiology and 
neuroanatomy, on “the hospital, the clinic, and even the autopsy table, as the arenas within which 
alone significant advances were likely to be made.”289 In order to gain scientific legitimacy, 
hypnosis thus had to adapt to the experimental methods and organicist approach that would 
guarantee its status as an object of scientific inquiry. 
In what follows, we will discuss its use in the three main practitioners and theorists of the 
French fin-de-siècle period, whose names remain associated with hypnotism to this day: Jean-
Martin Charcot from the Salpêtrière school, Hippolyte Bernheim from the Nancy school, and 
Pierre Janet, whose medical career was preceded by one in philosophy. Despite the strong 
divergences in their theoretical positions, all three stand out as central figures whose work had a 
seminal influence not only in medical and literary fields of the time, but also on Freud himself, 
during the early years which led to the invention of psychoanalysis. An examination of the fin-de-
siècle pre-Freudian unconscious in the work of these three French hypnotists therefore helps bring 
to the foreground the various competing models which existed in the early days of dynamic 
psychiatry, and the complex web of interactions and influence from which the “psychical 
unconscious” in its analytic formulation was able to emerge.  
 
1.1.4.1. Charcot’s Fantasy 
 
During the years 1870-1893, Jean Martin Charcot (1835-1893) was considered to be the 
greatest neurologist of his time. In 1862, he was appointed chief-physician at one of the largest 
sections of the Salpêtrière hospital in Paris, and began investigating the phenomenon of hysteria 
in the 1870s.290 While his career reached its paroxysm in 1880-1882, Charcot’s interest in 
hypnotism, “of which he undertook a purportedly scientific study,” began in 1878 and used 
“several of the most gifted of his female hysterical patients” as its subjects.291 In addition to his 
experimental research, Charcot also conducted weekly lectures, which were notoriously divided 
into the formal—and highly theatrical—Friday lectures, and the more private and informal, 
 
289 Gauld, 297. As Gauld puts, it: in this context, “the psyche was almost squeezed out of psychiatry.” Ibid. 
290 As Ellenberger explains, when Charcot first arrived at the Salpêtrière as an “interne,” it was still “an old hospital,” 
serving mainly as “a medical poorhouse for four or five thousand old women.” In 1870, he assumed the charged of a 
special ward containing epileptic and hysteric female patients. Having to distinguish the epileptic patients from the 
hysteric ones who had “learned to imitate epileptic crises,” he then began his investigation of hysteria with his disciple 
Paul Richer, using the same method as for the investigation of organic neurological diseases. See Ellenberger 89-90. 
291 Ellenberger, 90.  
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Tuesday clinical demonstrations.292 With hypnotism, Charcot was able to produce a clinical picture 
identical to the one found in hysteria, and reproduce artificially the various phenomena—such as 
paralyses, contractures and convulsions—from which the hysteric patient suffered. Charcot’s work 
followed a somatological approach, fitting the scientific theories and methods of the time, which 
frequently reverted to hereditary degeneration as an explanation of pathology and searched for the 
organic causes of psychological disease.293  
However, in spite of this “heavily organic psychiatry” and in the context of a  “resolutely 
experimental medicine” influenced by Claude Bernard, with Charcot’s work on hypnotism and 
hysteria, doctors and researchers also spoke of “an emerging experimental psychology, with 
hypnotism as its favored tool.”294As Ellenberger notes, the acceptance of Charcot’s findings on 
hypnotism by the Académie des Sciences—which he read publicly to them in 1882—constituted 
a true tour de force, given that the Academy had condemned hypnotism three times within the past 
century under the name of magnetism.295 Charcot’s work thus “gave hypnotism a new dignity” 
and with his seminal 1882 paper, “the heretofore shunned object once again became the topic of 
innumerable publications.”296  
 
Hypnosis as an Object of Experimental Scientific Inquiry 
The results of Charcot’s observations on hysteric patients were transcribed in systematic 
form by his pupil Paul Richer in the Études cliniques sur l’hystéroépilepsie ou grande hystérie, 
(1881). According to the Salpêtrière school, the typical hysteric crisis followed four distinct 
phases: epileptoid, clownish, passionate and hallucinatory.297 As for hypnosis, which itself was 
 
292 As Gauld notes, the theatrical dimension of the formal lectures was emphasized by stage lighting, the use of 
photographic slides and the scrupulous preparation of the presentation which Charcot would deliver to an audience 
composed not only of men of science, but also of laymen and society figures, journalists and writers. During the 
Tuesday demonstrations on the other hand, discussion was open, and Charcot would examine patients, including ones 
he had not seen before. Gauld, 307-308. 
293 Gauld, 298. 
294 Finn, 124. 
295 Ellenberger, 90. Pierre Janet describes it as the “break[ing] of a dam behind which a vat head of water had been 
accumulating.” See Pierre Janet, Psychological Healing: A Historical and Clinical Study, vol. 1 (New York: 
Macmillan, 1925), 170-171. 
296 Ellenberger, Ibid. See Jean-Martin Charcot, “Physiologie pathologique. Sur les divers états nerveux déterminés 
par l’hypnotisation chez les hystériques,” Comptes-rendus hebdomadaires de l’Académie des Sciences 94 (1882): 
403–5.  
297 Paul Richer, Études cliniques sur l’hystéroépilepsie ou grande hystérie (Paris: Delahaye & E. Lecrosnier, 1881). 
The “epileptoid” stage, itself composed of “tonic” and “clonic” phases, lasted for about five minutes. The “clownish” 
stage involved the production of exuberant, disordered movements, including the famous arc de cercle, which 
resembles demonic possession. In the passionate phase (phase des attitudes passionnelles), the subject mimed or acted 
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considered as an artificially created neurosis, Charcot developed a nosography which divided it 
into three successive phases—catalepsy, lethargy and somnambulism.298 The somatic phenomena 
demonstrated during what Charcot called “grand hypnotisme”—namely, neuromuscular 
hyperexcitability and cataleptic plasticity—served to illustrate the summum and most sophisticated 
of the hypnotic-hysterical states, which was only demonstrated in a small number of talented 
subjects.299 George Guillain gives a convenient summary of the views of the Salpêtrière school on 
hypnotism:300  
(1) Hypnosis is an artificially induced morbid condition; a neurosis found only in the hysterical. (2) Women 
are more easily influenced than men; children and old people are insusceptible. (3) Hypnosis can be produced 
purely by physical means; a person can be hypnotized unknown to himself. (4) Hypnotic phenomena can be 
induced, transferred or terminated by metals, magnets and so forth.301 
 
Charcot’s pupils claimed that with his work on hypnotism, he was “the first” to have produced 
“material symptoms, which give to some extent an anatomical demonstration of the reality of a 
special state of the nervous system.”302  
On the one hand, it has been pointed out that Charcot’s views, due to their strong organicist 
dimension, can be considered as a revised form of the physicalist-fluidist theory initiated by 
Mesmer.303 On the other, some historians, such as Lilian Furst, have underlined an ambiguity in 
 
out a series of emotions ranging from fear to erotic desire, to ecstasy, hence the association between hysteria and the 
concept of mimesis. Finally, the hallucinatory phase involved a period or delirium and disorientation. See Richer, 253-
323. All of these phases are captured in the famous iconography of the Salpêtrière, composed of numerous 
photographies and in Richer’s drawings.  
298 According to Charcot and his disciples, the main bodily manifestations of hypnosis are also those of hysteria, with 
which it also shares the common trait of heightened suggestibility. During the “cataleptic” phase, the patient is 
immobile but not stiff, her limbs will stay in place regardless of the position given to them and will be especially prone 
to acting out emotional states or attitudes. In the “lethargic” state, she seems to enter a state of deep sleep and becomes 
insensitive to stimuli and suggestions. In the “somnambulistic” phase, obtained by “rubbing the head” of a patient in 
the previous phases, produce anesthesia and “neuromuscular hyperexcitability,” as well as high suggestibility. Unlike 
the automaton-like behavior of the cataleptic, the somnambulist interprets suggestions “intelligently” and actively. 
See Gauld, 312-313.  
299 J. M. Charcot, “Physiologie pathologique. Sur les divers états nerveux determinés par l’hypotisation chez les 
hystériques,” Comptes Rendus hebdomadaires des séances de l’Académie des Sciences 94 (February 13, 1882): 403. 
300 The school was composed of Charcot and his disciples, among whom Paul Richer (1849-1933), Pierre Marie (1853-
1940), Gilles de la Tourette (1857-1904), J. F. F. Babinski (1857-1832) and Charles S. Féré (1852-1907).  
301 George Guillain, “J. M. Charcot, His Life—His work,” in Foundations of Hypnosis, ed. M. Tinterow (Springfield; 
IL: Charles C Thomas Publisher, 1970), 425. Indeed, in a manner strikingly reminiscent of Mesmer’s late eighteenth-
century experiments with Hell’s magnets, Charcot used metalloscopy and metallotherapy to supplement or enhance 
the hypnotic phenomena which he elicited and, as he claimed, could be transferred (transfert), notably in the case of 
paralysis, from one area of the body to another. 
302 Alfred Binet and Charles Féré. Le Magnétisme animal (Paris: Ancienne Librairie Germer Baillère et Cie., 1890), 
85-86. 
303 Gregory McGuire, “The collective subconscious: psychical research in French psychology (1880-1920),” Presented 
at the 92nd Annual Meeting of the APA (Toronto: August 25-28, 1984), 12ff.  
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Charcot’s work, where he also seems on the verge of recognizing the psychological factors in 
hysteria.304 Indeed, later in his career, Charcot came to lay “increasing emphasis” upon the 
psychological factors that might interfere in the production of the neuroses.305 This is especially 
the case with the diagnosis of hystero-traumatization (that is, the “traumatic neuroses” appearing 
in the patient after an accident306), as well as the question of  the “functional lesions” in the 
hysterical subject and the “dynamic” role of conscious and unconscious memories in the etiology 
of neurosis and hysteria.307 According to Furst, “more than his predecessors,” Charcot attributes a 
“major significance to psychic trauma,” if not in the—hereditary—causes of neurosis, at least in 
its acceleration or onset in the nervous individual or hysterically predisposed subject.308 
Nevertheless, it is important not to overemphasize the role of the psychological in Charcot’s work. 
Indeed, until the end of his career, Charcot remained attached to the doctrine of anatomical 
localization and mistrustful of psychology, which, as he writes, is merely “the rational physiology 
of the cerebral cortex.”309 In Charcot’s work, psychology remained subjugated to physiology. In 
this sense, with its emphasis on the somatic and its association between hypnosis and the 
pathological, hysterical crisis, Charcot’s doctrine can indeed be thought to “hark back” to 
Mesmer’s materialist model and its description of the magnetic crisis.310 
Nevertheless, Charcot payed special attention in distinguishing his theory of hypnotism 
from the older practices of the magnetists, which lacked the scientific rigor demonstrated in his 
own experimental method. In his 1883 Exposé des titres scientifiques, Charcot affirmed that his 
 
304 See Lilian Furst, Before Freud, Hysteria and Hypnosis in Later Nineteenth-Century Psychiatric Cases (Lewisburg, 
Bucknell University Press, Lewisburg PA: Bucknell, 2008), 114-118.  
305 Gauld, 310. 
306 For instance, in his later years, Charcot distinguished between traumatic and organic paralysis, noting the 
similarities between the paralysis resulting from trauma and those he observed in hysterical subjects. After using 
hypnotic suggestion to reproduce its symptoms, Charcot concluded that the traumatic shock, because of the strain 
imposed on the nervous system, could produce a spontaneous hypnotic state which creates paralysis in the subject by 
the means of autosuggestion: “the idea arises in the patient’s mind that he might become paralyzed; in one word, 
through auto-suggesiton, the rudimentary process becomes real.” J. M. Charcot and P. Marie, “Hysteria mainly 
hystero-epilepsy,” in A Dictionary of Psycholgical Medicine vol 1 (London: L J. and A. Churchill, 1892), 633. See 
also Crabtree, 167 and Gauld, 313. 
307 Richer, Études cliniques sur la grande hystérie ou hystero-épilepsie, 2nd Edition (Paris: Delahaye et Lecrosnier, 
1885), 509.  
308 As Lilian Furst argues, “if the resultant picture is confused, it is because Charcot himself was undecided; he would 
have preferred a physical causality as more straightforward and open to proof; however, he has to make concessions 
and compromises with the possible role of psychological elements.” In a case involving a women’s functional amnesia 
for instance, “since he was unable to pinpoint the pathological lesion for hysteria, Charcot had to concede that it was 
perhaps not a purely organic disease.” See Furst, Before Freud, 114-115. 
309 Furst, Ibid., 24. 
310 Crabtree, 167. 
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investigation on hypnotism constituted an absolute break—despite his personal, aesthetic and 
historical interest in possession and its representation in the visual arts311—with any occult or 
supernatural elements still associated with the practice. As he describes it, “every attempt was 
made [in his work] to avoid being attracted by the esoteric or the extraordinary, a peril which in 
this scientifically unexplored field was encountered, so to speak, at every step of the way.”312 
Following a rational and clearly laid out method, the investigator must: 
Confine himself at first to an examination of the most simple and constant factors … and only investigate 
later and still with caution the more complex or evasive phenomena; and finally, to omit systematically … 
those phenomena which are of a much more obscure nature and which for the moment do not appear to 
correlate with any known physiological mechanisms.313  
 
According to Charcot, it is “largely because these very simple precautions have been overlooked 
that the study of hypnotism as an experimental neurosis … have not until now borne fruit.”314 
 
The Experimental Theater 
On the one hand, Charcot thus gave to hypnotism the status of a legitimate scientific object, 
meeting the standards of rational and experimental scientific study of his time.315 On the other 
hand, it has become a well-known argument that, having “created a type of hysteria by suggestion,” 
he ended up producing a clinical picture that was “totally artificial,” for several reasons.316 
First of all, the experiments at the Salpêtrière and his Friday demonstrations, which 
attracted large crowds, have frequently been compared to the theatrical stage on which actresses 
perform for their director and audience. Indeed, as Alan Gauld notes, the entire doctrine of the 
Paris school was based on the performance of no more than a dozen of Charcot’s hysterical, female 
“star subjects.”317 Elaine Showalter, for example, has underlined the way in which Augustine, one 
 
311 Indeed, Charcot and Paul Richer edited Les Démoniaques dans l’art (1887) and Les difformes et les malades dans 
l’art (1889), which compiled collected images and representations of epileptics, ecstatics and hysterics in paintings 
and other mediums such as mosaic, bas-reliefs, tapestries, and so on. As Lilian Furst notes, “in these images, scenes 
of histrionic spectacle mingle with the medical, as indeed they did in Charcot’s lectures and case presentations.” Furst, 
116. 
312 Charcot, Exposé des Titres Scientifiques (Paris: Victor Goupy et Jourdan, 1883), 149. 
313  Charcot, Ibid., 149, emphasis added. 
314 Ibid. 
315 As Michael Finn notes, other Parisian doctors and researchers, such as Jules Luys at La Charité hospital and 
Amédée Dumontpallier at La Pitié, also and conducted “public demonstrations of hypnotized behavior. Finn, 125. 
316 Guillain, 245; Gauld, 308. 
317 Gauld, 311. 
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of Charcot’s most famous subjects, would perform “scenes, acts tableaux and intermissions” at the 
Salpêtrière, “on cue and on schedule with the click of the camera.”318  
Furthermore, according to Georges Didi-Huberman, who has addressed some of the most 
vigorous criticism of Charcot’s (re)invention of hysteria, the Salpêtrière school ended up turning 
experimental “hypocrisy” into stage direction:  
Hypocrisy offers a simple judgment as an act or decree of reality, and is fully—if obscurely—aware that it is 
doing so .… Figuring and directing, but always at the limits of counterfeiting: this is experimental (method) 
fabrication itself.319  
 
As Didi-Huberman shows, the experimental protocols and performances of the Paris school, while 
taking themselves as objective observations, in fact produced “a response that feigns to allow the 
word of the other to spin out at its own rhythm, but a response that is always already interpretive 
and thus oracular. It is hypocrisy as method, a ruse of theatrical reason as it presumes to invent 
truth.”320  
Even during Charcot’s time, such arguments were already being pronounced. For instance, 
Joseph Delboeuf, to whom we shall return further on, sided with the Nancy School, claiming that 
“the phenomena obtained with the hysterics of the Salpêtrière are all due to suggestion, as they 
can be reproduced at will with subjects who have no hysterical symptoms.”321 As we shall see, the 
Nancy school, led by Hippolyte Bernheim, did not hesitate to use ironical criticism to attack 
Charcot’s position, pointing out that if the hysterical alone can be hypnotized, “we must conclude, 
from the statistics of suggestibility, that at least eighty per cent of mankind suffers from 
hysteria.”322  
Secondly, in passages such as the one from the “Exposé” cited higher up, Charcot seems 
to place a heavy—yet somewhat blind—emphasis on the methodological frame that, in the name 
of objective and experimental examination of the scientific object, participated in creating—
through such acts of selection and rejection—the very object that it claims to observe. Indeed, as 
Chertock and Stengers have shown, the rational ideals set by Charcot paradoxically led the 
Salpêtrière school to overlook the power of suggestion that permeates even the most objective 
 
318 Elaine Showalter, The Female Malady: Women, Madness, and English Culture, 1830 –1980 (New York: Pantheon 
Books, 1987), 145. 
319 Georges Didi-Huberman, Invention of Hysteria, Charcot and the Photographic Iconography of the Salpêtrière 
(Cambridge, MA; London: The MIT Press, 2003), 8. 
320 Ibid., 8. 
321 Joseph Delboeuf, Le Sommeil et les Rêves et autres textes (Paris: Librairie Arthème Fayard, 1885), 337. 
322 Guillain, “J. M. Charcot, His Life—His work,” 245. 
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experimental setting.323 The most conspicuous failing of the Mesmerists was in this sense “one 
that they shared with a very large proportion of the hypnotists who followed in their footsteps in 
the second half of the nineteenth century.”324 Indeed, despite all his efforts and just like the 
magnetists from which he believed to have “freed” hypnotism, Charcot himself demonstrated what 
Alan Gauld calls “an almost complete failure to appreciate the powerful workings of the 
‘experimenter effect’ and ‘doctrinal compliance’” upon the subjects he observed.325 In this way, 
the Salpêtrière’s fantasy of a measurable, reproducible and objective theory of hysteria and 
hypnotism is the most telling example of how “the experimental history of hypnosis recounts the 
discovery of the snares of objectification, that is, the uncontrollable implication of the conditions 
that presumably insure objectivity in the very conditions of the phenomenon under study.”326  
As Charcot’s death in 1893 and the end of the century approached, criticism of the 
Salpêtrière’s pathologizing doctrine—with its three stages of hypnotism, its reduction of hypnosis 
to a morbid state and its restriction of hypnotic cure to nervous disease and hysteria—increased. 
After 1887, Charcot’s ideas began to lose favor in the medical field, which was in great part due 
to the increased acceptance of the doctrine of its rival—and much smaller—school, the École de 
Nancy, according to which all hypnotic phenomena can be explained with the single concept of 
suggestion. 327    
 
1.1.4.2. Joseph Delboeuf’s “Down to Earth” Criticism 
 
In this context, one contemporary testimony to the debate—and shift—between the 
Salpêtrière and Nancy doctrines deserve closer examination. Although he was not a medical 
 
323 Chertock and Stengers, A Critique of Psychoanalytic Reason, 204. 
324 Gauld, 267. Furthermore, as Lilian Furst has argued, with Charcot’s fascination, the “incidence and popularity” of 
hysteria “increased vastly in scale in France, as is reflected in the number of cases diagnosed as well as in the interest 
in and knowledge of the malady” Furst, 113.  
325 Nevertheless, despite this failure to grasp the methods of controlled experimentation which are “necessary to offer 
these dangers,” the magnetists, and to a certain extent, the hypnotists of the fin-de-siècle, “can hardly be blamed for 
not coming to terms with a problem which was not even adequately spelled out until well into the [twentieth] century.” 
See Gauld, 267. 
326 Chertock and Stengers, 204. For Pierre Janet, whose work we will discuss further on, Charcot’s error can be 
explained by the fact that he would describe his patient’s cases in front of them, that they had been trained beforehand 
by Charcot’s assistants and therefore influenced to produce certain patterns of reaction, and that the three stages of 
hypnotism were foreshadowed by the preexisting practices of the magnetists themselves, which served as inspiration 
for the members of the Salpêtrière school. See Janet, Psychological Healing, 186-192 and Gauld, 314. 
327 By the time of the second International Congress on Experimental Psychology in London in 1892, the theories of 
the Salpêtrière school “had almost ceased to attract attention,” and brutally declined after Charcot’s death in 1893. 
Guillain, 425. 
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doctor, the Belgian psychologist and philosopher Joseph Delboeuf produced what can be 
considered as one of the most useful contemporary accounts of the fin-de-siècle disputes on the 
nature of hypnotism and on the limits of the Salpêtrière’s doctrine.  
 
The De-pathologization of Hypnosis 
According to Delboeuf, at the Salpêtrière, patients were “encouraged indirectly to conform 
their acts to the theory” of the experimenters.328 Indeed, having visited and observed the 
experiments of the Parisian school in the 1880s, Delboeuf pointed out the problematic nature of 
its method, which, absorbed in the theoretical paradigm that it was trying to prove, remained blind 
to the implicit suggestions that were given to patients on a daily basis. Commenting on the 
experiments with “transfer of sensibility” (transfert) for example, Delboeuf notes: 
I saw elementary precautions were neglected, such as refraining from speaking in front of the subjects, that 
the expected phenomena would be announced out loud, that instead of using an electro-magnet without the 
subject and the operator knowing, the latter simply pulled out a large U-shaped magnet from his pocket; 
when I saw there wasn’t a single electric machine in the laboratory, I was overcome with defiance which, 
imperceptibly, undermined my faith in all the rest.329  
 
Similarly, in his own patients, Delboeuf suspects that “the subject’s behaviors could in part be 
induced by their hypnotist,” concluding that hypnotic phenomena are the product of “training and 
suggestion.”330 Noting the individual variations in the behavior and tendencies exhibited by 
subjects who have been previously hypnotized or magnetized, he argues:  
The operator will have considered as essential characters which are in fact individual if not purely accidental, 
which presented themselves in his first subject. Unconsciously using suggestion, he will have transformed 
them in habitual signs; he will have become attached, still unknowingly, to obtaining them, in other subjects 
who will have produced them by imitation, and thereby, master and students, influencing one another 
reciprocally, will have kept feeding their mistake unceasingly.331  
 
This led him to elaborate a definition of hypnosis as art of “creating,” “prolonging,” and 
“maintaining” a state of suggestibility.332 As he explains, there can be different degrees of 
suggestibility, not only among various subjects—“subjects may respond to one operator and 
 
328 Joseph Delboeuf, “Une visite à la Salpêtrière,” in Le Sommeil et les Rêves et autres textes (1886; Paris: Librairie 
Arthème Fayard, 1993), 257.Delboeuf made this observation after noting the similar reactions found in subjects who 
had previously been magnetized by Donato—eyes wide open, convulsions, violent and sudden movements, raspy 
voice, and so on. 
329 Ibid., 255. 
330 Ibid., 259. 
331 Ibid., 259.  
332 Ibid., 332. For him, the highest degree of natural suggestibility is to be found in the intermediate state between 
waking and sleep.   
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remain unresponsive to another”—but in the same subject at various moments: “initially refractory 
subjects may become extremely docile. The inverse is true. So that a same individual may 
condense in themselves, successively, all the degrees of suggestibility.”333 Delboeuf’s description 
is important for our purposes, as it produces a depathologized conception of hypnosis, which is a 
natural state involving the activity of the imagination:  
Hypnotic sleep differs only from natural sleep in that at least one of the senses remains completely open to 
certain kinds of impressions (for example, the voice of the hypnotist) and that this sleep, as the other kind, is 
characterized by the relative power of the imagination, which substitutes an imaginary world to the real 
world.334  
 
Anticipating twentieth-century conceptions of hypnotism as role playing, Delboeuf argues that 
hypnosis requires cooperation, activity and understanding of the operator’s expectations on the 
part of the subject, who “need[s] to possess a certain degree of intelligence. It is clear that if they 
do not understand what is expected of them, they will not execute it.”335 
 
Charcot’s Unconscious Petitio Principii:  
This is what allows Delboeuf to explain Charcot’s assimilation of hypnosis to hysteria as 
a form of faulty inductive reasoning, an abusive generalization based on a mere “analogy between 
various hysterical phenomena and various hypnotic phenomena.”336 Indeed, as Delboeuf 
provocatively puts it:   
Engrossed in this idea, [Charcot] obtains from two or three hysterical subjects put under hypnosis the 
phenomena which he expected, without suspecting—who could have suspected at first?—that he was 
provoking them himself; and from then on he believes his opinion to be based on experience.337  
 
After this, the members of the Paris school “remain blind to the most evident manifestations and 
entangle themselves in a physical theory of phenomena which have a purely psychological 
origin.”338 
Significantly, Delboeuf claims to have ended up siding with Bernheim and the Nancy 
School not for theoretical reasons, but through experimentation. Indeed, by training his own 
subjects, he was able to reproduce—with various degrees of success—the same sophisticated 
 
333 Ibid., 192-293; 332.  
334 Ibid., 317. As in Braid’s model, this conception presupposes that “the mind has an almost absolute empire over the 
body. Only, in order for it to be able to exert it, it must be placed in a particular state, akin to sleep.” Delboeuf, 337. 
335 Ibid., 318. 
336 Ibid., Ibid. 
337 Ibid., 260. Delboeuf also notes that Charcot’s grand hypnotisme exists only in the French capital, in the “five or 
six” hysterics of the Salpêtrière. 
338 Ibid. 
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phenomena as those demonstrated by Blanche Wittman and the other star subjects at the 
Salpêtrière.339 As he concludes, “by imitating the processes used in Paris, I stumbled upon, almost 
despite myself, on the results of Nancy.”340  
 
An Homage to Liébeault 
In his defense of the Nancy school, Delboeuf takes great care to acknowledge the 
contribution of Ambroise Auguste Liébeault (1823-1904), a countryside physician who was more 
concerned with the therapeutic value of hypnosis than the theorization which mostly occupied 
Charcot.341 
 In Le Sommeil et les états analogues (1864), Liébeault attributes the therapeutic effects of 
magnetism to  the concentration of the subject’s attention on the organs, and identifies six degrees 
of hypnotic trance, the depth of which can be measured according to the presence—or absence—
of certain factors, such as the rigidity of the limbs, rotation of the arms, and spontaneous 
appearance of “posthypnotic amnesia.”342 Delboeuf used a different method to check for the 
presence and depth of hypnosis, testing for the presence analgesia by pricking the subject’s skin 
with needles and using their lack of sensibility as both a means to measure the depth of trance and 
a strategy to impact their mind, by ratifying the presence of the hypnotic state. 
According to Delboeuf’s account of his visit to Liébeault’s practice in 1888, the therapeutic 
efficacy of hypnosis seems to rely on two main factors. First of all, it is caused by the effects and 
content of the physician’s verbal suggestion, which Liébeault gave to his patients in a 
straightforward manner—repeating “identical” and sometimes “monotonous” formulations or 
 
339 For example, Delboeuf cites an example in which he was able to recreate an état composé, where the patient’s face, 
with “both eyes open,” would express “love” on one side and “hatred” on the other. As he claims, “a mediocre subject 
has been trained in a few hours to reproduce the famous three states, the états dimidés, the états composés, the transfer 
of sensibility.” Ibid., 275. Similarly, he attributes the therapeutic success of metallotherapy to suggestion, comparing 
it to the miracle healings of Lourdes: “The patient cures themselves. The application of magnets acts as a form of 
suggestion, which presents the advantage of having both a mysterious and a scientific aspect.” Ibid., 273. In this way, 
Delboeuf dismissed Charcot’s experimentations with magnets as a naïve reproduction of the magnetist’s faith in the 
materiality of the fluid. 
340 Ibid., 261. 
341 A similar parallel could be made in this respect between Freud interest for theory and Ferenczi’s furor sanadi.  
342 Posthypnotic amnesia refers to the spontaneous or induced forgetting of the content of the hypnotic experience by 
the subject, which Liébeault attributes to the sudden expansion of the—previously concentrated—attention caused by 
awakening from the hypnotic state. The Nancy school claimed that amnesia spontaneously appeared after hypnosis 
and that the use of suggestion was necessary to restore the subject’s memory. For Delboeuf, what the Nancy schools 
defines as spontaneous post-hypnotic amnesia is actually unconsciously or inadvertently induced. For him, on the 
other hand, “forgetting and remembering are accidental” and there exists no notable difference in the therapeutic action 
of remembered versus forgotten suggestions. See Delboeuf 327-329 and Gauld, 323.  
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“affirmations,” first of “sleep” and then of symptom remission or progress recovery—often to 
large groups of patients at once.343 Second, it is also due to the nonverbal and paraverbal elements 
largely responsible for the successful implementation of the suggestion and the quality of the 
therapeutic relation.  These are perceived—largely unconsciously—through the physician’s tone, 
behavior, congruence and attitudes. Indeed, Liébeault’s therapeutic success was often attributed to 
his general disposition, to his “ardent, penetrating” tone and the “ardent faith” that he 
communicated to his patients, to the “confidence” he inspired in them.344 For Delboeuf and 
Liébeault, the operator’s internal state and genuine conviction is a crucial element of therapeutic 
success: “It is the operator’s conviction that is here the lever that will move mountains. Such a 
conviction is difficult to simulate. At the moment when he is about to be influenced, the subject 
demonstrates incredible subtlety, and will perceive in you the slightest hint of indecision. If you 
hesitate, all is lost.”345 Therefore, suggestion does not only impact the subject, conceived as a 
receptive passive force. Its efficacy also depends on its action upon the operator himself: “if you 
believe you will fail you shall fail.”346  
In 1882, Bernheim discovered Liébeault’s work, who quickly gained fame and recognition 
as he became the “father” of the Nancy school.347 Nevertheless, despite Bernheim’s indebtedness 
to his findings, Liébeault’s conception and use of hypnosis remained attached to certain elements 
of the old magnetic model. For example, Liébeault found himself able to cure young children by 
“simply laying hands on the afflicted region,” and famously kept a bottle of “magnetized water” 
in his clinic, which he sometimes gave to patients to ingest.348 While this led Liébeault to 
reconsider the possibility of the existence of the imponderable fluid, it led Bernheim to suggest 
that he replace it—without the patients’ knowledge—with ordinary water.349 And indeed, in a 
 
343 Delboeuf, 288. As Gauld observes, Liébeault’s practice adapted to the “French peasant” which composed the great 
majority of his clientele. Gauld, 319. 
344 Ibid., 288-9. 
345 Ibid., 333. 
346 Ibid, 334. 
347 Gauld, 321. 
348 Gauld, 323. Liébeault gave the magnetized water to infants suffering from diarrhea, constipation or vomiting. 
According to Delboeuf, Liébeault used the water “to content the mothers more than to cure the children. Strangely, 
the children’s condition improved from this singular treatment.” Delboeuf, 294. Worth noting in this respect is 
Liébeault’s earlier interest in a religious career.  
349 As Delboeuf notes, Bernheim attributed the curative effects of the water or the physical touch to suggestion—that 
is, to the infant’s sufficient suggestibility and understanding that “he is suffering and that the man who faces him and 
speaks with his mother wants to (and can) help relieve this suffering.” Delboeuf, 295.  
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striking demonstration and foreshadowing of the Placebo effect, Delboeuf cites the case of a 
paralytic and insomniac patient who claimed that the water “made her sleep.”350  
 
1.1.4.3. Hippolyte Bernheim: Suggestive Therapeutics.  
 
After visiting Liébeault’s practice in 1882, Hippolyte Bernheim (1840-1919), who was 
already professor at the faculty of medicine in Nancy, became interested in the phenomenon of 
hypnotism and decided to investigate it further, both at the Nancy hospital and in his own medical 
practice. At the height of the debate between his school and the Salpêtrière, Bernheim famously 
denied the existence of Charcot’s three phases of hypnotism and maintained that all of the 
phenomena produced by the Paris school—and indeed, hypnotic phenomena—can be explained 
by a single principle: suggestion is the key-stone of the arch of all hypnotic manifestations.351 In 
an article published in 1911, Bernheim writes:  
All the phenomena established at the Salpêtrière, the three phases of hypnotism, the neuromuscular hyper 
excitability of the lethargic phase, the special muscle spasms induced in the so-called somnambulistic phase, 
and the transfer of magnetism by metals would not exist if the experiments were conducted under conditions 
that excluded the use of suggestion. In other words, the subjects did only what they knew they should do, 
either because they had observed these acts performed by other subjects or because they had heard about 
them, or in one word because the idea of what should be done had been instilled in their brains by means of 
suggestion. The hypnotism of the Salpêtrière is a cultist type of hypnotism.352  
 
To disprove the views of the Salpêtrière, Bernheim used ordinary objects such as stethoscopes, 
pieces of wood, and so on, announcing that they were magnets to the patient. While the subject’s 
eyes were closed, he touched arbitrary points of the body and made the same kind of verbal 
suggestions than those of the Paris school, producing the same effects—in a quasi-parodic mode. 
One can indeed note the irony which permeates the descriptions of such experiments. For example:  
“See here, he said, I will touch the laughter-bump and she will laugh.” He touches a random area of the right 
cheek, the old lady laughs. “Now, I will touch the symmetrical point on the left cheek, she will cry.” The old 
lady weeps and tears stream down her face. “If I touch this spot on the forehead, she will start to pray.” The 




350 Delboeuf, 295. 
351 Bernheim, Suggestive Therapeutics, (New York: G. P. Putnam’s sons, 1889), 447. See also 1947 edition, translated 
by Christian Herter (New York: London Book Company, 1947), 89-91. 
352 Bernheim, De la suggestion, quoted in M. Tinterow, ed. Foundations of Hypnosis (Springfield; Illinois: Charles C 
Thomas Publisher, 1970) 430. It seems that the term “cultist” here might be a mistranslation of the French “un 
hypnotisme de culture,” which Bernheim uses in chapter XV of De la Suggestion. See Hippolyte Bernheim, “École 
de la Salpêtrière,” in De la Suggestion (Paris: BNP, 2016. ProQuest Ebook Central. Accessed August 24, 2020), 112. 
353 Quoted in Delboeuf, 326. 
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The Power of Suggestion 
In Suggestive Therapeutics (1889), Bernheim formulates his radical conception, in clear 
opposition with the Salpêtrière principles, which brought about a sharp turn in the theory of 
hypnotism and mirrors the sharpness that the Puységurian revision imposed on the Mesmeric 
model.354 
First of all, in Bernheim’s account, hypnotism is clearly dissociated from the pathological. 
It is described as “an ordinary sleep or torpor that can be induced in everyone,” a “quiet, beneficial 
condition.”355 Bernheim thus typically began hypnotic sessions with a reassuring introductory 
moment—later on called “framing”—which serves to defuse or dissolve the patient’s apprehension 
and potentially limiting beliefs about hypnosis. For Bernheim, this moment has one principal 
function: to “banish from [the patient’s] mind the idea of magnetism and the somewhat mysterious 
fear that attaches to that unknown condition.”356  
Furthermore, in his contention that “it makes little difference what sort of gesture is made” 
during the induction of hypnosis, Bernheim addressed a double blow, to the tradition of magnetic 
passes on the one hand, and to Charcot’s emphasis on hysterogenic zones on the other.357 Like 
Liébeault’s, Bernheim’s method of induction consisted in simply suggesting the idea of sleep in a 
“commanding tone,” until it took hold of the patient’s mind and produced somatic effects such as 
the heaviness of the eyelids. With patients displaying signs of resistance, Bernheim took care to 
specify that “the hypnotic influence may exist without sleep; many patients are hypnotized 
although they do not sleep. ... The suggestion may be beneficial without sleep.”358 Indeed, 
according to Bernheim, as seen in the demonstrations of stage magnetists such as Donato, “the 
aptitude for realizing suggestive phenomena is not always proportional to the depth of the 
sleep.”359  
 
354 Hippolyte Bernheim, Suggestive Therapeutics: A Treatise on the Nature and Uses of Hypnotism (New York: G. P. 
Putnam’s sons, 1889).  
355 Bernheim, Ibid., 430.   
356 Ibid., 430. Bernheim’s model thus underlines how the manipulation of the patient’s expectations and belief system 
is crucial in the constitution and induction of the hypnotic state as well as in its therapeutic efficacy. 
357 Indeed, for him, “passes or gazing at the eyes or fingers of the operator are only useful in concentrating the 
attention.” The essence of the induction lies in the repetition of auditory suggestions of sleep. Bernheim, Ibid., 440. 
358 Although here the reason seems more technical than theoretical, it will be remembered as one of Bernheim’s central 
ideas. 
359 Bernheim, Ibid., 439-441. The question of the correlation between suggestibility and depth of trance still being 
debated to this day. See Heap et. al., The Highly Hypnotizable Person. Theoretical, experimental and clinical issues 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2004), 11. 
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In the doctrine of the Nancy school, there does not seem to be such a thing as a “non-
susceptible” subject. Indeed, in Bernheim’s descriptions, one finds only “anxious” subjects, or 
“people who make it a point of honor to show that they cannot be hypnotized”—which in no way 
indicates that they are not receptive. Rather, they “do not know how to put themselves into the 
psychical state necessary to realize their suggestion; they refuse to accept it—consciously or 
unconsciously—and instead, “oppose a kind of counter-suggestion” to that of the operator.360 Most 
of the time, a “suggestive education” can correct these “resistant” cases, and deep states become 
attainable after two or three sessions, during which the subject learns how to gradually enter 
hypnotic trance.361 This strong emphasis on the activity, education and abilities of the subject shits 
authority away from the “power” of the operator. Instead, emphasis is placed on the power of 
language and verbal suggestion. Bernheim confirms this point in a striking manner when he notes 
that hypnosis can be produced by correspondence—by reading a letter—or on the telephone.362  
Unlike what is conveyed in conceptions of the hypnotic state as essentially lethargic, 
Bernheim also strongly rejects conceptions of the hypnotic subject as purely passive, stressing the 
fact that the subject is not unconscious: “I cannot repeat too often that the hypnotized subject is 
not a lifeless corpse ... he is conscious, and often shows signs of life. We may see him laugh ... He 
may comment upon his condition,” etc.363  
Finally, in stark opposition to the Charcotian tendency to systematize and classify, 
Bernheim underlined the numerous variations that come with the examination of single, individual 
case-studies, rather than nosographical categories and pathological types. Indeed, for Bernheim, 
“hypnotism manifests itself in different subjects in different ways,” and “each sleeper has, so to 
speak, his own special personality.”364 Although—in response to Liébeault’s classification—
Bernheim distinguishes several degrees of depth of trance, Bernheim specifies that this purely 
theoretical classification should not overshadow the individual differences and the spectrum of 
depth that exist in empirical cases. Although he did argue that “suggestibility is more decided if 
there is amnesia upon waking,” Bernheim also distinguished depth of trance from the concept of 
 
360 Bernheim, Ibid., 439. 
361 Ibid., 443. 
362 For the latter example, Bernheim specifies, “as M. Liégeois has shown.” Ibid. 
363 Bernheim, Suggestive Therapeutics, 452. 
364 Ibid., 447; 453. 
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suggestibility, claiming that “docility to suggestion and the ease with which diverse phenomena 
are provoked are not always in proportion to the depth of the hypnotic sleep.”365 
In this way, the Nancy school anticipated twentieth-century social-psychological 
explanations of hypnosis which reject the idea that a special “state” must be induced for the 
therapeutic efficacy of suggestion to occur. In these accounts—discussed at the end of this 
Chapter—there is no need to posit the existence of an isolatable, cognitive, hypnotic “state.” 
Rather, the phenomenon of hypnotic trance can be explained by ordinary, natural psychological 
processes, which involve the implicit, contractual collaboration between subject and operator, as 
well as the expectations and active participation of the subject. One of the biggest contributions of 
Bernheim’s model, therefore, was the depathologization of the hypnotic state, and the insistence 
on the centrality of suggestion, in all hypnotic phenomena. This conception was radically opposed 
to Charcot’s model, as well as Janet’s pathologizing conception of hypnotism, which we will 
examine in the following section.  
 
1.1.5. Dissociation and Pathology. 
 
With his seminal work on psychological automatism, Pierre Janet (1959-1947) is 
considered by some historians as being one of the main inventors of dynamic psychiatry.366 His 
work was revived in the 1990s, when interest in cases of multiple personalities spiked, and Janet 
was considered as a pioneer of the “neodissociationist” theories of hypnotism, to which we will 
return further on.  
Janet’s doctoral thesis in philosophy, L’Automatisme psychologique, was published in 
1889 and constitutes of the most important contributions to the theory of hypnosis of the late 
 
365 Ibid., 448; De la Suggestion dans l’état hypnotique et dans l’état de veille (Paris: Doin, 1884), 9. As noted higher 
up, Delboeuf disagreed with the former idea, arguing that posthypnotic amnesia is always consciously or 
unconsciously suggested or induced, rather than spontaneous. 
366 Ellenberger, 331. Pierre Janet was born in Paris in 1859. After studying at the École Normale Supérieure, he became 
professor of philosophy at the lycées of Châteauroux (1882-1883) and Le Havre (1883-1889), where he wrote his 
doctoral dissertation, L’automatisme psychologique. After its publication in 1889, Janet started his medical studies—
where he spent time with neurological and psychiatric patients in Charcot’s ward at the Salpêtrière, focusing mainly 
on hysteria, before receiving his medical degree in 1893. In 1898 he was appointed professor of psychology at the 
Sorbonne, and in 1902, of experimental psychology at the Collège de France. From the beginning of his career, Janet 
“was careful to say that he carried out his experiments and derived his conclusions as a psychologist, not a 
physiologist.” Crabtree, 314. As Gauld notes, although very strong, Janet’s influence is mostly noted in how his work 
shaped the ideas of others: “Jung, Bleuler, Adler and the early Freud were all more or less indebted to him.” Due to a 
resurgence of interest in the question of multiple personalities, in the 1990s his work was revived,” and he was “often 
hailed as a forerunner of the [twentieth-century] ‘neodissociationist’ approach to hypnotism. Gauld, 380; 375. 
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nineteenth century, as well as a “highly original approach to the theory and therapy of the 
neuroses.”367 Janet used hypnosis both as a therapeutic tool and a means of investigation in his 
theoretical description of dissociation, “subconscious” mental activity, and hysteria. Despite his 
pathologizing conception of hypnosis, much more than Charcot, Janet’s work has been considered 
as the first original attempt to produce a psychological, rather than purely physiological, 
explanation of the neuroses.368 With his concept of psychological automatism, Janet gave a central 
formulation of the hypnotic unconscious, rejecting physiological explanations of hysteria as 
“defective functioning of the nervous system.”369 Indeed, he inaugurated what is referred to as the 
“dual consciousness” paradigm, which posited the potential existence of two or more “streams” of 
consciousness in a same subject.370 Conversely, against spiritualist theories, Janet “believed that 
mediumship, thought reading, divination, table turning and all the other phenomena sometimes 
attributed to the interventions of spiritual beings could be adequately explained as manifestations 
of subconscious activity.”371 Describing them as forms of “partial” automatism, Janet thus also 
naturalized  the occult by explaining its manifestations as subconscious mental processes. 
 
Psychological Automatism and Subconscious Mental Phenomena. 
According to Janet, the basic phenomena of psychology is automatic activity, an 
elementary activity which is spontaneous, determined, seemingly automatic, and yet 
“conscious”372—hence its “psychological” dimension.373 Indeed, Janet conceived automatic 
activities—such as those found in hypnotic and hysteric subjects, including phenomena such as 
automatic writing—as being not only therapeutically useful but also, in a sense, “intelligent.” For 
 
367 Gauld, 369. 
368 Crabtree, 326.  
369 Indeed, Janet “did not agree that automatic actions were merely mechanical reflexes of the brain.” Because hypnotic 
subjects can speak, resolve problems, show sympathies and antipathies, and even refuse to obey the commands of the 
operator, hypnotic phenomena “are not the actions of an automatic puppet.” Crabtree, 326; 315. 
370 Although the expression “stream of consciousness’ is often linked to William James’ 1890 notion of “stream of 
thought,” Janet spoke of the conscious life of subjects as being potentially composed of various “parallel currents,” 
which could alternate or, in serious pathological cases, exist simultaneously and independently from one another. For 
instance, Janet writes that his patient Lucie had “three parallels streams one under the other.” Janet, L’Automatisme 
Psychologique, 335. His patient Léonie (Madame B.) also had three: Léonie, Léontine and Léonore. Another of his 
patients, Marie had four or five. Ibid., 334. This model of multiple personalities found—or induced—in the hysteric 
or neurotic patient was then to become generalized in turn-of-the-century practices of hypnotism, and found in other 
countries, including Great Britain and the United States.  
371 Crabtree, 326. 
372 “In fact, it is performed with the participation of consciousness, but not the ordinary consciousness of the 
individual.” Crabtree, 315, italics in original. 
373 Janet, L’Automatisme Psychologique, 1-3. 
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him, “we have the same reasons for attributing consciousness to them as to intelligent activities 
carried on by persons in a normal state,” except that in this case, the consciousness involved is 
“largely separated from and inaccessible to the ordinary waking consciousness.”374 Indeed, 
psychological automatic phenomena are produced by a subconscious intelligence which remains 
operative under the ordinary consciousness, “enjoying continual existence outside the 
experimental periods.”375  
In this context, Janet defines an unconscious act as “an action having all the characteristics 
of a psychological act, save one: that it is always unknown to the person himself who executes it 
at the moment of its execution.”376 His concept of the unconscious—or as he preferred, of 
“subconscious” mental activity—thus strongly differs from the Freudian Unconscious. In Janet’s 
conception, the existence of second consciousness is involved, one which is “awake,” even when 
it is out of sight of the main consciousness’ awareness. In this sense, it is non-conscious but not 
“unconscious”: it remains active, “below the normal consciousness of an individual.”377 
With the case of his patient “Lucie,” Janet was able to formulate his theory of dual 
consciousness early on.378 Indeed, as Janet observed, when Lucie was placed in a state of artificial 
somnambulism, a second consciousness, who called herself “Adrienne” was revealed. This second 
consciousness, whom Janet “contacted” by using two of his most famous techniques—automatic 
writing379 and “distraction”380—revealed that she was responsible for Lucie’s hysteric symptoms, 
and carried traumatic memories that Lucie was unaware of.381 Adrienne—who herself suffered 
from no symptoms—revealed that she was also responsible for carrying out the posthypnotic 
 
374 Gauld, 371. 
375 Ibid., 372. 
376 Janet, L’Automatisme Psychologique, 225. In his 1888 paper published in the Revue Philosophique, he 
distinguishes four kinds of unconscious acts: those produced by posthypnotic suggestions, anesthesia, his technique 
of “distraction” and finally, spontaneous unconscious acts, such as those seen in hysteria. 
377 Janet, L’Automatisme Psychologique, 265. 
378 In the years 1886-1889. 
379 For example, with his patient Léonie, Janet places a pencil in her hand and asks questions (Where are we? What is 
your age?): “The hand stirs and writes the answer on the paper, without, during this time, Léonie ceasing to speak of 
other things. In this way I have made her carry out arithmetical operations which were sufficiently correct; I have 
made her write quite long answers which clearly showed a fairly well-developed intelligence.” Janet, L’Automatisme 
Psychologique, 244.  
380 Janet, “Les Actes inconscients et le dédoublement de la personnalité pendant le somnambulisme provoqué,” in 
Revue Philosophique, 22, (1886): 589. While the patient was engaged in conversation with another person (distracted), 
Janet would address their second personality in a low voice, either giving her commands such as post-hypnotic 
suggestions or asking her to respond in writing without her main conscious awareness being involved. Janet’s 
technique of “distraction” is still used today to create partial or “total” dissociation in the hypnotic subject. 
381 Lucie’s symptoms included anesthesia of the whole body, inability to feel physical contact, pressure, or temperature 
changes, convulsions and severe headaches.  
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suggestions that Lucie responded to in her waking state.382 This is important in the sense that the 
second consciousness knows more than the waking consciousness: “Adrienne always saw what 
Lucie was unable to see. Adrienne had knowledge of [traumatic] life events for which Lucie had 
naturally induced amnesia.”383As therapeutic cure is brought about, and the subject returns to 
health, the second consciousness is no longer needed, and can disappear.384 In 1887, Janet 
formulates the essence of the dual consciousness paradigm more clearly:  
If a phenomenon is not conscious, it cannot be a psychological event ... A reasoning can only occur in the 
head of a person if he is conscious ... Why is the reasoning not known by the somnambulist or the hysteric? 
Because a psychological phenomenon can be conscious and yet not attached by association to the group of 
sensations and memories that constitute the idea of an “I.” ... Or indeed it could be associated with other facts 
equally separated from all consciousness and form, as it were, a second personality, as we see in the case of 
Adrienne.385 
 
As indicated in this passage, Janet conceives of a personality as a grouping together, a synthesis 
of psychological phenomena which experiences itself as an “I.”386  These can be associated with a 
second, “conscious” personality that may act of its own accord, even against the beliefs or desires 
of the main personality.387 An idea can thus be conscious, yet not associated with the group of 
sensations and memories that make up the “I.” When it becomes associated to another group or 
system that is complex enough—which has been sufficiently “fed by new experiences”—and 
 
382 In this sense, “Lucie did not forget the post-hypnotic suggestions given her; in fact, she never knew them.” Crabtree, 
309. Although he didn’t attribute the existence of the second personalities to suggestion on the part of the therapist, in 
1889, Janet acknowledged the impact of the operator on the subject’s second personality: “The second personality 
who is being born undergoes the influence and manners of his magnetizer as an infant undergoes the influence of his 
parents. It takes on the habits, manners and beliefs which have been inspired in him, almost without knowing or 
intending it. As the magnetizer, so the somnambulist. … Show me a somnambulist and I will immediately know who 
induces the sleep state and the opinions and beliefs, scientific or otherwise.” Janet, L’Automatisme Psychologique, 
127-128. 
383 Crabtree, 311. Indeed, “Lucie knew nothing of Adrienne, since ideas and sensations associated with Adrienne never 
reached Lucie’s consciousness.” Crabtree, 314. For example, when experimenting with negative hallucinations on 
cards, Janet found that “it was Adrienne, free of all hallucinations, who saw the cards and their markings and guided 
the blocking of Lucie’s perception.” Janet, “L’anesthésie systématisée et la dissociation des phénomènes 
psychologique,” Revue Philosophique, 23 (1887): 457-59. 
384 Janet, “Les Actes inconscients et le dédoublement de la personnalité pendant le somnambulisme provoqué,” in 
Revue Philosophique, 22 (1886): 588-92. 
385 “L’anesthésie systématisée,” 462. 
386  “When … psychological phenomena are united, ordinarily there is produced in the mind a new, very important 
reality: their unity, noted and understood, gives birth to a particular judgment that one calls the ideas of the ‘I’… 
Judgment … synthesizes different acts, establishes their unity and … forms a new idea: that of personality.” Janet, 
L’Automatisme Psychologique, 117. 
387 Janet, “Les Actes inconscients et la mémoire pendant le somnambulisme provoqué” in Revue Philosophique 25 
(1888): 249-54. The hysteric experiences successive states of consciousness that are distinct from one another: “The 
systems of psychological phenomena that form the successive personalities of somnambulism do not disappear upon 
awakening, but subsist, more or less complete, below normal consciousness, which they can change and disturb in a 
most singular way.” Janet, L’Automatisme Psychologique, 365. 
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begins to solidify, the second consciousness or personality begins to form.388 Otherwise, it can 
produce a mere partial automatism, as described higher up, such as automatic writing.389 With this 
account, Janet was able to explain hysterical symptoms as “the manifestation of a dissociated group 
of ideas crystallized in a personality.”390 
 
The Pathologization of Hypnosis 
Janet used hypnosis in three main ways to cure patients, most of which suffered from 
traumatic memories. First, hypnosis could be used to restore traumatic, dissociated memories from 
to the patient’s main consciousness, which would sometimes need fortification in order to bear 
them. Second, it could be used to “erase” the pathogenic memory by inducing hypnotic amnesia. 
Finally, it could be used to transform the memory, rendering it innocuous for the subject.391  
Disagreeing with Bernheim, Janet defined hypnosis “not [as] a state of heightened 
suggestibility, itself produced by suggestion” but rather, as “simply the artificial production of a 
state of hysterical somnambulism in a person liable to such attacks.”392 As was the case with 
 
388 Crabtree, 320. Despite this theoretical “dematerialization,” on a technical level, Janet still used the methods of the 
old magnetists, in his “mixture of verbal suggestion and mesmeric passes,” to induce the state of artificial 
somnambulism. Gauld, 377. 
389 Janet distinguished between states of total, and partial automatism. Total psychological automatism is “a disposition 
a mode of mental being, of the whole subject,” who is either completely in the waking state, or in somnambulism, or 
in delirium, but “never half in one state or half in another.” Janet, L’Automatisme Psychologique, 223. Total 
automatisms include a whole range of states, “from catalepsies, to hysteric somnambulism and fugue states to 
alternating personalities.” Gauld, 371. Partial automatisms, which are “isolated from the total consciousness of the 
individual, and continu[e] to develop by themselves on their own account,” range from catalepsy of a limb to hysterical 
contractures and paralyses, from automatic writing and speaking to occult phenomena such as pendulum swinging, 
planchette writing, water divining, etc. See Janet, L’Automatisme psychologique, 224; Gauld, 371. 
390 Crabtree, 314. 
391 For example, Janet used hypnosis in the case of Justine, a woman who nursed other patients dying from cholera 
and suffered from hysterical crises during which she hallucinated corpses and cried out ‘Cholera it’s taking me!’ 
Because in her case, the reintegration of the memories failed, Janet had to resort to some “striking[ly] creative” 
transformations of the traumatic material: “A particularly unpleasant greenish putrefying corpse was clad and turned 
into a rather comic Chinese general whom Justine had seen at the Universal Exposition. Finally, he eliminated the 
idea of cholera by suggesting that the Chinese general was called ‘Cho Lé Ra’.” Gauld, 375; Janet, Névroses et idées 
fixes (1898; Paris: Félix Alcan, 1904), 156-212. 
392 Gauld, 377. Janet’s conception of suggestion was opposed to Bernheim’s, for whom “almost any idea which 
penetrates the mind and produces an effect qualifies as a suggestion.” Gauld, 375.  For Janet this definition is “far too 
broad” and fails to capture the essence of the phenomenon. For him, “about true suggestions there is something 
abnormal and pathological.” Gauld, 375. Furthermore, for Janet, the hysteric patient obeys hypnotic suggestions 
almost impulsively, he “ceases to question himself, ceases to call up new pros and cons, ceases to surround the evoked 
idea by other ideas. … [The suggested idea] remains alone, isolated and powerful. It is then transformed by automatic 
assent, so that it becomes a suggestion. The curtailment of the mental field, monoideism, results from the 
disappearance of all other ideas and from the survival of the primary idea … which has now become impulsive.” Janet, 
Psychological Healing: A Historical and Clinical Study. Vol. 1. (New York: Macmillan, 1925), 273. 
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Charcot, according to Janet, “there is no reason for regarding hypnosis as in any way distinct from 
hysterical somnambulism.”393  
For Janet, subconscious acts such as those found in hysteria or hypnotism occur in 
individuals who are in a state of mental disintegration (désagregation),394 which occurs when the 
“mental force” required to produce a healthy mental synthesis is lacking.395 Indeed, in a healthy 
subject, the mind has the ability to unite diverse experience in a single grouping, through an 
internal synthesizing force.396 Weakness of the synthesizing force, on the other hand, leads to a 
plurality of “groupings” and to disaggregation.397 The hysteric patient, who has a particularly weak 
“synthesizing force,” does not have the mental strength required to assimilate traumatic 
experience. Instead of being integrated, these events form secondary subconscious centers of 
synthesis which ultimately, can take on the form of personalities.398 
Furthermore, in hysteria or hypnosis, the subject’s “field of consciousness” is “narrowed” 
or “shrunk”: it is “filled with one relatively simple sensation, one remembrance, a small group of 
motor images, and cannot contain others at the same time.”399 According to Janet, this restriction 
creates heightened suggestibility. In the pathological or diminished field of consciousness, “ideas, 
 
393 Gauld, 377. 
394 Janet, L’Automatisme Psychologique, 282. 
395 This “moral weakness” can be temporary, and induced by fatigue, drugs, or strong emotions. Indeed, for Janet, 
emotion “has an action that dissolves the mind, diminishes the synthesis and make it miserable for a moment.” Janet 
1898, 457. 
396 Crabtree, 319. In our normal state, we connect ideas that appear with “the enormous mass of other recollections, 
of other images, which constitute out personality. They have their place they play their part in the great system, but 
they are not isolated and independent, and their development is restrained by the development of all other thoughts.” 
Janet, The Mental State of Hystericals (New York: G. P. Putnam’s sons, 1901), 274. In Janet’s case histories, 
“occasionally, a secondary stream of consciousness may be superior to, or more highly endowed with critical faculties 
than, the ‘normal’ consciousness, and then it may be less rather than more susceptible to suggestion than the latter. 
…When the last level of somnambulism is reached, there are no subconscious acts and there can be no hypnosis.” 
Gauld 378.  
397 As Crabtree points out, for Janet dissociation does not involve the “undoing” of an already existing unity (there is 
no breaking away, or splitting off, of one group from another, nothing is being undone.). Rather, it involves “the 
immediate assignment of a phenomenon, at the moment when it occurs, ‘to one system and not to the other.” 
Dissociation, then, is not a dis-association: “Rather, psychic events are grouped as they occur.” Therefore, if the main 
consciousness does not have a knowledge of an event, it is because “it never did. … Forgetting is not involved.” 
Crabtree, 313. 
398 Crabtree, 320. For Janet, this weakness is congenital (the exhaustion underlying hysteria is considered a hereditary 
weakness or predisposition) and in this sense, hysteria is essentially incurable. This explains why hypnosis is used 
first and foremost for symptom removal or relief. However, although in hysteria, the cerebral exhaustion is “frequently 
due to constitutional factors,” there are often also “precipitating circumstances, usually of an emotive and stress-
inducing kind, which finally snap the trail hold which the subject’s mind has upon the elements it has to far managed 
to synthesize”: it may be triggered or intensified by factors such as fatigue, strong emotion, intoxicants or anesthetics. 
See Gauld 1992, 373; 379. Like Charcot, Janet struggled to explain why Bernheim could induce hypnosis in non-
hysteric subjects.   
399 Janet, The Mental State of Hystericals, 503. 
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once inserted, may develop in relative isolation without any of the normal restraints; hence the 
automatic working out of suggestions, and the characteristic susceptibility of the hysteric to both 
hetero- and autosuggestion.”400 For Janet, it is thus monoideism that explains the pathological 
functioning of hypnotic suggestions: “Like a morbid virus, it has been sown in [the mind] and 
developed in a place within [the subject’s] person that he cannot reach. It acts subconsciously, 
troubles the conscious mind, and provokes all the symptoms of hysteria and insanity.”401 
Therefore, by associating it to pathology and hysteria, Janet’s conception of hypnosis as 
automatism was closer to Charcot’s than to Bernheim’s.402 Like Charcot, for whom “one would 
almost be justified in maintaining that hypnotism is a manifestation of hysteria,” Janet also rejected 
the idea that hypnosis can be experienced by healthy subjects.403   
 
Towards Freud?  
In this sense, Janet’s contribution lies less in his conception of hypnosis than in attempt to 
produce a psychological explanation—and cure—of hysteria.404 This psychological explanation 
 
400 Gauld, 376. 
401 Janet, L’Automatisme Psychologique, 457. As we have noted higher up, monoideism was already present in Braid’s 
notion of “fixed” or dominant idea. As Gauld shows, it was also prefigured in the work of Charles Richet, Liébeault, 
and Charcot before Janet. 
402 However, although he pathologized hypnosis like Charcot, Janet believes that weakness of the synthesizing force 
was at the heart of all psychological pathology, hysteria being but one of them. Unlike Charcot, for who hysteria 
accounted for all dissociated phenomena, including hypnosis, Janet believed the opposite: “it is not hysteria which 
constitutes a terrain favorable to hypnotism, but it is hypnotic sensibility that constitutes favorable terrain for hysteria 
and other illnesses.” Janet, L’Automatisme Psychologique, 451-53. 
403 Joseph Babinski, Hypnotisme et hystérie: du role de l’hypnotisme en thérapeutique. Paris: G. Masson, 1891), 17. 
For Janet, in “the state of perfect psychological health, the power to synthesize being very great, all psychological 
phenomena, whatever the origin, are united in the same personal perception, and consequently the second personality 
does not exist. In such a state there would be no… suggestibility and no possibility of producing a somnambulism, 
since one could not develop subconscious phenomena, which would not exist.” Janet, L’Automatisme Psychologique, 
336. After leaving the Salpêtrière, Alfred Binet parted with Janet’s idea of hypnosis as pathology, and studied the 
“plurality of consciousness in healthy subjects.” As Binet describes it, “we witness the awakening of an unconscious 
intelligence; we can even communicate with it and direct it, hold a coherent conversation with it, measure the extent 
of its memory and the acuteness of its perception.” Alfred Binet, Les altérations de la personnalité (Paris: Germer 
Baillère, 1892), 97. According to Binet, these experiments were “amply sufficient to demonstrate the possibility of 
rousing an unconscious personality in healthy persons or those who are very nearly so.” Binet, Ibid., 245; Gauld, 381. 
404 Another well-known example is the case of Marie, who at age 19 was brought to the hospital in Le Havre as she 
experienced a series of frightening hysterical symptoms linked to her menstrual period. For Janet, Marie’s case 
“demonstrated the importance of subconscious fixed ideas [here, the idea that menstruation is shameful, and that it 
must and can be stopped with cold water] and the role they play in certain psychical ideas as well as moral illnesses.” 
Janet 1898, 440. Using hypnotic regression, Janet re-created the circumstances of Marie’s first menstruation at age 
13, assuring her that it had lasted for 3 days and gone well (when in reality she had jumped into a tub of freezing water 
and stopped it). He also modified a traumatic memory of her witnessing, at age 16, an old woman falling down the 
stairs and dying (the image was changed into one where the woman regained her balance and did not die). As Janet 
observes, Marie’s terror ceased and after 5 months, she returned to health. However, as Leys shows in Trauma, a 
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was further extended to the naturalization of phenomena such as demonic possession, which, like 
hysterical symptoms, can be explained by auto-suggestion, subconscious idées fixes and 
monoideism. A telling case in this respect is that of Achille, one of Janet’s patients who suddenly 
fell ill and believed he was possessed by the devil. Under hypnosis—using distraction and 
automatic writing—the “devil” revealed that Achille’s symptoms were due to a recent sexual 
infidelity to his wife. In other terms, demonic possession, like the hysterical symptom, was due to 
an autosuggestion which in this case, was caused by guilt.405 Using hypnosis, Janet recreated the 
Achille’s problematic memory, deconstructing and modifying it with the techniques of 
“dissociation of ideas” and “substitution”: 
It is the very memory of the transgression the Achille must be made to forget. This operation is far from easy. 
… An idea, a memory can be considered a system of images that one can destroy by separating them, by 
altering them once isolated, by substituting in the composite such and such a partial image for those that 
exist. … The memory of his transgression was transformed in every way through suggested hallucinations. 
Finally, his wife was herself evoked by hallucination at the proper moment, come to give a full pardon to this 
most unfortunate guilty spouse.406 
 
As tempted as one might be to see in this case a foreshadowing of the Freudian superego, Janet’s 
hypnotic unconscious, based on the concepts of dissociation and psychological automatism,  
differs strongly from the Freudian model, in both its 1900 theorization and the later topographical 
model, which are based on the notions of unconscious drives and fantasies, as well as repression. 
Nevertheless, the fin-de-siècle formulations of the hypnotic unconscious that we have examined 
in the work of Charcot, Bernheim and Janet can also be thought of as paving the way towards the 
formulation of the psychoanalytic unconscious. 
Indeed, James Strachey has pointed out that despite his “abandonment” of hypnosis as a 
therapeutic tool and of suggestive techniques in the constitution of psychoanalysis, Freud “never 
hesitated throughout his life to express his sense of gratitude to hypnosis.”407 Indeed, in Lecture 
XXVIII of the  Introductory Lectures, Freud describes psychoanalysts as the heirs of hypnosis, 
 
Genealogy, in this case, the therapeutic cure depends on the “erasure” and modification, rather than the integration, of 
the pathogenic memory. Indeed, as Leys observes, it is the excision, the forgetting of the traumatic memory that cures 
Marie, not its retrieval or narration: “according to Janet's first account of the case and contrary to the ingrained beliefs 
of many of his commentators, Marie was cured not by the recovery of memory but by the excision of her imputed or 
reconstructed trauma.” See Leys, Trauma a Genealogy and “Shell Shock, Janet, and the Question of Memory,” 
Critical Inquiry 20, No. 4 (1994): 650.   
405 Here Janet’s case comes close to illustrating the function that Freud’s superego will take on. Unlike Freud, however, 
Janet’s goal is to transform the problematic memory, rather than bring it to conscious awareness.  
406 Janet, Névroses et idées fixes, 2nd ed. 1:404. According to Janet, eight years after the suggestive treatment, Achille 
was still healthy. Ibid., 1:379. 
407 James Strachey. “Editor's Introduction to Papers on Hypnotism and Suggestion,” in SE, 1:68. 
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who “do not forget how much encouragement and theoretical clarification we owe to it.”408 
However, in the same lectures, he also makes his famous statement according to which 
“psychoanalysis proper began when I dispensed with the help of hypnosis.”409  
In what follows, I will therefore discuss the complex ways in which Freud was indebted to 
the French hypnotists of the 1880s, especially Charcot, and navigated the transition from using 
hypnosis in his early work on hysteria, to breaking with it in order to bring about the birth of 
“psychoanalysis proper.” As I will argue, although this break was crucial in establishing the 
scientific ambitions for analysis, it did not end the history of hypnosis, which reemerged with its 
“germ” intact, as Janet put it in 1924, and lives on to this day.  
 
1.2. Hypnosis and the Unconscious 
 
1.2.1. From Suggestion to Repression: The Transition Toward Psychoanalysis 
 
As Isabelle Stengers and Roxanne Lapidus have shown, the relations between hypnosis 
and psychoanalysis cannot be examined without mentioning the question of power.410 Indeed, 
power is at play both in a theoretical model’s relation its ancestry and in the authority with which 
rational discourse can endow itself, becoming in turn an instrument of power. According to 
Stengers’ argument, whereas the hypnotist has systematically been accused of “usurping” his 
power over the subject, the analyst is often exempt from such investigations. For Stengers, 
however, power can also be found at the heart of the analytic edifice—conferred by Freud to the 
analytic posture which gives itself “the privilege of judging the old psycho-therapeutic techniques” 
and “the ability to measure and evaluate what these techniques were about: wishful thinking and 
suggestion, theorized as the effects of transference.”411 Examining the relations between hypnosis 
and psychoanalysis then, brings up the “question, ultimately, of the power of a theory in the face 
of what it claims to judge, and the conditions of that power.”412  By discussing the dynamics which 
 
408 Freud, “Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis,” (1916-1917) in SE 16: 462. Similarly, in 1914, Freud writes: 
“We must still be grateful to the old hypnotic technique for having brought before us single psychical processes of 
analysis in an isolated or schematic form. Only this could have given us the courage ourselves to create more 
complicated situations in the analytic treatment and to keep them clear before us.” Freud, “Remembering, Repeating 
and Working-Through (Further Recommendations on the Technique of Psycho-Analysis II,” in SE 12:148. 
409 Freud, “Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis,” (1917), in SE, 16: 292. 
410 Stengers, Isabelle and Lapidus, Roxanne, “The Deceptions of Power: Psychoanalysis and Hypnosis,” SubStance 
19, no. 2/3, Issue 62/63 (1990): 81-91. 
411 Stengers and Lapidus, “The Deceptions of Power,” 81. 
412 Ibid, 81. 
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led to Freud’s “cutting the cord” with hypnosis, in this section, I will investigate both aspects of 
this power relation: on the one hand, it can refer—as Stengers and Lapidus do—to the institution 
of analytic power as theory, but on the other hand, it can also illuminate the power that hypnosis 
exerted on Freud’s early years—the power of his loyalty towards the Salpêtrière school and the 
intensity of the personal, quasi-hypnotic fascination that Charcot exerted over him in Paris in 1885-
1886.   
        1.2.1.1.    Freud’s Fascination for the Master 
 
Freud’s theoretical debt to Charcot is widely known.413 In the Wiener Medizinische 
Wochenschrift, in 1893, Freud salutes Charcot in a contribution that, although it appears to create 
historical continuity between Master and pupil, also implicitly relegates Charcot’s model into the 
past.414 In this sense, although the Freudian “cutting of the cord” was first and foremost a laudatory 
gesture, on the other hand—clothed in the image of scientific continuity, discovery, and progress—
it also contained the essential ambivalence towards the father-object. In this sense, it was both an 
homage and a death blow, which in a single gesture of separation, announced the birth of 
psychoanalysis through the rejection of its “primitive” parent, hypnosis.415  
Questions of identification, ambivalence and aggression are far from anecdotal when one 
examines the birth of analysis and the gesture with which it occurred. Freud himself, in multiple 
occasions, including in the preface to Bernheim’s De la Suggestion, invokes the fact that “in 
scientific matters it is always experience, and never authority without experience, that gives the 
final verdict.”416 However, beyond its theoretical impact, Freud’s fascination for the “great 
personal influence which Charcot evidently exercised” also played a part in the diversion of his 
scientific interests from neurology to psychopathology.417 This emphasis on an influence which is 
 
413 Freud worked at the Salpêtrière under Charcot from October 1885 to February 1886. See Strachey, “Editor’s Note 
to ‘Charcot’,” in SE 3: 8. 
414 Sigmund Freud, “Charcot” (1893), in SE 3: 7-23. Indeed, the very idea of transmission points both toward the death 
of the master and the living-on of the future which he birthed. 
415 Although our main focus is on the phenomenon of hypnosis, the Freudian death blow also marks the beginning of 
the “disappearance of hysteria.” As Mark Micale notes, almost immediately upon the death of Charcot, “the 
nineteenth-century pan-diagnosis of hysteria began to break apart under its own weight, and the many clinical states 
that it had contained began to scatter.” Mark Micale, “On the ‘Disappearance’ of Hysteria. A Study in the Clinical 
Deconstruction of a Diagnosis,” Isis 84, no. 3 (September 1993): 526. 
416 Freud, “Preface to the Translation of Bernheim's Suggestion,” (1888), in SE, 1:76. This question of scientific vs. 
historical authority is a problem that is not only complex, but also magnified by the question of hypnotic influence. 
417 Strachey, “Editor’s Note to ‘Charcot’,” in SE 3:3-4. As Freud wrote in a letter to his future wife in 1885, “I think I 
am changing a great deal. I will tell you in detail what is affecting me. Charcot, who is one of the greatest of physicians 
and a man whose common sense is touched by genius, is simply uprooting my aims and opinions. I sometimes come 
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not merely intellectual but also personal and embodied comes up again in the language of Freud’s 
“Report on My Studies in Paris and Berlin.”418 Indeed, in his report, the young Freud mentions the 
“attraction of such a personality” as a factor that led him to restrict his visits to a single hospital 
and to seek instruction “from one single man,” singled out from the multiple other potential 
authority figures.419 During his five month stay, Freud’s scientific experience was thus also 
profoundly intertwined with the power of human rapport: “what seems to me to have been of 
greater value than this positive gain in experience was the stimulus which I received … from my 
constant scientific and personal contact with Professor Charcot.”420 Under the spell of the 
fascinating figure, Freud writes that “like every other foreigner in a similar position, [he] left the 
Salpêtrière as Charcot's unqualified admirer.”421 
In the preface to the German translation of Charcot’s Lectures on the Diseases of the 
Nervous System, the vocabulary is similar, drawing on affective terms.422 In the preface of 
Charcot’s Leçons Du Mardi De La Salpêtrière, Freud even employs the lexical field of magic—
the very field that later on, analysis will have to banish. Describing Charcot’s Tuesday 
demonstrations, he writes: “It was then that—spellbound by the narrator's artistry no less than by 
the observer's penetration—we listened to the little stories which showed how a medical 
experience had led to a new discovery.”423 In Freud’s description the past seems to “come alive” 
and revives the powerful experience of Charcot’s lectures, emphasizing the neurologist’s hypnotic 
qualities: 
These lectures present so accurate a picture of Charcot's manner of speaking and thinking that, for anyone 
who has once sat among his audience, the memory of the Master's voice and looks comes alive once more 
and the precious hours return in which the magic of a great personality bound his hearer irrevocably to the 
interests and problems of neuropathology.424 
 
 
out of his lectures as though I were coming out of Notre Dame, with a new idea of perfection. But he exhausts me; 
when I come away from him I no longer have any desire to work at my own silly things; it is three whole days since 
I have done any work, and I have no feelings of guilt. My brain is sated, as if I had spent an evening at the theater.” 
In SE, 3:8. 
418 Freud, Sigmund. “Report on My Studies in Paris and Berlin,” in Pre-Psycho-Analytic Publications and 
Unpublished Drafts (1886-1899), SE 1:3-15.  
419 Freud, “Report on my Studies,” 8. 
420 Ibid., 9-10, emphasis added. 
421 Ibid., 10, emphasis added. 
422 For example, “my initial bewilderment at the findings of Charcot's new investigations…” See Freud, “Preface to 
the Translation of Charcot's Lectures on the Diseases of the Nervous System,” (1886), SE, 1: 20.  
423 Freud, “Preface and Footnotes to the Translation of Charcot's Tuesday Lectures” (1892), in SE, 1: 135.  
424 Ibid., 135, emphasis added. 
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The emphasis on the Master’s speech and its “binding” powers further confirms the analogy 
between Charcot “on stage,” and the hypnotist. Similarly, in the Second Lecture, Freud employs 
the trope of the magic spell to qualify the fascination that he and Breuer experienced in 1893: “we 
were completely under the spell of Charcot's researches.”425 Without placing too much weight—
or power—on the metaphor of magic spells and hypnotic fascination, one can nevertheless note  
the lingering of affective, hypnotic vocabulary which Freud, in his faithful commitment to the 
intellectual attitude of the Aufklarung, will strive to evacuate, and which, according to the  narrative 
of the foundational myth of the birth of analysis, has no place, even at the heart of the young 
Freud’s initial interest in hysteria. 
 
1.2.1.2. Freud’s Early Use of Hypnosis: From Direct Suggestion to the Cathartic Method. 
 
This loyalty continued throughout the period of the Salpêtrière-Nancy debates, often 
leading Freud to side with Charcot, even after he departed from the Master’s model. As early as 
the “Report on My Studies in Paris and Berlin,” Freud also underlines his fascination for the 
phenomena of hypnotism itself, which appears in conjunction, or in parallel to the fascination for 
its theorization by Charcot, and initially manifests itself as a form of bewildered astonishment:  
The phenomena of hypnotism … are so astonishing and to which so little credence is attached, and in 
particular with the ‘grand hypnotisme’ described by Charcot. I found to my astonishment that here were 
occurrences plain before one's eyes, which it was quite impossible to doubt, but which were nevertheless 
strange enough not to be believed unless they were experienced at first hand.426  
 
The initial shock of the confrontation with the mysterious effects of hypnotism seem to exert a 
similar power over the pupil as did the master’s portrayal of it.  
After Freud’s visit to Nancy in 1889, however, and as the gap between the two opposing 
conceptions of hypnosis grew more visible, Bernheim’s attacks on the Salpêtrière doctrines can no 
longer be ignored. In this sense, despite his loyalty towards Charcot, throughout the pre-
psychoanalytic years, one can almost sense Freud being pulled in two conflicting directions and 
detect, as James Strachey has pointed out, subtle “signs of oscillation in Freud's attitude to the 
debate.”427 How, then, does this oscillation take place?  
 
 
425 Freud, “Five Lectures” (1910), in SE, 11: 21. 
426 Freud, “Report” (1886) in SE, 1:13, emphasis added. 
427 Strachey, “Editor's Introduction to Papers on Hypnotism and Suggestion,” in SE, 1: 67. 
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The Nancy-Salpêtrière Debate 
In his preface to the first edition of Bernheim’s De la suggestion, which he claims to have 
translated without endorsing its content, Freud clearly lays out the stakes of the conflict between 
the two French schools, emphasizing the opposing conceptions of hypnosis as psychological on 
the one hand, and physiological on the other:  
One party, whose opinions are voiced by Dr. Bernheim in these pages, maintains that all the phenomena of 
hypnotism have the same origin: they arise, that is, from a suggestion, a conscious idea, which has been 
introduced into the brain of the hypnotized person by an external influence and has been accepted by him as 
though it had arisen spontaneously. On this view all hypnotic manifestations would be psychical phenomena, 
effects of suggestions. The other party, on the contrary, stand by the view that the mechanism of some at 
least of the manifestations of hypnotism is based upon physiological changes-that is, upon displacements of 
excitability in the nervous system, occurring without the participation of those parts of it which operate with 
consciousness; they speak, therefore, of the physical or physiological phenomena of hypnosis.428  
 
As we saw with Delboeuf, the stakes are higher for the Salpêtrière school, as the entire Charcotian 
edifice lies on the idea that the phenomena in question have not been produced or suggested, but 
objectively observed. In his description of the debate, Freud is not afraid to stage this question in 
dramatic terms. If Bernheim is right, as he points out,  
All observations made at the Salpêtrière are worthless; indeed, they become errors in observation. The 
hypnosis of hysterical patients would have no characteristics of its own; but every physician would be free 
to produce any symptomatology that he liked in the patients he hypnotized. We should not learn from the 
study of major hypnotism what alterations in excitability succeed one another in the nervous system . . .  we 
should merely learn what intentions Charcot suggested (in a manner of which he himself was unconscious) 
to the subjects of his experiments—a thing entirely irrelevant to our understanding alike of hypnosis and of 
hysteria.429  
 
Examined in light of Freud’s ulterior insistence on the “neutrality” of the analyst’s posture, this 
question of the unconscious suggestions emitted by the operator already lays out the future stakes 
for analysis, in a gestated form. At the time of Freud’s preface, though, the stakes concern less the 
question of the position of the physician in the therapeutic relation than the consequences which 
urgently emerge for the study of hysteria as an objective phenomenon. Indeed, what is at stake 
here is the risk of contaminating, of transferring the mimetic and thus “illusory” aspects of 
hypnosis as induced hysteria to the whole symptomatology of hysteria in general:  
If suggestion by the physician has falsified the phenomena of hysterical hypnosis, it is quite possible that it 
may also have interfered with the observation of the rest of hysterical symptomatology: it may have laid 
down laws governing hysterical attacks, paralyses, contractures, etc., which are only connected with the 
neurosis through suggestion and which consequently lose their validity as soon as another physician in 
another place makes an examination of hysterical patients.430 
 
 
428 Freud, “Preface to the Translation of Bernheim's Suggestion,” (1888-9) in SE,1: 76. 
429 Ibid., 78, emphasis added. 
430 Freud, Ibid., 78. 
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What one took to be “laws” would turn out to be artifacts, inadvertently produced—as 
Delboeuf pointed out—by the continuation of an initial suggestion of the experimenter. The effects 
of this original suggestion would have been reproduced time and time again in the experimental 
context, which would remain blind to the confusion between the phenomena it observes and those 
it produces. In this sense, as Isabelle Stengers shows, early on, hypnosis presented Freud with the 
ultimate threat to the scientific inquiry of the human psyche: “What experimenters dread—the 
artifact. If it is known that a fact is extorted, forced, purely dependent on its experimental 
conditions, it is worthless.”431 Even before the abandonment of the cathartic method and well 
before the abandonment of the seduction theory, hypnosis constitutes the field and the object which 
“lays a trap for those who think it produces a reliable witness, that it places its subject ‘in the 
service of truth’.”432 Carrying at its heart the impossibility of reality checking, the danger of 
confusing art[ifact] and truth, hypnotic phenomena represent the danger at the heart of all 
experimental procedure.  
Nevertheless, in 1888, Freud still sided with Charcot. Loyal to the Master, he reiterates the 
orthodox discourse of the Paris school: “the principal points of the symptomatology of hysteria are 
safe from the suspicion of having originated from suggestion by a physician.”433 Significantly, 
Freud uses Charcot’s interest in artistic collection and invokes the multitude of examples of trance 
states from the past, in order to consolidate the legitimacy of the physiological conception of 
hysteria in the present. The historical ubiquity of trance states—or as Charcot would have it, of 
hysterical symptoms—is invoked as an aid to prove the universality and thus, objective existence, 
of the Salpêtrière’s symptomatology: “Reports coming from past times and from distant lands, 
which have been collected by Charcot and his pupils, leave no room for doubt that the peculiarities 
of hysterical attacks, of hysterogenic zones, of anesthesia, paralyses and contractures, have been 
manifested at every time and place just as they were at the Salpêtrière.”434   
Despite these efforts, Freud already seems to be oscillating between his loyalty to the 
organic model and his interest in the psychical causes of hysteria. On the one hand, Freud insists 
that hysteria “is of a real, objective nature and not falsified by suggestion on the part of the 
observer,” but on the other, cannot help but concede that “this does not imply any denial that the 
 
431 Stengers, 84. 
432 Ibid., 83. 
433 Freud, “Preface to the Translation of Bernheim's Suggestion,” 78. 
434 Freud, Ibid., 78-79. 
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mechanism of hysterical manifestations is a psychical one: but it is not the mechanism of 
suggestion on the part of the physician.”435 The balance seems rather precarious at this stage, 
before the appearance of the concept of repression. In 1888, Freud can commit fully to neither of 
the opposing poles presented to him, and instead, adopts a position of compromise, stating that “it 
would be just as one-sided to consider only the psychological side of the process as to attribute the 
whole responsibility for the phenomena of hypnosis to the vascular innervation.”436  
 
The Oscillation. Siding with Bernheim? 
Nevertheless, in several occurrences Freud does seems to make a number of concessions 
to the Bernheimian model, despite his reticence. For instance, while he unwilling to grant any point 
which would harm Charcot’s theory of grande hystérie, Freud does seem ready to side with 
Bernheim on the question of “minor” hypnosis (petit hypnotisme), that is, of the hypnotism of 
healthy individuals, which the Salpêtrière distinguished from the “major” hypnotism (grand 
hypnotisme) described in the previous sections.437 Indeed, as Freud writes:  
In normal minor hypnotism …  every manifestation ... comes about by means of suggestion, by psychical 
means. Even hypnotic sleep, it seems, is itself a result of suggestion: sleep sets in owing to normal human 
suggestibility, because Bernheim arouses an expectation of sleep.”438  
 
As we saw, the Nancy school—which made no such distinction—conceived of all hypnosis as a 
natural, rather than pathological, phenomenon. Because, as Freud shows, Charcot’s notion of 
“minor” hypnosis introduces the “normal” and the psychological back into hypnosis, it implicitly 
undermined the Salpêtrière’s doctrine and fragilizes the strict assimilation between hypnosis and 
the pathological. In this case, Freud seems to be pulled towards the naturalization of the 
phenomenon rather than its pathologization.  
And indeed, after his visit to Nancy, Freud began to criticize Charcot’s model more 
explicitly. In his article 1891 article, “Hypnosis,” published in Anton Bum's medical dictionary, 
Therapeutisches Lexikon, he moves away from the strict Charcotian assimilation and seems to 
agree with Bernheim’s rejection of the correlation between depth of trance and suggestibility:  
We should be wrong if we sought to restrict the making of suggestions to those other cases in which the 
patient becomes somnambulistic or falls into a deep degree of hypnosis. … The depth of a hypnosis is not 
 
435 Ibid., 79. 
436 Ibid., 84. 
437 As Binet and Féré describe it, minor hypnotism is “difficult to distinguish from natural sleep.” Binet and Féré, Le 
Magnétisme animal, 75. 
438  Freud, “Preface to the Translation of Bernheim's Suggestion,” 80. 
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invariably in direct proportion to its success. We may produce the greatest changes in the lightest hypnosis 
and, on the contrary, we may have a failure under somnambulism.439 
 
In passages like these, one could indeed almost attribute the authorship to Bernheim himself.  In 
the same article, Freud describes the use of direct suggestion for symptom removal—of which, as 
we saw, Liébeault also made ample use—as a valuable tool, and as the core essence of the use of 
hypnosis in the therapeutic context: “The true therapeutic value of hypnosis lies in the suggestions 
made during it. These suggestions consist in an energetic denial of the ailments of which the patient 
has complained, or in an assurance that he can do something, or in a command to perform it.”440  
The instability of the results obtained by suggestive therapeutics—an argument often 
invoked by the detractors of hypnosis, and by Freud himself later on—does not seem to be 
problematic in this article:  
If hypnosis has had success, the stability of the cure depends on the same factors as the stability of every cure 
achieved in another way. If what it was dealing with were residual phenomena of a process that was 
concluded, the cure will be a permanent one; if the causes which produced the symptoms are still at work 
with undiminished strength, then a relapse is probable. ... In a number of cases—namely where the symptoms 
are of purely psychical origin—hypnosis fulfils all the demands that can be made of a causal treatment, and 
in that case questioning and calming the patient in deep hypnosis is as a rule accompanied by the most brilliant 
success.441 
 
In responses to arguments against the inconsistent, unreliable, or temporary effects of direct 
suggestion, Freud evokes the comparison with other available physiological treatments:  “Whereas 
no patient ventures to be impatient if he has still not been cured after the twentieth electrical session 
or an equal number of bottles of mineral water, with hypnotic treatment both physician and patient 
grow tired far sooner, as a result of the contrast between the deliberately rosy coloring of the 
suggestions and the cheerless truth.”442 Despite the fact that it emphasizes the gap that can occur 
between the—“rosy”—objectives and the—“cheerless”—results of suggestive therapeutics, 
Freud’s description also seems to participate in a defense of hypnosis, by replacing it among other 
competing remedies: the patience with which these latter treatments are met must also be granted 
to hypnosis. 
Furthermore, in his article Freud, also uses arguments that the Nancy school would be 
expected to mobilize in order to defend itself from the position that we usually associate with 
 
439 Freud, “Hypnosis” (1891), in SE, 1:110; 112. 
440 Ibid., 111. 
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Freud’s later critique of hypnotism. For example, pointing to the importance of non-verbal 
suggestions, Freud writes:  
A far more powerful result than that produced by a simple assurance or denial is achieved if we link the 
expected cure to an action or intervention [of our own] during hypnosis. For instance: ‘You no longer have 
any pains at this place; I press on it and the pain has gone.’ Stroking and pressing on the ailing part of the 
body during hypnosis gives excellent support in general to the spoken suggestion.443   
 
This use of an indirect kinesthetic suggestion—although it recalls images of the old mesmeric 
passes or Liébeault’s nostalgia for magnetic healing through touch—serves to assist the psychical 
integration of the content of verbal suggestion. In this way, it also stands out as the possible 
hypnotic origin of the “pressure technique” which Freud used later on to facilitate psychical 
movement in the opposite direction, as it were—that is, not for the integration of exterior 
information, but for the retrieval of repressed material.  
 
Hypnosis as Fact 
Like the nineteenth-century novelists examined in Chapter 2, despite the problems arising 
from the question of their cause, for a time, the effects of hypnosis seemed impossible to dismiss 
for Freud. This, as I will show, was for empirical—rather than theoretical—reasons. 
 In his review of Auguste Forel’s Hypnotism, Freud notes the rare enthusiasm of the Swiss 
psychiatrist, who claims that “the discovery of the psychological importance of suggestion by 
Braid and Liébeault [is] so magnificent that it can be compared with the greatest discoveries, or 
rather revelations, of the human spirit.”444 Freud then immediately declares that anyone who might 
consider this remark “a gross overvaluation of hypnosis” should “postpone a final judgement till 
the next few years have made it clear how many of the great theoretical and practical revolutions 
which hypnosis promises to bring about can in fact result from it.”445 This type of argumentation 
values hypnotism as an empirical fact, with potentially “invaluable therapeutic effects.”446 From 
the promising nature of its “results”—of its effects, rather than its theoretical worth—stems the 
scientist’s “duty not to abandon this powerful expedient henceforward.”447 This emphasis on the 
“fact” of hypnosis suggests a primacy of experience over theory. Indeed, as Freud describes him, 
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Forel is “a serious physician who has come to know the value and importance of hypnosis from 
his own rich experience and has a right to exclaim to ‘the scoffers and unbelievers’: ‘test before 
you judge!’ And we must agree with him when he adds: ‘In order to make a judgement about 
hypnotism one must have practiced it for a time oneself.’448  
Hinting at the medical community’s own suggestibility toward authority figures and 
compelling discourse, Freud therefore urges physicians—especially the German opponents of 
hypnosis of the time, among which his old professor Theodor Meynert—to have “respect for the 
facts” rather than for the greatness of those who study them.449 Invoking his own experience with 
his patients, he argues: “Any physician who is accessible to considerations of fact will be led to 
take a less unfavorable attitude when he notices that the supposed victims of hypnotic therapy 
suffer less after their treatment and can perform their duties better than they did before—as I can 
assert is the case with my own patients.”450  
In this way, if suggestive therapeutics are to be rehabilitated, it is first and foremost as an 
empirical, rather than theoretical, phenomenon. The question of the existence of hypnosis is no 
longer at stake: only that of its therapeutic value remains. 
 
A Harmless Practice  
In his 1889 review, Freud also responds to arguments about the “dangers” of hypnosis and 
describes it instead as a harmless state. In doing so, he is careful to distinguish between the 
hypnotic induction and direct suggestion: “Hypnotic treatment consists in the first place in bringing 
about a hypnotic state and in the second place in conveying a suggestion to the hypnotized 
subject.”451 This distinction then enables him to ask, “which of these two acts is supposed to be 
the injurious one? The bringing about of hypnosis?”452 Following the Nancy school’s doctrine, 
hypnosis is naturalized and compared to natural sleep: “hypnosis, when it is most completely 
successful, is nothing other than ordinary sleep which is so familiar to us all.”453 Furthermore, the 
analogies drawn between sleep and madness—“in sleep we lose our psychical equilibrium and that 
the activity of our brain during sleep is a disordered one and is in many ways reminiscent of 
 
448 Ibid., 92. 
449 Ibid., 93. 
450 Ibid. 




insanity”—are not sufficient to undermine the harmlessness of hypnosis. In the preface to 
Bernheim’s De la Suggestion, Freud even uses the description of dreams as an ordinary form of 
psychosis, to emphasize the harmlessness of hypnosis: 
There is little to be gained by calling ... hypnosis ‘an experimental psychosis.’... Anyone who is scared by 
the abusive term ‘psychosis’ may well ask himself whether our natural sleep has any less claim to that 
description … No, the cause of hypnotism is in no danger from this quarter … hypnosis is a harmless 
condition and to induce it is a procedure ‘worthy’ of a physician.454 
 
Furthermore, just as the analogy between sleep and madness “does not prevent our awakening 
from sleep with renewed strength mentally,” the subject emerges from hypnosis unscathed, having 
benefited from its therapeutic effects. Therefore, as Freud concludes, “we need not feel afraid that 
the dangers of hypnotic therapy lie in the act of hypnotizing.”455 In this sense, not only is hypnosis 
a “serious” practice, worthy of the medical field, its harmless quality also paves the way for Freud 
to distance himself from the conceptions of dreams and sleep found in older psychiatric models 
and produce his descriptions of primary psychical processes and later on, of the dream work.  
After having established the harmlessness of induction, in his review of Forel’s book, Freud 
then goes on to wonder, “is suggestion the dangerous part?”456 The—negative—response to this 
question is based on the ubiquity of suggestion, and its “partial” character, which preserves the 
freedom of the patient and the unity of the psyche:  
Is it, then, really possible to forget that the suppression of a patient's independence by hypnotic suggestion is 
always only a partial one, that it is aimed at the symptoms of an illness … and that life daily produces on 
every individual psychical effects which, even though they impinge on him while he is awake, make far more 
intense changes in him than does the suggestion of the physician who is trying to get rid of a painful or 
anxious idea by means of an effective counter-idea?”457  
 
In this sense, Freud is able to conclude—in strikingly modern fashion—that “there is nothing 
dangerous in hypnotic therapy but its misuse.458  
If any criticism can be addressed against hypnosis, it must therefore also apply to all 
therapy: “A whole number of the reproaches that have been leveled against hypnosis apply not in 
particular to it but to our therapy in general and may indeed be more justifiably directed against 
particular procedures which we all practice rather than against hypnosis.”459 Addressing opponents 
 
454 Freud, “Preface to the Translation of Bernheim's Suggestion,” 77. In this passage, Freud also argues that it is 
hypnosis that allows to shed light on the pathological phenomenon of monoideism, not the other way around.  
455 Freud, “Review of August Forel’s Hypnotism,” 93. 
456 Ibid.,” 93. 
457 Ibid., 94. 
458 Ibid. 
459 Ibid., 93. 
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to hypnosis, Freud invokes the moral duty of the physician, who must reduce suffering with the 
available means at hand : “As physicians, they will discover the impossibility of not practicing 
hypnosis and of allowing their patients to suffer when they can relieve them by a harmless use of 
psychical influence. They will be obliged to say to themselves that hypnosis loses none of its 
harmlessness and none of its curative value by being called ‘artificial insanity’ or ‘artificial 
hysteria’.”460  
And indeed, following this advice himself, Freud experimented with hypnosis and 
suggestive therapeutics in his own practice. In 1892, he published “A Case of Successful 
Treatment by Hypnotism,”461 a striking paper which describes his use of hypnotic suggestion in 
the case of “a mother” who finds herself unable to feed her new-born baby:462  
I made use of suggestion to contradict all her fears and the feelings on which those fears were based: ‘Have 
no fear! You will make an excellent nurse and the baby will thrive. Your stomach is perfectly quiet, your 
appetite is excellent, you are looking forward to your next meal, etc.’ The patient went on sleeping while I 
left her for a few minutes, and when I had woken her up showed amnesia. … When I returned on the third 
evening the patient refused to have any further treatment. There was nothing more wrong with her, she said: 
she had an excellent appetite and plenty of milk for the baby, there was not the slightest difficulty when it 
was put to her breast, and so on. Her husband thought it rather queer that after my departure the evening 
before she had clamoured violently for food and had remonstrated with her mother in a way quite unlike 
herself. But since then, he added, everything had gone all right. There was nothing more for me to do.463 
  
Here, Freud clearly uses Liébeault and Bernheim’s method of direct suggestion, focusing not 
merely on the physiological process of lactation, but also on the psychological and aspects linked 
to the symptom (“the feelings on which those fears were based”). Although partial, the success of 
hypnosis here is paradoxically linked to the absence of the need for it: once the symptom has been 
removed, it is dismissed. In the paper, Freud also mentions the patient’s aversion to hypnosis and 
the “shame” associated to the helplessness of her conscious willpower in face of the “counter-will” 
that prevents her from fulfilling her motherly duties. In a subtle and roundabout way, by alleviating 
the affective distress produced by what would later on be called repressed material, hypnosis 
becomes an early proof of the existence of the psychic unconscious and a crucial steppingstone in 
the invention of the concepts of repression and resistance.  
 
460 Ibid. 
461 Freud, “A Case of Successful Treatment by Hypnotism,” (1892-93), in SE, 1:115-128. The concept of “counter-
will” that figures in this paper seems to anticipate Freud’s later notion of repression. In this way, resistance to hypnotic 
suggestion was a crucial element that lead to the elaboration of the concept of repression.  
462 Ibid., 117. Freud describes this patient as being an hystérique d’occasion, but not a neurotic. According to Mikkel 
Borch-Jacobsen, it is highly probable that the mother in question was none other than Martha Bernays, Freud’s own 
wife. See Borch-Jacobsen, Sigmund Freud. L’Hypnose. Textes—1886/1893 (Paris: Éditions de l’Iconoclaste, 2015), 
381 note 3. 
463 Freud, “A Case of Successful Treatment by Hypnotism,” 120. 
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An Occasional Defense of Bernheim  
As early as 1889, Freud moved away from Charcot’s doctrines more clearly and sided with 
Bernheim, whom he visited briefly before the 1889 Congress on Hypnotism in Paris.464  Indeed, as 
Freud argues:  
A physician who desires to study hypnosis and form an opinion on it will undoubtedly be best advised to 
adopt the suggestion theory from the first. For he will be able to convince himself of the correctness of the 
assertions of the school of Nancy at any time on his own patients, whereas he is scarcely likely to find himself 
in a position to confirm from his own observation the phenomena described by Charcot as ‘major hypnotism’, 
which seem only to occur in a few sufferers from grande hystérie.465  
 
Whereas the fact of hypnosis seems to be on the side of the Nancy school, Charcot’s grand 
hypnotisme is circumscribed to the confines of the laboratory setting as an artificial construct. By 
the time of his 1893 obituary of Charcot, Freud has then clearly distanced himself from the Master 
and at last, explicitly criticizes “the exclusively nosographical” approach of the Salpêtrière:  “the 
restriction of the study of hypnosis to hysterical patients, the differentiation between major and 
minor hypnotism, the hypothesis of three stages of “major hypnosis,” and their characterization by 
somatic phenomena—all this sank … when Bernheim set about constructing the theory of 
hypnotism on a more comprehensive psychological foundation and making suggestion the central 
point of hypnosis.”466 
 
Criticism of Bernheim 
However, it would be reductive to try and pull Freud towards the Nancy side of the 
spectrum too strongly. On some aspects of the Bernheimian model, Freud remained intractably 
critical until the end. Especially, both in the review of Forel and thirty years later in his Second 
Introductory Lecture, he denounced the vagueness and tautological dimension that, according to 
him, characterizes Bernheim’s concept of suggestion: 
But what in fact is this suggestion, which is the basis of the whole of hypnotism, in which all these results 
are possible? By raising this question, we touch one of the weak sides of the Nancy theory. We are 
 
464 For example, this concerns the question of induction, and the admittance that suggestion acts in all induction 
procedures, even in the Salpêtrière techniques of non-verbal—“indirect”—suggestion: the manner in which this 
condition is brought about (and ended) … appears to be possible in three ways: (1) by the psychical influence of one 
person on another (suggestion), (2) by the (physiological) influence of certain procedures (fixating), by magnets, the 
human hand, etc., and (3) by self-influence (auto-suggestion). Only the first of these methods is, however, established: 
production by ideas-suggestion. In none of the other ways of producing hypnosis does the possibility seem to be 
excluded of the action of suggestion in some form or other. Freud, “Review of August Forel’s Hypnotism,” 95. 
465 Ibid., 98. 
466 Freud, “Charcot,” (1893), in SE, 3:22-3. 
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involuntarily reminded of the question of where St. Christopher stood when we find that Bernheim's 
exhaustive work, which culminates in the statement ‘Tout est dans la suggestion,’ nowhere attempts to touch 
upon the nature of suggestion—that is, upon a definition of the concept.467  
 
Much later on, by the time of the preface to the second edition of Bernheim’s De la suggestion in 
1896, Freud is categorical: “while [Bernheim] explains all the phenomena of hypnotism by 
suggestion, suggestion itself remains wholly unexplained.”468 As James Strachey has noted, at the 
end of the century, we see Freud definitely withdrawing from his earlier inclination to support 
Bernheim's views, explaining hypnosis with the concept of the “primitive” rather than with the 
notion of suggestion:  
The discussions in this section have induced us to give up Bernheim's conception of hypnosis and go back to 
the naïve earlier one. According to Bernheim all hypnotic phenomena are to be traced to the factor of 
suggestion, which is not itself capable of further explanation. We have come to the conclusion that suggestion 
is a partial manifestation of the state of hypnosis, and that hypnosis is solidly founded upon a predisposition 
which has survived in the unconscious from the early history of the human family.469   
 
Therefore, if there was an oscillation, it was mitigated at most. Although after 1889, he used 
Bernheim’s ideas to distance himself from the doctrines of the Salpêtrière, Freud never adhered to 
the Nancy School’s theory of suggestion. Therefore, as he summarizes it in a February 20, 1930 
letter to A. A. Roback, ‘In the question of hypnosis I did take sides against Charcot, though not 
wholly with Bernheim.’470  
 
1.2.1.3. A Clean Break? The Birth of Psychoanalysis 
 
Finally, as the birth of psychoanalysis grew closer, Freud expressed increased frustration 
with the hypnotic technique. Operating por via di levare himself,471 he gradually stripped the 
hypnotic trance of its somnambulistic depth—which he struggled to induce—and moved towards 
a lighter form of trance, which ultimately resulted in the establishment of his technique of free 
 
467 Freud, “Review,” SE, 1:101. 
468 Freud, “Preface to the second German translation of Bernheim’s Suggestion,” (1896), in SE, 1:87. In Chapter IV 
of Group Psychology Freud also argues that suggestion cannot explain itself, as it is only a “magic word” which 
tautologically explains the “magical power of words.” In SE, 18:88; 80. 
469 Freud, footnote 128n. quoted in in “Editor’s preface,” 68. 
470 Freud, quoted in “Editor’s Preface,” SE, 1:68. 
471 In “On Psychotherapy,” drawing on the imagery of fine arts of Leonardo da Vinci, Freud famously contends that 
like painting, suggestion acts per via di porre (“it superimposes something… in the expectation that it will be strong 
enough to prevent the pathogenic idea from coming to expression”) whereas analytic technique acts per via di levare: 
it introduces nothing new, but on the contrary, brings out, removes, lifts away the pathogenic idea by “concerning 
itself with the genesis of symptoms.” Freud, “On Psychotherapy,” (1905), SE, 7:259, note 16. As we shall see further 
down, this distinction is only valid when one reduces hypnotherapy to mere symptom removal with direct suggestion, 
however. Like analysis, modern hypnotherapy can also be considered as operating per via di levare. 
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association. In a sense, this “shifting away,” parallels the previous movement away from 
Bernheim’s direct suggestive technique, and moves toward the cathartic method, both of which 
constitute central steppingstones leading up to the birth of the analytic technique. It is with a double 
movement, then, that “psychoanalysis is born by tearing itself from the maternal womb of 
hypnosis”—an itinerary rather than a clean break.472  
 
From Direct Suggestion to the Cathartic Method 
In his Autobiographical Study, Freud claims that “from the very first I made use of hypnosis 
in another manner, apart from hypnotic suggestion,”473 a statement that seems to refer to the fact 
that in May 1889, Freud began treating Emmy von N. using the cathartic method. Developed by 
Joseph Breuer, the cathartic method was founded on the abreaction of repressed affect linked to 
traumatic memories, and still used hypnosis, albeit not for direct suggestion. Rather, it serves to 
reimmerse the subject into what Breuer calls the “hypnoid” state, during which the traumatic event 
became embedded in the psyche like a “foreign body,” in order to produce the recollection of the 
event and the salutary abreaction. As is widely known, in the cathartic treatment, the symptom 
disappears with the recollection of the traumatic scene and its “purgative” narration. The cathartic 
method 
brings to an end the operative force of the idea which was not abreacted in the first instance, by allowing its 
strangulated affect to find a way out through speech; and it subjects it to associative correction by introducing 
it into normal consciousness (under light hypnosis) or by removing it through the physician's suggestion, as 
is done in somnambulism accompanied by amnesia.474   
 
With the appearance of the cathartic method, the extension of the term hypnosis is widened once 
more. Instead of being reduced to a single use, such as mere symptom removal induced by direct 
suggestion or posthypnotic amnesia, it is now used in the service of a deeper procedure, to access 
unconscious material. In Freud and Breuer’s 1893 Preliminary Communication on “The Psychical 
Mechanism of Hysterical Phenomena,” hypnosis is the necessary gateway that provides access to 
traumatic memories and allows for the recollection of the cause of the symptom, “in part because 
what is in question is often some experience which the patient dislikes discussing; but principally 
because he is genuinely unable to recollect it and often has no suspicion of the causal connection 
 
472 Borch-Jacobsen, Hypnoses, 59, our translation. 
473 Freud, “An Autobiographical Study,” (1925), in SE, 20:19, emphasis added. 
474 S. Freud and J. Breuer, “On the Psychical Mechanism of Hysterical Phenomena,” (1893), in SE, 2:17. 
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between the precipitating event and the pathological phenomenon.”475 Here, hypnosis is not 
suspected as a potential creator of false memories. On the contrary, the vocabulary is one of clarity 
and transparency: “it is necessary to hypnotize the patient and to arouse his memories under 
hypnosis … when this has been done, it becomes possible to demonstrate the connection in the 
clearest and most convincing fashion”; “not until they have been questioned under hypnosis do 
these memories emerge with the undiminished vividness.”476 
It is well known that in the cathartic method, which relies on the power of abreaction and 
of unleashed affect in the reliving of the traumatic event, “The psychical process which originally 
took place must be repeated as vividly as possible; it must be brought back to its statu nascendi 
and then given verbal utterance.”477  The therapeutic value of the cathartic method is then affirmed 
against the weaknesses of the Bernheimian model : “any residues which may be left in the form of 
chronic symptoms or attacks are often removed, and permanently so, by our method, because it is 
a radical one; in this respect it seems to us far superior in its efficacy to removal through direct 
suggestion, as it is practiced to-day by psychotherapists.”478 
 
The Abandonment of Hypnosis 
Freud’s difficulties with hypnosis were expressed in the criticism of its unpredictable, 
unreliable efficacy:  
With one person there is scarcely a symptom that does not yield to suggestion, however firm its organic basis 
… with another person it is impossible to influence even disorders with an undoubted psychical causation. 
Not less depends on the dexterity of the hypnotist and the conditions under which he is able to treat his 
patients. I myself have had not a few happy results from hypnotic treatment; but I do not venture to undertake 
some cures of a sort which I have witnessed under Liébeault and Bernheim at Nancy. I know too that a good 
part of this success is due to the ‘suggestive atmosphere’ which surrounds the clinic of these two physicians, 
to the milieu and to the mood of the patients—things which I cannot always replace for the subjects of my 
experiments.479  
 
Here Freud seems to place the problematic dimension on the side of hypnosis itself, not of the 
therapist.480 As James Strachey has noted, Freud’s “irritation” with hypnotic technique began as 
 
475 Ibid.,3. 
476 Ibid., 3; 9, emphasis added. 
477 Ibid., 6. 
478 Ibid., 17. 
479 Freud, “Review,” 100. 
480 Significantly, the criticism addressed in the second half of the quoted passage, which points out the increase in 
efficacy that can be attributed to the implicit suggestions contained in the patient’s environment—the “suggestive 
atmosphere” of the Nancy clinics—rather than lead to a condemnation of hypnosis as devoid of efficacy, tends on the 
contrary to reinforce its potential power, via that of indirect suggestion. 
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early as 1891.481 Later, in 1910, he sums up his position by invoking not the unreliability of the 
therapeutic efficacy of direct suggestion, but the difficulty in inducing consistently deep hypnotic 
states “But I soon came to dislike hypnosis, for it was a temperamental and, one might almost say, 
a mystical ally. When I found that, in spite of all my efforts, I could not succeed in bringing more 
than a fraction of my patients into a hypnotic state, I determined to give up hypnosis and to make 
the cathartic procedure independent of it.”482 This “giving up of hypnosis,” however, merely 
concerns the abandonment of formal induction, and guarantees neither the elimination of trance 
nor that of suggestion from the analytic context.483 Indeed, as we can see in the passage following 
this initial announcement, Freud’s method transposes Bernheim’s technique of “lifting” post-
hypnotic amnesia—which consisted in using suggestion to “assure” the subject they will be able 
to remember—to the cathartic method:  
So I did the same thing with my patients. When I reached a point with them at which they maintained that 
they knew nothing more, I assured them that they did know it all the same, and that they had only to say it; 
and I ventured to declare that the right memory would occur to them at the moment at which I laid my hand 
on their forehead. In that way I succeeded, without using hypnosis, in obtaining from the patients whatever 
was required for establishing the connection between the pathogenic scenes they had forgotten and the 
symptoms.484   
 
Although there is no longer a formal induction of trance, the use of verbal (“I assured”; “I ventured 
to declare”) and non-verbal (the pressure technique) suggestions is still clearly in use. In this way, 
hypnosis can only be considered as having been discarded or “done without” if one reduces it to 
its narrow sense. 
Freud’s main argument against hypnosis is summarized in the Second Introductory 
Lecture. According to Freud, the main problem stemming from hypnosis is that its suggestive 
nature provides unreliable material which masks the patient’s resistance, by giving the impression 
of its dissolution. In fact, it prevents actual working-through by creating stronger resistance to 
analytic insight. Indeed, as Freud argues, the findings of Breuer’s case histories “were reached 
with the help of hypnotic influence. It is only if you exclude hypnosis that you can observe 
resistances and repressions and form an adequate idea of the truly pathogenic course of events. 
Hypnosis conceals the resistance and renders a certain area of the mind accessible; but, as against 
 
481 More specifically, it appears in 1891 in his contribution to Bum's medical dictionary, in 1892 in a footnote to his 
translation of Charcot's Leçons du Mardi, and in 1895 in the case history of Miss Lucy R. in the Studies on Hysteria. 
See Strachey, “Editor’s Preface,” in SE, 1:63-69.  
482 Freud, “Five Lectures on Psycho-analysis,” (1910), in SE, 11:22. 
483 See Appendix A. 
484 Freud, “Five Lectures on Psycho-analysis,” 23, emphasis added. 
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this, it builds up the resistance at the frontiers of this area into a wall that makes everything beyond 
it inaccessible.”485 Analytic inquiry, on the other hand, must examine resistance rather than 
artificially conceal it. 
 
The End of Suggestion? 
After 1893-1895, the practice of hypnosis was thus gradually “abandoned” and the analytic 
setting progressively rid of all suggestive influence. As Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen notes, in the 
narration of the birth of psychoanalysis, this break is framed as “a shift towards a purely narrative, 
demimeticized, deemotionalized therapeutic method.”486 This shift involved several small 
adjustments, with which Freud rid the analytic setting of the various reminders of all suggestive 
influence. First, the state of “concentration” was substituted for hypnotic trance. Then, hypnotic 
induction was replaced by the pressure technique, which as we argues higher up, seems directly 
inspired from the hypnotic model.487 The “mild word of command” which accompanies it—and 
which Freud does not name ‘suggestion’—aims to help patients remember the “rejected” 
pathogenic material, or persuade them that they “already know everything that was of any 
pathogenic significance,” that it was only a question of “obliging” them to “communicate” it.488 In 
both cases, the content would be allowed to come forth, because the “critical faculties” were now 
“relaxed.”489 When a patient claims to still be unable to remember, Freud imitates the Bernheimian 
model and simply repeats the suggestion until the patient’s belief has changed. Interestingly, 
although in practice this type of suggestion should have just as unreliable effects as the direct 
suggestions of Bernheim—which, as we may recall, can also prove efficacious without a 
somnambulism and therefore contain no technical difference with what Freud is doing here—
Freud emphasizes the regularity and systematic dimension of his “success” with this—hypnotic—
technique: “it yielded me the precise results that I needed”; “I can safely say that it has scarcely 
ever left me in the lurch”; “I turned out to be invariably right.”490 After Freud abandoned the 
pressure technique, he then purged free association of as much suggestive force as possible, merely 
 
485 Ibid., 26. 
486 Borch-Jacobsen, The Emotional Tie, 47. 
487 In the case study of Lucy R., Freud describes the use of the pressure technique as intended to “indicate a different 
state of consciousness” to the patient. Freud, In “Studies on Hysteria,” in SE, 109. 
488 Freud, “Studies on Hysteria,” (1893), SE, 2:109. 
489 Ibid., 109-110. 
490 Ibid., 110. 
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requesting that the patient give free reign to their associations with their eyes closed.491 In 1904, 
Freud recommends that the eyes remain open, and all physical contact be avoided, “as well as any 
other procedure which might be reminiscent of hypnosis.”492 Only one element remains—which 
one could argue is suggestive nonetheless—of the old hypnotic technique. In “On Beginning the 
Treatment,” Freud mentions the analytic couch as a ceremonial element reminiscent of analysis’ 
hypnotic parent:  
I must say a word about a certain ceremonial which concerns the position in which the treatment is carried 
out. I hold to the plan of getting the patient to lie on a sofa while I sit behind him out of his sight. This 
arrangement has a historical basis; it is the remnant of the hypnotic method out of which psycho-analysis was 
evolved.493 
 
James Strachey has noted the gratitude expressed by Freud in 1914: “We must still be grateful to 
the old hypnotic technique for having brought before us single psychical processes of analysis in 
an isolated or schematic form. Only this could have given us the courage ourselves to create more 
complicated situations in the analytic treatment and to keep them clear before us.”494 With this 
“gratitude,” then, the narrative of the clean break with the historical hypno-suggestive ancestor can 
be finalized. As Freud writes in his “Recommendations”:  
In practice … there is nothing to be said against a psychotherapist combining a certain amount of analysis 
with some suggestive influence in order to achieve a perceptible result in a shorter time. But one has a right 
to insist that he himself should be in no doubt about what he is doing and should know that this method is 
not that of true psychoanalysis.495  
 
Therefore, after the initial fascination for the hypnotic fact and its therapeutic potential, 
psychoanalysis “proper” founded its identity on this very break. By attempting to distinguish itself 
from the suggestive in all of its manifestations, it proposed a self-definition which, as Mikkel 
Borch-Jacobsen argues, asserts itself “in its supposedly total difference from all psychotherapy 
and indeed from all thaumaturgy.”496  
 
491 In the beginning of The Interpretation of Dreams, Freud still recommends keeping the eyes closed: “In order that 
he may be able to concentrate his attention on his self-observation it is an advantage for him to lie in a restful attitude 
and shut his eyes.” Freud, “The Interpretation of Dreams,” (1900), in SE, 4:101. 
492 “The physician “does not even ask them to close their eyes, and avoids touching them in any way.” Strachey, 
“Freud's Psycho-Analytic Procedure (1904 [1903])” in SE, 7: 250. 
493 Freud, “On Beginning the Treatment (Further Recommendations on the Technique of Psycho-Analysis I),” (1913), 
in SE, 12:133. 
494 Freud, “Remembering, Repeating and Working-Through,” (1914) in SE, 12: 148.  
495 “Recommendations to Physicians Practicing Psycho-Analysis,” 1912, 118. Disregarding the latter part of the quote 
and focusing on the former, the hypnoanalysts of the twentieth century attempted to reconcile the analytic framework 
and the technical tool of hypnosis. See Appendix A. 
496 Borch-Jacobsen, The Freudian Subject, 39. 
 109 
  
1.2.2. Back From the Dead: Hypnotic Hauntology  
  
What, then, is to be made of the “death” of hypnosis after it birthed the analytic 
unconscious? Can traces of it not still be found, albeit unnamed, at the heart of the therapeutic 
relation, and indeed, of human interaction in general? Can one not argue, with Mikkel Borch-
Jacobsen, that psychoanalysis broke with hypnosis “only to see hypnosis reappear, sometimes 
under other names or in other forms, at the crossroads of all questions”?497  
To respond to these questions, the term “hypnosis” must be reextended from the narrow 
sense, that reduces it to techniques of direct suggestion and formal inductions, to a broader sense, 
which gestures toward the subject’s general suggestibility, and to the more archaic, affective-
mimetic-suggestive “ties” that link individuals to one another.498 If hypnosis survived the Freudian 
death blow, it was indeed by shape-shifting, by reappearing in various forms and various 
suggestive phenomena, without having to be named as such.499 In this context, in what follows, I 
will examine three potential ways in which hypnosis can be said to “haunt” the analytic setting, 
even after its “death”: as a second royal road to the unconscious, as an indissoluble “affective tie” 
at the heart of human interactions, and as the inevitable suggestive influence of the therapist on 
the patient. 
 
          1.2.2.1.   A Second Road to the Unconscious 
 
As Erika Fromm observes in Hypnosis and Hypnoanalysis, hypnotic trance produces 
“changes in thinking from reality-oriented, sequential, logical thinking (secondary process 
thinking, which employs mainly the mode of inner language) to preverbal, pictorial, fantasy-full 
thinking in imagery.”500 Once hypnosis is redefined, as Fromm does, as a state which facilitates 
the production of primary process thinking and fantasy material, there is no need to conceptually 
 
497 Borch-Jacobsen, The Emotional Tie, 44. 
498 For Borch-Jacobsen, “we should be asking what is encompassed by the terms hypnosis and suggestion if we want 
to know from what, exactly, psychoanalysis has freed itself—if it has really done so.” Borch-Jacobsen, Ibid., 40. 
499 As stated in the introduction, in the extended sense, hypnosis can designate the wide array of suggestive phenomena 
that influence individuals and their modes of relating to one another, and can thus be thought to permeate all areas of 
human activity. In a less extended sense, it refers to a psychological state of suggestibility and absorption in which 
imaginary and unconscious, repressed or fantasized, material can emerge, and in the therapeutic context, can be 
worked-through. Finally, it can refer to the mimetic-affective tie between individuals that becomes magnified in the 
therapeutic relation. 
500 Fromm, Hypnotherapy and Hypnoanalysis, 14. 
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oppose it to the analytic investigation. As a space in which the subject can live fantasy in that it 
differs from reality, hypnosis offers the opportunity to go beyond mere affective abreaction and 
explore the significance of the material which it elicits. As a form of absorption in an imaginative 
and subjectively significant content where the critical faculties of the psyche are “relaxed,” like 
dreams, it can become a royal road to the unconscious.  Indeed, as Rebecca Curtis argues, insofar 
as psychoanalysis is conducted “in the interstices between actual events and the meanings people 
make of them,” in the “playground of the mind” between reality and fantasy, there is no reason to 
argue that “the suggestion to imagine events and feelings is inconsistent with psychoanalytic 
principles.”501  
In the Introductory Lectures, Freud even invokes hypnosis alongside dreams to prove the 
existence of the unconscious.”502 In The Ego and the Id, hypnosis becomes the paradigm of the 
unconscious, “a second royal road of analysis.”503 As Freud writes: “To most people who have 
been educated in philosophy the idea of anything psychical which is not also conscious is 
inconceivable… I believe this is only because they have never studied the relevant phenomena of 
hypnosis and dreams.”504   
Furthermore, once hypnosis is stripped of the hopes it still carried at the time of the 
cathartic method—that is, of providing access to the actual pathogenic cause or traumatic event—
and once the problem of false memories has been evacuated by a focus on narrative, rather than 
historical, truth, its status as a second “royal road” becomes much stronger.505 As a “slumbering 
of consciousness” during which the subject paradoxically remains awake, the hypnotic state is 
valuable, including in the analytic setting, as “particularly revealing of an unconscious psychic 
activity not subject to the monitoring and control of the ego.”506 And indeed, despite Freud’s 
insistence on its neutrality, a series of suggestive or hypnotic elements seems to have survived in 
the analytic setting itself.507 Among these, free association, although it is intended to prevent 
patients from being led astray by suggestions and expectations, also has a hypnotic rhythm, which 
 
501 Curtis, “A New World Symphony,” 259; 263.  
502 “Even before the time of psychoanalysis, hypnotic experiments, and especially posthypnotic suggestion, had 
tangibly demonstrated the existence and mode of operation of the mental unconscious.” Freud, “The Unconscious,” 
(1915), in SE, 14: 168. 
503 Borch-Jacobsen, The Emotional Tie, 41.  
504 Freud, “The Ego and the Id,” in SE, 19:13, emphasis added. 
505 For a more detailed explanation of the narrative turn in psychotherapy, see Appendix. 
506 Borch-Jacobsen, Ibid., 40. 
507 Indeed, the free-floating state of consciousness, lying on the couch, the relaxing of the critical faculties, the state 
of concentration, dream analysis and free association are all techniques which have an inductive dimension. 
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as the Surrealists knew, allows unconscious material to come to the foreground while rational, 
logical, critical or self-reflexive thinking temporarily recede. As Ferenczi himself has noted, “in 
all free-association there is necessarily an element of self-forgetful abstraction. ...  When the patient 
is called upon to go further and deeper ...  a more profound abstraction develops. Where this takes 
a quasi-hallucinatory form, people can call it auto-hypnosis if they like; my patients often call it a 
trance state.”508 Therefore, a first manifestation of the hypnotic in the analytic setting can be found 
in the effects of absorptive or trance-inducing elements, which played a central role in Ferenczi’s 
work.509  
 
         1.2.2.2.    The Emotional Tie: Hypnotic Rapport at the Heart of Psychoanalysis?  
 
Another possible way to frame the “survival” of hypnosis in the analytic setting concerns 
not the inductive aspects of hypnotic-therapeutic technique, but the question of the suggestive, 
relational and affective aspects of the therapeutic relation itself. As Oscar Mannoni writes: “Freud 
knew that the transference, in analysis, is a remnant of hypnosis. … These infantile affects which 
precede speech are perhaps—or still—hypnotic traits.”510 Rather than explain hypnosis with the 
concept of transference, can one consider that hypnotic rapport lies at the foundation of the 
therapeutic relation? Does the hypnotic ancestor live on, even at the heart of psychoanalysis?  
In The Emotional Tie, Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen conducts a provocative analysis of Freud’s 
theory of the social bond in Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, arguing that hypnotic 
rapport, which can be found at the heart of all human interaction, becomes the “great riddle of 
psychoanalysis” as it reveals an irreducible affective tie at the foundation of both social and 
therapeutic relations.511  
 
508 “Child-Analysis in the Analysis of Adults.” International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 12 (1931): 475. Chertock 
and Stengers have also pointed to this compatibility between the hypnagogic dimension of analytic technique and 
trance states revealed in Ferenczi’s work. Indeed, although he did not deliberately engage in suggestion and hypnosis, 
he nevertheless “left things in free play … and used the analytic instrument par excellence, free association. Even 
Freud had recognized on occasion … that the analytic setting could be hypnogenic … but Ferenczi puts to good use 
the uncontrollable ingredients that ought by rights to be excluded from the analytic setting. By so doing, Ferenczi 
actively erases the rigid frontier Freud had so often traced between hypnotic suggestion and psychoanalytic practice. 
… Interpretation, for him, is no longer independent of the affective relation created, in the form of a “trance” between 
the analyst and the patient.” Chertock and Stengers, 95. 
509 See Appendix. 
510 Quoted in Hypnoses, 58. 
511  Freud himself speaks of “the riddle of suggestion” and “the riddle of suggestive influence,” which for Borch-
Jacobsen is that of our fundamental relation Freud, Group psychology, 89; 117; Borch-Jacobsen, The Emotional Tie 
41. 
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As Borch-Jacobsen describes it, this hypnotic-suggestive dimension is most visible in the 
transference itself, which repeats, actualizes and exposes repressed, historical, affect (which the 
subject paradoxically acts out but refuses to remember) in the present, in statu nascendi, as was 
the case with the hypnotic-mimetic acting out of hysteric patients at the time of the cathartic 
method.512 In the transference, this relation is a “hypnotic umbilical cord” that keeps the subject 
tied to the “repetition, in history of prehistory.”513  
For Borch-Jacobsen, as transference gradually came to dominate the whole analytic 
encounter, it even ended up becoming another name for the “suggestibility” that Freud initially 
rejected, to the point where it can become difficult to distinguish analytic neutrality from 
suggestive forms of therapeutics.514 In the positive transference for instance, the analysand 
inevitably develops a relation of suggestibility, “dependency, submission, or … excessive 
valorization of the person of the physician,” thereby revealing the resurgence of rapport in the 
analytic setting.515 Although for Freud, the interpretation and dissolution of the transference is 
what distinguishes analysis from its hypnotic ancestor, Borch-Jacobsen argues that the affective 
nature of transference renders it indissoluble and, in fine, un-rememberable and un-representable: 
rather than a representation stored in memory, as an affective process, it can merely be exhibited 
or repeated in the present mode and relived in statu nascendi, as in hypnosis.516 The hypnotic 
dimension of transference thus lies in its affective—rather than representational—nature and in 
the suggestive component of the analytic relation. Reconceptualized as this irreducible affective 
core, hypnosis thus reappears in the analytic setting “with the crucial question now being to know 
how the transference relationship can finally be distinguished from the hypnotic tie, which analysis 
initially refused to mobilize in the cure.”517 The “emotional tie” underlying the analytic relation 
thus reveals Freud’s difficulty in properly “cutting the cord” with the hypnotic-suggestive 
 
512 As Borch-Jacobsen argues: transference is at heart a resurgence of affect, and not a representation. Because for 
Freud affect can only be perceived in the present, it can therefore not, strictly speaking, be remembered or narrated, 
and thus (as in hypnosis) necessarily emerges in the mode of the dramatic-mimetic, rather than the diegetic. 
513 Borch-Jacobsen, Hypnoses, 58.  
514 As Borch-Jacobsen notes: if even the analyst’s silence triggers transference reactions in the patient, then it is no 
longer possible to distinguish analytic neutrality from other suggestive-psychotherapeutic techniques. Borch-
Jacobsen, Le Lien Affectif, 86. 
515 Borch-Jacobsen, Ibid., 85. Borch-Jacobsen even asks” “How can one know …. if the results of analytic cure weren’t 
due to the hypnotic-transferential rapport, rather than to the interpretation and becoming-conscious of the repressed?” 
Ibid., 89. 
516 Ibid., 92. 
517 Ibid., 44 
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paradigm. For Borch-Jacobsen, with rapport at the heart of transference, the enigma of hypnosis 
thus “reappear[s] in psychoanalysis as the enigma of its own foundation.”518 
Borch-Jacobsen also underlines the presence of the affective tie outside of the therapeutic 
relation and of a suggestive component at the very foundations of the social bond, which challenges 
the theory of the social tie as a libidinal relation between the masses and the leader-Father. 
Although in Group psychology, Freud rejected the concept of suggestion as an explanation of the 
foundations of the social tie,519 for Borch-Jacobsen, the “mystery” and “fact” of suggestion 
nevertheless remained, and constantly eluded Freud’s attempts to theorize social relations in terms 
of an erotic, libidinous or love relation.520    
Indeed, as Borch-Jacobsen shows in his reading of Totem and Taboo and the myth of the 
primal horde, as it is intimately linked to an original, archaic, “prehistoric” process of 
identification, the affective tie is preexistent to object-relations—libidinal, Oedipal or otherwise—
and to the very constitution of “subject” and “object.”521 A preexisting and “original alteration (or 
affection) by others” exists “well before the constitution of an ego and well before any Oedipal 
triangle” and thus, well before the subject and its ulterior libidinous relation to an object-Father.522  
According to him, admitting this original alteration, Freud is thus led to rediscover the 
emotional tie to others “as a pure enigma,”—the libidinal hypothesis having failed—and then 
paradoxically ends up making hypnosis—which, “much more than love, most clearly shows the 
unfathomable ‘nature’ or ‘essence’ of the Gefühlsbindung to others”—the paradigm of the social 
tie.”523 Indeed, in Chapter VIII, Freud writes that “it would be more to the point to explain being 
in love by means of hypnosis rather than the other way round.”524 In this context, by taking 
 
518 Ibid. 
519 In Group Psychology Freud refuses theories of suggestion sur as those of Bernheim, Tarde and Le Bon. As we will 
see in Chapter 2, these theories of crowd psychology ultimately explain the foundation of the social tie by processes 
of unconscious and corporeal mimesis, and affective contagion. In Chapter IV of Group Psychology, Freud argues 
that the concept of suggestion is tautological and insufficient to explain the foundation of the social bond, and proposes 
instead his own theory of the libidinous relation between the crowd and the Leader-Father-Hypnotist. According to 
Borch-Jacobsen however, “rejecting the theory of suggestion never eliminated the enigma of hypnotic suggestion for 
Freud.” Borch-Jacobsen, The Emotional Tie, 43. 
520 Freud’s theory of the libido in Group Psychology remains “insufficient to explain the phenomenon” of the social 
tie, a “failure” which Freud “half admits.” Borch-Jacobsen, The Emotional Tie, 42-43 
521 Borch-Jacobsen, Le Lien Affectif, 58. For a description of this original ambivalent identification which contains 
aggression and precedes all relations of “love,” see Borch-Jacobsen’s reading of the constitution of the primal horde 
in “La Bande Primitive” in Le Lien Affectif, 13-32. 
522 Ibid., 42. 
523 Ibid.  
524 Freud, “Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego,” 114. In fact, Freud claims that “hypnosis would solve the 
riddle of the libidinal constitution of groups right away, if it were not that it itself exhibits some features which are not 
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hypnosis as a paradigm of our relationship to others, psychoanalysis thus “stumbled into the 
enigma of relationship itself, beyond the presupposed subject … of the relationship.”525   
Despite its provocative appeal about the close ties between analytic transference and 
hypnotic suggestibility, Borch-Jacobsen’s argument nevertheless relies on a strongly mimetic 
conception of hypnosis, as a primitive, affective-suggestive relation that precedes subject 
formation and object relations. As we will show in Chapter 3, this type of description tends to 
overshadow the anti-mimetic distance that also exists in hypnotic experiences, which is ultimately 
still the experience of a subject. In response to Borch-Jacobsen’s account of the hypnotic 
dimension that haunts psychoanalysis “proper,” one might thus also add that conversely, “hypnosis 
proper” should be distinguished from the states of blind symbiosis and dissolution to which it is 
often reduced. In fact, it should be examined as the experience of an already constituted psyche, 
with the underlying presence of a subject-as-subject.526  
 
         1.2.2.3.    The Ubiquity of Suggestion 
 
According to Freud, the analyst must act like a mirror, turning his unconscious like a 
receptive organ toward the transmitting unconscious of the patient, adjusting to the patient as a 
telephone receiver is adjusted to the transmitting microphone.527 In this context, as François 
Roustang points out, “to admit that the analyst can have an influence on the patient or that he can 
will or wish something for him or in his place” would “ruin the entire psychoanalytic discovery, 
since one would be led back to a variant of suggestion.”528 This is the third way in which hypnosis 
can be considered to reemerge at the heart of analysis. 
In “On beginning the treatment,” when he states the reasons for maintaining the ritual of 
the couch as a “remnant” of hypnosis, Freud begins by mentioning a “personal motive”—his 
 
met by the rational explanation we have hitherto given it, as a state of being in love with the directly sexual trends 
excluded. There is still a great deal in it which we must recognize as unexplained and mysterious.” (Borch-Jacobsen 
uses “mystical” to translate the German mystich). Freud, “Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego,” 114-115. 
525 Borch-Jacobsen, The Emotional Tie, 43. 
526 In Chapter 3, I undertake such an attempt, by examining hypnosis in light of the aesthetic experience of immersive 
reading. 
527 Freud, “Recommendations,” in SE, 12:118. The analyst must also undergo analysis himself so as to not “tolerate 
any resistances in himself which hold back from his consciousness what has been perceived by his unconscious.” 
Ibid., 116. 
528 François Roustang, Psychoanalysis Never Lets Go, trans. Ned Lukacher (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins 
University Press), 1983, 55. 
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reluctance to have patients “starting” at him for “eight hours” a day.529 The “proper” purpose of 
the procedure, however, is “to prevent the transference from mingling with the patient's 
associations imperceptibly, to isolate the transference and to allow it to come forward in due course 
sharply defined as a resistance.”530 In between these statements, however, Freud acknowledges the 
potential effects of the analyst’s reactions on the patient: “while I am listening to the patient, I, too, 
give myself over to the current of my unconscious thoughts, I do not wish my expressions of face 
to give the patient material for interpretations or to influence him in what he tells me.”531 This 
question of the ideal of neutrality of the analyst, and that of its corollary, the counter-transference, 
inevitably bring back the question of hypnosis, this time not as a non-verbal affective tie at the 
heart of all relations, but as the inevitable suggestive influence that organizes the therapeutic 
encounter.  
In a chapter titled “Suggestion Over the Long Term” in Psychoanalysis Never Lets Go, 
Roustang rejects the very possibility of a neutral position, given the “intense” relation that 
underlies “every therapeutic enterprise, whether or not one wishes it.”532 According to  Roustang, 
analytic neutrality is an ideal of the function, rather than an empirical possibility. In fact, the very 
ideal of neutrality can be considered as a form of magical thinking: “To confuse the function with 
the posture, that is to believe, as Freud does, that this attitude of pure receptivity, of having 
analyzed every resistance, is possible—is this not to reenter the realm of magic?”533  
Indeed, in the analytic setting, not only is “the patient confronted with the analyst’s own 
fantasies, symptoms and desires,”534 which Freud already knew, but “everything in the analyst’s 
unconscious passes to the patient under the protection of the mediated transference.”535 As 
Roustang provocatively writes, “anyone who has been to several different analysts knows very 
well that the past that he discovers with each one is different, and that his glance or his poor vision, 
his discourse or his bad hearing, have had a different effect on each of his analysands.”536 In this 
 
529 Freud, “On Beginning the Treatment (Further Recommendations on the Technique of Psycho-Analysis I)” (1913), 
in SE, 12:133. 
530 Ibid., 134. 
531 Ibid., 133. 
532 Roustang, Psychoanalysis Never Lets Go, 93. 
533 Ibid., 78. As Roustang adds, “Is it not simply to adopt a perverse position of all-powerfulness which fixes the 
patient in his own corresponding state of infantile all-powerfulness?” Ibid. 
534 Ibid. 
535 Ibid., 61. 
536 Ibid. 
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sense, Roustang agrees with Ferenczi who notes that “in analysis it is not legitimate to suggest or 
hypnotize things into the patients, but it is not only right but advisable to suggest them out.”537 
Despite all possible precautions, as a body with its specific reactions and as a second 
unconscious present in the therapeutic space, the analyst himself cannot help but act like an 
embodied suggestion.538 Even the analyst’s silence can be considered as a form of suggestion: 
There is such an abyss between the silence of death and that of life, such a difference between the silence of 
inattention and that of alert interest, between the silence of desire and of impotence, between that of 
depression and that of continuous mania! Every silence has an intensity and a coloration that is perceptible 
to the patient. If punctuation gives meaning to a sentence, then surely silence alone, with all its nuances, is 
capable of passing to the patient all sorts of preconscious or unconscious messages, which are all the more 
clear because the analyst thinks he is protected from communicating them.539   
 
Similarly, “routine questions such as, ‘What keeps you from doing such and such?’ implicitly 
contain suggestions.”540 Whatever the analyst’s reaction, whether verbal or nonverbal, conscious 
or unconscious, it will manifest itself. In this sense, as Rebecca Curtis points out, “the patient's 
view of the analyst’s behavior—whether that be silence, interpretation, or an active technique—
must be explored and analyzed. Silence and interpretations are behaviors as much as is the direct 
proposal of a means of coping.”541 One might even go as far as claiming, like Roustang, that 
neutrality itself is a suggestion:  
If the analyst’s position of pure receptivity suggests in effect, nothing in particular, would it not still constitute 
a formidable suggestion, since it arouses what is most fundamental to the patient, since it makes him depart 
from the real and from the present in order to send him into excess, immoderation, and unreality?542   
 
By describing psychoanalysis as “one long drawn out suggestion,” Roustang therefore implies that 
Freud has to face the same question than Mesmer in 1784 and Charcot in 1893 (“The numerous 
important psychological discoveries of psychoanalysis … are they not the result of unintentional 
suggestion?”).543 In doing so, he  therefore repositions psychoanalysis in the continuity of 
suggestive therapeutic practices already drawn out by Ellenberger: “psychoanalysis follows the 
most ancient therapeutic tradition by making the personality of the analyst into the physician who 
can heal; [it] creates the condition of credulous expectation or responds to the anticipatory ideas 
 
537 Ferenczi, “Child-Analysis,” 475. 
538 In this sense, the creation of a transference neurosis and the working towards its dissolution in no way prevents the 
analysand from being receptive, in return, to the suggestive elements—including the analyst’s own resistance—
presented to him, even under the cover of interpretation.   
539 Roustang, Psychoanalysis Never Lets Go, 59. 
540 Curtis, “A New World Symphony,” 256. 
541 Ibid., 252. 
542 Roustang, 78, emphasis added. 
543 Freud, note 74 in Roustang, 90. 
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as healers had done in the times past.”544 In this sense, “suggestive” therapeutics have been 
extended to all therapeutics. 
   
1.2.3. Hypnosis, After Analysis? 
 
Although the Freudian model seemed to overshadow or even mark the end of hypnosis, as 
we have shown, its “core” manifestations reemerged even in the field which actively strived to 
eliminate them. Nevertheless, despite its use as an abreactive treatment of the war neuroses in shell 
shocked soldiers during the first half of the twentieth century,545 after the Second World War, 
hypnosis was no longer the scientific tool of choice to explore unconscious material.546 
Psychoanalysis having revealed the therapeutic limits of mere symptom removal by direct 
suggestion, hypnosis in the therapeutic setting faced the choice between disappearing or adapting. 
Following the latter course, it reappeared in the second half of the century, with a new, indirect 
and permissive form of hypnotherapy which presented itself as a reaction to—and often, against—
psychoanalytic clinical theory.547 Setting aside the question of the rivalry between analytic and 
non-analytic cures, this shift is relevant to our purposes, as it forced hypnosis to move away from 
previous, authoritative methods and create a more horizontal relation, in which hypnotherapy 
adapts to the subject rather than the other way around. As we shall see in this section, one of the 
most striking models which carried out this transformation was instigated by the work of American 
psychiatrist Milton H. Erickson (1901-1980). 
 
       1.2.3.1.      Ericksonian Hypnosis 
 
The main transformation underwent by hypnosis in the twentieth century occurred after the 
“crisis” of the emergence of psychoanalysis, in the emergence of Ericksonian hypnotherapy in the 
1950s and 1960s.548 Based on the use of indirect suggestions, cooperative dynamics, and the 
strategic use of verbal and nonverbal communication, these new, permissive models are forms of 
 
544 Roustang, 91. 
545 See Ruth Leys, “Shell Shock, Janet, and the Question of Memory,” 632-43. 
546 Later called PTSD in the DSM. 
547 Once again, this thesis agrees with the hypnoanalysts when they argue that there need not be a strong opposition 
between analytic theory and hypnotic practice, which is a tool, rather than a conceptual framework.  
548 See The Collected Papers of Milton H. Erickson on Hypnosis. 4 vols. (New York and London: Irvington Publishers, 
1980); and The Seminars, Workshops, and Lectures of Milton H. Erickson, ed. E. Rossi and M. O. Ryan (New York: 
Irvington Publishers, 1992). 
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future- and solution-oriented brief therapy. In this sense, they diverge strongly from 
psychoanalytic cure.549 This utilizational and strategic—rather than insight-based—strand of 
therapy does not hesitate to “utilize whatever resources may advance the client's situation … 
whatever metaphor, layer of meaning, or technique circumstances evoked.”550 
Nevertheless, like Freudian analysis, permissive hypnotherapy also strives to produce its 
own form of therapeutic “neutrality.” Rather than trying to avoid the production of suggestion 
altogether, the hypnotist makes full use of the verbal and nonverbal power of suggestion at his 
disposal, while maintaining a nonintrusive posture of “unknowing.”  
To do so, he both uses and subverts the mimetic-suggestive dimension at the heart of the 
therapeutic relation, by actively mirroring the subject’s behavior and language. Rather than 
withdraw into neutral silence, he immerses himself fully and mirrors back, the worldview 
presented to him in the clinical assessment. The reproduction of the subject’s body language and 
vocabulary aims to establish strong rapport and allows the operator to become a “neutral” surface, 
capable of receiving and reflecting the client’s worldview.  
In Ericksonian hypnosis, suggestions are not given directly but indirectly, so as to counter 
both resistance to change and resistance to hypnotic trance itself. In this framework, a successful 
suggestion is considered as nothing more than an autosuggestion on the part of the subject. 
The various ideomotor and hypnotic phenomena that used to be considered symptoms of 
hysteria are now induced by—and acknowledged as the product of—verbal suggestions, with 
indirect techniques such as evocations, negative suggestions and double binds—all of which serve 
to work around resistance, while preserving the subject’s autonomy and creative resources.551 For 
instance, rather than command the subject to “go to sleep,” the operator will offer an evocative 
description of the state of sleep in another—often fictional—individual, which is taken to be 
conducive to eliciting the state in the subject once a state of absorption and suggestibility has been 
 
549 As Gilligan argues, “hypnosis, especially when applied within a context emphasizing systemic and depathologized 
views, enables briefer therapy.” Stephen Gilligan, “In Defense of Hypnosis,” in Broader Implications of Ericksonian 
Therapy, ed. S. Lankton, (London: Routledge, 1990), 10-11. 
550 Bradford Keeney and Douglas Flemons, “Milton Erickson’s Lesson,” in Broader Implications of Ericksonian 
Therapy, 12. In fact, Erickson practiced “short-term and long-term therapy; he depathologized and he pathologized 
behaviors; he could be simple and straightforward and complex and obscure; he would demystify and mystify; he 
operated as a change agent and a stability agent; he was direct and indirect; he used language sensitively and he used 
it like a sledgehammer; he didn't rely on medical interventions and he is known to have prescribed electroshock; he 
worked monadically and interpersonally; he spoke to the conscious and to the unconscious ... Erickson's lesson simply 
orients therapists to utilize what clients present. Ibid, 12-13. 
551 For a closer examination of hypnotic utterances, see Chapter 3. 
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attained. During hypnotic sessions, ideomotor hypnotic phenomena such as catalepsies and 
paralyses are not created as ends in themselves. Rather, they are co-created by the operator and the 
subject, and are given metaphorical functions which are tailored to each individual case. For 
example, the immobilization of a limb—often of an arm or a hand—will be induced to represent a 
difficulty in the life of the patient, which can be symbolically overcome once movement 
reappears.552 Significantly, the construction of this kind of therapeutic metaphor is “the result of 
the interaction between the client and therapist, not a story that is imposed on the client by the 
correct thinking therapist.”553 
One of the main contributions of the Ericksonian model is its implementation of an 
“important epistemological shift from an objective reality to a constructed reality” into the field 
of hypnotherapy.554 Following a constructivist framework, modern hypnotherapy rejects the notion 
of the observer’s independence from the observed, and relies on a conception of language as “not 
a simple descriptive mapping of reality but a dialogic process of creating reality” that “constructs 
what we observe.”555 Therapeutic change, as we shall see in Chapter 4, is both manifested in, and 
brought about by, the ways in which the client describes himself in relation to his or her problem. 
The therapeutic goal of hypnosis is then to produce a transformation in the subject’s beliefs, 
worldview, or self-perception, a “reframing” of the problem that enables alternative, more 
beneficial outlooks or behaviors. Just as “belief in dysfunctional structures creates our observation 
of such structures” in a self-reinforcing loop, “when the problem is no longer defined as a problem, 
it ceases to exist.”556  
Despite the active role of their hypnotic subjects and the ideal of neutrality mentioned 
above, as therapists and hypnotists, these modern operators must also acknowledge their own 
ineluctable participation in the phenomena which they do not merely observe, but actively co-
create. In fact, the permissive approach—where the subjects are often said to be “in charge” both 
of the success of hypnotic phenomena and of their own therapeutic change—does not necessarily 
 
552 Although suggestions are given in an indirect manner, the subject still experiences them as being acted out 
involuntarily and automatically, even when he or she is aware of the co-creative and participatory nature of the process. 
553 William J. Matthews, “More Than a Doorway, A Shift in Epistemology,” in Broader Implications, 18.  
554 Matthews, 16. 
555 In this framework, “we do not discover what is out there (such as with DSM-III categories); rather, we invent it.” 
Matthews, 17. The constructive framework and its implications for theories of novelistic absorption will be further 
examined in Chapter 3. 
556 Matthews, Ibid., 19. 
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imply passivity on the part of the therapist.557 In the Ericksonian model, therapists even have a 
responsibility to “actively influence clients to promote change.”558 However, the underlying 
constructivist framework of the practice also redistributes the power roles between physician and 
patient and greatly limits the scope of the therapist’s influence: 
To use a technique to cause the desired change that ‘we know would be best’ for our clients is to support an 
expert/dummy, hierarchical model of therapy. … A constructivist, nonobjective view of the world suggests 
that therapy is a conversation that can have the potential for the construction of new meaning for all the 
participants. The therapist moves from the restrictive role of expert to that of collaborator in the construction 
of new meaning, a different reality.559 
 
In this sense, any theoretical framework—including the categories in which the client’s problem 
or pathology is framed and presented—can be combined with hypnotic technique. In modern 
hypnotherapy, therapeutic efficacy is emphasized, over “truth” or insight.  
While it remains one of the most frequently practiced techniques in the therapeutic setting, 
the Ericksonian model does not propose a clear theorization of the nature of the hypnotic state. 
Instead, it dismisses this question as the object of inquiry of experimental science, and focuses on 
clinical cases rather than theoretical systematization. In what follows, I will thus examine the 
current theoretical models of hypnosis, which strikingly, do not take into consideration the 
difference between direct and indirect hypnosis. Furthermore, whereas Ericksonian hypnotherapy 
grants tremendous importance to the unique dimension of each individual case and adapts every 
hypnotic induction to the subject, current theories of hypnosis are mostly based on standardized 
hypnotic scales and pre-written inductive scripts, that fail to take into consideration individual 
specificities and variations between subjects. Nevertheless, these current theoretical accounts of 
the nature of hypnosis are relevant to our purposes, as they bring our historical examination of 
hypnosis full circle. Indeed, in their very attempt to objectively measure and observe hypnotic 
behavior, they demonstrate the ongoing oscillation between opposed explanations that were 
already present in the discourse of the observes of animal magnetism in 1784. 
 
1.2.3.2.  Contemporary Theories of Hypnosis: The Onion vs. The Artichoke 
 
An examination of contemporary theories of hypnosis reveals that, strictly speaking, the 
original quarrel between fluidists and imaginationists, as well as materialists and spiritualists, did 
 
557 Gilligan, “In Defense of Hypnosis,” 10. 
558 Ibid., 10. 
559 Matthews, 20. 
 121 
not “end” with the birth of psychoanalysis. Rather, its original alternation can still be found, albeit 
in modified form, in today’s opposing accounts of the nature of hypnotic phenomena. As Leon 
Chertock and Isabelle Stengers note, these debates, which oppose “state” and “non-state”—or as 
they put it, “artichoke vs. onion”560—explanations of hypnosis, run throughout its history and still 
polarize its theory to this day.561  
Setting aside the psychoanalytic theories of hypnosis, which I will briefly summarize at the 
end of this section, in what follows, I will describe the two main opposing models of hypnosis that 
still compete today: the “cognitive” and “social-psychological” theories, which propose radically 
different accounts of the nature of hypnosis.  
On the one hand, cognitivist (“artichoke”) approaches argue in favor of the existence of an 
objective, altered “state” of consciousness at the heart of all hypnotic phenomena, which occurs 
even when the subject is unaware that he or she is being hypnotized. On the other hand, social-
psychological (“onion”) theories reduce hypnosis to a phenomenon that, when “peeled away,” 
reveals not a special state, but a series of “ordinary” psychological processes such as suggestibility, 
imagination and role playing. In this sense, they reject the idea of an isolatable “essence” at the 
heart of the hypnotic experience. As Chertock and Stengers put it, “one peels an onion, removing 
one layer after the other, and finally nothing is left. On the other hand, the artichoke hides a heart, 
an essence.”562  
For many years, theories of hypnosis were dominated by cognitive explanations which 
strive to identify the operation of special psychological processes thought to produce a 
circumscribable, identifiable “hypnotic state” in the subject. This “state” approach can be traced 
back to the Salpêtrière school’s division of hypnotism into supposedly identifiable and 
experimentally reproducible states, with precise criteria allowing to measure them in an 
“objective” manner.  
As Michael Heap, Richard Brown and David Oakley have noted in The Highly 
Hypnotizable Person (2004), a common theme spanning across current “state-oriented” accounts 
 
 
561 Indeed, the tension in current theoretical debates can be traced all the way back to the 1784 Commission: “The 
commissioners were partisans of the onion: ‘imagination without magnetic, produces convulsions… Magnetism 
without imagination produces nothing,’ one reads in their report… Take it away and nothing will remain. Puységur, 
partisan of the artichoke, replies” Take away the banquet, take away the crisis, and magnetic sleep remains.” Chertock 
and Stengers, 242. 
562 Chertock and Stenger, A Critique of Psychoanalytic Reason, 242. 
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of hypnosis, is the idea that it involves the inhibition of high-level cognitive processes—with the 
ability to experience such inhibition being an important and stable component of 
“hypnotizability.”563 Among these cognitive approaches to hypnosis, “dissociated control theory” 
and “neodissociation” theories are the most prevalent, and are united in their assumption that 
hypnotic responses are both characterized and facilitated by a certain degree of inhibition of high-
level cognitive processes.564 
On the other side of the spectrum, social-psychological and socio-cognitive approaches 
reject the “altered state” and “special process” explanations of hypnosis, conceptualizing it instead 
as the mere interplay of “normal,” social, psychological, and—depending on the theory—
cognitive, processes. In these approaches, hypnotizability is not an innate trait, but rather, varies 
with individual differences in expectation, motivation, role-playing abilities, and so on. These 
divergences are conceived as being modifiable, and not purely cognitive.565  
 
563 Heap et al, The Highly Hypnotizable Person. Theoretical, experimental and clinical issues (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2004), 12. “Despite the absence of objective markers for the hypnotic ‘state,’ there exist modern theoretical 
approaches based on the idea that hypnosis involves some ‘special’ process, and that this has a physiological basis.” 
Ibid. 
564 See Heap et. al.’s summary in The Highly Hypnotizable Person: cognitive neuroscience’s explanation of hypnosis 
mobilizes the “dissociated control theory” formulated by Woody and Bowers in the 1990s. This theory explains 
hypnotic responses as the product of a dissociation between “high- and low-level cognitive control processes”: during 
hypnosis, higher executive control is inhibited, which “allows for the automatic activation of suggestion-related 
schemata by the words of the hypnotist.” Which is to say, it leads to the phenomena being experienced as unfolding 
automatically. This impression of involuntariness is a reflection of the fact that “the seat of volition has not been 
involved in the generation of the suggested effect.” Heap et. al., 14. In Ernest Hilgard’s neodissociation theory, to 
which we will return to in Chapter 3, the hypnotic induction is also thought to inhibit high-level functioning. However, 
unlike the dissociated control theory, for Hilgard, the dissociation is not between higher and lower levels of control, 
but within the high-level control systems themselves. In Hilgard’s model, during hypnosis, a part of the executive 
control in the mind continues to function as normal, while a second, dissociated, part is hidden from awareness by an 
“amnesic barrier.” Executive control thus still remains operative but is prevented from “representing itself in 
consciousness.” The subject is only aware of the changes in his behavior and experience, but not of the cognitive 
activity by these changes are created, and experiences them as occurring involuntarily. Finally, in neurophysiological 
models such as Gruzelier’s (1998), hypnosis is conceived as a special state and divided into three stages, each with a 
different “neurophysiological signature”: “in the first instance, the hypnotic subject concentrates carefully on the 
words of the induction, as evidenced by increased activity in left fronto-limbic brain areas associated with focused 
attention. In the second stage, the hypnotic subject ‘lets go’ of deliberate attentional functions and cedes executive 
control to the hypnotist; this is accompanied by an inhibition of activity in left frontal brain regions. Finally, there is 
increased activation of right-sided temporoposterior systems, as the subject becomes engaged in passive imagery and 
dreaming. … This inhibition of deliberate executive control renders the individual more responsive to suggestions, 
which operate via the reallocation of attention according to the nature of the given suggestion … hypnotic 
susceptibility is underpinned by superior attentional abilities that allow subjects to switch, focus and sustain their 
attention to relevant material during the hypnotic procedure.” Heap et al, The Highly Hypnotizable Person, 14-20. 
565 Ibid, 12. 
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Social-psychological explanations of hypnosis appeared after the Second World War with 
the emergence of social psychology as an experimental discipline.566 These approaches, which 
explain hypnosis as a psychological phenomenon, can be traced back to Bernheim’s contention 
that suggestion can explain all hypnotic phenomena, and that the notion of a special, “hypnotic 
state” is both incorrect and superfluous.  
Rejecting mentalistic constructs, socio-psychological explanations emphasize the 
situational, societal, and cultural context of the hypnotic subject’s behavior.567 Elaborated in 1969, 
Theodore X. Barber’s task-motivational approach to hypnosis, for example, emphasized the role 
of “attitudes and expectancies,” as well as the subject’s willingness to think and imagine in 
compliance with the given suggestions, making the imagination—the ability to “fantasize 
realistically”—one of the central features of hypnosis.568 Theodore R. Sarbin then reworked 
Barber’s approach, using role theory to explain the hypnotic responses of the subject. Similarly, 
for Sarbin and Coe, “susceptible” individuals are not innately more hypnotizable. Rather, they are 
motivated to play the “role” of the good hypnotic subject, “and will, where necessary, engage in 
deception (and this occasionally includes self-deception) to fulfil that role.”569  
Because these social-psychological approaches use the lexical field of theater and 
dramaturgy to describe the behavior of hypnotic subjects, their account of hypnosis as a complex 
form of “as if” behavior produced a misconception (already present during the Nancy-Salpêtrière 
debates), of hypnosis as a form of trickery, simulation, or deception.570  
Nevertheless, as Erika Fromm has shown, hypnotic “role-taking” is irreducible to mere 
simulation or complacency: it also includes a non-conscious level of response, as well as “some 
degree of conviction” and believing in, the role.571 Role theory is thus able to account for the 
automatic, seemingly involuntary dimension of hypnotic responses: hypnotic behavior is “actively 
 
566 Theodore Sarbin’s concept of “role theory,” initially intended as a framework to conceptualize social behavior, 
found widespread application in theories of hypnosis. See Theodore Sarbin and William Coe. Hypnosis: A Social 
Psychological Analysis of Influence Communication (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972). 
567 Kihlstrom, “The Domain of Hypnosis Revisited,” in The Oxford Handbook of Hypnosis (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012), 39. 
568 See for example T. X. Barber, Hypnosis: A Scientific Approach (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1969); and 
Barber, Spanos, and Chaves, Hypnosis, Imagination, and Human Potentialities (New York: Pergamon, 1974). 
569 Sarbin and Coe, Hypnosis: A Social Psychological Analysis of Influence Communication. (New York: Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston, 1972), in Heap et al, 20. 
570 In this work, I argue that on the contrary, role taking does not necessarily imply deception on the part of the subject, 
and successful games of make-believe are experienced as genuine by their participants. See Chapter 3. 
571 Erika Fromm, Hypnotherapy and Hypnoanalysis, 17. “The deeply hypnotized person has integrated the role at a 
level that involves participation of the total organism, both psychologically and physiologically.” 
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and voluntarily directed by the subject (though the subject is not consciously aware of his decision 
making and voluntarism.)”572  
Socio-cognitive approaches such as those of Nicholas Spanos (1991) also emphasize the 
importance of the subject’s activity in the production of hypnotic phenomena, focusing especially 
on task-motivation, attitudes and expectancies.573 In these approaches, the role of hypnotic 
inductions is not to encourage subjects to enter a “trance state,” but to enhance their sense of 
expectation and motivation to respond to suggestions.574 Spanos thus described hypnosis as a 
“strategic enactment,” shaped by the subject’s understanding of “task demands,” which are   
previously—and often implicitly—negotiated with the hypnotist.575 During hypnosis, the subject 
thus remains highly active. Elaborating cognitive strategies to comply with the operator’s explicit 
and implicit instructions, he produces behaviors that fit his idea of what a “good” hypnotic subject 
would do.576  
Steven J. Lynn and Irving Kirsch’s “sociocognitive” explanation also underlines the central 
role of “response expectancies” in the subject’s hypnotic experience and behavior.577 According 
to Kirsch, the hypnotist creates the expectancy that the subject will have certain experiences and 
responses, which in a motivated subject, is sufficient for these experiences to occur.578 For him, 
 
572 Fromm, Ibid., 13. 
573 See Spanos, “A Sociocognitive approach to Hypnosis,” in Lynn and Rhue, eds. Theories of Hypnosis: Current 
models and Perspectives, 324–361. (New York: Guilford Press, 1991). When expectations are experimentally 
manipulated, the subject’s responses to suggestions are modified. For example, negative expectations tend to inhibit 
the subject’s responses. 
574 Heap et al, 18. “So long as the induction procedure fulfils these aims (and defines the context as ‘hypnosis’) then 
the content of the induction procedure is less important, at least so far as enhancing the subject’s responsiveness to 
suggestion is concerned … Laboratory subjects who are presented with instructions designed to increase their 
motivation respond well to hypnotic suggestions even in the absence of an induction and deepening routine. Likewise, 
there is evidence that ‘dummy’ procedures presented as ‘genuine’ induction methods (such as inhaling an inert gas or 
swallowing a pill bearing the word ‘hypnosis’) have the same effect on suggestibility as a traditional induction. This 
casts doubt on the idea that traditional procedures put subjects into a unique or special state characterized by extreme 
suggestibility.” Heap et al, 18. 
575 Kihlstrom, 39. As Kihlstrom explains, “Spanos argued that reports of experienced involuntariness were in part 
misattributions shaped by the structure of the suggestions administered to subjects (Spanos and DeGroh, 1983), as 
well as a strategy for subjects to present themselves as deeply hypnotized (Spanos et al., 1985). These elaborations of 
role theory, coupled with a debunking tendency (Spanos et al., 1982), also left the impression that hypnotic subjects 
were engaged in “something akin to faking.” Kihlstrom, 39. 
576 See Spanos, “A Sociocognitive approach to Hypnosis,” 324–361. 
577 As Kihlstrom points out, the main difference between Kirsch and Lynn’s social-cognitive approach and Spanos’s 
sociocognitive approach lie in their conceptions of the experience of involuntariness in the subject.  
578 Irving Kirsch, “The social learning theory of hypnosis,” in Theories of Hypnosis, 466. See also J.R. Council; I. 
Kirsch and Grant, D. L. “Imagination, expectancy, and hypnotic responding,” in Hypnosis and Imagination, ed. R. G. 
Kunzendorf, N. P. Spanos and B. Wallace (New York: Baywood, 1996), 41-65. 
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response-expectancy is thus the essence, rather than a mere by-product, of hypnosis.579 When 
hypnotic phenomena are experienced as being automatic or involuntary, it is due to the subject’s 
own attribution of these qualities to the phenomena, because of the expectations generated by the 
hypnotic context.580 Like Bernheim, these sociocognitive approaches claim that “low-susceptible” 
individuals can be trained to become more, or even highly, susceptible. 
Finally, the third theoretical model of hypnosis can be found in post-Freudian 
psychoanalytic approaches.581 Although these theories belong to “state” accounts of hypnosis, their 
psychodynamic orientation requires that we examine them separately from the cognitivist 
approaches discussed higher up. These accounts of hypnosis reveal the ways in which hypnotic 
practice and analytic theory can be compatible. This is especially the case in hypnoanalysis, which 
uses hypnotic trance as a means to access unconscious material, that is interpreted from within the 
psychoanalytic framework.582   
According to hypnotically-oriented psychoanalysts such as Erika Fromm and Michael 
Nash, hypnosis is a regression “in the service of the ego.”583 This is not a total regression but rather, 
a regression to primary process thinking, which reduces the “general reality orientation” that 
 
579 As Heap. et. al explain, Kirsch has gone further than most sociocognitive theorists in challenging traditional ideas 
about hypnotizability. For Kirsch, the standardized hypnotic scales don’t measure hypnotizability but “imaginative 
suggestibility,” which also operates in non-hypnotic contexts, in the absence of a hypnotic induction. Heap et al, 20-
21. Our extensive notion of hypnosis fits this conception, as well as the idea that hypnosis need not be explicitly 
mentioned or formally induced to be operating.  
580 Heap et. al., 21. As Kihlstrom explains, “expectancies, shaped by suggestions and other aspects of the social 
context, function like ideas; and the idea of an action leads automatically to its execution. Thus, involuntariness is 
neither a misattribution nor an element of strategic self-presentation; instead, it is a genuine, subjectively convincing 
phenomenal experience, even if it is attributable to suggestion, not hypnosis as a special state.” Kihlstrom, 39.  
581 For a more detailed account of the ways in which psychoanalytic theory and hypnosis can be reconciled, see 
Appendix A. As we saw higher up, Freud’s explanation of hypnotic suggestibility and the patient’s “credulous 
submissiveness” is formulated in terms of libidinal fixation and regression in the transference: hypnotic trance is “an 
unconscious fixation of the subject’s libido onto the figure of the hypnotist, through the medium of the masochistic 
component of the sexual instinct.” Freud, in SE, 7:150, note 1. For Freud, the hypnotic relation both revives ancient 
infantile relations to parental objects in the adult, and “recapitulates the relation of the individual member of the primal 
horde to the primal father.” Freud, Group Psychology, 127. Thus, hypnosis is a double regression, ontogenetic and 
cultural, in this reemergence of a “vaguely remembered cultural primitiveness” Ibid. 
582 Lewis Wolberg is one of the pioneers of hypnoanalysis. See Wolberg, Hypnoanalysis (New York: Grune & 
Stratton, 1945); Erika Fromm and Daniel P. Brown, Hypnotherapy and Hypnoanalysis (Hillsdale NJ and London: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers), 1986. For a more detailed exploration of hypnoanalysis, see Appendix A. 
583 Heap et al, 12. See Erika Fromm, “The nature of hypnosis and other altered states of consciousness: An ego-
psychological theory,” in Hypnosis: Developments in Research and New Perspectives, eds. E. Fromm and R. Shor 
(New York: Aldine, 1979), 81-103; Fromm Erika and Michael R. Nash, Psychoanalysis and Hypnosis (Madison CT: 
International Universities Press, 1997); and Erika Fromm, An Ego-psychological theory of hypnosis, in Fromm and 
Nash, eds, Contemporary Hypnosis Research, (New York: Guilford, Press, 1992). 
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characterizes ordinary psychological functioning, and blurs the distinction between reality and the 
imaginary.  
In Fromm’s ego-psychological model,584 the regression occurring in hypnosis—which 
creates a shift from “sophisticated, logical thought” to more “primitive and illogical mental 
activity”—accounts for the increased suggestibility of the hypnotic subject.585 Although Fromm 
also describes it as “a highly cognitive process,” she defines hypnosis as a combination of this 
“increase in primary process thinking, a natural loosening of defenses, and a reduction of the 
subject’s general reality orientation and its customary logical thinking.”586 For her, hypnotic 
suggestibility and trance are defined as a state of “ego receptivity,” which provides access “to 
bodily sensations, emotions, memories, and fantasies that are usually beyond the [subject’s] grasp 
in waking consciousness.”587 In this state, where “critical judgment, strict adherence to reality 
orientation, and active, goal-directed thinking, are help to a minimum,” unconscious and 
preconscious material can “float freely into [the subject’s] mind” and repressed conflicts and 
affects can surface, “faster” than in analysis.588  
For Nash, although hypnosis is also a form of ego regression, “it is perfectly clear that this 
regression does not encompass the entire I-ness of the subject.”589 Unlike Fromm—for whom 
hypnotic regression is both temporal and topographic—Nash contends that the regression involved 
is hypnosis is solely topographic, and that “likening the hypnotic state to earlier stages of psychic 
functioning is misleading.”590 Indeed, as Nash argues, child development cannot be undone and 
earlier stages can thus not be “regressed” back to.591 As Nash explains, this argument is supported 
by theories of memory that, as we will see in Chapter 4, acknowledge “an ongoing interaction 
 
584 Ego-psychology draws a basic distinction between primary and secondary mental processes, formulated by Freud: 
“the primary processes are emotional, holistic, illogical, unconscious and developmentally immature forms of mental 
processing, which are primitive but thought to be the source of creativity. Secondary processes, in contrast, are affect-
free, analytic, logical, conscious and developmentally mature, and are said to be the seat of reason. Normal adult 
functioning is biased towards secondary processing.” Heap et al., 12-13. 
585 Heap et al, 12. See Fromm, An Ego-psychological Theory of Hypnosis, 131-148. 
586 Fromm, Hypnotherapy and Hypnoanalysis, 13; 143. 
587 Fromm opposes ego receptivity to ego activity (volitional) and ego passivity (overwhelm or helplessness). “In the 
receptive mode, one allows things to happen; one does not make them happen.” See Fromm, Ibid., 202-3; 15. 
588 Fromm and Nash, 273; Fromm, Hypnotherapy, 202. 
589 Nash, “Hypnosis as a Special Case of Psychological Regression,” in Theories of Hypnosis: Current Models and 
Perspectives, ed. S. J. Lynn and J. W. Rhue (Guilford, New York, 1991), 187-8. 
590 Nash, in Psychoanalysis and Hypnosis, 37; Lynn et. al., Essentials of Clinical Hypnosis, 18. For Nash this 
topographic regression involves specific properties that “go well beyond aggression phenomena” and include “an 
increase in primary process material, more spontaneous and intense emotion, unusual body sensations, the experience 
of nonvolition, and the tendency to displace core attributes of important others onto the hypnotist (e.g., transference).  
591 Fromm and Nash, 37. 
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between memory traces and contemporary factors such as expectation, cultural press, suggestion, 
and transference.”592 Therefore: 
From a psychoanalytic perspective, it appears that even during the most compelling hypnotic performances, 
there is a portion of the ego that does not engage, that remains apart, that does not participate in the regression. 
If hypnosis were a topographic regression across the entire ego, it would be like dreaming or a psychotic 
state, with little or no chance for the subject to initiate, focus, change or terminate the experience because the 
entire ego is a participant. From a socio-psychological, analytic or neodissociationist perspective, it is clear 
that hypnotic subjects do respond to cues that are incompatible with their hypnotic role—whether we examine 
hidden-observer phenomena, duality in hypnotic age regression, or differential effects of prehypnosis 
instructions.593 
 
Despite their divergences, in their analytic account of hypnotic experience, both Nash and Fromm  
place “less emphasis on sexual and aggressive instincts … and relatively greater emphasis on the 
availability of imagination, fantasy, and other expressions of primary process thinking during 
hypnosis.”594 In this way, they move away from Freud’s 1905 definition of hypnosis as “an 
unconscious fixation of the subject's libido to the figure of the hypnotist, through the medium of 
the masochistic components of the sexual instinct.”595  
 
As John Kihlstrom has observed, these three theoretical explanations of hypnosis still 
compete to this day. However, as Kihlstrom argues, upon closer inspection, the distinction between 
‘state’ or ‘special process’ theories, and ‘non-state’ theories is “not as clear-cut as much of the 
literature suggests.”596 In fact, cognitive and socio-cognitive accounts of hypnosis “are not 
mutually exclusive,” and a comprehensive explanation of hypnotic phenomena must embrace 
concepts from several schools of thought:597  
 
592 Ibid., 37. 
593 Nash, “Hypnosis as a Special Case of Psychological Regression.” In Theories of Hypnosis: Current Models and 
Perspectives, ed. S. J. Lynn and J. W. Rhue (New York: Guilford Press, 1991), 187-188. 
594 Lynn et al, Essentials of Clinical Hypnosis, 18. 
595 Freud, “Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality,” in SE, 7:150. 
596 Kihlstrom, 41. Furthermore, the “state vs. non-state” and “onion vs. artichoke” binaries do not overlap completely. 
Indeed, some “non-state theorists still attribute “essence” to the various cultural phenomena which hypnosis or 
suggestion is manifested. For neuro-cognitivist theorists, this “essence” is a special “state” of the human cognitive 
apparatus. For social-psychological theorists, it is imagination, role-playing or suggestion. For  psychoanalysis, the 
essence is transference: for instance, “Mannoni affirms that what we can call artichokes, that is, possession and other 
mystic phenomena, the ceremony of the banquet [see chapter 1], the beliefs of the magnetists, analytic theory, all have 
the same heart, all clothe the same nontheorizable ‘remainder’ with their discourse and their cultural practices.” 
Chertock and Stengers, 243. In their conclusion, Chertock and Stengers argue that insofar as both approaches aim for 
the same goal—to “eliminate, purify and control” the hypnotic situation “in order to identify the ‘core’ phenomenon, 
or to conclude that nothing remains”—both are “two sides of the same coin,” that of experimental reason.” Chertock 
and Stengers, 249. 
597 Kihlstrom, 41. For Kihlstrom, the problem is “that of simultaneously maintaining an interest in the cognitive 
processes by which consciousness is divided in hypnosis, and an interest in the social context in which hypnosis takes 
place.” Ibid. 
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We should abandon the stance of either–or and adopt a new stance of both–and. This ‘third way’ in hypnosis 
research construes hypnosis simultaneously as both a state of (sometimes) profound cognitive change, 
involving basic mechanisms of cognition and consciousness, and as a social interaction, in which hypnotist 
and subject come together for a specific purpose within a wider socio-cultural context.598 
 
 
      *** 
As I have suggested in this chapter, not only did hypnotic practice come into existence 
through the process of “dematerialization” described by Mayer, it did so by also constantly 
replaying the initial debate between material and psychological explanations, which echoes the 
onion vs. artichoke division. In this way, two intertwining, continuous but nonlinear movements 
can be traced throughout its history.  
Indeed, whether it opposes the animal magnetists to the 1784 commissioners, the mesmeric 
fluidists to the imaginationists, or the Nancy school to the Salpêtrière, this fundamental opposition 
replayed itself in various forms for more than two centuries, and thus complicates the image of a 
single historical moment during which hypnotism emerged as a psychologized version of 
magnetism. As I will show in the following chapter, this polarization—which, as Ruth Leys has 
observed, is effectively captured by opposition between mimesis and anti-mimesis—can be traced 
not only throughout the history of hypnosis as a practice, but also as an object of literary 
representation.599 During the nineteenth century, these aspects were closely linked, due to the 
mutual influence and circulation between medical and literary discourse. In this sense, an 
examination of the literary depictions of hypnosis and its emergence from its material, magnetic 
ancestor, will help further illuminate the ways in which its history follows this vacillating and 









598 Ibid., 41. 
599 See Leys, Trauma, 50. 
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Chapter 2. From Enthusiasm to Anxiety. 
Representations of Hypnosis in Nineteenth-Century 
Fiction. 
 
It is said that every night, when came the moment to go to sleep, Saint-Pol Roux had a 
sign hung on the door of his Camaret mansion, which said: THE POET IS AT WORK. 
—André Breton, (1954). 
 
As Michael Finn writes in Figures of the Pre-Freudian Unconscious, “when novelists 
began to connect the words ‘hypnotism’ and ‘pathological’, a new world of fictional plots opened 
up.”600 In this chapter, I will discuss the various “new worlds” that opened up for nineteenth-
century readers and writers of narrative literature as hypnotism emerged from the older, Mesmeric 
models. To do so, I will examine the shift which occurred in literary representation of hypnosis, 
from early and mid-century enthusiasm to fin-de-siècle fear and fascination.601  
Until well into the nineteenth century, hypnotism remained associated with its magnetic 
“parent” in literary and popular imaginations. Up until the end of the 1870s, often paired with the 
vague label, “Mesmerism,” it struggled to rid itself from the aura of spiritualism and occultism 
that followed it everywhere. Outside of medical circles and societies of magnetic practitioners, 
magnetism exerted its strong fascination on both literary and popular imaginations, due to the 
extraordinary implications that it opened up, on both philosophical and spiritual levels. During the 
first half of the century, authors of literary fiction across the francophone and anglophone worlds 
used magnetism as a means to challenge existing epistemological, metaphysical, and even 
cosmological frameworks, to stretch the limits of the naturally possible. However, as the end of 
the century approached—as medical knowledge of the psychological phenomenon of hypnotism 
spread across Europe and more psychologically oriented explanations of the unconscious began to 
appear—the earlier enthusiasm transformed into a fascinated anxiety. This anxious sentiment was 
fueled by the rapid cultural, scientific and political transformations of the period, which novelists 
 
600 Michael Finn, Figures of the Pre-Freudian Unconscious from Flaubert to Proust (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2017), 127. 
601 Although my general argument centers on the novel, in this chapter, I extend it to narrative prose in general, 
examining novellas and short stories in addition to novels, as these were widely used in Gothic fiction and fin-de-
siècle literary representations of hypnotism. My argument can thus be considered as applying to narrative prose, in its 
opposition to poetry.  
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both represented and conveyed in their texts, by portraying hypnotism in a new, worrying light. 
Absorbing pathologizing theories of hypnotism such as those of Charcot or Janet, as well as the 
seemingly extra-ordinary phenomena described by the Nancy school such as post-hypnotic or 
“hypnotic crimes”—they produced new representations of hypnotism linked to new, anxious ways 
of processing the relation between the self and its Other, whether psychological, social, political 
or moral. Whereas in the first half of the century, Mesmerism served as a means to interrogate the 
limits between the natural and the supernatural, at the end of the century, hypnotism became a 
literary metaphor for the dispossession of the subject. Therefore, by questioning the certainty of 
the knowable—which now extended to the subject’s own interiority—hypnosis was a powerful 
tool to express underlying fears which permeated late nineteenth century France and Victorian 
society. Although many literary authors were fascinated by its scientific dimension and used 
hypnotism to explain a wide array of seemingly occult or supernatural phenomena, including those 
of magnetism, they also associated hypnotism with the unnatural, the pathological, sometimes even 
the monstrous. In parallel to the dematerialization which occurred in the medical field, in its 
depictions of hypnosis, the literary field expressed an increased awareness, both of the limits of 
the self, and of the extra-ordinary powers of the individual mind—which, as hypnosis reveals to 
the modern subject, can no longer claim to fully know or control itself. 
In the first part of this chapter, I examine the mid-century enthusiasm by comparing 
Balzac’s 1842 novel Ursule Mirouët and three short stories about Mesmerism written by Edgar 
Allan Poe from 1843 to 1845. Despite the “radical redefinition” of magnetism brought about by 
Braid’s theory of hypnotism (described in Chapter 1), mid-century fictional representations still 
widely drew on the old, magnetic model, using the general terminology of “Mesmeric sleep” and 
“passes,” and positing the existence of the imponderable fluid as an object of scientific 
investigation. In both of these authors, the interest in Mesmerism goes hand in hand with a 
fascination for the scientific possibilities it opens up, as well as the spiritualist and occult elements 
associated with it. As I will argue, while Balzac represents magnetism as a subversive power whose 
philosophical impact can overturn the post-Enlightenment presuppositions of material monism, 
Poe’s stories take matters even further by using it as conceptual tool to suspend the usual relations 
between the material and spiritual, and to imagine a literal state of suspension between life and 
death. By linking it to spiritualist—rather than psychological—concerns, both of these conceptions 
reveal inherent ambiguity in the relation between Mesmerism and orthodox medicine in the first 
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half of the century. Indeed, while on the one hand, it serves as the “hand-maiden” of medical 
discourse, on the other, hypnosis also poses a serious challenge to the authority of orthodox 
medicine and rationalist discourse of the time.602  
In the conceptual vocabulary available in mid-century representations, the realm of 
“otherness” opened up by magnetism is not yet that of a psychical unconscious. Rather, it is that 
of an immaterial and spiritual plane which remains inaccessible to the ordinary, waking mind, and 
can be accessed through the altered states of consciousness produced by Mesmeric sleep. In other 
words, magnetism is associated with the spiritual, rather than the psychological. With the advent 
of experimental and positivist science later in the century however, Mesmerism’s associations with 
spiritualism and the occult lead to increasingly skeptic criticism, one of the most striking of which 
can be found in chapter VIII of Flaubert’s Bouvard et Pécuchet, which I will turn to at the end of 
the first section. On the one hand, Flaubert’s work presents a parodic representation of the 
fallacious reasoning inherent in fluidist and spiritualist conceptions of magnetism. On the other, 
by retrospectively looking back, from the perspective of 1870s to the earlier mid-century 
enthusiasm, Flaubert’s text also documents the shift in terminology and paradigms that occurred 
with the dematerialization of magnetism and the emergence of hypnotism proper. As we shall see, 
the distinction between magnetism and hypnotism was not always clearly established outside of 
the medical field until the end of the century. In literary representations of hypnosis, the boundary 
between both practices was often blurred and used strategically, both by critical discourses which 
aimed to denounce the “irrationality” of the practice, and by novelists themselves, in order to 
emphasize its fascinating aspects and poetic-philosophical potential.603  
In the second part of the chapter, I then turn to fin-de-siècle literary representations of 
hypnotism and propose a comparison between Maupassant’s Le Horla, Conan Doyle’s The 
 
602 Sidney Lind, “Poe and Mesmerism,” PMLA 62, No. 4 (Dec. 1947):1077. 
603 As Hilary Grimes has shown, “despite attempts to make hypnotism a scientific branch of study that was distinct 
from and in opposition to mesmerism … the discourse on hypnotism at the fin de siècle was actually a blend of ideas 
about mesmerism’s supernatural powers and hypnotism’s practical purpose in the field of psychology, developing in 
the 1880s and 1890s. ... In the popular imagination and in fiction, particularly in the Gothic fiction of the 1880s and 
1890s, the practices often merged into one another.” Whereas in France, the work of Charcot and Bernheim lead to a 
cleaner separation between both fields, in Victorian Britain, even “by the end of the century, handbooks about 
hypnotism could not be distinguished from those on mesmerism because their vocabulary and goals were so similar.” 
Indeed, James Coates, in his 1897 Human Magnetism or How to Hypnotise: A Practical Handbook for Students of 
Mesmerism, remarks that “[p]ractically, hypnotism is mesmerism. The phenomena observed being similar, change of 
name cannot alter them.” See: Hilary Grimes, The Late Victorian Gothic: Mental Science, the Uncanny, and Scenes 
of Writing (London: Taylor and Francis, 2016), 63-64; 79. 
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Parasite and Du Maurier’s Trilby. By offering close readings of these prose texts, my goal is to 
show how fictional representations of hypnosis radicalized both the fearful and the fascinating 
aspects of the practice. Armed with a new vocabulary and a more scientific conception of the 
practice, these authors used hypnosis as a general metaphor for dispossession, giving form to 
various psychological, social and political anxieties inherent to late nineteenth-century France and 
Great Britain. Although the concept of suggestion had by then replaced that of supernatural 
intervention, it served a similar function: to indicate the subject’s vulnerability in the face of forces 
which he or she cannot control. These forces point to the lack of self-mastery and fragility of the 
subject’s conscious mind and identity, in an increasingly complex world of burgeoning mass 
communication and modernity. For the late nineteenth-century subject, “if everyone was 
influenced by everyone else, then identity itself was at risk, not only of mingling dangerously with 
other sexualities, nationalities, races, classes, and genders, but also of deteriorating or dispersing 
altogether.”604  
As we shall see, for these three authors, the unconscious mental processes revealed by 
hypnotic phenomena—such as dual personalities, post-hypnotic suggestion and amnesia, 
automatism and monoideism—serve to thematize, reveal and, to a certain extent, exorcize the 
anxieties of a conscious, rational subject forced to acknowledge his own impotence.605 In these 
texts, the internal threat or anxiety is projected outwards and represented as an external, often 
personified menace—such as the Horla, Miss Penclosa or Svengali—which in turn, threatens to 
possess, contaminate and overpower the subject from without. In this way, by serving as a medium 
to represent this process of dispossession with a seemingly scientific vocabulary, hypnosis 
conveniently provides relief from having to acknowledge the multiple forces—unconscious, 
economic, social, political or moral—acting upon a subject who, even before Freud, is no longer 
master in his own house.606  
 
 
604 Grimes, The Late Victorian Gothic, 81.  
605 This echoes the remarks of Daniel Pick who writes, “hypnosis complicated Victorian ideas about the nature of the 
self, the subliminal aspects of all relationships, the indeterminate border between covert command and creative 
collaboration, inspiration and interference, partnership and possession.” Pick, Svengali's Web, 64, emphasis in the 
text. 
606 See Sigmund Freud, “A Difficulty in the Path of Psycho-Analysis,” in The Standard Edition of the Complete 
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XVII (1917-1919): An Infantile Neurosis and Other Works, 142. 
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2.1. From Mid-Century Enthusiasm to Skepticism 
 
2.1.1. Magnetism as Subversion: Balzac’s Ursule Mirouët 
 
The enthusiasm for the scientific, philosophical and novelistic potential of magnetism that 
occurred in France the 1840s can be found in Balzac’s 1842 novel Ursule Mirouët, where the 
author of the Comédie Humaine introduces Mesmerism in the broader framework of his interest 
in spiritualism, as a response to post-Enlightenment materialist monism. This conception linked 
the belief in a material magnetic fluid and the spiritual possibilities that it implied.  
Ursule Mirouët tells the story of a bourgeois family, the Minoret-Cremière, who is torn 
apart by its members’ desire to gain the inheritance of the Dr. Minoret in the provincial town of 
Nemours. The doctor Minoret’s adoptive niece, Ursule, is a fervent Christian and the only member 
of the family to demonstrate pure, disinterested love for her uncle. Although Minoret is presented 
as a strict atheist at the beginning of the novel, his encounter with magnetism suddenly leads him 
to open up to the spiritualist position and to the religious faith so dear to his niece.  
In Balzac’s novel, as a thematic object, magnetism provides an explanation for supernatural 
phenomena such as telepathy, clairvoyance and communication with the dead. Its main narrative 
function in the text, however, is to trigger the doctor’s conversion to Christianity. Formally, the 
novelistic treatment of magnetism leads Balzac to move from realism, into the realm of the 
fantastic, thereby creating a world of signification in which the material points to a dimension 
which transcends it, and can only be accessed by the “visionary” artist and the “magnetic” subject. 
Balzac also uses the magnetotrope to thematize the various character relations in the novel, where 
its lexical field serves to redefine the relations between the material and the spiritual, and capture 
the dynamics of attraction at the heart of human intersubjectivity.  
 
2.1.1.1. A Treatise on Magnetism 
 
In accordance with the encyclopedic ambitions of the Comédie Humaine, Balzac’s literary 
treatment of magnetism often involves blending the genre of the essay—or the philosophical or 
medical treatise—into that of novelistic prose. Balzac also uses specific characters to embody 
various philosophical positions and dramatize the tensions between them. In the beginning of 
Ursule Mirouët, magnetism is therefore introduced as a disruption to the materialist and skeptical 
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position of the main character, whose worldview is characteristic of the Enlightenment way of 
thinking. Indeed, the Dr. Minoret is an atheist, rationalist, philosophical materialist and skeptic, an 
adept of Diderot and Condillac. Magnetism is presented to him by his friend and former colleague, 
Dr. Bouvard. However, although it is linked to spiritualism later on in the text, here it is introduced 
from within the materialistic paradigm, as a scientific innovation—the “science of imponderable 
fluids”—rather than a superstitious belief-system or an occult phenomenon. This theoretical 
introduction of magnetism via materialism thus reinforces its subversive power to cause 
disturbance in the character’s worldview and the narrative structure. Against this background, it 
will create a violent disruption of materialist monism, with both scientific and philosophical 
implications. 
Before any disruption, however, the narrator’s theoretical and historical exposé begins by 
presenting magnetism as both a central philosophical question and an empirical fact, whose 
“discovery” by Mesmer makes the latter a true “pioneer” of his time.607 Here, the text constructs a 
parallel between the “discovery” of magnetism by Mesmer, and its experiencing by the Dr. 
Minoret, both of which are “one of those events … which ploughs up the field of conviction to the 
chalk and overturns it.”608 The image of “ploughing” suggests the depth of a personal and 
epistemological upheaval, as well as the growth of something new, which will emerge from the 
fertile soil of a revolution in paradigms both scientific and metaphysical.609  
According to Balzac’s narrator, the failure of Mesmerism was due to the revolutionary 
dimension of Mesmer’s “science,” rather than its inaccuracy. Its demise can be explained by the 
dogmatic, even fanatic mindset of Mesmer’s contemporaries; to the ignorance, in his time, of “the 
role played by hitherto unobserved imponderables in Nature.”610 Although the narrator claims that 
the possible uses of the fluid are much wider than those Mesmer made of it, he also describes the 
1784 Bailly commission’s condemnation as a form of ignorance comparable to “the fate that truth 
 
607 Balzac, Ursule Mirouët. 1842, in The Novels of Honoré de Balzac, trans. May Tomlinson, (Philadelphia: Barrie & 
Son, 1897), 87.   
608 Balzac, Ibid., 87. 
609 Ibid., 87. This revolutionary or disruptive power of magnetism is linked to the affective upheavals that can occur 
in the aesthetic experience, as we shall see in Chapter 4. Here, it is compared to the strong divisions among artistic 
schools: “Toward the end of the eighteenth century, science was as entirely divided about Mesmer’s appearance, as 
art had been about that of Gluck. Mesmer had, then, followers and antagonists as keen as were the Piccinists against 
the Gluckists.” Ibid. 
610 “Magnetism has more applications; in Mesmer’s hands it was, as regards its prospects, what principle is to effect.” 
Ibid., 87. 
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had met with in the person of Galileo in the sixteenth century.”611 According to the narrator, 
Mesmer’s downfall was caused by attacks emanating from two seemingly opposed camps: religion 
on the one hand, and the Enlightenment on the other: “magnetism was scouted by the united attacks 
of religious people and materialistic philosophers, alike alarmed.”612 From this initial presentation, 
then, the Balzacian narrator seems not only informed on the history of magnetism, but also 
sympathetic to its inventor, placing scientific truth on his side, against the materialist philosophers 
of the Enlightenment.613 
The text then goes on to retracing the history of the imponderable fluid before its discovery 
in the West—it was “cultivated equally by Egypt and Chaldea, by Greece and India”614—and after 
Mesmer: “the phenomena of somnambulism, barely surmised by Mesmer, were due to Messieurs 
de Puységur and Deleuze; but the Revolution put a stop to these discoveries which gave success 
to the cause of the scholars and mockers.”615 The fluid itself is described as “a penetrating 
influence, leading from man to man, worked by the will, healing by the abundance of fluid, the 
exercise of which constituted a duel between two wills, between an evil to be cured and the will to 
cure it.”616 The reader is thus informed from the start that the narrator’s conception of magnetism 
will not follow Mesmer’s materialism, but rather, corresponds to the ulterior psychofluidist 
philosophy initiated by Puységur’s model.  
Indeed, whereas for Mesmer its existence was undoubtedly material, in Balzac, magnetism 
ultimately allows for a refutation of materialism. In fact, Balzac’s text takes an extra step beyond 
Puységur’s emphasis on the will: by closely associating the fluid with the spiritual, it turns it into 
a divine principle of sorts, albeit one which can still be an object of scientific explanation. This 
explains the delicate balance, constantly held by the text, between on the one hand, the association 
of magnetism with religion—“Christ’s favorite science and one of the divine powers remitted to 
the apostles”617—and on the other, the emphasis of the persecution it underwent by religious 
 
611 Ibid., 87. 
612 Ibid., 88. 
613 “It was necessary to recognize the existence of intangible, invisible and imponderable fluids, three negations which 
the science of that time insisted upon considering as a definition of space… According to materialists particularly, the 
world is full, everything is connected, everything is linked together and everything is contrived… Those wretched 
men, who deified anything rather than acknowledge God, also shrank before the infinite divisibility of matter that the 
nature of imponderable forces admits of.” Ibid, 88. 
614 Ibid., 87. 
615 Ibid., 89. 
616 Ibid.   
617 Ibid., 88. 
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authorities. Indeed, Balzac’s narrator emphasizes the clergy’s hostility towards it, invoking it as a 
rational—and blasphemous—explanation of religious miracles, such as those “of the 
Convulsionaries, hushed up by the Church … in spite of the valuable pamphlets of the Councillor 
Carré de Montgeron.”618 Magnetism thus unites opposing binaries: it is both a “new faith” and an 
object of “persecution,” while simultaneously being a “march of intelligence,” a new science of 
the future.619  
In this context, the clergy and the philosophers of the Enlightenment are both grouped into 
a single category, guilty of committing similarly ignorant crimes, blinded by their dogmatism: 
“The Encyclopedia and the clergy could not reconcile themselves to this old human power which 
seemed so new.”620 The survival of magnetism in the margins of history, at the moment of 
Mesmer’s condemnation, is described as the product of courage and rebellion, especially for those 
men of science brave enough to resist the medical orthodoxy of the time: “A few doctors were 
amongst the believers. Until their death these dissenters were persecuted by their fellow 
physicians. The respectable body of Paris doctors displayed all the harshness of the religious wars 
towards the Mesmerists, and were as cruel in their hatred for them as it was possible to be in that 
time. … Only priests, magistrates and doctors can hate like that.”621With this delicate balance and 
double opposition—to both religion and the Enlightenment—the Balzacian narrator can thus 
gradually construct a theory of a spiritualist science, which refutes both materialist monism and 
religious fanaticism.  
In this “new” science, the magnetic fluid provides an empirical explanation—as the 
“source”—of a tremendous diversity of phenomena, ranging from the physical, to the occult, to 
those involving the human will, which we would now call psychological: “magnetic facts, and 
somnambulistic miracles, those of divination and entrancement which allowed penetration into the 
spiritual world, were accumulating.”622 The “fact” of magnetism is thus only supernatural in 
appearance. The spiritual and the scientific, far from being incompatible, can—and perhaps even 
 
618 Ibid., 88. 
619 Ibid., 90; 92. 
620 Ibid., 88. 
621 Ibid., 90. The mid-century conception of magnetism, as we saw with James braid, also intersected with phrenology:  
“magnetism, which is so closely allied … to light and electricity… Phrenology and physiognomy … proved to the 
eyes of more than one physiologist the traces of an imperceptible fluid, the base of the phenomena of the human will, 
the source of the passions and habits, the forms of face and those of the skull.” In this conception, magnetism is defined 
as the “source” of a variety of parapsychological phenomena and as the empirically observable “source” of the human 
will. Ibid., 90-92 
622 Ibid., 92. 
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should—be united: “those facts were nevertheless taking place, which were styled marvelous by 
superficial observers.”623  
Therefore, in the opening pages of the novel, the theoretical introduction of magnetism 
destabilizes the expected relations between science and religion, between the material and the 
spiritual. On a diegetic level, by blurring the boundaries between belief and knowledge, magnetism 
prepares for the reconciliation of Dr. Minoret with his colleague Dr. Bouvard. Indeed, both doctors 
had become estranged because of the latter’s enthusiasm for Mesmerism and the former’s hostile 
skepticism. In this way, the theory of magnetism presented at the beginning of the text sets the 
stage for its disruptive power to be transferred further on, from the theoretical, historical level, to 
the narrative level and the plot. Magnetism’s capacity to open up new possibilities and overturn—
or “plough”—the established balance and status quo is thus central to its introduction into the 
fictional space.  
 
2.1.1.2. An Extraordinary Man 
 
The main catalyst for this transformation is of course the magnetist himself, whom Dr. 
Minoret encounters upon receiving a letter from Dr. Bouvard and agreeing to witness a 
demonstration. In this scene, the magnetist—also referred to as the “Swedenborgian”—is 
presented as a “fascinating” figure who inspires both fear and attraction. His description 
reproduces early nineteenth-century conceptions that attribute extraordinary “powers” to the 
operator and neglect the role played by the subject: 
Just then an extraordinary man was making himself known in Paris, gifted by faith with an incalculable 
power, and making use of the magnetic powers in all their applications. Not only did this great unknown 
man, who is yet living, himself suddenly and radically cure the most cruel and most inveterate illnesses from 
a distance, like the Savior of mankind did formerly; but he would also produce the most curious instantaneous 
phenomena of somnambulism by mastering the most rebellious wills. The physiognomy of this stranger, who 
says to depend only upon God and to communicate with the angels, like Swedenborg, resembles a lion; a 
concentrated, irresistible strength flashes from it. His singularly distorted features have a terrible and startling 
appearance; his voice, which comes from the depths of his being, is as if charged with magnetic fluid, it 
penetrates the hearer through every pore.624 
 
 
623 Ibid., 87-92. 
624 Balzac, Ursule Mirouët, 94. 
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In this description, as Bertrand Méheust has noted, the novelistic imagination “takes its liberties” 
with historical facts when it attributes supernatural powers to the operator.625 Indeed, Balzac’s 
magnetist appears as an “extraordinary” being who communicates with the transcendent realm of 
the divine. His role consists in channeling the magnetic energy and its “incalculable power,” which 
is both curative and “curious” in the effects it produces. Significantly, these powers are directly 
linked to the magnetist’s “faith.” The analogy between his ability to “radically cure ... the most 
cruel and most inveterate illnesses” from a distance—which, according to Méheust, “no magnetist 
of the time ever claimed to have been able to do”—and the figure of Christ, turns him into a holy 
thaumaturge of sorts. 
Furthermore, the Christ-like image of the “lion” concentrates the ambivalence at the heart 
of the phenomenon of magnetic fascination: the magnetist’s power is both heavenly and earthly 
(animalistic), powerful but also potentially frightening. On the one hand, “a concentrated, 
irresistible strength flashes from” him, like the fluid itself.626 On the other, by describing his 
features as “singularly distorted,” “terrible” and “startling,” the Balzacian text blends together 
physical traits with moral attributes, suggesting that his appearance also contains a repulsive and 
“unnatural” dimension.627 This gesture of juxtaposing the fascinating with the physically repulsive 
will be reproduced in countless descriptions of the magnetist-hypnotist figure in nineteenth-
century fiction and popular culture.628  
Balzac’s description ends with the evocation of the magnetist’s voice, which comes from 
“the depths of his being” rather than the heavens. This reinforces the “earthly” dimension, by 
evoking a descending movement rather than an ascension.629 The fact that the voice is “charged 
with magnetic fluid,” creates a double effect: it materializes the immaterial (voice) in the fluid, 
and enchants the ordinary by charging it with quasi-supernatural properties.630 The image of the 
 
625 Bertrand Méheust, “Balzac et le magnétisme animal: Louis Lambert, Ursule Mirouet, Seraphita,” In: Traces du 
mesmerisme dans les littératures européennes du XIX° siècle (Brussels: Facultés Universitaires Saint-Louis, 2001). 
Méheust argues that in this sense, Balzac’s description is opposed to what was usually found in the discourse of 
psychofluidist practitioners such as Deleuze and Puységur. Nevertheless, his emphasis on the extraordinary dimension 
of the therapeutic powers of magnetism also invents “a sort of ideal magnetist, which paradoxically will serve as “a 
model for ulterior developments” and literary descriptions of magnetism. Méheust, 4; 9. 
626 Balzac, Ursule Mirouët, 94. 
627 Balzac, Ibid., 94. The French term for “startling” is foudroyante, which suggests the image of being struck by 
lightning—a trope that combines the petrification of the fascinated subject with the idea of the electric shock, linking 
mesmerism to the more general eletromagnetotrope of the time. 
628 This physical repulsion is also found in Thomas Mann’s description of Cipolla. 
629 Ibid., 94. 
630 Ibid., 94 
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voice which “penetrates the listener through every pore” prolongs this effect: it naturalizes the 
phenomenon by evoking the organic dimension of the human skin, while simultaneously extending 
the sense of hearing to the whole body.631 This evokes a total absorption of the magnetist’s words, 
on a level which is physiological, perceptible, material, and yet invisible—like the fluid itself. The 
recipient-listener’s permeability and vulnerability to the magnetist’s powers is located in the body 
rather than the rational mind.  
As in the theoretical presentation of magnetism, the Balzacian description of the magnetist 
himself is thus also based on a combination of opposites. It creates ambiguity by reconciling 
binaries and leave the reader uncertain as to the limits and moral dangers of a power that seems to 
bridge the gap between the natural and the supernatural. In Ursule Mirouët, the magnetist can 
either help or harm, cure or dominate, and is capable of “mastering the most rebellious wills.”632 
Like the character of Vautrin, he inspires a combination of attraction and fear, concentrating both 
a sacred and a demonic power in a single, material body.  
 
2.1.1.3. The Crumbling of Materialist Skepticism 
 
This dual aspect is what enables magnetism to prepare, on a narrative level, Dr. Minoret’s 
religious conversion, by opening up the material world and the realist genre to the insertion—one 
might say, the intrusion—of the spiritual, the religious, and the supernatural.  
As we have noted, before witnessing the demonstration of somnambulism, Dr. Minoret is 
initially skeptical.633 Just as the invitation letter he received from his “converted” colleague Dr. 
Bouvard “awakened his defiance,” when he arrives at the scene, he still “thought he was being 
humbugged.”634 Referencing Mesmer’s famous baquet cures, he sarcastically asks: “’What! no 
more tub?’ ... smiling.”635 Significantly, his second question—which is intended as a witty attack 
against the occultism associated with mesmerism—will constitute the central theme of Poe’s short 
 
631 Ibid., 94. 
632 Ibid. 
633 The demonstration involves the Swedenborgian inducing magnetic sleep in a woman with a technique that recalls 
the that of Puységur rather than Mesmer. In the text, it is described as a way to free the subject’s inner mind or “soul” 
from ordinary material constraints and allow it to travel, beyond the limits of the visible, the spatial and the physical: 
“the inmost being, freed from all the fetters which are brought into the exercise of its faculties by visible nature, 
wanders through the world which we wrongfully call invisible.” Ibid., 96. 
634 Ibid., 95-96. 
635 Ibid., 96. 
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stories, to which we will turn to in the following section: “Has magnetism prevented you from 
dying?” asked Minoret in a pleasant tone.”636  
Nevertheless, after this initial skepticism, once Minoret meets the Swedenborgian, the 
lexical field of religious conversion and scientific progress become intertwined, as the stakes are 
clearly established: “it is a question of changing a contrary belief to ours,” of “enlightening an 
honest scholar.”637 Indeed, the goal of the demonstration is for the magnetized woman to provide 
verifiable information in the clairvoyant state. In this way, under the “supervision” of the medical 
authority of both Doctors, the somnambulist woman “will prove to you that there exists a spiritual 
universe and that the soul does not recognize the laws of the material universe.”638 
Indeed, during the somnambulism demonstration, the doctor is able to verify the ways in 
which magnetic sleep seems to defy the laws of the material, first by witnessing the induction of 
somnambulism, then by observing the state of “clairvoyance” displayed by the subject:  
Sight and hearing … exercise themselves more perfectly than in the condition called waking, and possibly 
without the aid of those organs which are the sheaths for those luminous swords called sight and hearing! 
For a man put into this condition, distances and material objects do not exist, or are traversed by a life that is 
within us, and for which our body is a reservoir, a necessary prop, an envelope.639 
 
Indeed, in this state, physical distance and material obstacles disappear, as the mind is able to travel 
across vast distances once it has been freed from its somatic envelope: “I will send her to any 
region that you wish, twenty leagues away or to China; she will tell you what is happening 
there.”640 The Swedenborgian then invites Minoret to give instructions to the subject himself.641 
Following the magnetist’s instructions, the Doctor directs her while holding her hand and “sends” 
her to Nemours to observe his niece, Ursule.  
When the somnambule reveals accurate information about Ursule’s activities and 
burgeoning love story with a young man called Savinien, as well as the precise location of his own 
savings in his library, the Dr. Minoret undergoes a double reaction. On the one hand, he is 
“stupefied” and experiences a strong desire to “collect himself and recover from his profound 
terror”; but on the other, the scientist in him immediately wishes to “test afresh this immense 
power, to submit it to decisive experiments,” to questions “whose solution should remove every 
 
636 Ibid., 93. 
637 Ibid., 96. 
638 Ibid., 97. 
639 Ibid., 96. 
640 Ibid., 97. 
641 As we saw in Chapter 1, in Puységur’s model, rapport can be transferred by the operator to another individual. 
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kind of doubt.”642 Undergoing a mixture of astonishment and curiosity, the Doctor is torn between 
paralysis and an intellectual desire to test the (im)possible, in-credible, and yet empirically 
undeniable, phenomenon he has just witnessed. This tension between opposing forces, which 
pushes the limits of the knowable to their extreme, creates a state bordering on insanity: “‘I think 
I am mad, Bouvard,’ replied Minoret on the step of the gateway. ‘If the woman has told the truth 
… you will be right.’”643  
Indeed, once a courier has been sent to Nemours and the clairvoyant’s information is 
confirmed, the Doctor’s old belief system and worldview finally crumble: “he went to bed amidst 
the ruins of all his previous ideas about physiology, nature, and metaphysics.”644 Significantly, this 
disintegration occurs in the name of a paradoxically extraordinary, yet empirically undeniable 
observation: “He was bound to yield to evidence.”645  
Cloaked in the language of scientific discourse, the observation of magnetic sleep has 
paved the way for the Doctor’s conversion to Christianity:  
A strong wall crumbled away, so to speak, within him, for he lived supported by two foundations; his 
indifference to religious matters and his disbelief in magnetism. By proving that the senses … were bounded 
by some of the attributes of the infinite, magnetism overthrew … Spinoza’s powerful argumentation; the 
infinite and the finite… proved to be one within the other. Matter… had half-divine qualities. … All his 
science, based upon the assertions of the school of Locke and Condillac, was in ruins. Seeing his hollow idols 
in pieces, his incredulity necessarily faltered. And so all the advantage in this struggle between Catholic 
childhood and Voltairean old age, was to be with Ursule. A light was streaming on this dismantled fort, and 
on these ruins. The voice of prayer was bursting from the bosom of the fragments! … His spirit seemed 
wavering, he was no longer the same. … The edifice built up in this man by materialism was cracking in 
every part, it only needed one more shake; and, when his heart was ripe for God, he fell into the heavenly 
vineyard as the fruits fall.646 
 
In this passage, the destruction of the old belief system is conveyed with the architectural image 
of the crumbling of an internal edifice (“a strong wall crumbled away”; “in ruins”; his “hollow 
idols in pieces”; “dismantled fort”; “fragments,”; “cracking,” and so on). At the foundation of this 
edifice were two, mutually dependent aspects, pertaining to the worldview produced by the 
Enlightenment: “his indifference to religious matters and his disbelief in magnetism.”647 Now that 
the latter has been overcome, the revision of the former automatically follows. This revision 
reveals a quasi-deductive method implicit in the Balzacian text, in which a ripple or domino effect 
 
642 Ibid., 102. 
643 Ibid., 103. 
644 Ibid., 106. 
645 Ibid., 111. 
646 Ibid., 111-113.  
647 Ibid., 111. 
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leads from the acknowledgment of the magnetic “fact,” to a complete and profound revision of the 
relations between the material and the spiritual (and, as stated in this passage, between finitude 
and the infinite). The refutation of materialism that stems from the acceptance of magnetism 
necessarily, almost logically, opens up the Doctor’s mind to the religious.648 In a quasi-reversal of 
the Cartesian reconstruction of the world after the establishment of the single apodictic truth, here, 
a single but unquestionable experience of Mesmerism leads to a total and general overturning of 
Minoret’s worldview.  
Furthermore, in this passage, the lexical field of material ruins further emphasizes the 
power of the immaterial to overturn philosophical materialism. With the image of the crumbling 
edifice, the doctor’s beliefs are described as physical objects (walls, pieces, etc.) which are 
vulnerable to the destructive yet immaterial power of the spiritual: the imponderable and invisible 
has the ability to act on, modify and destroy the material. From this empty, hollow space created 
by the destruction of atheist materialism, religious faith can then emerge. As it fills up the hole, 
the text switches from inanimate and architectural images to organic evocations of life and 
plenitude in order to describe the “warmth” of faith: “a light was streaming,” “the voice of prayer 
was bursting,” “the bosom,” and so on.649 Once more, with a subtle juxtaposition of binaries—
from empty to full, dark to light, cold to warm, inanimate to animated—the text gradually injects 
life back into the ruins, in a motion reminiscent of the circulation of the fluid itself.  
The final “wavering” then corresponds to the last resistance of the cracked edifice of 
materialism, that “only needed one more shake.”650 Significantly, this “shake” comes from the 
“heart”—as opposed to the intellect, or Pascal’s Reason—and allows the paragraph to culminate 
in the Edenic image of fruition: “ripe for God ... into the heavenly vineyard.”651 The image of the 
fruit falling is the mirror-opposite of the Biblical Fall, and suggests instead proper maturation, 
ripening, completion, and harvesting, as well as a strong passivity on the part of the subject, who 
seems almost powerless in this process of yielding. Indeed, the force at play is far greater than the 
 
648 Significantly, his colleague Dr. Bouvard employed a similar pattern of thinking in an earlier passage: “If you 
acknowledge that this woman has the faculty of reducing or of traversing space, if you admit … that she hears and 
sees all that is being said and done at Nemours, then you must admit all the other magnetic effects, which to an 
unbeliever are as incredible as these are.” Ibid., 104, emphasis added. 
649 Ibid., 112. 
650 Ibid., 113. 
651 Ibid. 
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individual’s will or powers of ratiocination, suggesting an ineluctable necessity which echoes and 
subverts the initial idea of “yielding to evidence” from the opening of the paragraph.  
Therefore, in Ursule Mirouët, the irresistible power of magnetism causes one form of 
(atheist, materialist) “faith” to yield to another (spiritualist). A new individual then emerges from 
the symbolic death of the old belief system: “he was no longer the same.”652 Simultaneously, by 
bridging the gap between opposing philosophical views and “planes” of existence, magnetism 
serves as a gateway, a passage—and a naturalization—from materialism to spiritualism.  
Once a crack appears, a torrential wave of spirituality overcomes and permeates the soul 
of the old Doctor in the foreground, while in the background the text simultaneously thematizes 
and performs, with the image of a spiritual flood, the fluidic circulation which is central to the 
conception of magnetism of the time. As in other works by Balzac which tackle the question of 
the opposition between materialism and spiritualism, while scientific and medical discourse are 
“forced” to choose between either paradigm, the literary text is able to represent and incorporate 
both, as well as the conflicting and complex network of relations that polarize them. 
 
2.1.1.4.     Magnetism and Spiritualism 
 
In the second half of Ursule Mirouët, magnetism is then increasingly associated with the 
explicit emergence of the supernatural, whose presence is gradually strengthened until the novel 
seems to have shifted into the realm of the fantastic, rather than realism. Indeed, by the end of the 
text—like Swedenborg—Ursule has acquired several somnambulistic powers, such as the ability 
to communicate with the dead. In a series of dream apparitions, she receives instructions from her 
deceased uncle Minoret, that resolve the plot and bring the story to a close, by settling the 
inheritance drama and reestablishing justice.653 
Like magnetism, these spectral apparitions of Dr. Minoret receive a double treatment in the 
text. One the one hand, they are framed as religious interventions.654 On the other hand, they are 
naturalized in the discourse of the Abbé Chaperon, a friend of Dr. Minoret’s. These seemingly 
 
652 Ibid. 
653 “She narrated her three dreams and their most trifling details, insisting upon the absolute truth of the facts, the 
facility of her movements, and the somnambulism of an inner self, which, she said, moved about under the spirit’s 
guidance with the greatest ease.” Ibid. 
654 This is prepared early on in the text, in mentions of Christ’s apparitions: “But Jesus appeared to His Apostles after 
His death,” rejoined the curé. “The church must have faith in our Saviour’s apparitions.” Balzac, 113.  
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contradictory propositions are united in the Abbé’s contention that “all that God does is natural.”655 
In such passages, the fantastic, the supernatural, and the miraculous are grouped together and 
subsumed under the category of the natural, all pertaining to the realm of Creation. Indeed, when 
Ursule asks him what to make of her uncle’s strange nocturnal visitations, the priest provides a 
rational explanation which unites the power of ideas (of the “spiritual”) and the existence of spirits 
in a common realm of the natural:  
By what means can these strange apparitions take place?” said Ursule. “What did my godfather think of 
it?”— “Your godfather, my child, went by hypothesis. He had admitted the existence of a spiritual world, a 
world of ideas. If ideas are a production peculiar to man, if they subsist upon a life which is their own, they 
might have shapes that are imperceptible to our outward senses, but perceptible to our inward senses when 
they are in certain conditions. And so your godfather’s ideas may envelop you, and perhaps you have invested 
them with his semblance.656  
 
According to the Abbé, ghosts are but the imperceptible yet real manifestation of ideas, which can 
then be transformed into action and modify the material world: “Then, if Minoret has committed 
these acts, they resolve themselves into ideas; for all action is the result of several ideas. Now, if 
ideas move in the spiritual world your spirit must have perceived them by penetrating into it.”657 
To substantiate this argument about the material power of the immaterial, the priest uses the 
classical example of memory—rather than of the wind, as in Maupassant—and a rarer, olfactory 
example: “These phenomena are not more extraordinary than those of memory, and those of 
memory are as surprising and unaccountable as those of the perfume of plants, which may be the 
ideas of the plant.”658 The smell of plants, the power of memory, and Ursule’s terrifying nocturnal 
apparitions can all be conceptualized in terms of the “real” effects of—immaterial—“ideas.” In 
these analogies, the realm of the comprehensible or “explainable” is expanded beyond the 
boundaries of material reality, to the point where smells, ideas, and ghosts coexist (and thoughts, 
sap, and perfume circulate like the imponderable fluid) in a delicate balance which makes the 
spiritual real without necessarily having to make it material.659 In this sense, in the Balzacian text, 
spiritualism refers neither to superstition nor ignorance, but rather to an increase in knowledge, an 
extension of the mind’s capacities, and a refinement in perception—from the “gross” perceptions 
 
655 Ibid., 313. 
656 Ibid., 309. 
657 Ibid., 310. 
658 Ibid. 
659 Indeed, as she tries to reconcile the perceptual fact of “hear[ing] a corpse speak, to see it walking and acting” with 
the Abbé’s reassuring discourse, Ursule frames his explanation in terms of “enlarging the world.” Ibid., 310. 
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of the physical organs to the more “subtle” perception of the “inner senses.” In this way, the 
spiritualist’s world is “larger” than the materialist’s.  
As the fictional universe is extended beyond the materialist-spiritualist opposition and 
realist-fantastic division, the text simultaneously underlines its own gesture of philosophical 
inclusion, its ability to encompass and maintain balance between the naturalist explanation and 
spiritualism, between the rational and the religious, between the scientific and the occult.  
Therefore, for Balzac, while magnetism serves mostly to criticize materialist monism, it 
also preserves science’s ability to reconcile with spiritualism. As we shall see in the next section, 
for Poe, this philosophical “extension” is used to challenge scientific knowledge in a more extreme 
way, by pushing the question of the limits of the material to its maximal literality and thereby, to 
its breaking point.  
 
2.1.2. Magnetism as Suspension: Poe’s Three Mesmeric Tales 
 
As noted in the previous section, Dr. Minoret jokingly asked if magnetism, in its ability to 
disrupt the relations between mind and matter, could prevent death.660 In spiritualist circles, this 
question also corresponded to the fantasy and fascination for a discipline deemed capable of 
pushing back the boundaries of human finitude and mortality.661 In this section, we will examine 
Edgar Allan Poe’s (1809-1849) Gothic treatment of mesmerism, which also produces a 
“scientifically oriented” and spiritualist refutation of materialist monism. Like Balzac, Poe uses 
Mesmerism to experiment with the aesthetic, narrative and philosophical possibilities that it offers, 
as a union of seemingly incompatible and contradictory elements. In Poe’s texts, however, the 
subversive power of magnetism is radicalized and used to imagine the experience of a state of 
literal suspension between life and death. While in Reflections on War and Death,  Freud famously 
writes that “we cannot imagine our own death,” as I will show, Poe’s literary treatment of 
 
660 Balzac, Ursule Mirouët, 93. 
661 This fantasy of a discipline capable of pushing back against the physical limitations and ephemeral existence of the 
human body can also be found at the end of Madame Bovary, when Charles thinks of magnetism as a last hope to 
prevent Emma’s death: “He recalled stories of catalepsy, the marvels of magnetism, and he said to himself that by 
willing it with all his force he might perhaps succeed in reviving her.” Flaubert, Madame Bovary, ed. M. Cohen, trans, 
E. Marx Aveling (New York and London: Norton and Company, 2005), 261. 
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magnetism involves precisely such an attempt, which aims to produce a first-person account of 
this seemingly irrepresentable experience.662 
In the United States, mid-century, spiritualist interest in mesmerism and its potential to 
challenge the presuppositions of orthodox medical was also strong, like in France and Great 
Britain.663 As we shall see, in the three short stories examined in this section, Poe both reflected 
the interest of his day and poetically reimagined what was “by all odds the most fascinating of the 
new ‘sciences’.”664 Although in the medical field in the 1840s, it had already begun to take on the 
psychological connotations associated with hypnotism, Poe’s use of the term “mesmerism” mostly 
overlaps with the term “magnetism.”665  
In “A Tale of the Ragged Mountains” (published in Godey's in April 1844), “Mesmeric 
Revelation” (published in the Columbian Magazine in August 1844), and “The Facts in the Case 
of M. Valdemar” (published in the American Review in December 1845), Poe restricts his 
conceptualization of the material-spiritual divide to the question of the life-death relations and 
explores, through the theme of mesmerism, various points of transition between both of these 
states. By representing magnetic sleep as a state of interim which can temporally, corporeally, and 
intellectually prolong—thereby making it available in the first person—the state of the individual 
in articulo moris, Poe’s tales both capture and radicalize “something of the mesmeric effect in 
general”—that is, the “hiatus” it creates in conscious volition.666  
In this section, we will examine the stories in chronological order, to underline the gradual 
progression with which a conscious, lucid exploration of the non-conscious is thematized, 
culminating in the representation of an impossible state of living-death.  
 
 
662 “We cannot, indeed, imagine our own death; whenever we try to do so we find that we survive ourselves as 
spectators. The school of psychoanalysis could thus assert that at bottom no one believes in his own death, which 
amounts to saying: in the unconscious every one of us is convinced of his immortality.” Freud, “Our Attitude Towards 
Death,” in Reflections on War and Death, trans. A. A. Brill and Alfred Kuttner (New York: Moffat, Yard and 
Company, 1918), 41. 
663 As Sidney Lind notes, Deleuze’s Practical Instruction in Animal Magnetism was translated and published in the 
United States in 1837. In 1841, a committee composed of doctors, clergy men and prominent citizens was also put 
together in Boston to witness a series of experiments performed by Dr. Robert H. Collyer, a “rabid supporter of animal 
magnetism,” and in June 1842, the journal Magnet, which declared itself as “devoted to the Investigation of Human 
Physiology” was established. Sidney E. Lind, “Poe and Mesmerism.” PMLA 62, no. 4 (December 1947): 1077. 
664 Lind, “Poe and mesmerism,” 1077. 
665 As Doris Falk notes, the proximity between the publication dates of Braid’s work (1842-43) and of Poe’s mesmeric 
tales (1844-5) “makes it unlikely that Poe could have read Braid at this time.” See Doris V. Falk, “Poe and the Power 
of Animal Magnetism.” PMLA 84 (1969): 536. 
666 Pick, Svengali's Web, 58. 
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2.1.2.1.  “A Tale of the Ragged Mountains”: Metempsychosis of Mesmerism 
 
Poe’s “A Tale of the Ragged Mountains” recounts the story of Augustus Bedloe, who 
suddenly disappears, then mysteriously reappears, after an extraordinary experience of “soul 
travel,” which leaves open the question of its potentially delusional, or on the contrary, 
supernatural, nature. Set in the 1840s, the story represents events occurring in 1827, when 
Mesmerism was still deemed controversial. According to the narrative discourse, this twenty-year 
long gap allows the extraordinary events of the past to be established with the seriousness of a 
new, “scientifically informed,” perspective: “It is only now, in the year 1845, when similar 
miracles are witnessed daily by thousands, that I dare venture to record this apparent impossibility 
as a matter of serious fact.”667 In Poe’s text, the alternation between the possibility of natural and 
supernatural explanations contributes to the fantastic genre of the text, in which mesmerism 
strengthens the undecidability between both explanations. Poe’s text has thus been described as 
“an exceedingly well contrived mixture of the real and unreal, of hypnotism and 
metempsychosis.”668 
Bedloe’s character fits mid-century conceptions of the “susceptible” magnetic subject. 
Described as “peculiar” in all aspects,669 he combines both innate and acquired factors which 
contribute to his susceptibility to magnetism: as a morphine addict with a “singularly vigorous and 
creative” imagination, he has become greatly diminished by “a long series of neuralgic attacks,” 
cured by the magnetic remedies of his physician, Dr. Templeton.670  
Descriptions of Bedloe’s gaze focus on its “abnormal” ability to reconcile opposing 
aspects, alternating between excessive vitality and luminosity on the one hand, and an 
overwhelmingly morbid dullness on the other:  
His eyes were abnormally large, and round like those of a cat. The pupils, too, upon any accession or 
diminution of light, underwent contraction or dilation, just such as is observed in the feline tribe. In moments 
of excitement the orbs grew bright to a degree almost inconceivable; seeming to emit luminous rays, not of 
a reflected but of an intrinsic lustre, as does a candle or the sun; yet their ordinary condition was so totally 
vapid, filmy, and dull as to convey the idea of the eyes of a long-interred corpse.671  
 
 
667 Edgar Allam Poe, “A Tale of the Ragged Mountains.” 1844. In Mystery Tales of Edgar Allan Poe (New York: AL 
Burt Company, 1907), 217. As in Balzac, the serious dimension of “fact” is pitted against the extraordinary dimension 
of the miraculous. 
668 Lind, “Poe and Mesmerism,” 1079. 
669 Poe, “A Tale of the Ragged Mountains,” 214. 
670 Poe, Ibid., 215. 
671 Poe, Ibid., 215. 
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Confirming the central role of the gaze in representations of hypnosis, Poe’s description also 
anticipates, in the “natural” predispositions of the magnetic subject, his ulterior state of suspension, 
which will be artificially created by the operator. 
Mesmerism is introduced in the text in virtue of its curative properties, following the topos 
of the mid-century. Templeton having already induced magnetic sleep in Bedloe on several 
occasions, both men are said to share “a very distinct and strongly marked rapport, or magnetic 
relation.”672 Nevertheless, by presenting the events from the perspective of an exterior narrator, 
the text subtly undermines the position of the established medical discourse, and introduces 
uncertainty regarding the therapeutic efficacy of Templeton’s practice. Indeed, the text creates 
distance between the doctor’s perspective on the one hand, and Bedloe’s and the narrator’s on the 
other,673 as the narrative voice casts skeptical doubt on the efficacy of Templeton’s cures (“from 
whose attention … he either received, or fancied that he received, great benefit”), setting up an 
atmosphere of interpretative undecidability from the start.674 In this way, the narrative function of 
magnetism as sole means of interpreting the event about to be narrated is undermined.  
In Bedloe’s story, the realist aesthetic then undergoes a series of “assaults” by the 
supernatural and the “reality” of the extraordinary event is put to the test hyperbolic doubt in a 
Cartesian nightmare of sorts. The shift from the ordinary walk in the hills to the extraordinary—
uninterpretable—event is marked by a disruption of the unusual, on both auditory and visual levels, 
into Bedloe’s attention field.  
First, the character’s familiar universe is suddenly invaded by the exotic, the uncanny, and 
the unfamiliar: “Very suddenly my attention was arrested by the loud beating of a drum … a dusky-
visaged and half-naked man rushed past me with a shriek … there darted … a hyena.”675 This 
unusual sight then creates a dissociation, prompting the hypothesis that Bedloe is dreaming: “The 
sight of this monster rather relieved than heightened my terrors—for I now made sure that I 
 
672 As the narrator notes, they have reached a point where “the will of the patient succumbed rapidly to that of the 
physician, so that, when I first became acquainted with the two, sleep was brought about almost instantaneously by 
the mere volition of the operator, even when the invalid was unaware of his presence.” Ibid., 216. Like Balzac, Poe 
seems to lean more towards Puységur’s model, in which one will acts upon another, rather than describe the pure 
circulation of a material fluid.   
673 Indeed, the pupil initially seems more skeptical than the doctor, who is described in Balzacian fashion as having 
been “converted” to Mesmerism in Paris, but who “like all enthusiasts,” has “struggled hard to make a thorough 
convert of his pupil.” Ibid., 216. 
674 Ibid., 215. 
675 Ibid., 219. 
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dreamed, and endeavored to arouse myself to waking consciousness.”676 Upon the sight of a palm 
tree, however, the dream hypothesis vanishes and is replaced and reinforced, transformed into the 
hallucination—or waking dream—hypothesis: “I saw—I felt that I had perfect command of my 
senses—and these senses now brought to my soul a world of novel and singular sensation.”677 The 
impression of reality emanating from sensory perception brings the narrator’s “dream” into the 
more tangible, sensory, domain of hypnotic experience, as if immersed in a hallucinatory yet 
perceptible world, which is manifested in the shift between the visual (“I saw”) to the kinesthetic 
(“I felt”).  
The text then establishes that Bedloe has been transported to the city of Benares, in India, 
where the population seems to in a state of revolt. Here, the event reaches its paroxysm: the 
character is hit, and suddenly feels himself slipping away from the realm of the living: “I 
struggled—I gasped—I died.”678 Although the event remains narrated as past, with its three 
moments distinct from one another—unlike the impossible utterance of M. Valdemar, “I am dead,” 
in which death is experienced in the present mode—here, the text’s use of punctuation and dashes, 
the repetition of the pronoun “I” and the ternary rhythm and sentence structure, bring the 
chronological order of the three moments as close as possible to one. Like Valdemar’s, Bedloe’s 
utterance is an impossible one, provided that one is judging from within a paradigm that excludes 
metempsychosis or past life regression: either the character has died, and is no longer able to make 
utterances, or he has survived, and therefore his utterance is false.  
However, from a spiritualist paradigm, Bedloe’s utterance might count as true. Indeed, the 
“moment” of death is described as a dissolution of the material followed by a split between the 
body and soul, where the character is aware of his corporeal death and able to perceive his body 
from above.679 Following this dissociation, the metaphor of electricity is mobilized, as the soul is 
“jolted” back into the body, creating a return to the ordinary: “I again experienced a shock as of a 
galvanic battery, the sense of weight, of volition, of substance, returned. I became my original self, 
and bent my steps eagerly homeward.”680 Although one might be tempted to dismiss the experience 




678 Ibid., 223. 
679 “’For many minutes,’ continued the latter, ‘my sole sentiment—my sole feeling—was that of darkness and 
nonentity, with the consciousness of death.” Ibid., 223. 
680 Ibid., 224. 
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the real—and not now, even for an instant, can I compel my understanding to regard it as a 
dream.”681  
Despite its being previously framed as scientifically legitimate, with this extraordinary 
event, Mesmerism then seems to be placed on the side of the occult.682 Indeed, detaining the 
authoritative discourse in the story, Dr. Templeton is the one to defend the supernatural—rather 
than the naturalizing—hypothesis, by subscribing to the theory of metempsychosis. The magnetist 
thus explicitly defends the hypothesis of the reality of Bedloe’s soul-traveling, and subsumes it 
under the category of scientific progress, blurring the boundaries between medical science and 
psychical research: “Let us suppose only, that the soul of the man of to-day is upon the verge of 
some stupendous psychal [sic] discoveries.”683 At the end of the story, when he hands Bedloe a 
1780 watercolor portrait of Mr. Oldeb, (a British officer who died in the “insurrection of Cheyte 
Sing, which took place in 1780”) and Bedloe’s death is uncannily announced a week later in the 
paper—with the “e” missing, making it “Oldeb conversed”—the medical authority serves to give 
credence and reinforce the supernatural interpretation.684 By the end of the story, the narrative 
perspective thus seems to lean more heavily towards the paradigm in which soul-travel and 
metempsychosis are possible, as “facts.” The competing, hallucination-dream hypothesis, 
according to which the illusory is experienced as real but remains an illusion nonetheless, seems 
to have been discarded. 
As Sidney Lind had insightfully argued, however, on the contrary, the event narrated by 
Bedloe can be interpreted as the full product of mesmerism, that is, as an induced hallucination, 
rather than a supernatural event. Metempsychosis, in this sense, would simply be Dr. Templeton’s 
belief, a mere element of his characterization, rather than the general framework of the narrative. 
Indeed, for Lind, the story was clearly “intended by Poe to be a study in hypnosis, with the theme 
of metempsychosis subordinated to one character, Dr. Templeton. There is nothing whatever of 
the supernatural in it.”685 In this sense, Templeton suffers from a “lack of awareness throughout 
the tale that metempsychotic implications exist only in his mind.”686 According to this reading, as 
 
681 Ibid. 
682 This is strengthened by the fact that the doctor is able to interject and predict Bedloe’s sentences as he tells his tale, 
which creates a sense of astonishment in the characters present. 
683 Ibid., 224. 
684 Ibid., 225-6. 
685 Lind, “Poe and Mesmerism,” 1085. 
686 Ibid., 1081. 
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in Balzac, the status of mesmerism remains ambiguous, opening the text up to the intrusions of the 
occult, yet serving as a “scientific explanation” to naturalize the supernatural.  
Regardless of the role granted to the supernatural in the tale, in this story, mesmerism is 
what makes “possible” an early, first person experience of the suspension later developed in “The 
facts in the Case of M. Valdemar.” The fascination and function of mesmerism, therefore, seems 
to be to stretch the limits of rational discourse, to extend the boundaries of the material and of 
human finitude to their limits. Mesmerism allows Poe to literalize and give concrete, fictional, 
representation to what would otherwise remain a mere, abstract, thought experiment. In this sense, 
it plays a metaphysical, rather than merely fantastic, role. 
 
2.1.2.2.  “Mesmeric Revelation”: Transcending the Material 
 
In “Mesmeric Revelation” (1844), Poe also establishes a framework of “mesmeric 
experimentation” as the basis for his “venture into metaphysical speculation.”687 Drawing heavily 
on Townshends’ 1840 Facts in Mesmerism688—a defense of Mesmerism which popularized it in 
England at the time—Poe’s story begins by establishing the “rationale” of mesmerism and the 
existence of mesmeric sleep as a “fact” that no longer needs to be proven. 
The short story opens with a theoretical presentation of mesmerism not unlike Balzac’s in 
Ursule Mirouët. Although the narrator claims he will enumerate “the laws of mesmerism in its 
general features,” it quickly becomes apparent that his true objects of fascination are the 
similarities between the state of mesmeric sleep and death.689 Describing magnetism as an 
“abnormal condition, of which the phenomena resemble very closely those of death,” he is on the 
contrary quite selective in the “laws” he examines.690  
Rather than demonstrate the existence of mesmerism, however, the narrator-operator 
proposes to restitute a dialogue with one of his subjects, Mr. Vankirk, a “sleep-walker” with whom 
he has experimented with mesmeric sleep multiple times.691 Vankirk, who has been “laboring 
 
687 Ibid., 1087; Poe, “Mesmeric Revelation.” In Tales. Second Edition (London: Wiley & Putnam, 1846). 
688 Chauncy Hare Townshend, Facts in Mesmerism, With Reasons for a Dispassionate Inquiry into It (New York: 
Harper & Bros, 1842). 
689 Poe, “Mesmeric Revelation,” 47. 
690 Ibid., 47. It is probable that here Poe has mainly the cataleptic state in mind, for as stated in Chapter 1, a wide array 
of hypnotic experiences reveal that subjects can freely move, speak, laugh and display numerous signs of ‘vitality’ 
rather than death, during magnetic sleep. 
691 Ibid., 49. 
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under constant phthisis,” has recently suffered from an asthma attack and suffers from “acute pain 
in the region of the heart.” Rather than to soothe his “bodily ailment,” however, he has called the 
narrator to his bedside because of “phychal impressions” which give him anxiety.692 Vankirk then 
asks the narrator to conduct an “experiment” in which, after the induction of mesmeric sleep, he 
will be asked a series of questions about the relations between the somatic and the spiritual. During 
this anti-rationalist dialogue, the possibility of man’s immortality is discussed in relation to 
mesmeric sleep, launching a metaphysical reflection on the boundaries between the material and 
the spiritual as the narrative transforms into a dialogue on cosmogony, the nature of matter and 
God.  
The form of the text is reminiscent of a pastiche of a Platonic dialogue, in which Poe's 
clairvoyant “differs from most” as “he expresses himself in the prosaic language of science or 
philosophy, presenting an organized argument.”693 Seo-Young Chu, for instance, contends that the 
form of Poe’s story may be described as “hypnotic ratiocination,” where interlocutors in different 
states of consciousness—“asleep and awake, passive and active, second-person and first-
person”—interact.694 The function of this ratiocination is to defend the position according to which 
God and thoughts are made up of “unparticled matter” in motion, a matter rarer and finer than 
ether.695 Mesmerism, according to the text’s spiritualist description, is a means to access “direct” 
and “refined” forms of perception, where the powers of the mind can transcend physical, spatial 
and material obstacles and the limitations usually imposed by the physical senses: “the person so 
impressed employs only with effort, and then feebly, the external organs of sense, yet perceives, 
with keenly refined perception, and through channels supposed unknown, matters beyond the 
scope of the physical organs.”696 In this sense, it comes as close as possible to accessing this 
 
692 Ibid., 48.  
693 Falk, “Poe and the Power of Animal Magnetism,” 544. 
694 Seo-Young Chu, “Hypnotic Ratiocination,” The Edgar Allan Poe Review 6, no. 1 (Spring 2005): 5. 
695 Poe, “Mesmeric Revelation,” 50. This spiritualist idea directly fits Poe’s conception of Mesmerism, which is the 
closest that man can get to this “unparticled matter” in the material realm. Indeed, as Doris Falk explains, is “a 
pervasive organizing principle, accounting for the cohesion of the molecules of the body and the nervous system, as 
it does for that of the particles of matter and of the units of the cosmos,” which recalls many of the aspects of animal 
magnetism. See Falk, “Poe and the Power of Animal Magnetism,” 538. 
696 Indeed, it is described as a state of “profound self-cognizance,” a clairvoyant state in which the mesmeric “sleep-
walker” displays “extensive knowledge … upon all points relating to the mesmeric condition itself.” Although this 
state of intense absorption can give the impression of the subject is “deaf”—and thus dead—to exterior stimuli, the 
mention of his intellectual faculties being “wonderfully exalted and invigorated” suggests on the contrary that 
magnetic sleep can enhance potential rather than diminish it, and thus seems incompatible with the state of “death. 
Ibid., 47; 49. 
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“unparticled matter” which, “through what we consider its immateriality, eludes the organic.”697 
In this way, it opens up the possibility of providing experiential “proof” of the immortality of the 
soul. 
Indeed, unlike what Descartes believed, rather than be demonstrated rationally, in Poe’s 
tale the immortality of the soul must be established through experience: “if man is to be 
intellectually convinced of his own immortality, he will never be so convinced by the mere 
abstractions.”698 As Vankirk explains, there is a gap between his own intellectual “denial” of the 
immortality of the soul and his “feeling,” the “half-sentiment” that his soul has of its own 
existence.699 This notion of “feeling” allows the text to set up the possibility of an intuitive “truth” 
accessible via mesmeric sleep, by detaching oneself from the gross perceptions of the material 
body. As in Balzac, the experience of Mesmerism thus opens the door to spiritualism in the mind 
of the rational skeptic, “all attempts at logical inquiry” having resulted “in leaving me more 
sceptical than before.”700  
After blurring the material and the spiritual, the text can then draw the parallel between 
mesmeric trance and death: “the mesmeric condition is so near death as to content me.”701 Rather 
than merely end physical existence, mesmeric sleep allows to transcend it, by providing access to 
a more subtle, finer, plane of existence, beyond the limitations of ordinary sense perception: 
“When I say that it resembles death, I mean that it resembles the ultimate life; for when I am 
entranced the senses of my rudimental life are in abeyance and I perceive external things directly, 
without organs, through a medium which I shall employ in the ultimate, unorganized life.”702  
Significantly, the affirmation of the triumph of the immaterial causes the sudden 
interruption of the narrative—announcing the sudden death of the speaker—bringing the story to 
a close: “As the sleep-waker [sic] pronounced these latter words, in a feeble tone, I observed on 
his countenance a singular expression, which somewhat alarmed me, and induced me to awake 
him at once. No sooner had I done this than, with a bright smile irradiating all his features, he fell 
 
697 Ibid., 56. 
698 Ibid, 48. 
699 Ibid. 
700 Ibid. 
701 Ibid., 50. 
702 Spirit travel and immortality are then made possible by the soul’s “volition”: “In all, the organs vary with the 
features of the place tenanted. At death, or metamorphosis, these creatures, enjoying the ultimate life -immortality- 
and cognizant of all secrets but the one, act all things and pass every where by mere volition.” Ibid., 54; 55. 
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back upon his pillow and expired.”703 With this sudden expiration, three aspects of materiality—
the concept of matter, Vankirk’s body and of the body of the text itself—simultaneously dissolve, 
in an ending that constitutes both a closing and opening up to the unknown, beyond the known.704 
In “Mesmeric Revelation,” mesmerism thus functions as a means to suspend the state 
between life and death and allow the text to pose the question of what lies beyond human mortality 
and materiality. Through the fictionalization of a thought experiment, Mesmerism is thus a means 
to conduct “serious” philosophical inquiry beyond the opposition between rationalism and 
obscurantism, “beyond the opposition between logic and feeling.”705 In this sense, it is also a way 
to renegotiate the vocabulary and standards for philosophical inquiry. Indeed, it provides a means 
of redefining terms like “proof,” and as Chu argues, allows to “reimagine logical and poetic rigor” 
in an anti-rationalistic, yet discursively refined manner.706 In “The Facts in the Case of M. 
Valdemar,” this philosophical investigation will be radicalized and, rather than merely centering 
on the question of death as after-life, will portray Mesmeric sleep a literal suspension between life 
and death, which paradoxically simultaneously negates both.  
 
2.1.2.3.  “The Facts in the Case of M. Valdemar”: Mesmerism as Suspension 
 
Nowhere has “the horrific face of mesmeric medicine” been more dramatically portrayed 
than in Poe’s third “macabre” tale, which according to Pick, “many took to be an authentic 
report.”707 Indeed, rather than a purely fictional invention, “The Facts in the Case of M. Valdemar” 
has been described as the “expansion, in detail, if not beyond, then at least to the limits of horror” 
of an actual case reported by Townshend in Facts of Mesmerism.708 As Lind observes, with the 
 
703 Ibid., 57. 
704 This openness is emphasized by the interrogative form and the final question mark, which end the text on a note of 
uncertainty, marking the impossibility of ending the narrative on the affirmative or declarative mode: “his corpse had 
all the stern rigidity of stone. His brow was of the coldness of ice. … Had the sleep-waker … been addressing me 
from out the regions of the shadows?” Ibid., 57. 
705 Chu, “Hypnotic Ratiocination,” 5. 
706 Ibid., 5. 
707 Pick, Svengali's Web, 57; Poe, “The Facts in the Case of M. Valdemar.” 1845. In Amazing Stories 1, no. 1 (April 
1926): 92-96. 
708 Lind, 1091. Indeed, the “Notice” to the 1844 London edition of his book, Townshend reports: “I have watched the 
effects of mesmeric treatment upon a suffering friend, who was dying of that most fearful disorder—Lumbar Abscess. 
Unfortunately, through various hindrances, Mesmerism was not resorted to till late in the progress of the disease, so 
that, of course, that it should effect a cure was out of the question. ... I have no hesitation in saying, that, under God, 
the life of my friend, R. T. was prolonged, at least, two months by the action of Mesmerism.” Townshend, Facts of 
Mesmerism, xvi. 
 155 
invocation of the concept of “facts” in its very title, Poe’s tale thus strives to “resembl[e] its source” 
by imitating the form of “a logical, pseudo-medical case-study, once the impossible premise has 
been granted.”709 As we shall see, however, Poe’s poetic reimagination of mesmerism—as an 
impossible state of suspension between life and death—has little to do with the actual medical 
cases of the magnetists described in Chapter 1. Furthermore, the “facts” mentioned in Poe title are 
presented without the interpretive keys that would enable their understanding, preserving the full 
ambiguous complexity of magnetism as a poetic-philosophical—rather than purely medical—
object.710 In this sense, the “suspension” involved in Poe’s representation of Mesmeric sleep will 
be epistemological—between knowledge and uncertainty—just as much as it is literal—between 
life and death. 
 
Mesmerism as Suspension 
In fact, the lexical field in the opening paragraphs of Poe’s tale is that of the exceptional or 
supernatural rather than the “factual.” In the first three lines for example, one encounters the terms 
“wonder,” “extraordinary,” and “miracle,” before the narrative voice switches to a more suspicious 
mode and a vocabulary of “investigation,” “misrepresentations,” “disbelief.” 711 This contrast 
underlines the two available, opposing attitudes towards magnetism, even before the mention of 
the subject is explicitly introduced: wonder at the extraordinary, and skeptical disbelief.  
The topic of the story is then presented by the narrator as an innovative experiment serving 
to correct an “omission” in the general experimental history of Mesmerism: “no person had as yet 
been mesmerized in articulo mortis.”712 The goal of the investigation is to induce mesmeric sleep 
in order to suspend the advent of bodily death, establishing “to what extent, or for how long a 
period, the encroachments of Death might be arrested by the process.”713 Like Bedloe, M. 
Valdemar—who also suffers from phthisis—is described as predisposed towards being susceptible 
 
709 Lind, 1091. 
710 The “correct” interpretation is announced as inaccessible as such from the start, leaving the interpretative gap open 
for the reader to fill as the narration unfolds: “It is now rendered necessary that I give the facts—as far as I comprehend 
them myself.” Poe, 93. 
711 Poe, “The Facts in the Case of M. Valdemar.” 93. 
712 Ibid., 93. 
713 Ibid.,93. Significantly, in Poe’s tale, the first-person narrator is not introduced. His occupation remains unknown 
and his characterization is reduced to the “curiosity” which leads him to plan on carrying out the experiment, and 
search for a “subject” in order to conduct his “test.” In this sense, the narrative voice is juxtaposed with this sense of 
curiosity regarding the boundaries of the rational, the knowable and the natural, cloaked in the language of scientific 
inquiry 
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to magnetism.714 As in the previous tales, both men have previously experiments together with 
magnetic sleep, albeit with disappointing results in terms of clairvoyance and absolute—
“positive”—control of the will. Paradoxically, this initial hindrance is the condition of the 
unfolding of the story: as Mr. Valdemar knows that his death is imminent, he disposed to selflessly 
experiment during the little time remaining available for scientific inquiry.715  
Poe’s description of Valdemar at death’s door is particularly striking, juxtaposing personal 
elements (“his face”) and impersonal descriptions (“the skin”), drawing on medical terminology 
and fragmenting the already decomposing body into discrete parts, culminating in the mention of 
the “ossification” of the left lung.716 There is a sharp contrast however between corporeal 
dissolution and mental vitality which emphasizes the possibilities opened up by magnetic sleep: 
despite his physical frailty, Valdemar retains his “mental power,” speaks “with distinctness” and 
even occupies himself by “penciling memoranda” in a pocket-book.717 The fantasy of suspension 
involved in descriptions of mesmeric sleep, involving a delay of bodily degradation, is operative 
in the description of a subject whose mental capacities remain untouched and are allowed to 
explore both internal and external worlds once they are freed from the “laws” of pathology and 
materiality.  
 
Medical and Magnetic Authority 
Poe’s tale dramatizes the dynamics of authority and authenticity brought to the fore by the 
phenomenon of magnetism. As in the other stories, here, the authority of medical discourse initially 
seems to serve as a guarantee of the narrative events. For instance, the narrative itself claims to be 
 
714 Indeed, he is “particularly noticeable for the extreme spareness of his person” and “his temperament was markedly 
nervous Poe.” As in the previous tales, the characters have previously experiments together with magnetism, albeit 
with disappointing results when it comes to clairvoyance and absolute—“positive”—control of the will. In other 
words, early on, the text underlines the gap between the fascination for the potential of magnetism and its actual 
results. Rather than dismiss mesmeric technique altogether, the narrator attributes the failure to the “disordered state” 
of Valdemar’s health, who also suffers from phthisis. Ibid., 93. 
715 “it was his custom to speak… calmly of his approaching dissolution, as of a matter neither to be avoided nor 
regretted.” Ibid., 93. Even at this early stage, the temporal structure of the narrative is disrupted by magnetism. 
Although Valdemar sent the narrator a note indicating that he was expected to die in less than a day, the latter indicates 
that seven months have passed since he received it. Consequently, either the diagnosis given by Valdemar’s doctors 
(“D— and F—”) was incorrect, or another factor disrupted the predictable course of disease and death. At this stage 
of the narrative, both options remain available in the text.  
716 “His face wore a leaden hue; the eyes were utterly lusterless; and the emaciation was so extreme that the skin had 
been broken through by the cheek-bones. His expectoration was excessive. The pulse was barely perceptible.” Ibid., 
93. 
717 Ibid., 94. 
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reconstituted—“either copied or condensed verbatim”—from the memoranda of Mr. L—the 
medical student—establishing both the “veracity” and accuracy of the details of the story.718 The 
regular insertion of temporal annotations (“five minutes before eleven”; “it wanted about five 
minutes of eight”) mimics the rigor of scientific methodology and observation.719 In this way, as 
Brian Diemert notes, the text creates “the illusion that we are reading a scientific account wherein 
language is made transparent, so as not to interfere in the presentation of ‘the facts in the case’.”720  
Nevertheless, while the narrative discourse establishes this—illusory—ideal of a 
transparent notation, of a pure transposition from the factual to the textual, the text itself actively 
works to gradually undermined it as the narrative unfolds. In this sense, the narrator “claims for 
himself an authority, supported by his position as a scientist” which he cannot sustain “because 
Poe's ironic perspective consistently undermines him.”721 This underlying undecidability it as the 
heart of the literary treatment of the magnetic object. 
Once the state of magnetic sleep has been induced, a blurring occurs, where the 
“unequivocal signs of the mesmeric influence” become practically indistinguishable from those of 
imminent death.722 The similarities between a comatic state, somnambulism and expiration are 
emphasized, at the expense of their differences.723 As we saw in Chapter 1, Valdemar’s transfixed 
gaze, his cataleptic eyelids and limbs, are classic signs of the hypnotic state—ones that in the 
1880s, the Salpêtrière school would call its ‘somnambulistic’ and ‘cataleptic’ phases, and the 
Nancy school would describe as the mere products of suggestion. Here, however, they become 
interchangeable with the physiological signs of imminent death of the subject. Only the medical 
 
718“He would take notes of all that occurred, and it is from his memoranda that what I now have to relate is, for the 
most part, either condensed or copied verbatim.” Ibid., 94. 
719 Ibid., 94. 
720 Brian Diemert, “Recomposing ‘Valdemar’: Graham Greene Reweaves a Tale by Poe,” Style 27, no. 3 (Fall 1993): 
433. 
721 Ibid., 428. 
722 Poe, 94. Although it introduced the new term of “trance” in addition to that of “sleep,” like Balzac’s, Poe’s 
description of the mesmeric induction still works with the magnetic, rather than the hypnotic, model. Describing the 
use of magnetic “passes” and “lateral stroke[s],” the text also introduces the possessive “my powers,” which suggests 
that the participation of the subject is not a central factor in the induction of mesmeric sleep. As Valdemar’s pulse 
becomes imperceptible and his breathing has slowed down considerably, the narrator then exchanges “the lateral 
passes for downward ones” and directs his gaze “entirely into the right eye of the sufferer” for reasons that remain 
unspecified in the text—precisely the type of material which will be parodied by the Flaubertian narrator. The parallel 
between the states of 
723 For instance: “that expression of uneasy inward examination which is never seen except in cases of sleep-waking, 
and which it is quite impossible to mistake”; the eyelids “quiver, as in incipient sleep”; the “stiffening” of the limbs 
Ibid., 94. 
 158 
authority is able to distinguish both states, and in this way, guarantee the presence of a state of a 
mesmeric trance.724 
After several hours, the body of Valdemar has become a quasi-inanimate object, seemingly 
devoid of all signs of life: “the limbs were as rigid and as cold as marble.”725 Nevertheless, the 
narrator is able to maintain that his “general appearance was certainly not that of death,” based on 
two observable signs: Valdemar’s barely perceptible breath—“scarcely noticeable, unless through 
the application of a mirror to the lips”—and surprisingly enduring capacity for verbal speech.726 
Indeed, when asked if he is “asleep, ”a term whose ambiguity increases as the story unfolds, 
Valdemar responds: “Yes; —asleep now. Do not wake me! —let me die so!”; then “No pain —I 
am dying”; “Yes; still asleep dying.”727  
By allowing logos—in Valdemar’s mind and speech—to remain operative beyond organic 
degradation, Poe’s representation of mesmeric sleep begins to bridge the gap between two states: 
mesmeric trance on the one hand, and lucid-death on the other.728 In Valdemar’s utterance, the 
absence of punctuation to separate the terms ‘asleep’ and ‘dying’ reinforces the impression of a 
transition from the former to the latter, both of which are temporally blended together in the 
participle “dying,” which extends the duration of the state of suspension. 
This gradual transition is suddenly precipitated and interrupted when Valdemar appears to 
have crossed the border between life (dying) and death (being dead). First of all, a series of 
physiological changes takes place: “The eyes rolled themselves slowly open, the pupils 
disappearing upwardly; the skin generally assumed a cadaverous hue, resembling not so much 
parchment as white paper; and the circular hectic spots which, hitherto, had been strongly defined 
in the centre of each cheek, went out at once.”729 All signs of life are drained out of the body, 
removing the color and fullness from its description, emptying it out.730 Then, the grotesque sign 
of death emerges from the very space-orifice from which life previously emanated: “the mouth 
 
724 “I requested the gentlemen present to examine M. Valdemar’s condition. After a few experiments, they admitted 
him to be an unusually perfect state of mesmeric trance.” Ibid., 94. 
725 Ibid., 95. 
726 Ibid. 
727 Ibid. 
728 These equally “unnatural” states—the former being artificially induced and the latter “impossible” or 
“inaccessible” to ordinary human consciousness—are juxtaposed yet distinct, and would remain disconnected without 
the connection provided by the magnetic induction. 
729 Ibid., 95. 
730 Descriptive language itself is also emptied out, as the only remaining lexical field is one of disappearance and 
morbid pallor (“disappearing,” “white paper,” “went out”). 
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widely extended, and disclosing in full view the swollen and blackened tongue.”731 The tongue 
acting simultaneously as the sign of corporeal death and the instrument of language, its decay and 
corruption suggested by the participle ‘blackened’ is both physiological and discursive. As we 
shall see, this decay spreads to the narrative voice itself as the tale draws to an end, and approaches 
Valdemar’s impossible utterance. Indeed, as Adam Frank has shown, the agency of “expression or 
writing itself” is transferred “from the mesmerist to Valdemar's tongue” itself, as the narrator 
becomes increasingly incapable of producing adequate descriptions of the impossible situation.732 
The sudden interruption caused by Valdemar’s apparent physical death inserts a second 
kind of suspension into the story, creating a pause in the temporality of the narrative, during which 
the narrator is led to take a step back and comment on his own story. This metanarrative insertion 
points toward—and thus influences—possible reactions from the reader, reverting to the discourse 
of skepticism: “I now feel that I have reached a point of this narrative at which every reader will 
be startled into positive disbelief.” It is my business, however, simply to proceed.”733 By referring 
back to the opening of the story, this metanarrative gesture creates a looping motion, with which 
incredulity is folded back onto the text’s own sense of authority, based on narrative duty (“my 
business”).734 Here, as the operator would with the subject, the narrative voice proposes an implicit 
contract, in which the progression of the story is contingent on the acknowledgment of the 
extraordinary nature of the “reality” that it describes, on a suspension of disbelief that opens up 
the natural to what was previously deemed impossible. 
In the final scene, the idea that language can be rendered “unambiguous” and offer a full 
description and “single univocal interpretation” of the situation is dismissed by the text itself.735 
In this scene, the fragmentation of Valdemar’s body—which no longer belongs to an individual—
is pushed to its extreme, its separate parts seemingly acting out of their own accord.736 The 
description of his voice fails to grasp it as a whole, and can only seize parts of it.737 Repeatedly 
 
731 Ibid., 95. 
732 Adam Frank, “Valdemar's Tongue, Poe's Telegraphy” ELH 72, no. 3 (Fall, 2005): 654. 
733 “A strong vibratory motion was observable in the tongue,” “there issued from the distended and motionless jaws a 
voice” Poe, Ibid., 95. 
734 Significantly, it is highly similar to the hypnotic technique of fractionation described in Chapter 3, with which the 
hypnotist creates distance or temporarily “awakens” the subject, in order to then reimmerse them more fully into their 
imaginary experience.  
735 Diemert, “Recomposing ‘Valdemar’,”428. 
736 Poe, Ibid., 95. 
737 “Here issued from the distended and motionless jaws a voice—such as it would be madness in me to attempt 
describing. There are, indeed, two or three epithets which might be considered as applicable to it in part; I might say, 
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invoking the indescribable and ineffable dimension of the scene, the narrative voice both 
acknowledges its own impotence and notes the inability of language to describe a phenomenon 
which escapes both the domain of the natural and the conceptual categories available to describe 
it. Therefore, in parallel to the destruction of Valdemar’s body, the story seems to stage “the 
disintegration of P--'s writing in shuttling between the figurative and the inexpressible.”738 This 
general impossibility is reinforced in Valdemar’s words by the juxtaposition of the positive and 
negative, then the repetition of “now,” before the impossible utterance is pronounced at last : 
“Yes;—no;—I have been sleeping—and now—now—I am dead.”739  
In the face of the “unutterable, shuddering horror which these few words, thus uttered, were 
so well calculated to convey,” Mr. L, the medical student, faints—this time ironically suggesting 
the fragility of medical authority in the face of the unexplained—while others “bus[y] 
[them]selves, silently—without the utterance of a word.”740 The absence of speech (“silently”) and 
of consciousness (“fainted”) thus serve to frame and reinforce the impossible, contradictory 
dimension of the unutterable utterance which has just occurred. 
 
Impossible Utterances, Impossible Endings. 
Indeed, as Roland Barthes puts it, in uttering the impossible, “I am dead,” Valdemar’s 
words invent an “unheard of category: the ‘true-false’, the ‘yes-no’ the ‘death-life’.”741 For 
Barthes, in Valdemar’s utterance, “language serves no purpose … it is nothing but itself,” 
affirming an essence that is not in its place.”742  
Furthermore, as Diemert argues, the paradoxical utterance also establishes Valdemar—or 
rather, one might add, his magnetic state—as “a cypher for the text itself.”743 Indeed, as the site of 
suspension between life and death, Valdemar’s magnetic sleep can also be taken to correspond to 
the space of writing itself, as what Peter Brooks describes as the “dilatory space’ of postponement 
 
for example, that the sound was harsh, and broken and hollow; but the hideous whole is indescribable, for the simple 
reason that no similar sounds have ever jarred upon the ear of humanity.” Poe, Ibid., 95. 
738 Frank, 654. 
739 Poe, 95.  
740 Ibid., 95. 
741 Barthes, “Textual Analysis of Poe’s ‘Valdemar’,” in Untying the Text: A Post-Structuralist Reader, ed. R. Young 
(Boston: Routledge, 1981), 154. 
742 Ibid., 153. Indeed, Valdemar’s words “fully exposes the gap between the signified and the signifier, and between 
the event and the narration of the event, since the self-cancelling nature of the utterance evades lexical certainty. 
Diemert, 429. 
743 Ibid.,  429. 
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and error ... wherein narrative perpetuates itself ... while always moving towards its end.”744 Not 
only does this description apply to Poe’s tale, which is structured on the principle of extending its 
own narrative suspension, but according to Diemert, insofar as “suspense occurs at all levels of 
the narrative’s discourse,” it might also apply to all narratives.745  
Nevertheless, just as the narrative must come to a close, so must the unnatural mesmeric 
suspension, if the experiment is to reach a conclusion. At this stage, Valdemar has been maintained 
in the state of mesmeric sleep, his death suspended, for seven months.746 Although his body is 
reduced to a corpse, his “soul” still appears to be alive. However, as the doctors conclude, “death 
(or what is usually termed death) had been arrested by the mesmeric process, and awakening 
Valdemar from trance would imply putting him to “sleep” for good.747 Exiting one—artificial—
form of sleep would imply entering another—natural—final one: “to awaken M. Valdemar would 
be merely to insure his instant, or at least his speedy dissolution.”748  
Therefore, when Valdemar is finally “reliev[ed] from the mesmeric trance, a double 
destruction occurs, this time explosive rather than gradual. First of all, the “usual” or previous 
conditions for speech have been completely disrupted and the whole process occurs “amid 
ejaculations of ‘dead! dead!’ absolutely bursting from the tongue and not from the lips of the 
sufferer.”749 Second, an acceleration of organic decomposition occurs, in which the gruesome 
bodily discharge signifies the process by which the material has finally caught up with the narrative 
ellipsis and the passage of time.”750 The ordinary natural laws of material objects having been 
 
744 Brooks, Reading for the Plot, 96. “The ‘dilatory space’ of narrative, as Barthes calls it-the space of retard, 
postponement, error, and partial revelation-is the place of transformation: where the problems posed to and by 
initiatory desire are worked out and worked through.” Ibid., 92. 
745 Diemert, 430. 
746 “From this period until the close of last week—an interval of nearly seven months—we continued to make daily 
calls at M. Valdemar’s house, accompanied, now and then, by medical and other friends. All this time the sleeper-
waker remained exactly as I have last described him. The nurses’ attentions were continual.” Poe, 95. 
747 Poe, 95. 
748 Ibid., 95. 
749 Ibid., 95, emphasis added. When he is awakened and asked about his “feelings or wishes now?” the semi-dead 
individual begins by verbally manifesting impatient distress: “For God’s sake! — quick! —quick! —put me to sleep—
or, quick!—waken me! —quick! —I say to you that I am dead!”749 Here, the ambiguity of the terms “sleep” and 
“awake”—which have both a ‘natural’ and a ‘mesmeric’ sense, referring either to trance and somnambulism or to 
natural sleep and death—is uncannily, almost ironically reinforced by the accumulation of short segments and staccato 
rhythm of his words, while Valdemar himself is suspended, simultaneously alive and dead, asleep and awake, existing 
“both a presence and an absence.” Poe 95; Diemert, 429. 
750 When he is awakened and asked about his “feelings or wishes now?” the semi-dead individual begins by verbally 
manifesting impatient distress: “For God’s sake! — quick! —quick! —put me to sleep—or, quick!—waken me! —
quick! —I say to you that I am dead!”750 Here, the ambiguity of the terms “sleep” and “awake”—which have both a 
‘natural’ and a ‘mesmeric’ sense, referring either to trance and somnambulism or to natural sleep and death—is 
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violated, the sudden and immediate dissolution of the very subject of the narrative coincides with 
that of his body: “his whole frame at once—within the space of a single minute, or even less, 
shrunk—crumbled—absolutely rotted away beneath my hands.”751  
The final result is merely a trace, a material remnant of what used to be Valdemar, a whole 
now devoid of parts and lacking differentiation: “a nearly liquid mass of loathsome—of detestable 
putridity.”752 Approximation, comparison and vagueness (“nearly”) seem to have completely 
replaced the scientific precision and rigor of the beginning of the story.753 They appear as the only 
rhetorical means available to a narrative voice which has lost all authority, and whose available 
vocabulary and concepts fail to produce a full description or understanding of the situation. 
Whereas the narrator had initially promised to explain the facts in the case of M. Valdemar and 
present the truth of his situation, the final paragraph of the story merely his dissolution: “no further 
explanation is forthcoming.”754  
 
     *** 
 
As we have seen in these three stories, although Poe’s literary representations of 
Mesmerism “attempt to achieve the sensational without deliberately attempting to mislead,” they 
also uses the medical phenomenon of magnetism to produce a literalized, fictional, poetic-
philosophical exploration of the limits of the human finitude.755 In this sense, like Balzac’s, they 
are “fictional, if not impossible extensions of contemporary mesmeric theory.”756  
As it momentarily—and experimentally—suspends the usual distinctions between states 
and concepts, mesmeric sleep serves as a rhetorical tool, a “scientific guarantee” and an 
imaginative framework from within which the relations between life and death, body and matter 
 
uncannily, almost ironically reinforced by the accumulation of short segments and staccato rhythm of his words, while 
Valdemar himself is suspended, simultaneously alive and dead, asleep and awake, existing “both a presence and an 
absence.” Poe 95; Diemert, 429. 
751 Poe, 96. 
752 Ibid., 96. The decayed organic matter seems to concentrate or serve as a substrate for mankind’s general repulsion 
in the face of death. 
753 Here the qualifiers “loathsome” and “detestable” convey more information about the possible attitudes to be 
adopted towards the object or phenomenon than about its nature, texture or composition.  
754 Diemert, 429. As Adam Frank argues, with this brutal ending, the temporal collapse and that of Valdemar's “frame” 
are both “mapped onto the collapse of the frame of the tale” itself. See Frank, “Valdemar's Tongue,” 655. 
755 Lind, 1094, 
756 Ibid., emphasis added. 
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can be explored, to their “horrid” extremes. It concretizes an impossible thought experiment that 
allows to live through death, to make the unconscious conscious, the ineffable describable, to turn 
absence into presence, to make the impossible to momentarily possible. Like fiction, it requires 
the temporary adhesion of the subject. In this sense, it also serves to extend the scope of narrative 
possibilities, and stretches the limits of medical, literary and linguistic discourse, as in Balzac’s 
Ursule Mirouët.  
As Falk has observed, because they are still based on early nineteenth-century magnetic 
models—as opposed to the mid-century psychological definitions of hypnotism emerging in the 
medical field—Poe’s tales on mesmerism emphasize its “physical, cosmic properties,” rather than 
its “psychological, interpersonal ones.”757 In particular, they underline its—imaginary—“power to 
suspend animation,” taking seriously and literalizing the idea that the mesmerized subject is both 
unconscious and mentally active.758 Fifty years before its Freudian invention, the possibility of a 
psychical unconscious is here thinkable only from within a spiritualist paradigm, in terms of a 
“soul” surviving corporeal death, with suspension serving as the most adequate concept to 
reconcile the idea of the mental with that of an absence of consciousness.  
As we shall see in the next section, whereas in the writing of Balzac magnetism served to 
strengthen the “scientific” dimension of spiritualism, and in that of Poe, to push the limits of the 
scientifically knowable to their breaking point, later in the century, in Flaubert’s Bouvard et 
Pécuchet it is used to point out the limitations of scientific and philosophical knowledge itself, 
both material and spiritual.  
 
2.1.3. Skepticism and Parody: Flaubert’s Bouvard et Pécuchet 
 
As the second half of the century progressed, the earlier enthusiastic conceptions of 
magnetism—whether it be the belief in the existence of an imponderable fluid permeating nature, 
or in the spiritualist and occult dimension evoked in the works of Balzac or Poe—were revised. 
After the 1840s, as magnetism was increasingly dematerialized, reframed and renamed as 
 
757 Falk, 537. In Poe’s magnetic model, because of the existence of the magnetic fluid, there is not the action of a will 
upon another (as in Lind’s interpretation) but rather the union of two wills” which “release the power of animal 
magnetism to perform its organizing function”; and in this rapport, the magnetist “is only a stagehand—a combination 
of light-man and prompter… he did not write the script” (Falk. 546). In this sense, magnetism implies a horizontal 
fluidic circulation rather than the vertical domination of an individual will over another. 
758 Ibid., 543. 
 164 
“hypnotism,” its effects were attributed—as they already were by the 1784 commission—to the 
imagination and mental faculties of the subject. Although this evolution from magnetism to 
hypnotism occurred more slowly in the literary domain than in the medical field, the increase in 
circulation between literary and scientific discourse toward the end of the century led to renewed, 
more psychological, conceptions of hypnotism in fin-de-siècle literary fiction.  
However, as I will show in this section, in the 1870s it was already was starkly apparent in 
the work of Gustave Flaubert, whose parodic treatment of magnetism in Bouvard et Pécuchet 
captures the transition from magnetism to hypnotism by sketching out a parallel trajectory, from 
enthusiasm to skepticism.759  
Indeed, because it challenges post-Enlightenment medical and scientific discourse, and as 
Alain Corbin writes, “reconsiders the ancient duality of the body and the soul,” magnetism is an 
ideal object for Flaubert’s parodic exposition of the limits of scientific and popular knowledge.760 
As we have argued up until here, this is due in great part to the fundamental undecidability at the 
heart of the magnetic-hypnotic object, to the opposition between its seemingly undeniable effects 
and its unexplainable causes. In a letter to Louise Collet, Flaubert even expresses his “irritation” 
toward magnetism, calling it one of the “unresolvable” notions which “whether one speaks well 
or ill of them” cause irritation.761 However, Flaubert’s exasperation here is not directed toward 
magnetism per se, but rather toward “all forms of dogmatism,” especially those that attempt to 
produce a final explanation of a given phenomenon. Indeed, as Juliette Azoulai has noted, Flaubert 
wrote that “materialism and spiritualism are equally impertinent,” and that the material and 
spiritual—as in nervous diseases for example—are “indissoluble.”762 In this sense, as we shall see, 
the Flaubertian criticism of magnetism is first and foremost a criticism of the dogmatic dimension 
of all monisms, whether materialist or spiritualist. The parodic treatment of mesmerism is a means 
 
759 Gustave Flaubert, Bouvard and Pécuchet: A Tragi-Comic Novel of Bourgeois Life, trans. A. J. Krailsheimer 
(London: Penguin, 1978). Left unfinished in 1870—the year of Flaubert’s death—the text was published 
posthumously in 1881. The text as a whole is constructed on the fundamental controversy between Bouvard’s 
materialism (who believes neither in the existence nor in the causality of a transcendent God) and Pécuchet’s 
spiritualism (who believes in the immortality of the soul, in God, in final causes, and the prominence of spirit over 
matter). 
760 Alain Corbin, “Le XIXème siècle ou la nécessité de l'assemblage,” in L'Invention du XIXème siècle (Klincksieck: 
Presses de la Sorbonne nouvelle, 1999), 159. 
761 In this letter, Flaubert writes that like any idea, such irritating topics “must not be taken by one end but in the 
middle” (“Il ne faut pas sans doute prendre une idée par un bout, mais par son milieu”), because “most of the time, 
concluding seems to [him] an act of stupidity” (“La conclusion, la plupart du temps, me semble acte de bêtise”). 
Flaubert, Letter to Louise Colet, 31 mars 1853, in Correspondance II, 295. 
762 Juliette Azoulai, L’Âme et le corps chez Flaubert. Une ontologie simple (Paris: Classiques Garnier, 2014), 19. 
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to carry out this broader critique of monism’s consistent failure to grasp the richness and 
complexity of the “facts” that it wishes to explain, and exhaust.  
Furthermore, as I will argue, by representing magnetism on the parodic mode in Chapter 
VIII of Bouvard et Pécuchet, Flaubert is implicitly making a case for hypnotism, which appears 
as an alternative model to explain the phenomena that the main characters grapple with. In 
Flaubert’s text, the hypnotic model thus inserts itself in the gap between the characters’ naive 
fluidist beliefs and the ironic distance of the narrative voice—a gap which is also temporal and 
separates the narrative perspective of the 1870s from that of the characters in the 1850s. Indeed, 
Flaubert’s text both exposes and participates in the debate between “psychofluidist” and 
“imaginationist” explanations of hypnosis, providing ironic criticism of mid-century naiveté from 
the perspective of the latter half of the century, through the distance between the text and the 
various discourses which it confronts, revealing their internal contradictions and limitations.  
As Florence Vatan has shown, in Bouvard et Pécuchet, the thirst for knowledge is both a 
motor and a structuring principle of the narrative, while simultaneously being the object of a 
constant mise en abyme. With Flaubert’s text, “literature is born out of an intimate and conflictual 
relation to the forms of knowledge which it incorporates and subverts.”763 As a thematic object, 
magnetism thus helps demonstrate how the discourses and objects which remained unquestioned 
in the first half of the century, gradually underwent the scrutiny—especially with the experimental 
medicine of Claude Bernard and positivism of Auguste Comte—of an increasingly critical 
discourse, announcing the emergence of the golden age of experimental hypnosis fifteen years 
later in Paris. 
In this way, hypnosis is put in the service of the Flaubertian process, where, as Jacques 
Neefs has shown, contradictory or competing models are confronted, “so that their immediate or 
fundamental problematic dimension can emerge.”764 
 
2.1.3.1.  The Parodic-Skeptical Treatment of Magnetism  
 
 
763 Florence Vatan, “Du désir de savoir à l'art de (faire) rêver,” Revue Flaubert n° 4 (2004): 1. 
764 “Flaubert prend le parti de faire se rencontrer les contradictions ou les versions concurrentes pour en faire remonter 
les fonds problématiques immédiats, ou fondamentaux.” Jacques Neefs, “Paroles en l’air, l’espace des dialogues dans 
Bouvard et Pécuchet.” Revue Flaubert 13 (2013): 5. 
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Although the magnetotrope was operative in Flaubert’s earlier work, it mainly served as a 
metaphor to describe the phenomena of erotic attraction and crowd psychology.765 According to 
Kayoko Kashiwagi, Flaubert’s interest for magnetism per se “developed while he was writing 
Bouvard et Pécuchet.766 In fact, as Vatan has argued, Flaubert’s interest in the phenomenon of 
suggestion is linked to the very project of Bouvard et Pécuchet (where “both characters evolve, so 
to speak, in a state of chronic suggestion”) and to “its reflection on the multiple forms of social 
mimesis, including the circulation of idées reçues (received ideas).”767As is well known, in 
Flaubert’s tragic-comic encyclopedia, numerous forms of spiritualist and occultist beliefs, 
conceptions, and practices are presented, which all undergo the attacks of the ironic, skeptical 
narrative voice. Chapter VIII, titled “New Diversions,” takes magnetism as its central object, and 
uses it to cast skeptical doubt on both materialist and spiritualist paradigms. In Flaubert’s text, the 
parodic representations of magnetism are pitted against the medical authority of the Dr. 
Vaucorbeil—itself an object of parody—who, unlike Bouvard and Pécuchet, is able to explain the 
“true nature” of the object of experimentation: unknowingly, Bouvard and Pécuchet are practicing 
hypnotism, not magnetism. As I will show in this section, underlying Flaubert’s representation of 
magnetism is his conception of hypnotism and suggestion, against which magnetist practice is 
pitted, in parodic fashion. 
 
The Introduction of Magnetism 
In Chapter VIII of Bouvard et Pécuchet, magnetism appears after Bouvard and Pécuchet 
abandon the—corporeal—practice of gymnastics and discover spiritism.768 Indeed, Bouvard and 
Pécuchet initially take up magnetism to investigate the contradictory explanations of the in-vogue 
 
765 In Madame Bovary for example, magnetism is used to describe the growing desire between Emma and Rodolphe, 
while in L’Éducation Sentimentale, it is briefly used to describe the suggestibility of the crowd during the 1848 
revolutionary upheaval. See for instance: “Rodolphe with Madame Bovary was talking dreams, pressentiments, 
magnetism… From magnetism little by little Rodolphe had come to affinities and …  was explaining to the young 
woman that these irresistible attractions find their cause in one’s previous state of existence.”  Flaubert, Madame 
Bovary, 119-120. See also: “De droite et de gauche, partout, les vainqueurs déchargeaient leurs armes. Frédéric, bien 
qu’il ne fût pas guerrier, sentit bondir son sang gaulois. Le magnétisme des foules enthousiastes l’avait pris,” Flaubert, 
L’Éducation Sentimentale, ed. P. M.  de Biasi (Paris: Librairie Générale Française, 2002), 434-435.  
766 Kayoko Kashiwagi, “Emma Bovary: parfaite hystérique ou ‘poète hystérique’?” In Madame Bovary et les savoirs 
(Paris: Presses Sorbonne Nouvelle, 2009), 218. 
767 Vatan, “Du désir de savoir à l'art de (faire) rêver,” 12. 
768 Flaubert, Bouvard and Peécuchet, 183. 
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phenomenon of tables tournantes (table-turning).769 In the structure of the opening of the text, 
therefore, it is established as a possible “scientific” explanation of occultist practices, at the 
juncture of the material and spiritual. In its initial appearance, two forms of knowledge are 
opposed, which run throughout the chapter: experiential or empirical observation on the one hand, 
and analytic or skeptical knowledge on the other: “Bouvard denied the facts, but nevertheless 
agreed to experiment himself.”770 Indeed, in Flaubert’s text, both forms of knowledge challenge 
one another in a constant oscillation that underlines the limits of orthodox medical discourse. 
Indeed, denying the “facts” of magnetism does not exhaust the fascination which emerges from 
acknowledging its effects.  
After delving into the theory of magnetism, Pécuchet then begins experimenting with 
inducing the somnambulist state. Its induction, however, does not fit the conditions for 
experimental inquiry. It is neither objective nor reproducible and thus challenge preexisting models 
for rationality: “‘All right, put me to sleep,’ said Bouvard. ‘Impossible!’ replied Pécuchet: ‘for 
someone to experience the magnetic action, and to transmit it, faith is indispensable’.”771 As this 
description shows, Flaubert’s text is familiar with the various branches of magnetism described in 
Chapter 1, and seems to adopt the imaginationist and psychofluidist models, which attribute the 
hypnotic state—at least in part—to the faculties and mental activity of the subject.  
However, because the characters are practicing with an instruction manual titled 
Magnetiser’s Guide by the fictional author Montacabère, they still follow the old mesmeric—
fluidist—models that were quickly losing ground after the 1840s. The manual affirms, for instance, 
that although “science has developed since Mesmer,” it is “an important thing to pour out the fluid 
and to make the passes.”772 By mimicking the technical language used before Puységur and 
enumerating the various types of magnetic passes—“ascending or descending, longitudinal, 
 
769 Shocked by Bouvard’s materialist position, the notary invites both men to a séance. In the scene, although most 
characters appear as naive and credulous, conducting faulty reasoning and blaming the table for their failures in 
conjuring the spirits. The guests all seem to come from an earlier time, such as Mlle Laverrière, who is subjected to a 
cruel description which portrays her as “strange” and displaying a hair do from the 1830s. In the end, it is impossible 
to determine whether the experience is successful or a failure, as interpretations are multiplied and the comical 
dimension of the text intensifies (the table fails to move, the guests accuse each other of pushing it, the spirit makes 
rowdy inappropriate jokes and innuendos. Nevertheless, Pécuchet leaves the séance “astonished by the evening.” This 
leads him to the hypothesis that the flow of magnetic current between the participants is what moves the table. Flaubert, 
Bouvard et Pécuchet, 188. 




transversal, with two, three or even five fingers”—the text emphasizes the antiquated dimension 
of the character’s theoretical apparatus.773 If there is to be any magnetic success, it will have to 
occur on a practical level. 
Unfortunately, the first attempt at a therapeutic use of magnetism is a failure and a quasi-
parody of the Balzacian séance with the somnambulist woman. Indeed, the text substitutes natural 
sleep for magnetic sleep in Germaine, the servant who, with “her eyes closed and quite gently she 
began to snore. After they had looked at her for an hour, Pécuchet said in a low voice: ‘What do 
you feel?’ She woke up. Later, no doubt, lucidity would come.”774 Here, the expression “no doubt” 
reinforces the ironic distance between the character’s enthusiasm and the narration’s skeptical 
doubt. After both men have practiced on numerous individuals, Bouvard’s first success occurs 
with the character of La Barbée, a woman displaying various hysterical symptoms. This time, the 
subject displays all the expected signs of hypnotic trance:  
He placed his finger between her eyebrows at the top of her nose: suddenly she became inert. When her arms 
were raised they fell back; her head stayed in whatever position he chose, and her half-closed lids, vibrating 
spasmodically, revealed the eyeballs, rolling slowly; they stayed fixed in the corners, convulsed.775 
 
Following the magnetic theory of Puységur and Deleuze, the patient then displays the signs of 
somnambulism which we described in Chapter 1: clairvoyance, endoscopy, “remedy instinct” (the 
ability to diagnose her own disease and prescribe her own treatment), and is cured from her illness 
after a few sessions. Significantly, the narrator’s skepticism here seems to disappear momentarily, 
as the text remains euphemistically silent as to the causes of the cure, focusing solely on the effect: 
“it was really like a miracle.”776 
Nevertheless, this silence is short lived. Indeed, in the rest of the chapter, while Bouvard 
and Pécuchet try to prove the existence of the fluid, the text constantly reinjects a polemic 
dimension into the question, structuring its movement on the oscillation between argument and 
counterargument. The productive tension created by the opposition between medical discourse and 
empirical facts—or “miraculous” healings—also keeps the text moving forwards, preparing the 
scene for two central parodic examples: that of the magnetized cow and tree. As we shall see, 
under the guise of tackling the problem, raised by Dr. Vaucorbeil’s skepticism, of practicing 
magnetism on non-human subjects, these examples push the parodic treatment of magnetism to its 
 
773 Ibid., 190.  
774 Ibid., 189. 
775 Ibid., 189-190. 
776 Ibid., 190. 
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paroxysm. By inserting ironic distance between the observable, successful effects of magnetism 
and the characters’ fallacious reasoning about its causes, the text acknowledges the—unstable—
therapeutic efficacy of magnetism while vehemently denying the existence of the fluid, which only 
seems to exist in the minds of Bouvard and Pécuchet and their naive subjects.  
 
The Magnetized Cow: a Parody of the Fluidist Model 
 
The apple-trees were in blossom, and the grass in the yard steamed under the rising sun. At the edge of the 
pond, half covered with a cloth, a cow was lowing, shivering with the pails of water that had been thrown 
over it, and so immeasurably swollen that it looked like a hippopotamus. No doubt it had eater some ‘poison’ 
as it grazed in the clover. Old Gouy and his wife were distraught, for the vet would not come, and the 
wheelwright who knew words to use against swelling did not wat to be bothered; but our two gentlemen, 
with their famous library, must have some secret knowledge.777  
 
Although this paragraph opens with a quasi-pastoral description of the landscape, it contains a 
subtly parodic dimension, in the juxtaposition of the “grass” and the participle “steaming,” which 
anticipates the appearance of the cow-dung. The cow’s situation seems somewhat absurd: her 
“lowing” indicates distress, the function of the “cloth” remains unclear, while the temporary 
remedy—throwing pails of water at her—seems highly ineffective. This failure of the “natural” 
fluid ironically anticipates the “success” of the magnetic one.778 Clearly, the farmers have called 
upon Bouvard and Pécuchet as a last resort, owing to the fact the veterinarian and the wheelwright 
are both unavailable. Significantly, it is to the “encyclopedic” knowledge of their “famous library” 
that they owe their reputation; the term “secret” here suggesting that a mysterious form of 
knowledge, inaccessible to both peasants and veterinarians—that is, to empirical knowledge and 
the medical and natural sciences—alike.779 The men’s magnetic demonstration and their comically 
exaggerated gesturing then indicate an adherence to fluidic hypothesis, which is ridiculed by the 
text: 
They rolled up their sleeves and placed themselves one at the horns, the other at the tail, and with great inward 
efforts and frantic gesticulation they spread out their fingers to pour out streams of fluid over the animal, 
while the farmer and his wife, their lad and some neighbors looked on almost in terror. The rumblings that 
could be heard in the cow's belly made their own insides bubble. It broke wind. Then Pécuchet said: ‘That 
opens the door to hope, there is a way out, perhaps.’ The way out worked, hope gushed out in a tub full of 
yellow matter exploding like a bomb. Hearts were eased. The cow’s swelling went down. An hour later, 
 
777 Ibid., 191. 
778 Furthermore, the visual comparison between the cow and hippopotamus is justified by her swelling. Not only does 
this hyperbolic image reinforce the comic dimension, it is also justified by the proximity with the neighboring “pond,” 
as if by a process of fluidic contagion, the water created an association between both animals, suggesting that the 
cow’s body, which is both next to and soaked by water, is also somehow swollen with water. 
779 Ibid., 191. 
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nothing showed. It was not the effect of the imagination, that was certain. So the fluid does contain some 
peculiar property.780   
 
Here, the men’s “great inward efforts” to project the fluid externally mime the cow’s own 
biological expulsion, in a Rabelaisian scatological pun on the term “matter.” The “pouring out” of 
the “streams” further suggests the materiality of the fluid, which is opposed to the inefficiency of 
the pails of water previously thrown onto—rather than projected through—the cow. Here the 
“opening” or is both literal and metaphorical, organic and conceptual, material and immaterial: it 
refers both to the orifice of the animal body and to the solution of the problem (the appearance of 
hope).  
In a description reminiscent of Valdemar’s “nearly liquid mass of liquid putridity,” here 
“hope” is materialized into the “bundle” of yellow “stuff”—the French plural matières 
emphasizing this aspect even further—subverting the question of the material and the spiritual by 
tying it to the grotesque and bodily theme of excretion. When the tension—both physical and 
emotional—recedes, the brief formula “noting showed” ironically recalls the previous observation 
used to describe the curative effects of magnetism, “It was really like a miracle.” 
The expression “that was certain” and the adverb “so” subtly underline the dangers of 
abusive deductions, which transform a relation of coexistence into a relation of causality. In this 
way, the text ironically indicates that the conclusion about the fluid’s “peculiar property” is the 
product of the characters’ fallacious thinking, a hasty deduction about the cause of the 
phenomenon. Indeed, here, only the effects have been objectively acknowledged (“the cow’s 
swelling went down”). In this way the text distances itself from the characters’ credulity.  
The example of the magnetized cow thus serves to undermine the fluidic hypothesis, 
dismissing it as a petitio principii which discards other possible causes and “proves” what the 
characters already believe to be true. 
 
The Magnetized Tree: a Parody of Hypnotic Theatricality  
The scene of the magnetized tree serves to challenge a second “epistemological model,” 
with just as strong a parodic dimension. This episode is presented as a technical improvement, a 
“scientific progress” of the characters:  
Continuing their studies, they gave up mesmeric passes for the system of Puységur, which replaces the 




it. They prepared it by hugging it tightly several times. A bench was set up underneath. Their clients sat there 
in line and they obtained such marvelous results that, to confound Vaucorbeil, they invited him to a session, 
with the local notables.781  
 
As suggested in this passage, the magnetized tree—a practice used both by Mesmer and 
Puységur—functions both as a challenge to medical discourse and a spectacle, a quasi-theatrical 
performance that gathers the leading personages of the locality, not merely as experimental 
subjects, but also as audience.782 Clearly, the subjects of the experiment expect entertainment just 
as much as they expect a cure, both being intertwined in a discipline whose curative effects were 
often attributed to its theatrical dimension and to the charisma of the operator. In setting up this 
experimental “stage,” this episode anticipates the spirit of the Charcotian demonstrations in the 
medical amphitheater: rather than place the emphasis on the curative or therapeutic potential of 
hypnosis (which Puységur was strongly attached to, Bouvard and Pécuchet “reduce their patients 
to experimental subjects, even instruments of scientific advertisement.”783 
Nevertheless, as the scene unfolds, the bourgeois guests cannot help but point out the 
appalling condition of the setting to each another, echoing the contempt that stage magnetism 
received as a “lower” form of entertainment, despite its popular appeal.784 Furthermore, the 
absence of spectacular or dramatic effects in Bouvard and Pécuchet’s demonstration causes their 
expectations are to be disappointed. Indeed, the induction of trance through the magnetized tree 
proves to be a failure: “instead of sleeping, had their eyes wide open. ‘So far it is not much fun,’ 
said Foureau.”785 
 
781 Flaubert, Bouvard, 192. Although various objects and elements—such as bread and water—were already 
magnetized in the time of Mesmer, here the text attributes the technique to Puységur, known indeed for curing 
somnambulistic patients around a magnetized tree, a “spectacle” which “ha[d] nothing in common with Mesmer’s 
convulsions.” Atsushi Yamazaki, “L’inscription d’un débat séculaire: le magnétisme dans Bouvard et Pécuchet.” 
Revue Flaubert n° 4 (2004): 13.  
782 This element of spectacle reproduces the historical evolution of magnetism, where “after the rejection of animal 
magnetism by the academic establishment, a popular culture of magnetic demonstrators and healers continued to draw 
large audiences.” Mayer, Sites of the Unconscious. 94. Significantly, the magnetic tree was a central experimental 
component in the establishment of the verdict of the Bailly commission. See Yamazaki, “L'inscription d'un débat 
séculaire,” 16-19. 
783 Yamazaki, Ibid., 15. 
784 “The guests pointed out with a nudge the dusty windows, the stains on the panels, the peeling paint; and the garden 
was lamentable. Dead wood everywhere!” Ibid., 192 A similar process is found in Thomas Mann’s description of 
Cipolla’s shabby stage, except that here, the “dead wood” is also an ironic subversion of the supposedly magnetized, 
living, pear-tree. 
785 Flaubert, Ibid., 192. 
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It is perhaps this pressure to produce a theatrical spectacle that leads Pécuchet to turn to a 
technique that reinforces the parodic dimension of the scene by blending together multiple models: 
Mesmer and Puységur’s paradigms, the magnetic with the electric, and so on. Indeed:  
Pécuchet remembered an excellent method of magnetization. He put the noses of all the patients into his 
mouth, and inhaled their breath to draw electricity to him, while at the same time Bouvard embraced the tree, 
with the aim of increasing the fluid.786  
 
Surprisingly, despite this exaggerated multiplication of absurd gestures, the scene as a whole 
preserves the ambiguity of the narrative perspective, which does not dismiss Pécuchet’s actions as 
pure charlatanry, but alternates between ironic doubt and observation of facts. For instance, the 
function of the article “the” (the fluid) seems to indicate the existence of a known, identifiable 
entity. Here at last, the patients finally appear to enter the somnambular state: “The mason 
interrupted his hiccoughs; the beadle went quieter; the man with the contraction stopped jerking. 
It was now possible to approach them, put them through all the tests.”787  
Nevertheless, as the Dr. Vaucorbeil conducts the expected tests (such as pricking the skin 
with a lancet to check for anesthesia, testing for clairvoyance, ability to see with the eyes 
blindfolded, etc.) he constantly denies the magnetic effects by opposing rational arguments which 
belong to the later decades rather than the first half of the century. Among these explanations, one 
finds the evocation of unconscious memories, the diagnosis of hysteria and the suspicion of 
cheating: “there’s nothing surprising after all! A hysteric! You can’t expect any sense out of that!”; 
“With a little skill any bandage can be slipped!”; “Come on now, that’s a tall story!”788 By 
introducing the vocabulary and skepticism of the medical discourse of the second half of the 
century, the doctor demonstrates a complete lack of “faith” in magnetism. Significantly, this is the 
very same faith which was defined as necessary to its success by Pécuchet in the beginning of the 
chapter.  
In a passage reminiscent of Balzac’s Ursule Mirouët, an experiment is thus set up to 
establish the veracity of La Barbée’s clairvoyant powers: “These denials by the doctor revolted 
Pécuchet. He was bold enough to claim that La Barbée could describe what was going on in his 
own house at the moment.”789 However, unlike the shock and religious conversion which occur in 
 
786 Ibid., 193. 
787 Ibid. 
788 Ibid., 193-94. 
789 When the Doctor Vaucorbeil asks: “What is my wife doing?” La Barbée replies “She is sewing ribbons on a straw 
hat!” Ibid., 194. 
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the Balzacian text, here, when Vaucorbeil receives a letter confirming the accuracy of the 
information provided by La Barbée, the doctor dismisses it: “A coincidence, upon my word! That 
proves nothing.”790 Although Bouvard and Pécuchet receive a second confirmation of the success 
of their therapeutic endeavors after the doctor’s departure,791 the narrative perspective sides with 
the medical perspective and leans towards skepticism rather than enthusiasm: “Bouvard and 
Pécuchet, all in all, had not succeeded.”792  
However, rather than produce a definitive conclusion, the text reinserts a layer of doubt 
and keeps the polemic going. Indeed, first of all, rather than acknowledge the nonexistence of the 
fluid, several attempts to explain Bouvard and Pécuchet’s failure are enumerated. Clearly, the 
narrative perspective distances itself from this ultimate attempt, which searches for causes (here, 
of failure) in the wrong place: “Was it due to the temperature, or the smell of tobacco, or Abbé 
Jeufroy's umbrella, which had copper trimmings, a metal inimical to the emission of the fluid?”793  
Secondly, the authority of the medical Doctor’s skeptical discourse in undermined in 
several ways. For instance, it is attacked—on a social and political, rather than theoretical level—
by Alexandre Petit, the new schoolmaster: “Petit, the progressive, had found the doctor's 
explanation prosaic, bourgeois. Science is a monopoly in the hands of the rich. It excludes the 
people. … Truth should be obtained through the heart, and, declaring himself to be spiritist, he 
indicated several works, no doubt defective, but which were signs of a new dawn.”794 Despite the 
ironic gaze cast upon this ultimate objection, the passage on magnetism ends at is began: with the 
temporary “victory” of spiritualism.795 In this way, Flaubert’s parodic treatment of magnetism 
maintains an ironic uncertainty throughout, an ambiguity that casts doubt upon all forms of 
knowledge: the heroes’ conception of magnetism, medical discourse, as well as spiritualist and 
materialist monism in general. Flaubertian irony ultimately applies to all forms of reductive or 
dogmatic discourse by pointing out their contradictory aspects and inherent limitations. 
 
 
790 Ibid., 195. 
791 “Marcel shot out of the orchard, his chinstrap undone: "Cured! Cured! Kind sirs!” Ibid. 
792 Ibid., 194. 
793 Ibid. 
794 Ibid., 196 
795 Nevertheless, this “victory” should not be attributed to the narrator having sided with one camp or another.  Rather, 
it serves a structural function and allows the text to move to the section centered on philosophy. 
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2.1.3.2.  From Magnetism to Hypnotism: Flaubertian Dematerialization.  
 
In Flaubert’s text, although this ambiguity also affects the medical discourse and its 
dubitative indignation. Indeed, Dr. Vaucorbeil’s perspective serves a dual, quasi-contradictory 
function in the text. On the one hand, it is used to ironically mock the rigidity of orthodox medicine, 
while on the other, it grants it the—serious—role of dismissing magnetism in favor of the hypnotic 
paradigm. 
On the one hand, unlike that of Larivière in Madame Bovary, Vaucorbeil is often ridiculed 
by the narrative perspective, his discourse is not spared by the ironic distance of the text. Indeed, 
despite the authority of his position, Vaucorbeil often displays signs of obtuse ignorance and 
remains deaf to the intelligence of the questions that emerge from the episode on magnetism. 
Rather than engage in the reflection prompted by the text, he is frequently found condemning the 
characters’ experiments altogether, without considering their value. He is repeatedly found 
blushing and unable to provide thorough explanations of the phenomena at hand. Furthermore, in 
several occasions, the text suggests that the Doctor’s hostility towards magnetism is not due to 
scientific but to pecuniary, financial reasons, as Bouvard and Pécuchet’s success begins to impede 
upon Vaucorbeil’s own clientele.796   
On the other hand, despite Flaubert’s “ironic, critical and subversive” relation to medical 
knowledge, Vaucorbeil also becomes the spokesman for the scientific discourse of the second half 
of the century, revealing his imaginationist conception of hypnosis at the end of the section on 
magnetism.797 In doing so, he reveals knowledge that Bouvard and Pécuchet do not have access 
to.798 Vaucorbeil’s dismissal of mesmerism is caused by a dissatisfaction with the empirical 
“proof” that has been hitherto gathered, and the antiquated dimension of the fluidic model (“But 
prove it, show it, this fluid of yours! Besides, fluids are out of date. Listen to me”).799 Despite the 
criticism, mockery and ironic assaults of the Flaubertian narrator, his discourse is more historically 
 
796 “’What! you again?’ he cried, furious at finding them again with his patients ... Then he fulminates against 
magnetism, a lot of conjuring tricks, whose effects derive from the imagination.’” Flaubert, 190. 
797 Florence Vatan, “Emma Bovary: ‘poète hystérique’ ou parfaite hystérique?” in Madame Bovary et les savoirs. 
Edited by P. L. Rey and G. Séginger (Paris: Presses de la Sorbonne Nouvelle, 2009), 229. 
798 As Yamazaki has shown, “the importance granted to the imagination” in Vaucorbeil’s model implies “the denial 
of the existence of a fluid but also of the part played by the will of the magnetist in the appearance of somnambulism. 
Yamazaki, 14. On the other hand, Indeed, at the end of their experiments on magnetism, Bouvard and Pécuchet remain 
attached to their fluidist model: “Personally, I admit a fluid,” replied Bouvard. “Neuro-siderial,” added Pécuchet.” 
Flaubert, 195. 
799 Flaubert, Ibid., 195. 
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accurate than the two heroes’ older Mesmeric conception and participates in the 
“dematerialization” of the phenomenon.800  
Indeed, just as earlier in the century, Balzac presented magnetism via the materialist-
medical paradigm, here it is via Dr. Vaucorbeil’s discourse that Flaubert’s text introduces the 
hypnotic model and the concept suggestion, characteristic of the terminology used in the second 
half of the century.  
For instance, once both companions have resumed their travels, a brief mention of Pécuchet 
falling into a strange state allows hypnotic trance to serve as an explanation for the unexplained:  
Pécuchet, however, was slowing down. His mouth fell open, his eyeballs became convulsed. Bouvard spoke 
to him, shook him by the shoulders: he did not stir and remained inert, exactly like Barbée. … The next day 
Pécuchet sat down beside a ditch; and as he dreamed … he fixed his gaze on the peak of his cap; he fell into 
the same trance as the day before. … The crisis was about to finish when the doctor arrived. … Vaucorbeil 
watched him, then with a flick of his fingers knocked the cap off. Pécuchet recovered his faculties. ‘I thought 
as much,’ said the doctor. ‘That shiny peak hypnotized you like a mirror, and the phenomenon is by no means 
rare with people who look too closely at a bright object!801 
 
Here, the opposition between Pécuchet’s spiritualist concerns and the “scientific,” Braidian, 
concept of fixation reveals the gap between the protagonists’ world-views.802 With the intervention 
of the medical discourse, the rationalist invocation of the hypnotic induction—which, as we saw 
in Braid’s model, is caused by focusing the gaze on a shiny object—illuminates Pécuchet’s state 
and cuts through both spiritualist and fluidist explanations.803  
In his explanation of somnambulism as the product of hypnotic suggestion, the doctor also 
emphasizes the psychological and affective—rather than physiological and purely material—
dimension of the phenomena explored in Chapter VIII:  
If you say to a child: 'I am a wolf; I am going to eat you,' he imagines you are a wolf, and he is afraid; so that 
is a dream controlled by words. In the same way a somnambulist will accept any fantasy you like. … This is 
how crimes are suggested and virtuous people may see themselves as wild beasts and become cannibals.’ 




800 Mayer, Sites of the Unconscious, 75. 
801 Flaubert, Ibid., 202. 
802 Indeed, Pécuchet is holding “his head high, trying to hear the spirit voices though his aromal proboscis [i.e. his 
astral body].” Ibid. 
803 Vaucorbeil also demonstrates his knowledge of zoohypnotism, “point[ing] out how to conduct the experiment on 
hens,” thus retrospectively dismissing the theoretical postulates behind Bouvard and Pécuchet’s attempts to magnetize 
the cow at the beginning of the chapter. Ibid., 202.  
804 Ibid., 195. 
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In this passage, the “child” and the hypnotic subject seem to be placed on the same level and 
undergo equal degrees of infantilization by the authority of the medical discourse. Storytelling and 
hypnosis are also brought together as manifestations of the suggestive and performative dimension 
of language, the power of words to “conjure up visions.” In his notes, Flaubert himself mentions 
the ubiquity of suggestion, anticipating the Bernheimian conception of the end of the century: “But 
who is to say that everything, in human life, isn’t suggested, by somebody or some thing? How 
can one be sure of the contrary? What is true?”805  
Echoing the anxieties of the time and anticipating those of the fin-de-siècle, Vaucorbeil 
therefore condemns hypnotism for its supposed moral dangers, citing the case of “hypnotic crimes” 
to denounce the purportedly animalistic and “primitive” states it might lead to. In such 
discourses—which were also found in nineteenth century theories of crowd psychology—
hypnotism is no longer the ally but the enemy of culture and scientific progress. 
As we saw in this section, by inserting ironic distance between the medical discourse on 
hypnotism and the characters’ discourse on magnetism, the text therefore reveals the temporal 
distance which separated both of the paradigms which it encompasses. Furthermore, it emphasizes 
the difficulties faced by medical practitioners who strived to dissociate their field from the older 
magnetic model, well into the second half of the century. As we will see in the next section, 
although these “magnetic” connotations were still attached to the practice in literary texts of the 
end of the century, this time, the ambiguity was purposefully used by authors of literary fiction to 
radicalize the sensationalist and fascinating dimension of hypnotism. 
 
2.2. Fin-de-siècle Fear and Fascination 
 
As we saw in Chapter 1, in the medical field, hypnosis “struggle[ed] to detach itself from 
a superstitious past” from the 1840s onwards.806 By the 1880s, most practitioners considered, as 
Bernheim himself noted, that “magnetism is dead together with alchemy, and hypnotic suggestion 
is born of magnetism as chemistry is born of alchemy.”807 Nevertheless, well into the second half 
of the century, medical hypnotists still had to distinguish their practice from those of the stage 
 
805 Flaubert, quoted in Yamazaki, 31. 
806 Atia Sattar, “Certain Madness: Guy de Maupassant and Hypnotism.” Configurations 19, no. 2 (Spring 2011): 219. 
807 Bernheim, Suggestive Therapeutics, 106.  
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magnetizers, with which they continued to be associated in the mind of the public, as well as from 
the variety of occult parapsychological practices that thrived at the end of the century.808 
As we will see in the second half of this chapter, fin-de-siècle conceptions of hypnotism 
emerged from the frequent crossing, by novelists and scientists alike, of the boundaries between 
literary and scientific discourses during the last two decades of the century, during which “many 
physicians publish[ed] in both genres, while some novelists participated in hypnotism experiments 
on a similar footing to medical students.”809  
Rather than examine fictional texts which directly reproduce the medical discourse of their 
time, however—one might call these the hypnotic roman à idées—this section focuses on a 
comparison between Maupassant, Conan Doyle and Du Maurier’s fictional representations of 
hypnotism. Focusing on these authors—rather than on the medical novels of the time—will 
illuminate the ways in which fictional representations of hypnotism, rather than merely illustrate 
it, reworked medical discourse and blended it with popular conceptions, producing depictions of 
hypnotism whose implications reach beyond the boundaries of the medical field.  
Indeed, despite their differences, the literary representations of hypnotism found in the 
prose texts of these authors are centered on a profound uneasiness, a mix of fear and fascination, 
in which the fascination for the possibilities opened up by hypnotism as a new medical and 
experimental object of science, and the anxieties stemming from this knowledge, coexist. As I will 
show, the anxieties about hypnotism then serve to represent the broader, underlying anxieties that 
permeate late Victorian society. Indeed, this uneasy discourse—of which the worrying descriptions 
of hypnosis should be considered as a symptom rather than a cause—is strategically used by all 
three authors, as a narrative tool to process and portray the rapid changes occurring in late 
nineteenth-century society, as the burgeoning science of psychology, the rise of capitalism and 
mass culture led to widespread—and often unconscious—fears of the Other, who suddenly 
threatens to intrude and penetrate into the very heart of modern subjectivity. In the three fin-de-
 
808 As Michael Finn observes, the fin-de-siècle fascination for the occult held both French and British society “riveted 
by articles, editorials, novels, stories, medical case studies, and personal testimonials about possession and mind 
control … on the one hand, and of the channeling powers of ‘possessed’ mediums, on the other. Finn, 91.  
809 Kim Hajek, “‘Je lis ça comme je lirais un roman’: Reading Scientific Works on Hypnotism in Late Nineteenth-
century France.” Australian Journal for French Studies 53, no. 3 (2016): 233. As Mark Micale has noted, for example, 
at the end of the century, physicians “were as influenced by cultural representations and popular stereotypes as 
novelists and artists were about the findings of medical science.” Micale, The Mind of Modernism, 5. Prominent 
journalists such as Jules Clarétie wrote columns about the subjects of the Salpêtrière and novels like Les Amours d’un 
interne (1881) and Jean Mornas, (1885), centered on themes of post-hypnotic suggestion and hypnotic crime.  
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siècle depictions that follow, hypnotism thus becomes the metaphorical equivalent of the complete 
(dis)possession of the subject.  
 
2.2.1. Anxieties of (Dis)possession: Maupassant’s Le Horla 
 
Le Horla offers a first-person description of the main character’s gradual (dis)possession, 
caused by an invisible, foreign and seemingly supernatural Other, whose material existence is 
neither fully established, nor denied in the text.810  
Maupassant was attuned to the numerous apparently paranormal phenomena that flooded 
France in the 1880s, including “experiments in telepathy, apparent mind control via hypnotism 
and the powers of suggestion publicized by the Nancy school of hysteria studies.”811 As Vincent 
Kaufmann has observed, Maupassant’s treatment of hypnosis in Le Horla is a “radical reversal” 
of the Balzacian perspective in Ursule Mirouët, stripping all religious dimension from the 
phenomenon.812 Having rid the mesmeric object from its religious connotations, Maupassant—
who attended Charcot’s demonstrations and appreciated the work of the stage magnetists—
nevertheless still relied heavily on the occult as he reworked the fascination and fears surrounding 
hypnosis in the 1870s and 1880s, using it as a literary means to explore a fundamental split at the 
heart of the human psyche.813 As we will see in what follows, this split is thematized through the 
“discord and concord between the supernatural and the scientific,” still found in the discourse on 
hypnotism at the time.814 While on the one hand it incorporates the scientific vocabulary of Charcot 
and Bernheim, Maupassant’s representations of hypnosis in Le Horla are also deeply intertwined 
 
810 Maupassant, The Horla. 1887, trans. C. Mandell (Hoboken, N.J.: Melville House Publishing, 2005). The mere 
attempt to describe the plot of the Horla already involves making an interpretative choice about the Horla’s existence 
and the (un)reliability of the narrator. For example, Sattar describes it as “the story of a man unhinged by what he 
believes to be a hypnotic agency,” while Liz Trueman as the narrator becoming possessed by “an invisible monster.” 
See Atia Sattar, “Certain Madness: Guy de Maupassant and Hypnotism,” 215; Liz Trueman, “Progression/ 
Regression” 6. 
811 Finn, Figures of the Prefreudian Unconscious, 97. 
812 “Balzac’s medico-religious synthesis is replaced by a paradoxical medico-parapsychological, anti-religious 
synthesis.” Vincent Kaufmann, “Le magnétisme sans le médico-religieux (Maupassant)” in Ménage à trois. 
Littérature, médecine, religion (Villeneuve d'Ascq: Presses Universitaires du Septentrion, 2007), 149; 154.   
813 In his 1882 story “Magnétisme,” the model is still linked to the occult connotations surrounding the practice, such 
as premonitions in dreams. In the text, Charcot is compared to Poe, having become mad due to excessive study of the 
question of madness itself.  See “Magnetism,” in The Complete Short Stories of Guy de Maupassant, ed. A. Artinian 
(Garden City, NY: Hanover House, 1955). 
814 Trueman argues that the narrator’s theory of the Horla is “a cocktail of proven scientific theory with a strong twist 
of the persistent supernatural.”814 Liz Trueman, “Progression / Regression: Hypnotism and the Superstitious in 
Maupassant's Le Horla.” Romance Notes 58, no. 1 (2018): 6. 
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with the phenomenon of possession, and thus open up the possibility of an occultist interpretation 
in the text. Following Todorov’s famous definition, because of the central “hesitation” on which 
it is constructed, Maupassant’s text belongs to the genre of the fantastic, due to its central 
alternation between undecidable and opposing—natural vs. supernatural—explanations of the 
phenomenon at hand.815 Indeed, as Laurent Dubreuil points out, the stake of the Horla is to 
“mobilize multiple models of possession … as long as they contradict one another, following the 
logic of the fantastic apparition,” and hypnosis is deeply intertwined with this process of 
alternating between explanatory models.816 
As Jean-Louis Cabanès has shown, the dispossession involved in Maupassant’s text comes 
both from without and within.817 One the one hand it is a dissolution caused by an exterior force, 
“the power to alienate a subject’s will, to occupy his psyche, just as in a possession, demonic or 
otherwise”; but on the other, it can come from inside the subject himself, and reveals, as in 
hypnosis, “that the psyche is splitable and that the other unconscious half may rise to 
consciousness, replace it and occupy its space.”818 The Horla and its mysterious presence have 
thus been frequently described as a foreshadowing of the psychoanalytic unconscious, but as an 
“essentially predatory principle, which possesses the ‘ego’ and destroys it: pure alterity.”819 If 
Maupassant’s novella proposes a literary “pretheory” of the unconscious, then, it is conveyed 
through the fictional representation of an essential hauntedness—both textual and psychological—
centered on the intrusion of the Other into the realm of the self-same.820 As Pierre Bayard argues 
 
815 See for instance: “The person who experiences the event must opt for one of two possible solutions: either he is 
the victim of an illusion of the senses of a product of the imagination—and laws of the world then remain what they 
are; or else the event has indeed taken place it is an integral part of reality—but then this reality is controlled by laws 
unknown to us. … The fantastic is that hesitation experienced by a person who knows only the laws of nature, 
confronting an apparently supernatural event.” Tzvetan Todorov, The Fantastic: A Structural Approach to a Literary 
Genre, trans. R. Howard (Cleveland: Press of Case Western Reserve University, 1973), 25. 
816 Dubreuil, 30. As with hypnosis, the explanatory models for the Horla are numerous and contradict each other.  
817 The name “Horla” itself is highly suggestive, phonetically connoting simultaneous internality and externality, with 
the French terms “hors” (outside) and “là” (here). Fundamentally indescribable, the Horla is, as Jack Abecassis notes, 
“a being for whom no synonym exists, and for whom the only analogy available is a deictic oxymoron, there/here”; 
in this sense, it “might be the most honest fictional title in literature.” Jack Abecassis, “On Reading Maupassant's Le 
Horla Problematologically,” Revue Internationale de Philosophie 242, no. 4 (2007): 404. 
818 Cabanès, Le Corps et la maladie dans les récits réalistes (1856-1893), vol. 2. (Paris: Klincksieck, 1991,) 118. In 
The Horla, the gradual (dis)possession of the subject, which culminates in the final expropriation, goes with a constant 
atmosphere ambiguity surrounding the question of the reality of the entity or force responsible for the possession, and 
a gradual shift in the process of attributing causes: from the internal space of the body or the psychological, to the 
external forces of the Horla or the hypnotist, back to the internal space of the human psyche. 
819 Kaufmann, “Le magnétisme sans le médico-religieux,” 149. 
820 For the contention that Maupassant’s text is haunted by the presence of Flaubert and his style, see Yvan Leclerc, 
“Maupassant: le texte hanté,” in Maupassant et l’écriture (Paris: Nathan, 1993). In this sense, if there is a 
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in Maupassant, juste avant Freud, unlike what is seen in Freudian theory, in Maupassant’s 
unconscious, the essential internal split is not between conscious and unconscious but rather, 
between Subject and Other.821 For Bayard, the unconscious in Maupassant’s work is “indécidable” 
in the same sense that the fantastic is undecidable for Todorov: like hypnosis, it constantly eludes 
and escapes all attempts to propose a final and complete explanation of it.  
This is the context in which hypnosis intervenes in Le Horla: as a possible, albeit non-
exhaustive, explanation for the nature and cause of the inexplicable phenomenon of the Horla, and 
the haunting possession that gradually overcomes the narrator’s psyche. As was already the case 
in the literary representations of magnetism discussed at the beginning of the chapter, in Le Horla, 
the medical theory of hypnosis is put both in the service of a naturalization of the supernatural, 
and of the extension of the “natural” beyond its presupposed limits. Hypnosis serves as a means to 
conceptualize the Invisible which haunts the narrator and pushes the alternative between 
materialism and spiritualism, as well as between the natural and occult explanations, to their 
psychological breaking point. Because of the fundamentally undecidable nature of the Horla, 
hypnosis and suggestibility permeate the whole text and serve as a framework in which it can 
appear. 
 By representing it in relation to the occult and as a form of expropriation of the subject, 
Maupassant proposes a profoundly anxious treatment of hypnotism, which also participates in 
perpetuating popular myths and conceptions of the practice as a dangerous (dis)possession of the 
individual. At the same time, Maupassant’s text gives a distinctly psychological dimension to the 
treatment of this very dispossession, and therefore also proposes its own literary conceptualization 
of a hypnotic unconscious, leaving the hypothesis of madness constantly open in the text. 
 
      *** 
 
There are two versions of The Horla, published during the golden age of hypnotism in 
Paris. As we shall see, each version creates “a different framework for understanding the narrator’s 
personal account of the creature Horla”—as well as “his resulting madness.”822  
 
Maupassantian Unconscious, it is a haunted, persecutory and fundamentally undecidable unconscious (like hypnotism 
itself), which manifests itself through the domain of the “psychological fantastic.” 
821 Bayard, 25. 
822 Sattar, 216. 
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The first version of the text was published on October 16, 1886 in the newspaper Gil Blas; 
and republished in the December 9 issue of La Vie populaire. In this first version, which is 
presented as a case history, given orally by the patient to an assembly of medical doctors, the 
presence of hypnotism is somewhat minimal. It is mentioned as “a phenomenon far inferior to the 
truly supernatural” as the narrator declares to the assembly: “Everything you have been doing 
yourselves for the last few years, gentlemen, what you call hypnotism, suggestion, magnetism—it 
is he [the Horla] that you are setting the stage for, that you are prophesizing!”823 In this 1886 
version, the supernatural explains the hypnotic, rather than the other way around. The presence of 
the supernatural is not only introduced by also enabled by a narrative which, as Jacques Neefs 
observes, “clings to its introductory framework [the doctor’s discourse] as to its external proof.”824 
The second, 1887 version is far more ambiguous and presented in the form of a series of 
diary entries, as is the case for Conan Doyle’s “The Parasite.” In this version, the episode about 
hypnosis occupies seven pages, testifying to Maupassant’s developing fascination with the 
subject—which explains why the text has been referred to as a “vampire fathered by La 
Salpêtrière.”825 Rather than serve as an “objective” framework for the supernatural, here the 
medical discourse is filtered through the first person perspective—and writing—of the main 
character, whose reliability is gradually undermined as the narrative progresses. In this section, we 
will focus on the second version of the text, as the ambiguous status of the narrative discourse 
“problematizes the overarching scientific narrative of its predecessor,” and thus indirectly poses 
the questions of hypnotic-readerly suggestibility.826 As we shall see, in this second version, the 
undecidability and hiatus permeating the text spread to the narrative voice, where, as Jacques Neefs 
has shown, “the unrepresentable appears to the subject of representation himself.”827 In this way, 
we will see how Maupassant’s representation of the Horla and of hypnosis impose “another 
additional turn of the screw … onto the question of the relations between representation and 
reality,” while dramatizing the eruption of the Other and of the irrational into ordinary 
consciousness.  
 
823 Maupassant, Le Horla, 1886 edition (Hoboken: Melville House, 2005), 73. 
824 Jacques Neefs, “La représentation fantastique dans ‘Le Horla’ de Maupassant,” Cahiers de l'Association 
internationale des études françaises, 32 (1980): 234. 
825 Elisabeth Roudinesco, Histoire de la psychoanalyse en France (Paris: Fayard, 1994), 76. 
826 Sattar, 222. 
827 Neefs, “La représentation fantastique dans ‘Le Horla’ de Maupassant,” 234. 
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2.2.1.1. From Familiarity to (Dis)Possession 
 
Maupassant’s text opens with an almost exaggerated emphasis on self-possession, on what 
Jacques Neefs calls “the stability of an orientation.”828 Indeed, the narrator’s first diary entry 
contains a suspiciously enthusiastic evocation of a sense of belonging, rooted in the familiarity and 
comfort of his immediate environment:  
What a wonderful day! I spent all morning stretched out on the grass in front of my house, beneath the huge 
plane tree that completely covers, shelters, and shades the lawn. I love the country here, and I love living 
here because this is where I have my roots, those profound and delicate roots that attach a man to the land 
where his ancestors were born and died. … I love my house, I grew up in it. From my windows, I can see the 
Seine flowing along the whole length of my garden, behind the road, almost in my back yard.829  
 
This image of a familiar, peaceful landscape—both physical and mental—which has not yet 
become unheimlich, culminates in the metaphor of rootedness: of being at home both in the land 
of one’s “ancestors” and in one’s own “house”—a physical space which since Freud has become 
associated with the Ego, its psychical equivalent. By setting up this solid foundation—based on 
the self-mastery that comes with being at home in oneself—the text sets the stage for its 
deconstruction, as the narrator’s sense of self-possession gradually breaks down, before shattering 
into pieces. 
In fact, one might argue that this apparent solidity is undermined from the start. For 
instance, Jack Abecassis describes the narrator’s suspicious sense of familiarity as “a particular 
identity-fantasy of an existence free of questioning,” which is “so emphatically and repeatedly” 
asserted that it must already be part of his “symptom.”830 Indeed, as the metaphor of rootedness 
keeps the narrator sheltered against the intrusion of the Other, “this very identity is precisely the 
symptom of what is about to dissolve.”831  
Regardless of the exact moment of its initial occurrence, the disruption of the ordinary 
appears early on in the text and is submitted to a constant alternation between competing 
explanatory hypotheses. 
The initial explanatory framework is of a physiological nature, as the narrator suspects he 
suffers from an unknown disease. Medical vocabulary of nervous disorders and unknown 
 
828 Neefs, Ibid., 238. 
829 Maupassant, Le Horla (1887; Hoboken: Melville House, 2005), 3. 
830 Abecassis, 399. 
831 Ibid., 399. 
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conditions keep the text’s explanation on a material, organic level.832 However, once the 
hypothesis of physical disease is no longer satisfactory, the process of “dematerialization” begins, 
as possible explanations switch to the psychological level: “Suddenly I was seized by a shiver, but 
not of cold—a strange shiver of anxiety”; “Frightened for no reason, stupidly, because of the 
profound solitude”; “when we are alone for a long time, we people the void with phantoms.”833  
In parallel to this shift toward the psychological, a process of exteriorization is put in place, 
as the narrator begins to suspect the existence of a presence outside himself: “All of a sudden, it 
seems to me I was being followed, that someone was walking just behind me, very close, very 
close.”834 As Jacques Neefs has shown, this gradual personification of the Horla underlines 
fiction’s ability to turn the metaphorical question of identity—or the immaterial presence of the 
unconscious—into a concrete reality: “Fictional production will unfold, into a quasi-character, the 
interrogative doubling; the realist application of what here is still metaphorical, leads to the 
neighboring presence of this ‘Invisible’ which governs me.”835 
As the story unfolds, this processes of exteriorization and personalization results in 
descriptions where the supernatural and demonic explanations seem to have replaced the 
psychological ones, as in the image of the vampire: “Last night, I felt someone squatting over me, 
who, with his mouth over mine, was drinking in my life through my lips. Yes, he was sucking it 
in from my throat, just like a leech.”836 As Atia Sattar notes, here “the terrorizing someone now 
reveals itself as a predator, no longer simply close but upon him, consuming his very being.”837  
In other passages however, the text radically reverts to more psychological explanations. 
In this context, madness and hypnosis, which both allow for the continuation of mental activity 
while the conscious, rational self is—supposedly—absent or incapacitated, are the two main 
available explanations. These psychological hypotheses go hand in hand with an internalization 
that complicate the idea of an exterior possession: “Someone must have drunk this water. Who? 
 
832 For instance: “a shiver of cold that … has affected my nerves”; “a feverish nervous exhaustion”; “a sickness still 
unknown germinating in the blood and the flesh”; “my nerves vibrating, but without any alarming symptom”; “a 
circulatory disorder perhaps, an irritated nerve ending … a tiny perturbation in the all too imperfect and delicate 
functioning of our living mechanism,” Maupassant, 5-7. 
833 Ibid., 8, emphasis added; 16. 
834 Ibid., 8-9. Here the pronoun “someone” personalizes the Horla, suggesting an unidentified presence, another 
identity, both exterior yet too close to the subject to be entirely foreign, the link between proximity and identity being 
further strengthened by the repetition “very close.” 
835 Neefs, “La représentation fantastique dans ‘Le Horla’ de Maupassant,” 242. 
836 Maupassant, Le Horla, 12. 
837 Sattar, 227. 
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Me? It must be me; it could only be me”; “someone drank the entire content of my carafe last 
night—or rather, I drank it.”838  
Unlike madness, however, the hypothesis of hypnosis is especially valuable on a narrative 
level, as it combines into a single phenomenon the binaries that are opposed in other explanations. 
For instance, it combines the notion of a somnambulistic trance state (internal), and of possession 
by another mind (external). As a form of scientific discourse, it also keeps the Horla confined to 
the realm of the natural—thereby asserting its existence—while stretching the boundaries of the 
rational and scientific to their limits. Finally, it allows for a “lucid” form of madness, during which 
the subject is both awake, and dispossessed.839  
This is especially fitting with the moments in which the narrator remains “awake” despite 
the presence of the Horla—which corresponds more accurately with historical descriptions of 
trance states than the possession model: “I am fully aware that I am lying down and sleeping.”840 
Such moments of “lucid sleep” are also chronologically juxtaposed with visual “hallucinations” 
such as the book page turning, and with certain actions, such as drinking the water and the milk, 
whose author remains unknown and are followed by a complete absence of recollection and are 
thus reminiscent of post-hypnotic amnesia.  
Furthermore, even before an explicit mention of hypnotic suggestion in the text, the 
association between a lucid form of madness and the hypnotic state is reinforced by the comparison 
to dreams, in which the rational faculties are “asleep” but the mind’s activity continues:  
Surely, I would think myself crazy, absolutely crazy, if I weren’t aware of my condition … So I am in fact 
just a rational person suffering from hallucinations … This distress has established a profound divide in my 
mind … Similar phenomena occur in dreams, which parade us through the most implausible phantasmagoria 
without our being surprised, since the verifying apparatus, the sense of control, is asleep, while the 
imaginative faculty is awake and at work.841  
 
 
838 Maupassant, 13; 14. 
839 Significantly, descriptions of sleep often precede or follow the inexplicable “supernatural” events in the text, and 
share strong similarities with hypnotic or magnetic sleep: “the invincible sleep seized me”; “I suddenly fall into repose, 
the way one drowns oneself, dropping into an abyss … I don’t feel it coming, this treacherous sleep … that lies in 
wait for me, that is about to seize me by the head, close my eyes.” Maupassant, Le Horla, 15; 7. 
840 Ibid., 7. 
841 Ibid., 26. 
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As Pierre Bayard has shown, the “Other” in Maupassant appears to the conscious mind. As 
in hypnosis, it manifests itself directly in the narrator’s body and thoughts, rather than being held 
under the surface of repression.842  
Hypnosis is then explicitly mentioned by the narrator as a possible explanation for the 
manifestations of the Horla. In some instances, the model is that of automatism and 
somnambulism: “I must have been the plaything of my exhausted imagination, unless I am actually 
a sleepwalker, or have undergone one of those influences, which have been observed but are yet 
to be explained, that are called ‘suggestive’.”843 In other passages, the more radical model of dual 
personality is evoked, where the hypnotic state is characterized by a complete obliteration of the 
conscious self, followed by amnesia:  
So I was a sleepwalker, then, and was living, without knowing it, this double mysterious life, which makes 
us suspect that there are two beings inside us, or that a foreign being, unknowable and invisible, animates our 
captive body when our soul is dulled.844 
 
In this type of explanation, hypnosis is blended with demonic possession, conceived as the literal 
invasion and replacement of one mind by another, the subject finding himself in a state of complete 
passivity and helplessness: “our body obeys this other being as it does ourselves, or obeys it more 
than ourselves.”845 
 
2.2.1.2. The Natural and the Supernatural 
 
In an 1886 issue of Les Lettres et les Arts, Dr. J Renaut writes:  
These days hypnotism is all that is left of sorcery. ... In fact, the basic element it consists of is the strange 
notion of possession... In certain situations, a man acquires absolute power over another man, such that he 
can plunge him at will into a death-like sleep. He then wakes him from it as he wishes, whether to make him 
motionless like a statue, or to make him into an automaton who will obey his every whim. ... The subject 
then becomes truly possessed.846 
 
 
842 This is why for Bayard, Maupassant’s model is one of hallucination—which threatens identity—rather than 
repression, which in a sense, preserves balance. See Maupassant juste avant Freud, 30. 
843 Maupassant, 15, emphasis added. 
844 Ibid., 13-14, emphasis added.  
845 Ibid., 13 
846 J Renaut, “L’Hypnotisme,” Les Lettres et les Arts (August 1886): 160. 
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As we will see in this section, Maupassant’s representation of hypnosis in Le Horla oscillates 
between demonic possession at one end of the spectrum, and as “an emerging scientific 
rationalization for the Other,” a naturalization of the occult, on the other end.847  
 
A Naturalization of the Occult 
Indeed, in the central episode involving hypnotism—where the narrator’s cousin, Mme 
Sablé, is put under a state of somnambulism by Dr. Parent—a vocabulary reminiscent of 
Bernheim’s establishes hypnosis as a scientific explanation, casting doubt on the supernatural 
descriptions discussed higher up, before blending it with possession altogether. 848 
In this central episode, the text first establishes the “reality” and “scientific” dimension of 
hypnotism through the presence and authority of Dr. Parent, whose legitimacy “appears 
incontrovertible in the opinion of the narrator.”849 Unlike Flaubert’s Dr. Vaucorbeil, who 
condemned hypnosis for its dangerous and morally or politically subversive potential, Dr. Parent 
practices hypnotism himself and spends “much of his time studying nervous illnesses.”850 As he 
both fascinates and explains, his authority is twofold: it is that of both medical knowledge and 
magnetic power concentrated in a single character. 
In the discourse of the Dr. Parent, scientific authority allows to criticize the superstitions 
of the past while legitimizing the “reality” of an invisible hypnotic force, which—like the Horla—
has the power to penetrate and act upon another’s mind. One of the functions of Dr. Parent as a 
character is also to participate in the medical debate of the 1880s and criticize the doctrines of la 
Salpêtrière, which Parent refers to “the incredible results obtained by English scholars and by 
doctors in the Nancy school” and proposes a demonstration involving post-hypnotic suggestion, 
rather than the reproduction of hysteric symptoms.851   
 
847 Sattar, 235. 
848 In this episode, all skeptical characters, including the narrator himself, are convinced of the “truth” of hypnosis. 
Once in the hypnotic state, Mme Sablé demonstrates clairvoyant abilities (she can see images in a blank business-card 
as if it were a mirror), and carries out a post-hypnotic suggestion the next day (asking to borrow 5000 francs from the 
narrator), of which she remembers nothing. In brief, Maupassant’s text reproduces a classic scene of somnambulism 
and the effects expected of it in the nineteenth century. See Le Horla, 17-20. 
849 Trueman, 12. 
850 Maupassant, 17. 
851 Ibid., 17. Nevertheless, critics disagree on whether the Dr. Parent is modeled on Charcot or Bernheim or Janet. On 
the one hand, Liz Truman claims that the mirror-image scene is inspired by the work of Alfred Binet at the Salpêtrière. 
For her, the business-card episode is “an almost exact description” of an experiment performed and published by Binet 
in 1884 in La Revue Philosophique, where he describes “hypnotizing subjects to ‘hallucinate images on a blank piece 
of card’ [un carton blanc],” as well as “the faithful interaction of the subject with the hallucination and its lifelike 
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The clearest passage in which hypnosis is used as a naturalization of the occult is Dr. 
Parent’s monologue, which links hypnotism to scientific progress, and reveals it as a conceptual 
tool which can be used to explain supernatural phenomena, superstition and religion alike. In this 
way, hypnosis is portrayed as a tool for Enlightenment ideals and a means of providing rational 
explanation of the secrets of nature—of the invisible, incomprehensible, natural fact:  
“We are,” he asserted, “on the verge of discovering one of the most important secrets of nature, I mean one 
off its most important secrets on this earth, for nature must have far more important ones, up there, in the 
stars. Ever since man has thought … he has felt touched by a mystery impenetrable to his coarse and imperfect 
senses, and he has tried, by the effort of his intelligence) to compensate for the powerlessness of his organs. 
When this intelligence was still in its rudimentary state, this haunting by invisible phenomena took 
frightening forms of the most commonplace kind. Hence popular beliefs in the supernatural were born, 
legends of wandering spirits, fairies, gnomes, ghosts, I will even say the legend of God. … But for a little 
more than a century there has been a presentiment of something new. Mesmer and a few others have put us 
on an unexpected track, and we have truly arrived, especially in the last four or five years, at surprising 
results.852  
 
Further down, the idea is repeated:  
He has come, the One the primal terrors of primitive tribes dreaded, the One anxious priests exorcised … 
After the coarse imaginings of primitive horror, more perspicacious men had a clearer presentiment of him. 
Mesmer guessed his existence, and for ten years now doctors have discovered, in an accurate way, the nature 
of his power.853 
 
Not only does hypnosis offer a possible explanation for the nature of the experience of the Horla, 
it offers a secularization of what both religious and “primitive” beliefs attributed to the 
supernatural: it “taps the secret power at the root of all of these superstitions.”854 
 
The Reality of the Invisible: Maupassant’s Supernaturalism 
 
conformity to the physical properties of a real image on a card.”851 Michael Finn on the other hand argues that the 
scene with Mme Sablé resembles Janet’s experiments on clairvoyance with Léonie: “I wanted [Léonie] to describe 
photos she could not see but which I was holding in my hands. I realized that she described them just as well when I 
wasn’t familiar with them as when I was. Seven times she indicated exactly which photo I had touched before anyone 
else had seen.” For Finn, Maupassant’s text proposes “a reorientation away from Salpêtrière teachings and, instead, 
an opening both to theories and practices emanating from the Nancy school.” Finn, 77-78. See also Janet’s 1886 
articles, discussed in Chapter 1: “Notes sur quelques phénomènes de somnambulisme,” 198 and “Deuxième note sur 
le sommeil provoqué à distance,” 212–23. Indeed, when in Maupassant’s text, Dr. Parent mentions “experiments on 
hypnotism and suggestion,” the emphasis on suggestion—rather than hysteria, pathology or neurosis—recalls 
Bernheim’s conception of hypnosis as a natural state that can be induced in any individual. Maupassant, Le Horla, 17. 
Sattar even goes as far as arguing that “Charcot was so well aware of the author’s antagonism toward him that he had 
Maupassant banned from his Tuesday lectures after the publication of The Horla, when Maupassant also began to 
manifest behavioral problems on account of his syphilis.” Sattar, 235. 
852 Maupassant, Le Horla, 18. 
853 Ibid., 34. 
854 Trueman, 12. 
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Nevertheless, because of the fundamental undecidability that characterizes both hypnosis 
and the Horla, this naturalization of the occult alternates with a seemingly opposed movement, 
where the texts establishes its adherence to the reality of invisible phenomena.  
For instance, the description of Mms Sablé acting out the Dr. Parent’s post-hypnotic 
suggestion allows the narrative to oscillate back towards the occult by framing hypnotic rapport in 
terms of absolute domination: “this weapon … the domination of a mysterious will over a human 
soul, which turns into a slave. They called it ‘magnetism,’ ‘hypnotism,’ ‘suggestion’.”855 The 
grouping of these three concepts into a single category reinforces the impression of a single, 
dangerous phenomenon, cancelling out the nuances which were familiar to practitioners and 
theoreticians of the time—and no doubt to Maupassant himself, who is said to have attended 
Charcot’s Tuesday Lectures.856 Indeed, as Laurent Dubreuil has shown, in Maupassant’s fictional 
representation, “the possessed is not struggling against his unconscious but against the negation of 
his own will (conscious and/or unconscious) and its replacement by another. The magnetized 
subject no longer has access to the pure experiences of wokeness, sleep and dreams. When he 
stands, when he believes he lives for himself, he sleeps, subjugated by his master.”857 In other 
words, even in the episode that medically establishes the “truth” of hypnosis, the latter is reworked 
so as to incorporate the absolute domination and enslavement pertaining to the occult phenomenon 
of demonic possession. 
In fact, in “Un Fou?”—a 1884 short story considered as an early version of Le Horla—
hypnotism is denounced by another character named Parent, as a horrific violation of the subject 
by the operator, a stealth of the soul: 
A man, a being has the frightful and incomprehensible power of putting another being to sleep by the power 
of his will, and while he is asleep, of robbing him of his thoughts—that is to say, his soul, his sanctuary, the 
secret of the ego, that impenetrable secret of man, that fountain of inexpressible ideas. He can rob him of 
everything he hides, of everything he loves. He opens his sanctuary, violates it, displays it, gives it to the 
public! Is this not atrocious, criminal, infamous?858 
 
 This fear of hypnotism is confirmed when the narrator of the Horla compares his own possession 
to Mme Sablé’s hypnotic experience:  
 
855 Maupassant, 34. 
856 Michael Finn has argued that despite the numerous indirect sources we have of Maupassant presence at Charcot’s 
lectures, such as the testimonies of Léon Daudet and Axel Munthe, all that “we do know” is that “Maupassant 
consulted Charcot about his eye problems in April 1886.” Finn, Figures of the Pre-Freudian Unconscious, 76-77. 
857 Laurent Dubreuil, De l’attrait à la possession: Maupassant, Artaud, Blanchot (Paris: Hermann, 2003), 59. 
858 Maupassant, “Un fou,” Le Figaro (September 1, 1884), 259. 
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Surely this is how my poor cousin was possessed and dominated when she came to borrow five thousand 
francs from me. She was undergoing a strange will that had entered her, like another soul, like a parasitic and 
dominating soul. Is the world about to end? But the one that is governing me, what is it, this invisible thing?859  
 
Here, the hypnotist (or the doctor) becomes as dangerous as the Horla himself: “For the hypnotizer 
or the Horla, the power is the same: to put the subject to sleep, to paralyze his/her body and his/her 
volition by displacing the energies and self-appropriating them.”860 By paralleling his condition 
with that of his cousin, the narrator “applies the language of his own distress” to the magnetic 
influences that subjected his cousin,861 and begins to portray himself as an increasingly passive, 
helpless figure: “I have lost all strength, all courage, all self- control, even all power to put my will 
in motion. I can no longer want anything; but someone wants for me; and I obey.”862 By this point 
in the narrative, the narrator’s autonomy is reduced to pure spectatorship and passivity, as he has 
“subsumed the efficacy of hypnotism into that of diabolical control.”863 Unlike the hypothesis of 
madness (to which we shall return) the function of hypnosis in the text is not point to the delusion 
of the main character, but to his possession.  
In asserting the power of one mind over another, hypnosis establishes the possibility of the 
reality of invisible forces which elude ordinary human perception. In doing so, under the apparent 
return to the occult, it also participates in a general extension of the domain of the natural, in the 
service of Maupassant’s “supernaturalism,” by which, as he writes in “Letter of a Madman,” the 
supernatural is “nothing other than what remains veiled to us.”864 
For example, when the character meets the monk during his trip to the Mont Saint Michel, 
the example used to prove the existence of “other beings exist besides us on Earth” is taken from 
Nature,865 as the monk evokes the example of the wind to justify his argument about the “super”-
natural: 
Do we see the hundred-hundred-thousandth parts of what exists? Look, here is the wind, which is the 
strongest force in nature, which knocks men down, destroys buildings, uproots trees, whips the sea up into 
mountains of water and throws great ships onto the shoals; here is the wind that kills, whistles, groans, 
howls—have you ever seen it, and can you see it? Yes it exists.866 
 
859 Maupassant, Le Horla, 29. 
860 Micheline Besnard-Coursodon, “Une ‘Chaise basse en crepe de Chine’: Sommeils Maupassantiens.” Romantisme 
37 (1982): 46.  
861 Sattar, 236. 
862 Maupassant, Le Horla, 28. Similarly, the next entry states: “I am lost. Someone possesses my soul and governs it. 
Someone controls all my actions, all my movements, all my thoughts. I am nothing inside, nothing but a slave 
spectator.” Ibid., 29. 
863 Sattar, 237. 
864 Maupassant, “Letter From a Madman,” trans. C. Mandell (Hoboken, N.J.: Melville House Publishing, 2005), 54. 
865 Maupassant, Le Horla, 11. 
866 Ibid., 11-12. 
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In this passage, the personification of the wind helps bridge the gap between the idea of invisible 
“forces” one the one hand, and invisible “beings” on the other—a leap that the Flaubertian narrator 
would not leave unnoticed.867 In the first version of The Horla, a similar idea is evoked, albeit with 
a different example: 
Can you see electricity? And yet it exists! This being, which I have named the Horla, also exists. … For 
centuries, we have had a foreboding of him, we have dreaded him and foretold him! The fear of the Invisible 
always haunted our ancestors … he is the one of whom an already anxious and trembling humanity had some 
premonition. And everything you yourselves have been doing, gentlemen, in recent years, what you call 
‘hypnotism,’ ‘suggestion,’ ‘magnetism’—it is he you are heralding and prophesying!868 
 
It is important to note that in these examples, the imperfection of the sensory organs is what 
explains the lack of belief in the existence of the supernatural. Were our sensory organs subtler 
and more acute, the perception of the Invisible would be made possible. Just as the unknown or 
unknowable is redefined as “as of yet unknown,” the imperceptible in Maupassant is reframed as 
“as of yet unperceived,” a process which, as Finn notes, underlines Maupassant’s “obsessional 
longing” for physical explanations of the immaterial.”869 
Like the wind, electricity and the Horla, hypnosis itself is a manifestation of the “reality” 
of the “invisible.” As Laurent Dubreuil has noted, it allows us to perceive the imperceptible, by 
maintaining it in a “transparent opacity”:  
No more of the dusty, old, exaggerated supernatural. Instead, an anti-natural supernature, which transcends 
naive and primitive beliefs and the initial rationalist interpretations alike … beyond naturalism and its 
scientist pretensions [prétentions scientistes].870 
 
Madness: The Only Way Out? 
As Jacques Neefs writes, the fantastic genre allows fiction to draw the boundaries of what 
we call “reality.”871 In Maupassant, the “reality” of the Invisible triggers both a scientific quest to 
explain, and an ultimate failure of scientific discourse, which leads the text to build up a greater 
 
867 The example relies on the fact that invisibility here serves as a metaphor for imperceptibility and immateriality in 
general: if the invisible has physical effects in the world, then other immaterial and imperceptible forces can likely 
affect our material world, beyond what is suggested to us by the limitations of ordinary perception. 
868 Maupassant, Le Horla. 1886 version, 73. 
869 Finn, 90. For Finn, this pulls Maupassant back toward the spiritualist side, making him “a faithful creature of his 
age, for in this same period a broad swath of spiritualists and some scientists were trying to imagine psychic 
phenomena as poorly understood extensions of the physical. 
870 Dubreuil, 27-29. 
871 “The affirmation of reality which characterizes nineteenth century fantastic texts (with their protocols of 
authentication, of experimental science, of scientific and informed interrogation) proceeds by slyly tracing the 
demarcations, the knowable limits, the guarantees of the subject, the extension of Reality.” Neefs, “La représentation 
fantastique dans ‘Le Horla’ de Maupassant,” 232. 
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and greater ambiguity, only resolvable to the modern, post-Freudian reader, on a psychological 
level.  
In his quest to understand and observe the existence of the Horla, Maupassant’s character 
begins by conducting a series of “scientific” observations and experiments in order to determine 
whether there can “emerge a scientifically proven someone, positively identifiable through 
scientific means of investigation.”872 Nevertheless, as we have seen in the various works examined 
so far, while such investigations provide observations of its effects—liquids being drunk, food 
eaten, cups broken, reflections in the mirror disappearing, and so on—they fail to provide sufficient 
explanations of its cause.873 The narrator—and reader—is forced to merely observe the traces of, 
rather than understand, his object of observation. By the end of the story—as in Balzac and 
Flaubert—scientific discourse is unable to provide a satisfactory and total explanation of the 
phenomenon in question, which resists all attempts at normalization.  
Atia Sattar argues that this absence of a discourse capable of providing a satisfactory 
explanation leaves madness as the only option for the narrator.874 Conversely, the medical 
perspective being unable to produce a sufficient explanation, it has no choice but to relegate the 
inexplicable to the domain of madness.875  
This hypothesis of madness is suggested in numerous passages in the text, where the 
narrator grows increasing skeptical towards his own sanity and ability to think rationally: “July 6. 
I am going mad”; “July 10. Without a doubt, I am mad! And yet…”; “doubts about my reason 
came to me, not vague doubts as I have had but precise, absolute doubts.”876 This uncertainty is 
reinforced by the first-person form of the diary entries, where, without an “objective” third 
person—or medical authority as in the first version of the text—to rely on, the progress of the 
 
872 Sattar, 228. The narrator does so by laying out food, drink, and chalk for the Horla to consume or spread during 
the night. 
873 Sattar goes one step further, in contending that all scientific attempts to explain fail in the text: “He hopelessly 
scrambles to rationalize a presence that, although discernible through the means of empirical observation and 
experimentation, cannot, in fact, be explained by science.” Sattar, 229. 
874 “Similarly deceived and deprived of a scientific solution, the narrator finds himself at the brink of insanity—or 
perhaps chooses insanity as a definable solution”; the narrator’s experience “remain[ing] undecipherable in the domain 
of scientific expertise, is explicable only in terms of madness.”  Sattar, 230; 215.  
875 Indeed, the medical figures “rationalize their encounters with the supernatural by relegating whatever the scientific 
discipline cannot elucidate to the realm of madness.” See Gwenhaël Ponnau, La folie dans la littérature fantastique 
(Paris: Editions du CNRS, 1987), 98. 
876 Maupassant, Le Horla, 14; 26. 
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narrator’s “madness” goes hand in hand with his gradual dispossession by the Horla.877 And 
indeed, as Rae Gordon puts it, “what creates the Fantastic, what is indeed terrible at the present 
moment is not the phantom, the supernatural being, but rather the experience of mental 
alienation.”878  
Hypnosis, from this perspective, can be thought to intervene in a second sense in the text, 
beyond the mere naturalization of the occult. Indeed, it helps reveal the psychological dimension 
of the narrator’s haunting, and move the object of inquiry from the external to the internal, from 
the material/immaterial divide to the conscious/unconscious. It shows that the threat that seemed 
to be exterior is in fact haunting us from within. Indeed, as Jack Abecassis has shown, hypnosis 
reveals that “the [exterior] solutions the narrator has been seeking by means of distancing and 
quarantining the phenomenon … are futile, for the real question and the real answer are interior to 
and constitutive of our psyche, threatening our crude identity when it lets down its guard.”879  
Beyond the question of its scientific legitimacy, then, hypnosis also manifests the “late 
nineteenth-century incipient recognition of the limits of a strictly rational, positivist and 
mechanistically empirical understanding of mental processes,” in favor of the recognition of the 
“invisible forces,” which as Jack Abecassis puts it, can now be understood as manifestations, not 
of ghosts, but of “the unconscious and irrational dimensions of the real.”880 
Nevertheless, as noted previously, this unconscious is not pre-Freudian but rather, a 
“hypnotic” unconscious, centered on an essential duality or split at the heart of identity.881 For 
Pierre Bayard, in Maupassant, the Unconscious is “not just an unknown object or thematic 
content,” but is: 
What constantly shows itself, in an excess of visibility or perception, in the sudden emergence 
[surgissement]… of the Other in the self, or the self in the other, an emergence which questions us, down to 
the deepest roots of our identity. Who is this Other in me? Who am I in the face of what overwhelms me? 
[bouleverse].882  
 
877 As Jacques Neefs has noted, “the alterity of the Horla, increasingly present in the text, feeds off of discursive 
solitude, of subjective confinement… The inaugural gesture of a will [to explain, and thus to possess oneself] turns 
into the proof of dispossession.” Neefs, 236. 
878 Gordon, “'Le Merveilleux scientifique’ and the Fantastic,” 20. 
879 Abecassis, “On Reading Maupassant's Le Horla Problematologically,” 409. 
880 Ibid., 409. 
881 The threat of splitting, dissociation, annihilation of the self, were all are intimately linked with the questions raised 
by hypnosis at the end of the century, especially in the work of Janet. As Michael Finn has noted, “Maupassant’s mind 
is haunted by an undecidability that is person-related … The anguish of many of his works stems from an inability to 
be sure of identity. Undecidability and duality are thus the unconscious embedded in the writer’s style. Finn, 96. 
882 Bayard, 82. It is also “the way in which discourse disposes itself in relation to what overwhelms [dépasse] and 
threatens it.” Ibid., 27 
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This undecidability as to the limits and interchangeability between self and other goes with a 
gradual and increasing dissolution of the sense of self in the text. In fact, by the end of the story, 
the subject is so split that it is disintegrating. In this sense, identity, as the fundamental and 
ungraspable object of The Horla, cannot but drive one to madness—“Un objet qui rend fou.”883  
For Bayard, “facing these contradictory, and thus unbearable representations, the subject 
must act.”884 The narrator’s final act of despair—the decision to burn down his house to destroy 
the Horla—becomes his only way out, the only possibility of liberation or relief.885 Therefore, at 
the end of the story, the identity-fantasy of the beginning of the text—the familiarity of the 
landscape and psychic home—is completely destroyed and overturned.  
On the other hand, the final act also—and finally—marks, beyond the tragedy of splitting, 
the painful integration or internalization of the Horla into the “I,” putting an end to the maddening 
dissociation in the text’s closing sentence: “NO… no… of course not… of course he is not dead…. 
So then—it’s me, it’s me I have to kill!”886 In this final insight, horror culminates as the Horla 
violently merges into the concept of “me,” putting an end to the destructive alternation between 
the exterior vs. interior hypotheses.887  
 
    *** 
 
In Maupassant’s anxious representation, hypnosis is a conceptual tool that allows to give 
form to the haunting emergence of the “Other,” a means both experiential and theoretical to 
propose a “pretheory” of the psychical unconscious, based on a fundamental undecidability and 
 
883 Ibid., 180. 
884 Ibid., 181. Bayard comments on the relevance of the English expression “acting out,” as he conceives this act as a 
means of “escaping” and “exiting” the self (“une sortie de soi”). Ibid. 
885 This act is in this respect comparable to Mario’s shooting of Cipolla in Thomas Mann’s Mario and the Magician. 
Jack Abecassis describes it as “a metaphor of loss of identity and an explicit descent into psychotic chaos.” Abecassis, 
400. 
886 Maupassant, Le Horla, 43, emphasis added. 
887 From a Kleinian perspective, this could be read as a move from the paranoid schizoid to the pain of the depressive 
position, but the ending of the text and the mention of suicide maintain the ambiguity until the end. Nevertheless, the 
final act does mark the appearance of one last—tragic—certitude, that of human finitude. The uncertainty which 
characterizes the Horla’s materiality (and thus its “material” death at the end of the text) is what leads the narrator 
towards suicide. If there is one thing that he cannot doubt however, even at the end of the text, it is his own materiality, 
his own bodily nature, his mortality. Even if he is subject to the torture of a Maupassantian evil genius, and is a victim 
of hypnotic hallucinations, suggestions, absolute madness, complete destruction of the ego, he is mortal.  
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revealing the dynamics of possession and dispossession, of splitting and dissolution of the 
subject.888 
As we saw, Maupassant’s text multiplies possible yet seemingly incompatible 
interpretations—hypnotism, madness, the supernatural—and manages to posit “in unthinkable 
juxtaposition with medical diagnosis the absolute possibility of a diabolical Other.”889  
If from an epistemological point of view, hypnosis is still an in-between or a 
material/immaterial-undecidable, it is an efficient concept which allows to think the impossible 
binaries of the text such as the visible-invisible, the opaque-transparency, the real-hallucination of 
the Horla. Unlike the hypothesis of madness, monomania, hallucination, or psychosis, the 
hypothesis of hypnotic suggestion allows the text to preserve the reality of possession, in a 
naturalized-supernaturalist paradigm that extends beyond purely occultist interpretations. Indeed, 
“whereas science is often… in apparent opposition to the supernatural, it is in fact their similarities 
that fascinate de Maupassant.”890 
In the end, the text prevents any interpretation from emerging as final or total. In 
Maupassant’s story, scientific discourse, with its various attempts to confine reality to the 
reassuring boundaries of concepts and language, fails to permanently remove anxiety and doubts. 
Even hypnosis, despite its role as a naturalization of the supernatural, is far from being able to 
settle the question of identity. On the contrary, as a secular form of demonic possession, it 
participates in its unsettling.  
Unlike scientific discourse, the power of literature, on the other hand, lies in its inclusive 
ability to refuse to choose between competing models. As Jacques Neefs has shown, this openness 
was already that of the Flaubertian (and Balzacian) texts, and as we have argued, is inevitable 
when confronting the undecidability of the hypnotic object. In this sense, one diary entry in The 
Horla in this sense is especially illuminating: “July 19.—Many people to whom I have told the 
adventure have laughed at me. I no longer know what to think. The wise man says: Perhaps?”891 
 
 
888 Bayard argues that the unconscious in Maupassant is “indécidable” in the same sense as the fantastic is for Todorov. 
Bayard, 24. 
889 Sattar, 241. 
890 Rae Beth Gordon, “'Le Merveilleux scientifique’ and the Fantastic,” L’Esprit Créateur 28, no. 3, Theories of the 
Fantastic (Fall 1988): 20. 
891 Maupassant, Le Horla, 23. 
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2.2.2. Fear of Contamination: Conan Doyle’s The Parasite 
 
As Hilary Grimes has noted, by the 1880s and 1890s, works like Trilby, Dracula, The 
Beetle, and The Parasite were “surging with the Gothic horror of the trance, not with friendly 
exchanges of power.”892 This fascination for the perils of trance states points to a dual ambition in 
both Francophone and Anglophone worlds: of “trying to safely contain the dangers of mesmerism 
and hypnotism within the fixity of print, while simultaneously delighting in the creative 
possibilities trance states offered.”893  
In late Victorian Britain however, rather than reproduce the experimental rigor of Parisian 
medical circles, representations of hypnotism were strongly influenced by the Society of Psychical 
Research and the spiritualist phenomena which interested its members.894 Sir Arthur Conan Doyle 
can be counted among the authors whose fictional treatment of hypnosis pulled it toward the 
spiritual side. Indeed, Doyle became a member of the Society for Psychical Research in 1891 and 
announced his “conversion” to spiritualism in 1916, in what many perceived as the great aberration 
of his life.895 Among other topics pertaining to his spiritualist interests, Doyle “clearly believed” 
in the powers of post-hypnotic suggestion, which he uses in The Parasite as a gothic trope to 
“explore human identity.”896 In an unpublished essay quoted by Pierre Nordon, Doyle poses 
questions about the ubiquity of suggestion reminiscent of the Bernheimian thesis, with which he 
was familiar: “How can we tell that all our actions are not of this nature? What appears to us to be 
 
892 Hilary Grimes, The Late Victorian Gothic: Mental Science, the Uncanny, and Scenes of Writing (London: Taylor 
and Francis, 2016), 79. See Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, The Parasite (Harper Bros: New York, 1895). 
893 Grimes, Ibid., 79. 
894 The Society was founded in February 1882, to investigate phenomena ranging from hypnosis and dissociation, to 
parapsychological and paranormal phenomena such as mediumship, thought transference, apparitions, and so on, with 
Henry Sidgwick at its head. Among its most famous members were Frederic Myers, William James and Charles 
Richet. Doyle resigned from it in 1930. 
895 Indeed, numerous biographers attempted to tone down Doyle’s interest in spiritualism—a “seeming anachronism 
in an otherwise respectable life,” that sharply contrasts with the “super-rationalism” of Sherlock Holmes. See Alex 
Owen. “'Borderland Forms': Arthur Conan Doyle, Albion's Daughters, and the Politics of the Cottingley Fairies.” 
History Workshop 38 (1994): 67. 
896 Owen, Ibid, 49. As stated in the Portsmouth Evening News (in which Doyle also wrote), as early as 1889, he 
volunteered to be part of a hypnosis demonstration attended by “twenty thirty medical and scientific men and journalist 
of Portsmouth,” performed by a professor named Milo de Meyer. The professor’s attempt to hypnotize Doyle—which 
consisted in a mixture of ocular fascination, old mesmeric passes, and a “new” technique consisting in “standing 
behind his subject and placing his hand on the latter's coat, at a point between the shoulder blades”—“failed, the 
Professor remarking, after making the attempt, that the process would take too long.” See “Hypnotism at Southsea,” 
The Evening News (9 February 1889). 
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our own choice may prove really to have been as unalterable and inexorable as fate—the 
unavoidable sum total of suggestions which are acting upon us.”897 
Doyle’s treatment of hypnosis, however, is heavily focused on its dangers, rather than its 
therapeutic potential. As noted in Chapter 1, fin-de-siècle discussions of crimes committed under 
hypnosis greatly impacted popular fiction and the press, and representations of hypnosis allowed 
to voice a series of late Victorian anxieties about social, economic, and political “invasions” of all 
sorts. In Doyle’s The Parasite, concerns about the dangers of posthypnotic suggestions and 
hypnotic trance are thematized as the threat of a parasitic unconscious which is both “exotic” and 
erotic. Indeed, the narrator’s anxieties about contamination have a double object. On the one hand, 
they concern the female Other and the “irresistible” force of sexual desire. On the other hand, they 
concern the foreign Other, who threatens Victorian British identity with invasion and degeneracy, 
with literal and metaphorical infiltration and infection, as in a return of repressed colonial guilt. In 
Doyle’s story, these “threats” creep up gradually into the mind and life of the narrator, who 
experiences—and projects—them as exterior because of their incompatibility with bourgeois 
moral values and his form of life as a rationalist, philosophically materialist, professor of 
physiology.  
Although for Professor Gilroy, scientific inquiry is the means to “combat foreign, even 
'demonic' threats of degeneration and racial pollution, often associated with the colonized,” his 
method ultimately fails and leads to his downfall.898 Indeed, while scientific methodology is 
initially used to guarantee the rigor of his exploration of hypnosis—as well as the text’s—it 
backfires, so to speak, leading to Gilroy’s scientific “conversion” from skepticism to mesmerism, 
and from thereon, to his gradual loss of control and acknowledgment of the horrors of psychical 
“contamination.” 
Therefore, while Balzac’s treatment of hypnotism was based on the notion of subversion, 
Poe’s on that of suspension, and Maupassant’s on splitting and (dis)possession, in Conan Doyle’s 
1894 novella, it is centered on the notions of invasion and contamination. Nevertheless, as we shall 
see, while perpetuating gender and racial stereotypes of the time, Doyle’s tale also constitutes an 
exception in fin-de-siècle gothic or late Victorian representations of mesmerism as it inverts the 
 
897 Doyle, in Pierre Nordon, Conan Doyle (London: John Murray, 1966), 151. 
898 Laura Habbe, “The Horrors of Scientific Investigation: Parasitic Mesmerism in Arthur Conan Doyle’s The 
Parasite,” Irish Journal of Gothic and Horror Stories 14 (Summer 2015): 49. 
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usual gender roles and dynamics of power operating in medical and stage hypnosis alike, by 
portraying a female, lay hypnotist who uses a male scientist as her subject.  
 
2.2.2.1. Scientific Curiosity and Hypnotic Possibilities 
 
Rationalism vs. Nervous Predisposition 
Like Maupassant, Conan Doyle’s novella traces the main character’s moral decline, via the 
experience of hypnosis and the threat of madness, from initial certainty to complete intellectual 
dissolution. However, while Maupassant represented a character possessed by an unknown force 
after witnessing a hypnosis seance, Conan Doyle’s text goes further by representing a character 
whose metamorphosis is due to more than his position as witness or observer. Indeed, as Professor 
Gilroy becomes both experimenter and subject of his experiment, Doyle’s text thematizes the 
question of the porous boundary between observer and participant not only in suggestive practices, 
but also in scientific experimentation in general. To do so, it sets up a strong contrast between the 
main character’s apparent rationalism and his susceptibility to be influenced by spiritualist forces 
later on in the text. 
The title of Conan Doyle’s novella is strongly reminiscent of Maupassant’s—with the 
article “the” followed by the mention of an unknown entity which threatens contamination. 
Similarly, the date “March 24” formally signals the appearance of a diary entry—as in Le Horla, 
it omits the year, merely mentioning the day and month of the narrative events—which creates a 
sense of intimacy with the narrative voice. Like the description of the landscape in The Horla, the 
evocation of “the rich silent force of nature” in the opening page of The Parasite reinforces the 
impression of familiarity and safety. As in Maupassant, the evocation of the natural realm is used 
to establish Gilroy’s position of intellectual stability and “moral and professional” certainty: 
“Outside my laboratory window the great chestnut-tree is all covered with the big, glutinous, 
gummy buds, some of which have already begun to break into little green shuttlecocks.”899 As in 
Le Horla, not only does this description of the tree evoke the main character’s “rootedness” (here 
in a specifically English setting—“the heavy English air is laden with a faintly resinous perfume”), 
it also sets the stage for the intrusion of the “unnatural” into the realm of Nature:900 
 
899 Habbe, “The Horrors of Scientific Investigation,” 50; Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, The Parasite (Harper Bros: New 
York, 1895),1. 
900 Doyle, The Parasite,1. 
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How sweet and gentle and soothing is Nature! Who would think that there lurked in her also such vile forces, 
such odious possibilities! … this dreadful thing which has sprung out at me is neither supernatural nor even 
preternatural. No, it is a natural force which … society is ignorant of … subject to physical laws.901 
 
It is no surprise, then, that Professor Gilroy is a rationalist who studies the realm of the material 
and the natural, with scientific and analytic methods of investigation that “closely resemble 
[Sherlock] Holmes’s investigative method based on pure reason.”902 Indeed, he is one of the first 
chairs in the University, specializing in the “recognized” and “exact” science of physiology.903 In 
Doyle’s story, Gilroy refers to the human organism with the mechanistic model, describing it as a 
machine which Nature “readjusts” every year.”904 In this description, Spring—the season which 
opens the narrative—is described as both internal and external:905 “We also have our spring when 
the little arterioles dilate, the lymph flows in a brisker stream, the glands work harder, winnowing 
and straining.”906 This mirroring of the external season in the internal space prepares the ulterior 
scenarios of parasitic contamination which are already evoked, in potential, by the title.  
Physiology and psychology are opposed both in Gilroy’s mind and in the beginning of the 
text. Psychology, which Gilroy initially dismisses as an “underground” science “of the future” and 
a “nebulous semi-science,” is the domain of his friend, Wilson.907 As Gilroy puts it in a clear-cut 
dismissal: “So long as half his subjects are tainted with charlatanerie and the other half with 
hysteria, we physiologists must content ourselves with the body and leave the mind to our 
descendants.”908 Unlike physiology, psychology is described as being laden with uncertainty and 
“lies,” and involving work with “semi-maniacs.”909 For him, its objects are “vague and mystical 
and indefinite.”910 
 
Initial Skepticism: Hypnosis as Charlatanry 
Furthermore, despite the scientific heyday of hypnotism that took place in France in the 
1880s, from the perspective of Gilroy’s 1895 positivist scientism, hypnosis is reduced to mere 
 
901 Ibid., 1. 
902 Habbe, “The Horrors of Scientific Investigation,” 49. 
903 Doyle, 3. 
904 Ibid., 2. 
905 “I can see it without, and feel it within.” Ibid., 2 
906 Ibid., 2. 
907 Ibid., 3. 
908 Ibid., 5. 
909 Ibid., 7. Here a parallel can be drawn both with Charcot’s dismissal of psychology, and with the suspicion that the 
hypnotic-hysteric subject “lies.” 
910 Ibid., 8. 
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charlatanry: “I have no doubt that he has some new mesmerist or clairvoyant or medium or trickster 
of some sort whom he is going to exhibit to us.”911 
Gilroy describes hypnotic suggestion as a dubious object of study, grouping it together 
with affective or sensory phenomena which he opposes to the scientific study of material objects: 
“I have trained myself to deal only with fact and with proof. … Show me what I can see with my 
microscope, cut with my scalpel, weigh in my balance, and I will devote a lifetime to its 
investigation.”912 Because of its mimetic, contagious potential, suggestion belongs to the 
emotional and subjective elements of human experience and is dismissed as uncertain: “Surmise 
and fancy have no place in my scheme of thought. … When you ask me to study feelings, 
impressions, suggestions, you ask me to do what is distasteful and even demoralizing. A departure 
from pure reason affects me like an evil smell or a musical discord.”913 Significantly, Gilroy’s 
mistrust of hypnotism is linked to the fact that he associates psychology, with “women’s” taste for 
the irrational, which he opposes, in a reductive, gendered binary and demonstration of 
physiological-aesthetic disgust and contempt (“evil smell … musical discord”), to the supposedly 
masculine qualities of rationalism and analytic thinking. 
Nevertheless, as Doyle’s story shows, this strong aversion for the irrational, rather than 
protecting him from it, reveals Gilroy’s vulnerability to the “feelings, impressions and 
suggestions” in the face of which he will lose control.914 Gilroy’s gendered condescension—which 
ultimately leads to his downfall—appears to stem from a latent fear of being overpowered by the 
“feminine” qualities that already seem to preexist in him. 
For instance, Gilroy opposes his intellectual, academic materialism to his personal “nature” 
and “temperament,” which lean towards the spiritualist side of the spectrum: “by nature I am, 
unless I deceive myself, a highly psychic man. I was a nervous, sensitive boy, a dreamer, a 
somnambulist, full of impressions and intuitions.”915 Therefore, beneath the image of the man of 
science and experimenter lies a deeper core of latent nervous predisposition, sensitivity, and 
susceptibility to hypnotism, ready to emerge once the narrative allows it. In Doyle’s tale, the 
experimenter conceals a subject of experimentation, lying in wait.  
 
911 Ibid., 8. The term “trickster”—which is central to our whole aesthetic discussion of hypnotism—indicates the 
protagonist’s skepticism, which retrospectively qualifies all of the enumerated terms as equally untrustworthy. 
912 Ibid., 6. 
913 Ibid. 
914 Ibid. 
915 Doyle, 5. 
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Furthermore, commenting on the “steadying effect” of diary-keeping upon his mind, Gilroy 
confesses: “I fear that, after all, much of my neurotic temperament survives, and that I am far from 
that cool, calm precision which characterizes Murdoch or Pratt-Haldane.”916 His aversion—being 
rooted in fear—is motivated by affective, rather than rational reasons, and thus lies in the very 
emotional reactions which he dismissed as feminine.917 Conan Doyle therefore opens the story 
with a main character whose “neurotic” temperament makes him especially vulnerable to the 
elements from which he seems so determined to protect himself.918 His rationalism and 
materialism appear as the defense mechanisms of the male English bourgeois individual against 
what he calls his own “weakness,” but what hypnosis will reveal as an overwhelming force, or 
power, further on in the text.919 The worrying, uncontainable, unpredictable and internal 
manifestations of Nature threaten the character from within before they even manifest in external 
elements in the narrative and the plot. In this sense, well before he realizes that “all power within 
the novella emanates from a woman, who is old, unattractive, and foreign at that,” Gilroy is 
threatened by his own “feminine” unconscious.920 
 
Conversion Through Spectacle: Miss Penclosa’s Demonstration 
 
As Laura Habbe notes, at the beginning of the story, Gilroy “is so eager to exploit 
Penclosa’s power for his own scientific advancement that he entirely disregards her as a human 
being with her own wishes and agenda.”921 However, as the narrative unfolds, the “ordinary” fin-
de-siècle power structures and gender roles are overturned by allowing the usual subject of the 
experiment, “a woman, to seize control of the proceedings.”922  
Initially, the character of Miss Penclosa is portrayed in terms of the “irrational” female 
power to “attract, unbalance, even to destroy the controlled, organized Victorian male as he sees 
himself.”923 As a colonial Other—from Trinidad—she is able to “undermine male confidence” in 
 
916 Ibid., 8. 
917 Ibid., 6. 
918 Later on, reflecting common racial prejudice of the time, he will similarly attribute his hypnotic susceptibility to 
hereditary factors: whereas he himself is “black and “Celtic” and therefore more vulnerable, his neighbor Slater’s 
“phlegmatic Saxon temperament” makes him less susceptible to miss Penclosa’s powers. Ibid., 72. 
919 Ibid., 9. 
920 Habbe, 52. 
921 Ibid., 56. 
922 Ibid., 62 
923 Knight, 181. 
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her “overturning of a moralized racial hierarchy.”924 Paradoxically, in a sense, Miss Penclosa 
seems to be more “scientifically” advanced than Gilroy, when, noting his aversion to Mesmerism, 
she exclaims: “Dear me, I thought science had got further than that.”925 Nevertheless, due to the 
unease that stems from her Otherness and hypnotic powers, like Du Maurier’s Svengali, she is 
exoticized and animalized throughout the text, with a lexical field that draws on tropes of 
predatory, often feline, creatures.926 Later on, she is demonized and denied humanity altogether, 
in descriptions that compare her to “a monstrous parasite” and call her a “devil woman with her 
tricks.”927 
Penclosa’s character is opposed to another, Victorian female figure, that of Gilroy’s young 
and innocent—English—fiancée, Agatha. The scene in which Miss Penclosa hypnotizes Agatha 
is set up as a spectacle with dubious esthetics and morals, in front of a mixed audience.928 In this 
demonstration, Miss Penclosa performs an induction then whispers a posthypnotic suggestion into 
Agatha’s ear (instructing her to end her engagement with Gilroy), and slips a piece of paper to 
Gilroy, telling him to open it the next morning, at 10 am. The theatricality of the scene is reinforced 
by the “red velvet arm-chair” which is “pushed into the centre” as Agatha adopts the passive 
position of the conventional female hypnotic subject: “lay[ing] back in it, a little flushed and 
trembling slightly from excitement.”929 
The stark contrast and imbalance in power between both female figures is felt in the 
verticality of the spatial disposition of their bodies, as well as in Gilroy’s reaction of repulsion: 
“She looked down at Agatha with an expression which I resented from the bottom of my soul—
 
924 Habbe, 57. 
925 Doyle, 15. 
926 For example, she is repeatedly referred to as a “creature” with “feline” eyes,” her voice “came through her white 
lips like a snake's hiss”; she is also compared to “a cat with a mouse”; “a tiger,” etc. Doyle, 13; 92; 122; 134. Like 
Svengali or Vautrin, much of Penclosa’s power is revealed in the descriptions of her eyes—which blend together 
animalistic, masculine and feminine traits: “her most remarkable, and … least pleasant, feature… gray with a shade 
of green”; “her eyes follow me about the room,” their expression “furtive”; “feline”; “imperious”; “fierce—coldly and 
inexorably so.” Doyle 13; 37; 88; 100. 
927 Ibid., 89. Significantly, Miss Penclosa comes to life with a fluidic power which she can direct but does not seem 
to own: without it, she is quasi-invisible. Indeed, it is only when she is actively hypnotizing another character that she 
comes alive with her power, which reinforces the split between two opposed states, even in the operator herself. 
“Strange what a silent, colorless creature she is save only when she exercises her power!”; “even talking about it gives 
her color and life.” Male hypnotists like Svengali on the other hand, seem to retain their powers even when they are 
not “exerting” them on a subject. Their power is inherent to their “masculine” nature, and is not dependent on their 
existence as a hypnotist. Ibid., 37. 
928 “All the company had gathered round us in a circle”; “something between a religious ceremony and a conjurer's 
entertainment”; “some awed, some critical.” Ibid., 17. 
929 Ibid., 17. 
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the expression with which a Roman empress might have looked at her kneeling slave.”930 Later on 
however, once Gilroy is under Miss Penclosa’s powers, this very lexical field of slavery is 
reworked into passages where the erotic charge of hypnotic rapport is brought to the foreground: 
“she passed her hand over my hair as one caresses a dog; and it gave me pleasure—the caress. I 
thrilled under it. I was her slave, body and soul, and for the moment I rejoiced in my slavery.”931  
As in The Horla and Trilby, Agatha’s acting out of the post-hypnotic suggestion the next 
day serves as indubitable proof in the minds of the characters. Described with the vocabulary of 
dissociation and dual consciousness, Agatha’s strange behavior and ending of her engagement 
with Gilroy portrays her as an automaton: Agatha is “not like [her]self,” her voice “was cold and 
measured; her manner strangely formal and hard.”932 Reinforcing this dimension of pure 
automatism, Miss Penclosa uses the image of clockwork, in which the mechanist model reduces 
the human body and will to a series of automatic reactions: “what I did was to set her mind as I 
might set the alarum of a clock so that at the hour named it would go off of its own accord.”933 The 
Like Trilby or Maupassant’s Mme Sablé, when confronted, Agatha is found peacefully reading at 
home, recalling nothing of their interaction except having fallen asleep while reading and of a 
“vague” dream about Gilroy.934 Almost as if he were a somnambulist himself, is only when the 
clock strikes ten that, with a process of—mechanical—psychological association, Gilroy suspects 
that hypnosis might have anything to do with Agatha’s unexplainable behavior.935 As was the case 
for Balzac’s Dr. Minoret, upon reading the explanatory note, Gilroy experiences a violent 
paradigm shift, which does not lead to religious conversion, but to acknowledging suggestion as a 
“fact” belonging to the laws of nature: “For me hypnotic suggestion was finally established. It took 
its place from now onward as one of the facts of life. That Agatha, who of all women of my 
acquaintance has the best balanced mind, had been reduced to a condition of automatism appeared 
to be certain.”936  
 
930 Ibid. 
931 Ibid., 88. 
932 Ibid., 24; 25. 
933 Ibid., 38. 
934 “I merely had a vague impression that you came into it. I cannot recall any thing definite.” Ibid., 32. 
935 “The clock upon the mantel-piece struck ten. Ten! I associated the idea with Miss Penclosa's note.” Ibid., 27. 
936 Rather than receive a causal or scientific explanation, suggestion is described with an analogy that reinforces the 
fascinating—rather than rational—aspects of hypnosis. Indeed, Gilroy uses a comparison drawn from the world of 
engineering and weaponry: “a person at a distance had worked her as an engineer on the shore might guide a Brennan 
torpedo.” Here the mesmerist is described as having the extraordinary—and violent—power to remotely manipulate 
the subject. Ibid., 29; 30. 
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Following Penclosa’s demonstration, Gilroy’s perspective on hypnosis radically changes. 
Because it appears to cause an “eclipse” of the soul, hypnosis refutes his initial materialism: “Her 
body was there on the velvet chair. … But her soul! It had slipped from beyond our ken. Whither 
had it gone? What power had dispossessed it? I was puzzled and disconcerted.”937 A second 
formulation is then proposed, consisting in a spiritualist description of (dis)possesion that confirms 
the relinquishment of the materialist paradigm: “A second soul had stepped in, as it were, had 
pushed her own aside, and had seized her nervous mechanism, saying: ‘I will work this for half an 
hour’.”938 Here, hypnosis is described as an infiltration of the material (body) by the spiritual 
(soul), as the hypnotist takes control from within and reduces the somatic envelope to an empty 
shell, and temporarily replaces one soul with another: from remote-control, the language has 
switched to invasion and possession, and hypnosis is represented here as complete parasitism.  
Far from referring to the subject’s active use of their cognitive imaginative capacities, 
hypnosis here blends together images of vampirism and spiritualism, as one’s willpower is 
“overridden by a stronger one,” and the operator “project[s]” their will “into another person,” 
leaving their own body “lethargic,” or gains “complete command over his subject … make him do 
whatever he likes.”939   
 
Scientific Enthusiasm: The Subject of Enunciation as Subject of Experimentation  
Unlike Maupassant’s text, instead of immediately creating fear and anxiety, the 
establishment of hypnosis as fact first sparks enthusiasm in Conan Doyle’s main character. Indeed, 
for Gilroy’s scientifically oriented mind, hypnosis implies a widening of horizons, an enrichment 
of observable facts: “my horizon of scientific possibilities has suddenly been enormously 
extended.”940 No longer dismissive of Wilson’s unexplored field, Gilroy is suddenly excited about 
the scientific prospects of psychology, which he now describes as touching upon “the very roots 
of life and the nature of the soul!” and makes his own physiological laboratory observations seem 
“petty” in comparison.941 Gilroy and Wilson then go on to conduct a series of experiments where 
Gilroy will be submitted to Penclosa’s hypnotic powers.  
 
937 Ibid., 20. 
938 Ibid., 30. 
939 Ibid., 40-42. 
940 Ibid., 33. 
941 Ibid., 34. 
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In this reversal, hypnosis has thus “corrected” Gilroy’s initial position about the relations 
between mind and matter: “The brain, I thought, secreted the mind, as the liver does the bile. But 
how can this be when I see mind working from a distance and playing upon matter as a musician 
might upon a violin?”942 As in Maupassant, the invocation of the wind—an immaterial force which 
acts upon visible material objects—is used to strengthen the argument about spirit: “the windmill 
does not give rise to the wind, but only indicates it.”943 At this stage of the narrative, a fact or 
phenomenon has thus emerged and reversed the order of primary causes and the hierarchical 
relations between the material and the spiritual. When Gilroy notes: “it was opposed to my whole 
habit of thought, and yet it was undeniably possible and worthy of investigation,” rationalism and 
materialism are now defined as “habits” to be deconstructed—the very same habits that were 
previously opposed to his inner “temperament” and “nature.” Accusing skeptical colleagues of 
giving in to “unreasoning prejudices,” Gilroy now established the spiritual as a “positive and 
objective” fact, worthy of scientific inquiry. In short, the narrator’s “conversion” has been 
completed.944  
One of the originalities of Doyle’s text is having submitted his own main character to the 
hypnotic experiment himself, and producing a first-person description of the experience. In the 
scene in which Gilroy is hypnotized by Penclosa, we find him boasting about the advantage of him 
being both extremely susceptible—a characteristic previously associated with femininity—yet 
capable of self-examination—thanks to his rational and scientific mind. Significantly, while he 
believes to be lauding the powers of science, Gilroy is in fact emphasizing the power of 
storytelling: “To have the power of examining these phenomena from inside—to have an organism 
which will respond, and at the same time a brain which will appreciate and criticize—that is surely 
a unique advantage.”945  
The description of Gilroy going into hypnosis, narrated from the perspective of the 
hypnotic subject, is both poetic and realistic:  
My eyes were fixed upon Miss Penclosa's face, but as I gazed the features seemed to blur and to fade away. 
I was conscious only of her own eyes looking down at me, gray, deep, inscrutable. Larger they grew and 
larger, until they changed suddenly into two mountain lakes toward which I seemed to be falling with horrible 
rapidity. I shuddered, and as I did so some deeper stratum of thought told me that the shudder represented 
the rigor which I had observed in Agatha. An instant later I struck the surface of the lakes, now joined into 
 
942 Ibid. In Gilroy’s new paradigm, the body no longer gives rise to the soul, but rather the soul is now “the rough 
instrument by which the spirit manifests itself. Ibid, 35. 
943 Ibid., 35.  
944 Ibid., 35; 37. 
945 Ibid., 44.  
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one, and down I went beneath the water with a fulness in my head and a buzzing in my ears. Down I went, 
down, down, and then with a swoop up again until I could see the light streaming brightly through the green 
water. I was almost at the surface when the word "Awake!" rang through my head, and, with a start, I found 
myself back in the arm-chair, with Miss Penclosa leaning on her crutch, and Wilson, his note book in his 
hand, peeping over her shoulder.946  
 
Here, the aquatic metaphor and lexical field of dissolution reinforce the image of drifting 
downwards, still frequently used by hypnotist to represent access to unconscious material, the 
“deeper strat[a] of thought” mentioned here. The repetition of the term “down” simultaneously 
creates an inductive effect for the reader, leading the text to perform what it describes. However, 
as Gilroy’s “shudder” and the adjective “horrible” indicate, the image of dissolution is inherently 
ambiguous, suggesting “nothing less than the disintegration of a soul, and the dissolution of 
personality.”947  
This aquatic metaphor is carried out into the subsequent experiments to which Gilroy 
submits himself: “What strange, deep waters these are!”948 In these experiments—as the 
Flaubertian narrator ironically pointed out—the fascinating dimension of hypnosis is linked to the 
difficulty in identifying the cause behind its seemingly extraordinary effects:  
Results, results, results—and the cause an absolute mystery. It is stimulating to the imagination, but I must 
be on my guard against that. Let us have no inferences nor deductions, and nothing but solid facts. I KNOW 
that the mesmeric trance is true; I KNOW that mesmeric suggestion is true; I KNOW that I am myself 
sensitive to this force. That is my present position.949 
 
Therefore, in order to prevent “drowning” and remain on the firm land of “solid facts,” Gilroy and 
Wilson adopt a rigorous scientific attitude towards their object, recording and manipulating various 
“experimental conditions” in a manner that goes beyond the amateur experiments set up by 
Maupassant’s character. Here, the doctors take note of varying parameters (“temperature of room, 
barometric pressure, pulse, and respiration”), engage in multiple classifications (“Notebook A”), 
use excessively technical vocabulary (“sphygmographic chart taken by Professor Wilson”), which 
all serve to guarantee the—illusion of—rationality of the procedures, in a quasi-parody of the 
Salpêtrière’s method. 950  
Most striking is the motivation behind the reversal of gender roles in the traditional 
hypnotic rapport: “Professors have demonstrated these things upon women at Nancy and at the 
 
946 Ibid., 45-46. 
947 George M. Gould, “The Ethics of Hypnotism.” The Open Court 4 (1890): 2172–73. 
948 Doyle, 47. 
949 Ibid., 48, emphasis added. 
950 Doyle, 49; 52. 
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Salpêtrière. It will be more convincing when a woman demonstrates it upon a professor, with a 
second professor as a witness.”951 Placing a woman in a position of scientific authority is yet 
another parameter to be manipulated by the male experimenters. Gilroy’s being “experimented 
upon” by Miss Penclosa is ironically presented as remaining under his control, described as a noble 
“devotion to science” and a “sacrifice which truth ever requires of us” rather than a gradual loss 
of control.952   
 
2.2.2.2. Fatal Attraction: Hypnosis and Parasitism 
 
The Rise of Anxiety 
Nevertheless, this emphasis and excessive faith in analytic-scientific modes of being in the 
world will be sharply criticized in the remaining parts of the narrative. Indeed, Gilroy and Wilson’s 
initial enthusiasm is quickly mitigated by the dangers of hypnotism, which, as noted in Chapter 1, 
was often conceived as a potential “relapse to the mental and social conditions of animalism and 
barbarism” by fin-de-siècle critics.953 Several passages of Doyle’s tale reinforce this association 
between hypnotic trance and the dangers of a “primitive” Other: “My soul was filled with a hatred 
as bestial as the love against which it was a reaction. It was the savage, murderous passion of the 
revolted serf” “and if the suggestion had been to assassinate me? … But this is a terrible power!” 
I cried.— “It is, as you say, a terrible power," she answered gravely, and the more you know of it 
the more terrible will it seem to you.”954  
The terror caused by these dangers are intimately linked to the power of the feminine and 
the erotic charge at the heart of hypnotic rapport. In Doyle’s text, Victorian fantasies and anxieties 
about moral dissolution thus blend together with xenophobic fears of being haunted by the—
punishing and persecutory—colonized Other. In this context, science gradually appears as 
increasingly helpless in the face of Penclosa’s dark powers.  
At the same time, science is equally unable to provide the distressed individual with the 
understanding and compassion that he requires. For instance, further on, when Gilroy has become 
 
951 Ibid., 49. 
952 Ibid., 50. The ultimate authority of the experiments is guaranteed by Wilson’s perspective, in case Gilroy’s becomes 
fallible during the process. 
953 Gould, “The Ethics of Hypnotism,” 2172. This fin-de-siècle conception is comparable to Dr. Vaucorbeil’s 
condemnation of hypnotism in Bouvard et Pécuchet. 
954 Doyle, 91; 38. 
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the helpless victim of Penclosa’s power and thinks of turning to Wilson for help, he realizes that 
he will receive no empathy from the cold medical practitioner: 
I am convinced that I should not have the slightest sympathy from him. He would look upon me as an 
interesting case, and read a paper about me at the next meeting of the Psychical Society, in which he would 
gravely discuss the possibility of my being a deliberate liar, and weigh it against the chances of my being in 
an early stage of lunacy. No, I shall get no comfort out of Wilson.955  
 
Indeed, when he finally confides in Wilson, Gilroy feels treated “like a freak at a fair” by a doctor 
who “has lost sight of human beings. Every thing [sic] to him is a case and a phenomenon.”956 
Gilroy’s downfall and experience as a vulnerable experimental subject denounces the 
medical position that he himself used to embody, as lacking humanity and unable to attain a 
complete understanding of the individual and his emotional experience. As Gilroy acknowledges 
the power of hypnotic rapport and realizes the impossibility of reaching objectivity in his 
experiment, he finally admits that his previous scientific outlook lead him to neglect the—
unconscious and affective—dimension at play in human relations, including his own: “In my 
eagerness for scientific facts I have been foolishly blind to the human relations between Miss 
Penclosa and myself.”957 
Indeed, with increasing frequency, Gilroy finds himself engaging in erotic behavior during 
his experiments with Penclosa, whose romantic interest is now clear—and is initially attributed to 
“her ardent West Indian manner.”958 Just as Gilroy’s aversion to irrationality previously concealed 
his strong nervous sensibility, his horrified reaction to the erotic nature of the hypnosis sessions 
points toward repressed sexual desire which the conscious—Victorian—self finds morally 
intolerable: “I could not, no, I COULD not, trust myself another moment… in a moment of 
reasonless passion”; “was it the sudden upcropping of some lower stratum in my nature—a brutal 
primitive instinct suddenly asserting itself? I could almost believe the tales of obsession by evil 
spirits, so overmastering was the feeling.”959 As the text progresses, hypnosis becomes a means to 
represent the dance of female seduction and male erotic impulse, concealed under a layer of moral 
guilt and condemnation that systematically associates the erotic—and hypnotic—with the 
primitive: “this creature … possesses no single charm upon earth. But when I am near her. … She 
rouses something in me, something evil, something I had rather not think of. She paralyzes my 
 
955 Ibid., 82-83. 
956 Ibid., 97. 
957 Ibid., 54, emphasis added. 
958 Doyle, 55. 
959 Ibid., 55-56. Capitals in original. 
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better nature, too, at the moment when she stimulates my worse. Decidedly it is not good for me 
to be near her.”960 Although Miss Penclosa’s character is now reduced to the external cause and 
trigger of erotic desire (“this monstrous temptation which drags me so low”) Gilroy no longer feels 
he can be master of himself in her presence: “I know that I cannot trust myself with that woman.”961 
In this sense, the rational, conscious will has lost control and power, and the main protagonist been 
stripped of all sense of self-mastery, as both agency and moral responsibility are shifted—via 
hypnosis—to the female character.  
 
Imminent Downfall  
Toward the end of the story, the erotic dispossession set up by Doyle’s text leads to a more 
general psychological disintegration, as Gilroy begins to doubt his own sanity and use formulations 
that resemble those of the narrator of The Horla: “11 P. M. God help me! What is the matter with 
me? Am I going mad?”962 Conjointly, Gilroy’s physical state begins to deteriorate as he keeps 
returning to Miss Penclosa’s house, gradually describing his helplessness with stronger and 
stronger terms: “as if the noose of a rope had been cast round me”; “I am in her clutch”; “I must 
do as she wills.”963 Here, the text puts forth the complete deresponsabilization of a narrator who 
attributes his actions and experience to the power of the hypnotist, which culminates in the 
metaphor of parasitism, illuminating the title of the novella: “while I am under the spell, she can 
make me love her … those odious impulses do not come from me at all … she can project herself 
into my body … yes, she is a parasite, a monstrous parasite. She creeps into my frame as the hermit 
crab does into the whelk’s shell. I am powerless.”964  
Unlike Le Horla—where the narrator’s madness was dramatized from within the 
undecidable framework of his solitude—here Doyle’s text also gives voice to Miss Penclosa, 
whose own discourse casts doubt on the narrator’s version of the story, shifting the blame back 
onto Gilroy:   
 
960 Ibid., 58. 
961 Ibid., 63-64. 
962 Ibid., 65. 
963 Ibid., 66. 
964 Ibid., 67. Several scenes of The Parasite bear striking resemblance to The Horla. For example, in passages such as 
these, “I lay down with my clothes on and began to read one of Dumas's novels. Suddenly I was gripped and dragged 
from the couch. It is only thus that I can describe the overpowering nature of the force which pounced upon me. I 
clawed at the coverlet. I clung to the wood-work. I believe that I screamed out in my frenzy. It was all useless, hopeless. 
I must go. There was no way out of it,” the narrative seems to switch to the fantastic mode, and yet continues to refer 
to a “force”—rather than to a “being”—that seizes the character and compels him to act. Ibid., 84 
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It was you who asked me to enter into a series of experiments with you, it was you who won my affections, 
it was you who professed your love for me, it was you who brought me your own photograph with words of 
affection upon it, and, finally, it was you who on the very same evening thought fit to insult me most 
outrageously, addressing me as no man has ever dared to speak to me yet.965   
 
With the insistent repetition of “you,” the text poses the central question that stems from the 
observation of post-hypnotic suggestion—that of “who” is really acting—and preserves a certain 
degree of ambiguity regarding the final attribution of responsibility, albeit in a less undecidable 
manner than in Maupassant’s text. By making space for Penclosa’s version of the story, the text 
pulls the interpretative framework back toward the hypothesis of the narrator’s delusion—perhaps 
even unconscious bad faith—rather than his possession. 
Indeed, Doyle’s parasitic model—which involves possession from within rather than from 
without—allows for such ambiguity to be maintained: the “force” overpowering Gilroy could very 
well be internal and post-hypnotic, not supernatural in the least.966 Rather, in Doyle’s text, 
“supernatural” and “naturalizing” passages alternate, with the narration periodically reverting to 
the “dual consciousness” paradigm and describing events from a psychological perspective:  
A peculiar double consciousness possessed me. There was the predominant alien will, which was bent upon 
drawing me to the side of its owner, and there was the feebler protesting personality, which I recognized as 
being myself, tugging feebly at the overmastering impulse as a led terrier might at its chain. I can remember 
recognizing these two conflicting forces, but I recall nothing of my walk, nor of how I was admitted to the 
house.967  
 
As the narrative comes to a close, the narrator becomes less and less reliable—which, as in 
Maupassant, is facilitated by the form of the first-person diary entry. Statements from other 
characters confirm this unreliability. For instance, his colleague Pratt-Haldane suspects that Gilroy 
suffers from “brain congestion.”968 Professional and moral degradation then ensues, as Gilroy’s 
Chair is revoked, and he is dismissed from the university. The plot then accelerates as Gilroy’s 
actions appear more and more irrational and “dispossessed”: he breaks into the bank of England, 
becomes suicidal, attacks Sadler, and finally catches himself holding a bottle of vitriol in Agatha’s 
boudoir, on his way to poison his fiancée. 
 
965 Ibid., 101. 
966 Nevertheless, it is important to note that the model of exterior demonic possession is also present in the story, 
almost “replacing” hypnosis in certain passages, as the character himself admits: “what would I myself have said a 
short month ago if one of my colleagues had come to me with a story of demonic possession?” Ibid., 106. 
967 Ibid., 86. 
968 Ibid., 108. Furthermore, one of his students lets him know that “in one portion of the lecture [Gilroy] championed 
the most outrageous and unscientific heresies,” and the character of Sadler compares him to a “madman.” Doyle, 110; 
126. 
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At the end of the story, suffering from absolute defamiliarization in a familiar world and 
alienated from the rest of his community, Gilroy appears to descend into madness, having learnt 
that “there are powers which are uncontrollable by academic analysis and classification” the hard 
way.969 Hypnotic invasion and loss of control having led to his literal “alienation,” he finds himself 
in a state of absolute moral, intellectual, and political isolation:  
I am weighed down and tortured by a power of which science knows nothing. No magistrate would listen to 
me. No paper would discuss my case. No doctor would believe my symptoms. My own most intimate friends 
would only look upon it as a sign of brain derangement. I am out of all touch with my kind.970  
 
Here, human institutions—academic, legal, medical, scientific—as well as human empathy and 
solidarity—friendship—are dismissed as equally helpless in the face of the “power” acting upon 
Gilroy. Unlike Maupassant’s tale, in which the final elimination of the parasitic force remains 
uncertain, The Parasite closes with a final certainty—that of failure. Indeed, Gilroy’s final and 
desperate hope of murdering Miss Penclosa is frustrated, as the woman has died of natural death 
before he has a chance to act. The main character’s ability to act has thus been utterly and 
completely annihilated, as the Other—the irrational, the exotic, the female, the hypnotic—emerges 
victorious, beyond Penclosa’s physical death. This is what leads Laura Habbe to describe The 
Parasite as “an anomaly compared with much of Doyle's work,” as here, in the end, “the rational 
hero is not victorious over the foreign threat.”971  
 
      *** 
      
Ultimately, The Parasite makes use of hypnosis as a powerful means to crystallize a variety 
of fears centered on the Other, especially the female-foreign. These late Victorian, moral and 
political-colonial anxieties are dramatized through the “dangers” associated with hypnosis at the 
end of the century, pertaining to hypnotic crimes, posthypnotic suggestion and amnesia. 
Simultaneously, Doyle’s text uses hypnosis in service of a spiritualist criticism of orthodox 
science, by reworking the relations between mind and matter, and using its “semi-science” to both 
threaten medical authority and force it to broaden its field of inquiry. Indeed, as Laura Habbe has 
shown, Gilroy experiences his final degeneracy not in spite of, but because of his scientific 
 
969 Habbe, 55. 
970 Doyle, 115. 
971 Habbe, 49. 
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investigation into hypnotism: his downfall can be attributed to his initial mindset which “ultimately 
neglects all other aspects of human interaction.”972 In this sense, Doyle’s tale can be read as a 
“critique of the tendency of materialist science to neglect the human aspect of research.”973 Rather 
than merely serve as “proof” for the supernatural, then, Doyle’s interest in paranormal and 
parapsychological phenomena also “serves to expose the impotence of a close-minded and purely 
positivist understanding of the world.”974  
Had hypnosis been conceptualized as a legitimate scientific object—rather than on the 
model of demonic possession and contamination—Gilroy might have learned that “academic 
analysis and classification” cannot do without taking into consideration the—affective, 
unconscious, human—elements that Gilroy excluded from it at the beginning of the tale. In its 
criticism of materialist science, Doyle’s text might thus also be considered as an anticipatory call 
for a science of the mind which takes into account the unconscious phenomena which inspired 
both fear and fascination at the end of the century, and were about to be theorized with the birth 
of psychoanalysis.  
 
2.2.3. Artistic Automata: Du Maurier’s Trilby 
 
The immense popular success of George Du Maurier’s novel Trilby led its main characters, 
Trilby—the tone-deaf model who became the most famous soprano in Europe—and Svengali—
the genius composer with no voice and “evil” hypnotist—to “enter the cultural mythology of the 
fin-de-siècle along with Dracula, Nora and Sherlock Holmes.”975 Indeed, while the “robust and 
ribald world of magnetic attractions remained part of the music hall and theatrical tradition 
throughout the late Victorian years,” it culminated with “the carnivalesque Svengalis who popped 
up in cartoons, poetic spoofs and plays, in the aftermath of Du Maurier’s triumph.”976  
Indeed, Trilby was serialized in the American magazine Harper’s New Month, and is 
generally thought to have been the best-selling novel of the nineteenth century. Published in book 
form in 1894 in the United States, it sold more than 200,000 copies in the first year, unleashing a 
 
972 Ibid., 49. 
973 Ibid., 50. 
974 Ibid., 50; 62.  
975 Elaine Showalter, Introduction to Georges Du Maurier, Trilby (Oxford and New York: Oxford University 
Press,1998), vii.  
976 Pick, 56. 
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passion “in excess of any evident logic.”977 There is thus an intimate relation between the reception 
of the novel, its theme, and the rise of capitalism and mass media at the turn of the century.978 The 
publication of the novel set off a marketing frenzy during which “the heroine’s name was bestowed 
upon a hat, several shoes designs, candy, toothpaste, soap, a brand of sausage, and even a town in 
Florida. Trilby’s face appeared on dolls, fans, writing paper, puzzles, and there were ice cream 
bars made in the shape of her feet.”979 By “drawing on popular myths surrounding musical stars,” 
the novel thus also became its own popular myth: “Reality and fictional topic matter uncannily 
echo each other.”980 In this sense, “it was as though the very reception of the book and the play 
manifested the hypnotic problem described in its plot.”981 
As a bilingual author, Du Maurier offers a fin-de-siècle perspective on hypnotism both in 
the francophone world, and on the moral, social and esthetic values of mid-century British society. 
Set both in Paris and London, the story takes place in the 1850s and early 1860s, but—in a gap 
similar to Flaubert’s Bouvard et Pécuchet—is told from the perspective of the 1890s. Upon the 
publication of Trilby, the medical press of the time declared that Du Maurier had produced “an 
exceptionally accurate rendition of the hypnotic relationship,” a “literary masterpiece, in which 
the conditions of hypnotism are used with the power of genius.”982 Du Maurier, who experimented 
with magnetism during his early years and remained critical of “the imperialistic claims of science” 
from then on, used his fictional representations of hypnosis “to point out the inadequacy of 
orthodox science, materialistic medicine or Darwinian explanations of psychology.”983 
Nevertheless, as was the case for Doyle and Maupassant, Du Maurier’s treatment of hypnosis 
perpetuates myths about the practice which were common in the popular and medical culture of 
the time. In the British Medical Journal, the character of Trilby was described, “like all thorough 
 
977 For Pick this success occurred “for reasons which had little to do with literary merit.” Ibid., 43. 
978 Henry James himself describes the effect of this ‘Trilbymania’ as a “landslide of obsessions, of inane incongruous 
letters, of interviewers, intruders, invaders.” Henry James, “George Du Maurier.” Harper’s New Monthly Magazine, 
34: (Sept. 1897): 607. 
979 Pintar and Lynn, Hypnosis: a Brief History, 1. 
980 Phyllis Weliver, Women Musicians in Victorian Fiction, 1860-1900; Representations of Music, Science and Gender 
in the Leisured Home (Aldershot and Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2000), 271. 
981 Pick, Svengali's Web, 22. 
982 Ernest Hart, “The Hypnotism of ‘Trilby’,” British Medical Journal (20 November 1895): 209. 
983 Pick describes Du Maurier as being haunted by “intuitions of unconscious mental states … as well as by a painful 
sense of ‘the unknowable’ in the human spirit and in the heavens.” After his death in 1896, his friend Felix Moscheles 
published a book recounting both men’s experiments with animal magnetism during their youth, titled In Bohemia 
with Du Maurier. Pick, Ibid., 19. 
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hypnotics” as being “reduced to the state of a marvelous machine, capable of receiving the most 
perfect training and in complete subjection to the will and the suggestion of the operator.”984  
In this section, I will begin by exploring how Du Maurier’s novel both reflected and 
participated in creating late Victorian fears about hypnotism, and conceptualized the relations 
between the medical and the artistic aspects of the practice by portraying “very strong images” of 
hypnotic rapport as it plays out on the opera stage.985 Then, I will show that underlying this 
evocation of the “dangers” of hypnosis, like Le Horla and The Parasite, Trilby gives form to 
unconscious anxieties pertaining to the inner conflicts of Victorian society itself, rather than 
hypnosis per se, and does so by relating these questions to artistic creation itself. Therefore, in its 
very representation—and moral condemnation—of hypnotic influence, the text simultaneously 
poses the question of the influence of the artwork on the recipient. Finally, as I suggest, beneath 
these fears also lies a strong fascination for a practice which, by the end of the century, was moving 
away from previous pathologizing and conceptions and hinting at the possibility of hypnosis as a 
natural and active state. As I will show, feminist readings of Trilby point to a more emancipatory 
reading of the novel in which Trilby uses hypnosis to her advantage, rather than being merely used 
by Svengali and his domineering powers.986 
 
2.2.3.1. Du Maurier’s Representation of Hypnosis  
 
Unlike The Horla and The Parasite, which focus more directly on the psychological 
questions of identity and dispossession, Trilby focuses on explicitly aesthetic questions, 
thematizing—via similar descriptions of hypnotic control and automatism—the question of the 
 
984 Hart, Ibid., emphasis added.  
985 Judith Pintar and Steven Jay Lynn, Hypnosis: a Brief History (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2008), 8. Indeed, 
in the same article of the British Medical Journal, the description of automatism is presented as compatible with the 
idea of hypnotism as a natural state, capable of enhancing the subject’s preexisting potential. As the article continues, 
it states that “the elaborate lessons of Svengali in vocalisation and dramatic passion might quite conceivably transform 
Trilby, who possesses a magnificent vocal organ, into a dramatic singer of the highest order.” Rather than an unnatural 
occult phenomenon, hypnosis concerns “the transformation effected in a perfectly natural and physiological manner 
in the subject under the influence of external of auto-mental suggestion.” Ibid. This conception, which aligns perfectly 
with Braid’s theory as we described it in Chapter 1, implies that “No new ingredient or endowment has been ‘injected 
into the subject’; rather the inhibitory influence of fear, shyness and other ‘interfering mental emotion; had been 
removed.” Pick, 125. 
986 Despite the centrality of these anxieties, because of its interest in popular culture, Du Maurier’s text is considerably 
lighter than Maupassant’s and Conan Doyle’s. It is often humorous and lighthearted, it does not hesitate to multiply 
puns, jokes, phonetic transcriptions of various accents, bits of song and various other snippets from “lower” culture 
and Parisian Bohemian slang. 
 214 
potentially authoritative and suggestive relations between artist, work and audience. Published at 
a time marked by the development of “multiple fads, tourism, the press and advertising agencies,” 
Trilby manifests awareness that “literature was inevitably part of this dynamic and shifting 
marketing world.”987 
 Furthermore, Du Maurier’s serialized novel is traversed with reflections on esthetic 
representation, whether visual, aural or textual. Set in Paris Bohemia, its three main characters—
Taffy, The Laird and Little Billee—are painters, who often discuss modes of artistic 
representation, and the respective merits of realist, emotional, or symbolic visual representations 
of reality in the work of art.988 Nevertheless, in Trilby, aesthetic questions mostly appear in the 
field of music, which Du Maurier’s engages with by drawing out the parallels between musicality, 
musical performance and hypnotic phenomena. 
Indeed, the medical discourse of the time produced descriptions of the potentially 
dangerous effects of music on the “susceptible” or “vulnerable”—often female—subject in terms 
highly reminiscent of those that applied to hypnosis. Doctors in Victorian Britain, for instance, 
feared the “strong physical” influence “on the body, mind and emotions” that music imposed on 
the nervous system of the listener.989 For instance, an anonymous article titled “The Piano as Cause 
of Neuroses” appeared in the British Medical Journal in 1899, reporting that the “crashing sounds” 
produced by musical performers “jar the delicate apparatus of the nervous system to a degree that, 
in irritable persons, might have serious consequences.”990 Like hypnosis, the musical experience 
was conceptualized in terms of the passive receptivity of a helpless subject, as “most listeners have 
little rational control over the way it influences them.”991 The act of listening to music was often 
described with the vocabulary of entrancement, as “in each experience lay the possibility of a 
radical loss of boundaries … a felt dissolution of the self, access to worlds of sensation unknown 
 
987 Pick, Svengali’s Web, 91. Indeed, “new mass literacy had fueled fears of a world of debased popular taste, in which 
books were just as often cast as agents of mental anarchy as they were celebrated as the sources of edification and 
education. While such anxieties and diatribes were not new, the sprinkling of neurological and degenerationist terms 
that characterized the later-Victorian discussion gave the whole subject of dissolute cultural tastes a particularly 
alarming and portentous scientific tone. Vulnerable readers were thought by some authorities to be entering into virtual 
trance states as they absorbed the latest vulgar best-seller.” Pick, 80.  
988 Little Billee’s paintings, with their “sense of beauty… quick seizing of a peculiar individuality… subtle rendering 
of a strongly received impression” are, out of the three, the only form of artistic representation which lives up to the 
“work of a master.” Du Maurier, Trilby, 20. 
989 Weliver, Women Musicians in Victorian Fiction, 5-6. 
990 Anonymous. “The Piano as Cause of Neuroses,” British Medical Journal (22 April 1899): 988. 
991 Susan McClary, Feminine Endings: Music, Gender and Sexuality (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1991), 151.  
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in ordinary waking life.”992 As for the musician, musical performance and technique served as a 
common example to describe automatic processes, and as proof of the existence of unconscious 
and habitual learning patterns.993 Conversely, in the field of hypnosis, musical analogies were also 
frequently used. As we saw in Chapter 1, music was already part of Mesmer’s treatment around 
the baquet. During the nineteenth century, it was then used to describe hypnotic rapport as 
harmony: “the empathy between magnetizer and subject, was frequently explained though the 
analogy of two chords vibrating sympathetically.”994 These reasons explain why in popular culture, 
music became associated with the figure of the mesmerist, “becoming part of his stereotypical 
character and a metaphor for the mastery he exerted over Victorian heroines.”995 Significantly, Du 
Maurier’s text itself is permeated with musicality and uses this association to its advantage. The 
repetition of recurrent phrases (“Milk Below”) and songs (“Ben Bolt”), of rhythmic patterns and 
rhyming passages, all act as musical leitmotifs that not only “help the novel to cohere,” but also 
inject, into the form of the narrative itself, some of the hypnotic power that it represents.996 
Nevertheless, rather than thematize the relations between music and hypnosis from the 
perspective of an isolated listener, Du Maurier uses the performance on which they both rely to 
underline their shared theatrical dimension. As seen in Chapter 1, the parallels between hypnosis 
and theatrical performance were extremely frequent during this time, producing tropes of the 
patients as simulators or actresses, and of hypnotic operators as manipulative stage directors. Just 
like Charcot’s patient Augustine would perform “on cue and on schedule” at the Salpêtrière, 
hypnotized women in the Victorian era, like Trilby, “utilized performance style that may have 
been unconsciously learned” or “consciously put on or posed,” turning hypnosis into a 
“performance art, just as mesmerism was earlier in the century.”997 Critics have thus drawn the 
parallel between Trilby and Charcot’s hysterical patients at the Salpêtrière, who while entranced, 
 
992 Pick, Svengali’s Web,112. 
993 “Music making as representative of automotive process was a significant and recurring example in scientific studies 
which led to an understanding that there can be multiple levels of consciousness coexisting in one person.” Weliver, 
9. 
994 Weliver, 267. 
995 Ibid., 15. Conversely, the new stereotype of the mesmerizing and all-controlling musical conductor emerged, after 
“the dominant style of musical direction had shifted from a previously favored impersonal attitude towards a more 
self-conscious stress on the power of personal expression and even the demonic force of individual genius.” While 
the mesmerist controlled the public by circulating the fluid, the baton becomes an extension of the conductor’s 
powerful, magnetic personality. Pick, Svengali’s Web, 113. 
996 Weliver, 13. For the importance of musicality—and musical variation—in hypnotic discourse, see Chapter 3. 
997 Showalter, The Female Malady,145; Weliver, 263. 
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participated in “an established type of performance ... displaying lively and gifted women whom 
society called ‘ill’.”998 
Du Maurier’s novel proposes a representation of hypnosis based on fin-de-siècle theoretical 
models of dual consciousness, that emphasizes the dangers of hypnotic trance rather than its 
therapeutic value. These fears are concentrated in the character of Svengali, who as Pick notes, is 
a “dazzlingly memorable” meeting point of various currents of fear and fascination that brings 
together “many of the fin-de-siècle forebodings about the nature of hypnosis, alien control and the 
unconscious.”999 Indeed, the hypnotic encounter between Svengali and Trilby corresponds to “the 
dazzling culmination of older mesmeric excitements and dreads, as well as of racial fear and 
fascination.”1000  
Although, as we saw in Chapter 1, medical texts of the fin-de-siècle insisted on learned, 
acquired—rather than innate—processes of entering hypnotic trance, like Poe’s mesmeric 
characters, Trilby is described as being naturally susceptible to hypnosis due to her 
“impressionable” disposition.1001 This innate susceptibility is reinforced by a strong social 
determinism that suggests, as in Zola’s naturalist novels, that vulnerable characters carry both 
innate biological flaws and environmental predispositions which lead to their ulterior downfall. As 
an orphan with a family history described as “a sad tale of drink and desertion, gambling and 
fighting,” within the medico-psychiatric terms of debate in the time, Trilby is thus “extremely 
vulnerable to hypnosis.”1002  
It is no surprise, then, that like the works examined thus far, Trilby also begins by 
presenting hypnosis as “a perilous encounter between a powerful actor and a passive subject.”1003 
Although it is introduced through the gateway of its therapeutic potential, hypnosis is presented as 
dangerous by The Laird early on in the novel, after Svengali relieves Trilby’s neuralgic migraines 
with its “unnatural” powers:  
 
998 Weliver, 259. 
999 Pick, 4. 
1000 Ibid., 220. 
1001 “She had a singularly impressionable nature, as was shown by her quick and ready susceptibility to Svengali’s 
hypnotic influence.” Du Maurier, Trilby, 53. 
1002 Pick, 23. 
1003 Pintar and Lynn, 6. 
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He mesmerized you; that’s what it is—mesmerism! I’ve often heard of it, but never seen it done before. They 
get you into their power, and just make you do any blessed thing they please—lie, murder, steal—anything! 
and kill yourself into the bargain when they’ve done with you! It’s just too terrible to think of!1004  
 
The specificity of Du Maurier’s text, however, is that it represents this pure domination of 
the operator over the subject through the analogy between musician and instrument: “That Trilby 
was just a singing-machine—an organ to play upon—an instrument of music—a Stradivarius—a 
flexible flageolet of flesh and blood—a voice, and nothing more—just the unconscious voice that 
Svengali sang with.”1005 As a singing body or automaton, Trilby is dehumanized and, losing her 
name, becomes La Svengali, a mere vessel for Svengali’s artistic voice:  
When you heard her sing the “Nussbaum,” the “Impromptu,” you heard Svengali singing with her voice, just 
as you heard Joachim play a chaconne of Bach with his fiddle! Herr Joachim’s fiddle ... what does it know 
of Sebastian Bach?1006  
 
As Elaine Showalter phrases it, once Trilby is under hypnosis, La Svengali is a mere “case” 
that the hypnotist-conductor “fills with sound.”1007 Indeed, everything that makes Trilby “an 
unusual and memorable character” is systematically taken away from her, so that by the end of the 
story she is “less of a protagonist than she is a clockwork doll.”1008 When the three painters see her 
perform for the first time, it seems as though Svengali is “conducting her … just as if she had been 
an orchestra herself.1009 This explains why the public often comments on the contrast between her 
beautiful singing and her “stupidity” off-stage, her inability to produce spoken utterances longer 
than a few monosyllables in German. Once she is under his spell, Svengali is able to “play her, 
quite literally as his instrument, until the end of her life.”1010 Therefore, the “musical brilliance” 
that Trilby demonstrates while under hypnosis is a result of “Svengali’s will and talent moving 
through her,” not her own.1011 Beyond—or rather, through—the specific question of hypnotic 
influence, this division of musical labor between singer and composer points to the gender roles 
 
1004 Du Maurier, 52. Here the opposition between the pronouns “they” and “you” reinforces the impression of a 
disreputable, esoteric and dangerous practice. The unnatural dimension of the therapeutic use Svengali made of 
mesmerism is denounced, rather than its beneficial aspect underlines: “I’d sooner have any pain than have it cured in 
that unnatural way, and by such a man as that!” Ibid. 
1005 Du Maurier, 299. 
1006 Ibid., 299. 
1007 For Showalter, this corresponds to yet another “myth in which men attempt to appropriate the creative organs of 
maternity.” Showalter, “Introduction to Trilby,” xix-xx. 
1008 Pintar and Lynn, 2. Indeed, the painters notice that her eyes are “larger, their expression not the same,” on stage 
she “stood vacantly looking at everybody and everything … she seemed quite passive.” Du Maurier, 222; 251. 
1009 Du Maurier, 210. 
1010 Pintar and Lynn, 4. 
1011 Ibid., 4. 
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still operating in the fin-de-siècle musical field: “in nineteenth-century Europe and America, while 
a great performer could be talented, only a composer could have innate, immutable genius.”1012 
In such conceptions of hypnotic rapport, Svengali possesses Trilby parasitically, using her 
like an instrument, against her will and without her knowledge. Early on in the narrative, the 
forceful, coercive dimension of Svengali’s attempts to hypnotize her underline the involuntary 
dimension of Trilby’s hypnotic experience, which bears resemblance to a psychical form of 
assault, even rape: “He would playfully try to mesmerize her with his glance, and sidle up nearer 
and nearer to her, making passes and counter-passes, with stern command in his eyes, till she 
would shake and shiver and almost sicken with fear, and all but feel the spell come over her, as in 
a nightmare.”1013 Significantly, the physical force of a male character—here, Taffy—is portrayed 
as necessary to protect Trilby from the sexual-hypnotic assaults of Svengali: “If Taffy were there 
he would interfere with a friendly ‘Now then, old fellow, none of that!’ And a jolly slap on the 
back, which would make Svengali cough for an hour, and paralyze his mesmeric powers for a 
week.”1014  
Indeed, unlike Doyle’s tale—which leaves the question of the responsibility of the subject 
and operator somewhat open—Du Maurier’s text makes it clear that Trilby is hypnotized without 
her conscious knowledge, even against her will. This can be felt for example in her vehement 
declaration that she will never love Svengali: “I never could be fond of him in the way he wished—
never! It made me sick even to think of! Once I used to hate him—in Paris—in the studio; don’t 
you remember?”1015 As Pintar and Lynn have noted, in this passage “the sinister undertones of the 
hypnotic relation come fully to the surface, where unscrupulous practitioners seem able to abuse 
their victims, with devastating consequences.”1016  
Svengali’s power is in great part due to his implanting a central suggestion in Trilby’s mind 
early on in the novel: “When your pain arrives, then shall you come once more to Svengali, and 
he shall take it away from you, and keep it himself for a soufenir [sic] of you when you are gone. 
 
1012 Weliver, 5. 
1013 Du Maurier, 73. Here one can note the old model, where the operator is described as authoritative and all-
commanding, and still relies on magnetic passes to induce the hypnotic state. The description of the state itself as a 
“spell” further reinforces the impression of passivity and helplessness of the subject. 
1014 Du Maurier, 73. Female safety is entirely dependent on the physical presence of a masculine force for protection, 
which, because of its “jolly” undertones of masculine camaraderie, minimizes the violating dimension of Trilby’s 
experience. 
1015 Du Maurier, 300. 
1016 Pintar and Lynn, 5. 
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… And you shall see nothing, hear nothing, think of nothing but Svengali, Svengali, Svengali!”1017 
The internal, subjective experience of the idée fixe or implanted suggestion—the description of 
which is absent from Maupassant and Conan Doyle’s texts, that prefer post-hypnotic amnesia and 
the retrospective recounting of forgotten actions—is described as painful, and hauntingly 
obsessive: “‘Svengali, Svengali, Svengali!’ went ringing in her head and ears till it became an 
obsession, a dirge, a knell, an unendurable burden, almost as hard to bear as the pain in her eyes”; 
“She dreamed of him, oftener than she dreamed of Taffy, the Laird, or even Little Billee.”1018 Even 
after Svengali’s death, as Trilby holds a large photograph of him (in which he is “looking straight 
out of the picture, straight at you”), the mere sight of his eyes puts her back into the trance state 
and causes her to sing.1019 When Trilby dies shortly thereafter, her final words are “Svengali… 
Svengali… Svengali,” which can be interpreted either as a confirmation of the monoideism 
causing her absolute submission, or as an accusation in which, in a final flash of lucidity, she is 
able to point to the actual culprit behind her automatic behavior and actions.1020  
To ground the complete alienation of the subject in “realist” medical discourse, Du 
Maurier’s text uses the vocabulary of hypnotic dissociation and the “dual consciousness” 
paradigm, as it was found in the work of Boris Sidis, Morton Prince, and Pierre Janet. As Gecko 
describes at the end of the novel, hypnosis created—or revealed, depending on one’s school of 
hypnotism—a second, dissociated personality in Trilby, of which the “ordinary” consciousness 
has no recollection.1021 Indeed, as Gecko exclaims:  
 
1017 Du Maurier, 52. 
1018 Ibid., 53; 93.  
1019 Ibid., 282-283. Svengali’s power over Trilby is so strong that by the end of the story, she is described as having 
“the obedience and devotion of a dog.” Du Maurier, 246. The final scene of the portrait, beyond the Gothic trope of 
hypnosis operating from beyond the grave, draws on those of magnetic attraction and of the scopic invasiveness of 
the hypnotist. In Trilby, descriptions of Svengali’s gaze are crucial on a narrative level, as “it is through the gaze, or 
her sustained eye contact with Svengali, that La Svengali is held entranced and ‘conducted’ in her public 
performances.” Weliver, 256. Indeed, without the physical presence and eye contact of the hypnotist, Trilby is unable 
to sing: “Svengali would not be parted from her for a minute, or trust her out of his sight.” Du Maurier, 246.  
1020 Du Maurier, 284. 
1021 Indeed, in Du Maurier’s text, “Trilby’s waking state and her hypnotized state are so discrete from one another that 
there is no overlap in her memory at all.” Pintar and Lynn, 7. This split is confirmed in numerous passages, for instance, 
when The Laird exclaims, unable to reconcile the old Trilby and the cold, remote behavior of La Svengali: “It’s not 
Trilby—I swear! She could never have done that—It’s not in her! And it’s another face altogether—I’m sure of it!” 
After Svengali’s death, Trilby herself seems to suffer from post-hypnotic amnesia, which reinforces split between her 
hypnotic (forgotten) self and her present (amnesic) self: “Struck me! rehearsing? …what are you talking about, dear 
Taffy? Svengali never struck me! He was kindness itself—always! And what should I rehearse? … I never sang at 
any theater. … It all seems like a bad dream! Was it a dream I wonder? … You’re dreaming Little Billee—you’re 
taking me for somebody else.” Here, the use of italics in the text, especially in connection with the first-person 
pronoun, serves to reinforce this split on a formal level. Du Maurier, 235; 255. 
 220 
There were two Trilbys. There was the Trilby you knew, who could not sing one single note in tune. She was 
an angel of paradise... with one wave of his hand over her—with one look of his eye—with a word—Svengali 
could turn her into the other Trilby, his Trilby—and make her do whatever he liked ... you might have run a 
red-hot needle into her and she would not have felt it. He had but to say ‘Dors!’ and she suddenly became an 
unconscious Trilby of marble, who could produce wonderful sounds—just the sounds he wanted, and nothing 
else—and think his thoughts and wish his wishes—and love him at his bidding with a strange, unreal 
factitious love.1022 
 
As we saw in Chapter 1, this split is conceived as one between two separate, isolated and 
alternating personalities, which enjoy continuous existence. As in the work Janet, here too the 
second consciousness can “develop so independently of the main consciousness as to rival with it 
for bodily control, transforming into a walking, talking second personality.1023 Indeed, “When 
Svengali’s Trilby was singing—or seemed to you as if she were singing—our Trilby had ceased 
to exist ... our Trilby was fast asleep ... in fact, our Trilby was dead.’1024 In the novel, the idea that 
the “real” Trilby’s existence continued, “under” that of the second consciousness of La Svengali, 
is confirmed, when “our Trilby” reappears at the end of the text after Svengali’s death. This 
“original” identity reappears having retained the integrality of her emotional and intellectual 
capacities, except for the post-hypnotic amnesia which denies her all recollection of her actions 
while La Svengali was operating.  
 
2.2.3.2. Underlying Late Victorian Anxieties 
 
In Trilby, descriptions of hypnosis provide the necessary vocabulary and imagery allowing 
for the verbalization—in quasi-Freudian displacement—of three central Victorian anxieties. 
Pointing to the fragility of the conscious self, they also reveal underlying preoccupations about the 
foreign “alien” and Jewishness, crowd psychology, and female sexuality. 
 
Antisemitism 
First of all, in its descriptions of Svengali, Du Maurier’s text incorporates and perpetuates 
the antisemitic discourse of the 1890s, according to which Jewish people were “contaminating the 
mind and body of gentiles, as well as controlling everything from the stock market to public taste 
in art” and were “routinely cast as financial wizards, omniscient seers or mysteriously omnipotent 
 
1022 Du Maurier, 298. 
1023 Jill Galvan, The Sympathetic Medium: Feminine Channeling, the Occult, and Communication Technologies, 
1859–1919 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010), 123. 
1024 Du Maurier, 298-299. 
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bankers.”1025 Indeed, as Pick has convincingly argued, a great part of the fear-inducing dimension 
of Svengali’s character is linked to his Jewishness:  
The image of the bewitching and inveigling Jew brought together a range of fears: not only of exploitation 
and parasites, but the prospect of a kind of enchantment, in which an abject and dirty alien figure successfully 
entered into and distorted the victim’s mind and body. The Svengalian narrative brought together two widely 
rehearsed historical concerns: the hypnotic man’s wrongful possession of the woman and the Jew’s capacity 
to invade the gentile. The Jew at issue here was a fantasized object into which a variety of psychologically 
unwanted features was projected. But via the image of hypnosis, the reviled and envious figure was then, as 
it were, imaginatively reinternalized, perceived as a terrifying psychic ‘insider’, the resurgent master in the 
house of the unsuspecting gentile’s ego.1026   
 
In Trilby, Svengali is described as an unclean, cunning and repulsive character. As in one of 
Balzac’s novels, his physical traits serve to represent moral aspects:  
He was very shabby and dirty … his thick, heavy, languid, lusterless black hair fell down behind his ears on 
to his shoulders, in that musician-like way that is so offensive to the normal Englishman. He had bold, 
brilliant black eyes, with long heavy lids, a thin, sallow face, and a beard of burnt-up black, which grew 
almost from his under eyelids ... He went by the name of Svengali, and spoke fluent French with a German 
accent and humorous German twists and idioms, and his voice was very thin and mean and harsh, and often 
broke into a disagreeable falsetto.1027  
 
In these antisemitic descriptions, Jewishness is portrayed as “strangerhood incarnated within the 
host culture,” while Jews become a “receptacle for all those qualities it is comfortable to 
disown.”1028 Indeed, as Pick argues, they become a moral “lightning conductor” for unwanted parts 
of the self and uncontainable social forces, “the depository of what would otherwise be recognized 
as disintegrative forces within the community.”1029 In such discourses, “the internal negativity of 
society itself is channeled into the Jew.”1030 
On the other hand, Little Billee’s “Jewish blood” is also described as a sign of creative 
genius and artistic potential, pointing to his latent kinship with Svengali. Indeed, Little Billee’s 
painting is compared to Svengali’s musical talent on equal terms: “his touch on either canvas or 
paper was like Svengali’s on the keyboard—unique.”1031 As Elaine Showalter summarizes it, 
“Jewish blood, to use the peculiarly fin-de-siècle and Darwinian inflection of Du Maurier’s text, 
 
1025 Pick, Svengali’s Web, 4. 
1026 Ibid., 222. 
1027 Du Maurier, 13, 1992 ed. Here, the lexical fields of darkness and artifice (which the Italian musical term “falsetto” 
reinforces) are combined with the evocation of Svengali as an alien parasite threatening to “contaminate” English and 
Gentile identities. 
1028 Pick 211. See for instance the description of Svengali “walking up and down the earth seeking whom he might 
cheat, betray, exploit, borrow money from, make brutal fun of, bully if he dared… was about as bad as they make’em.” 
Du Maurier, 42. 
1029 Du Maurier, 212.  
1030 Ibid., 212. 
1031 Ibid., 55. 
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carries genius. Not only Svengali but the great singer Glorioli, and Little Billee himself, are 
influenced by it.”1032 Furthermore, at the end of the novel, Du Maurier switches perspectives, and 
“writes about the effects of anti-Semitism on Svengali’s life and psyche; ‘his life had been a long, 
hard struggle.’”1033 Even so, the description of Svengali as a dangerous Jewish hypnotist 
corresponds to yet another “innumerable variations on the metaphors of unfitness, parasitism, 
vampirism, corrosion” which served to voice concerns about “the danger of racial difference—or 
racial fusion—in the age of Svengali.”1034 
 
 Crowd Psychology 
Secondly, Trilby uses hypnosis as a means to verbalize late nineteenth-century anxieties 
centered on the affective mimesis and suggestibility of the public occurring in crowd 
psychology.1035 As Pick has shown, hypnosis “offered a language to conceptualize what was really 
going on in individuals and groups who had, as it were, lost their hearts and minds to politicians, 
lovers, musicians or enchanting theatrical performers.”1036 Such accounts, which underlined the 
ubiquity of imitation and fascination, echoed the theories which flourished in France at the end of 
the century and explored “the powerful hypnotic investment in all political and commercial 
relations, the bewitching features of the most material of objects and the most ephemeral of social 
 
1032 Showalter, “Introduction to Trilby,” xx. 
1033 Ibid., xx. 
1034 Pick, Svengali’s Web, 202. 
1035 Crowd psychology—which developed with the work of Scipio Sighele in Italy (La Folla Delinquente, 1891) and 
in France, with that of Gabriel Tarde (Les Lois de l’imitation, 1890), Henry Fournial (Essai Sur la Psychologie des 
Foules 1892), and Gustave Le Bon (Psychologie des Foules, 1895)—emerged in part as a way to address the anxieties 
of the bourgeois individual after the French Revolution in the face of the “threat” of popular insurrection. The concepts 
of hypnosis, suggestibility, and imitation were used to explain public behavior and opinions, and the mutual influence 
among individuals in the crowd. In The Laws of Imitation, Tarde famously developed the concept of the “social tie” 
as imitation, and imitation as a form of “somnambulism”: “the social fact is a relation of imitation”; and ““Imitation 
is a social tie for it is either dogma or power which binds men together.” Gabriel Tarde. The Laws of Imitation (1890; 
New York: Henry Holt, The Mershon Company Press, 1903), 76-77; xvi; xxii. According to Gustave Le Bon, in the 
crowd, the individual “is no longer conscious of his acts. … As in the case of the hypnotised subject, at the same time 
that certain faculties are destroyed, others may be brought to a high degree of exaltation. Under the influence of a 
suggestion, he will undertake the accomplishment of certain acts with irresistible impetuosity. This impetuosity is the 
more irresistible in the case of crowds … the suggestion being the same for all the individuals of the crowd, it gains 
in strength by reciprocity.” Gustave Le Bon, The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind (1895; London: Macmillan, 
1896), 7-8. As in a state of trance, individuals in crowds, whose individuality disappears, are likely to execute orders 
that they would not obey as isolated individuals. Mental contagion, the central feature of crowd formation, based on 
association of ideas, is conceptualized thanks to hypnosis and suggestibility, and its psychology and behaviour 
explained by “primitive” or “inferior” forms of evolution,” also found in children and women. Ibid., 32.  
1036 Pick, 69.  
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exchanges.”1037 Gabriel Tarde’s famous theorization of the social bond as imitation in Les Lois de 
l’imitation, for example, draws the analogy—as does the July 14th entry in Maupassant’s Horla—
between the citizen and the sleepwalker or hypnotic subject: “The social like the hypnotic state is 
only a form of dream, a dream of  command and a dream of action. Both the somnambulist and 
the social man are possessed by the illusion that their ideas, all of which have been suggested to 
them, are spontaneous.”1038 
Rather than write about crowd psychology from a socio-political perspective, however, Du 
Maurier centered his reflection on the esthetic realm, limiting it to the opera stage and the question 
of the circulation of cultural artifacts (often described, as Weliver points out, with the vocabulary 
evolutionist psychology).1039 Even so, the underlying fear of a manipulating force acting behind 
the movements of the crowd is a similar one: “Du Maurier did not write of urban riots, but of wild 
bourgeois passions at the theatre. Yet the fact that, behind the scenes, a foreign, low-tide Svengali 
could orchestrate the emotions of the audience hinted at this darker and more sinister world of 
group manipulations.”1040 Indeed, the opera stage is an ideal setting to represent the movements 
unconscious imitation, since the musical performance “transforms social interaction from artificial 
mannerisms into spontaneous, natural emotion.”1041 
 
1037 Ibid., 82. 
1038 Tarde, The Laws of Imitation, 77. See The Horla: “July 14—It is idiotic, though, to be happy on schedule, on a 
day decreed by the government. The people are an imbecile herd, sometimes stupidly patient and sometimes 
ferociously rebellious. They are told, ‘Have fun.’ They have fun. They are told, ‘Go fight with your neighbor.’ They 
go fight…. Those who run it are also fools; but instead of obeying people, they obey principles … that is, ideas 
imagined to be definite and immutable, in this world where we are sure of nothing, since light is an illusion, since 
sound is an illusion.” Maupassant, 16-17, emphasis added. This passage is also especially fitting Gustave Le Bon’s 
contention that leaders are hypnotized by the ideas that “possess” them: “The leader has … himself been hypnotised 
by the idea, whose apostle he has since become. It has taken possession of him to such a degree that everything outside 
it vanishes, and that every contrary opinion appears to him an error or a superstition. An example in point is 
Robespierre, hypnotised by the philosophical ideas of Rousseau, and employing the methods of the Inquisition to 
propagate them. The leaders we speak of are more frequently men of action.” Le Bon, The Crowd: A Study of the 
Popular Mind, 72. 
1039 Weliver, 250. 
1040 Pick, 73. 
1041 In this contagious mimetic process of listening to the performance, “physiological associationism occurs through 
involuntary physical responses by the audience … Muscles involuntarily contracting, causing tears and laughter,” and 
so on. This description “fit evolutionary biologists’ descriptions of physiological associationism.” Weliver, 250-251. 
In addition to the opera, the novel also describes the suggestive—hypnotic and harmonizing—powers of music in the 
context of religious ceremonies, where even “true Britons of very advanced liberal and religious opinions” are 
temporarily “converted.” Du Maurier, 110. This same suggestive dimension of religion via music is found at the end 
of chapter VIII of Bouvard et Pécuchet (see for instance: “They listened to the Gospel and the Credo… This faith on 
the part of others touched Bouvard in spite of his reason, and Pécuchet in spite of the hardness of his heart… Then 
burst forth a strain of gladness inviting the whole world to the feet of the King of Angels. Bouvard and Pécuchet 
involuntarily joined in it, and they felt, as it were, a new dawn rising in their souls.” Flaubert, Bouvard et Pécuchet, 
314-315. Here, when the Englishmen hear the beauty of the music during the religious ceremony, “their susceptible 
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Therefore, during her performance, “it is not just music that Trilby communicates but the 
mesmeric state itself. By her enchanting song, she passes on her own fascination to her 
audience.”1042 On stage, La Svengali “draws together in unity an audience initially made up of “the 
most cynically critical people in the world,”1043 with her “seductive” and “strangely sympathetic” 
voice that “drives you mad!,” is “irresistible” and “forces itself on you.”1044 When she sings 
Chopin’s “Impromptu in A flat”—“that wondrous song without words’—every note is “a gem of 
sound, linked to the next by a magic bond.”1045 Here, the mesmerizing effects are transmitted 
through musicality itself, through melody and harmony, rather than verbal utterances or 
suggestions. During the performance, Little Billee finds himself in a trance: “he believed himself 
to be fast asleep … and was trying his utmost not to wake,” and “seemed to be looking inward at 
some transcendent dream of his own,” with a “smile almost idiotic in rapture.”1046 And indeed, at 
the end of the show, bathing in a general oceanic feeling, the united audience seems to be under a 
spell of its own and begins to act just automatically as Trilby: “all the fellows went mad and gave 
her their watches and diamond studs and gold scarf-pins… I was just as mad myself… it’s the 
particular twang of her voice I suppose.”1047 In these passages, Du Maurier’s text also gestures 
toward its own power as a work of art to affect suggestible audiences. As Pick notes, in Du 
Maurier’s evocation of collective euphoria—as well as “gossip, ventriloquism, exploitation and 
stardom”—the novel uncannily thematizes and “reflects, disturbs, interacts with its own overblown 
reception.”1048  
Furthermore, with these descriptions of audience’s responses, Trilby can also be considered 
as an oblique theorization of “the natural affinity between mesmerism and capitalism.”1049 Indeed, 
 
hearts soon melted at the beautiful music … and they were quickly in unison with all the rest.” In the scene of the 
Christmas mass, “the singing human voice had especially strange powers to penetrate into his innermost depths.” Du 
Maurier, 110-111. 
1042 Galvan, The Sympathetic Medium, 106. 
1043 Du Maurier, 159. As Weliver argues, because her music is “irresistible and programmatic,” it leads the audience 
to temporarily shed the artifices of social mores, “forcing a group to remember a natural state and stripping away the 
mannerisms of a group.” Weliver, 251. Indeed, at the end of her performances, the crowd forms a unity, not a collection 
of individuals: “The many-headed rises as one, and waves its hats and sticks and handkerchiefs, and stamps and 
shouts.” Ibid., 220. 
1044 Du Maurier, 211; 169; 218.  
1045 Ibid., 213. 
1046 Ibid., 213; 215. 
1047 Du Maurier, 171 
1048 Pick, 36. Similarly, Jonathan Freedman has noted the “mimetic and pedagogical” relationship between the “wildly 
enthusiastic” response of the fictional audience and the “similarly demonstrative historical audiences that viewed the 
dramatized version of Trilby in America.” Freedman, quoted by Vrettos in Somatic Fictions, 103. 
1049 Galvan, 106. 
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by describing La Svengali’s fans as spontaneously compelled to hand over their wealth, Du 
Maurier “never lets us forget the commercial stakes of Trilby’s performance,” which is also 
“dramatized as a kind of mesmerism.”1050 In her ability to hypnotize the audience, Trilby 
“prefigures and exaggerates the modern tendency to link mass communication to mesmeric 
domination.”1051 This reworking of the old fluidist concept of circulation into a fin-de-siècle 
representation of communication—where it is now artifacts, entertainment, performances and 
commodities that circulate—has led critics like Jonathan Freedman to call Trilby a “remarkable 
adumbration of twentieth-century mass culture theory.”1052 
 
 Female Sexuality 
Finally, in Trilby, portrayals of the hypnotized subject as passive and helpless go together 
with the unformulated fear, and simultaneous desire to contain, female sexuality.1053 The anxieties 
surrounding Trilby’s succumbing to Svengali’s manipulative powers and her marriage to him can 
be interpreted as more general preoccupation with the dangers of sexual corruption and moral 
violation. Indeed, during the late nineteenth century it was strongly feared that “sexual conquests 
amounting to rape might be facilitated by the trance: sexual violence concealed by the appearance 
of mutual agreement within the hypnotic couple.”1054 And indeed, under much of Svengali’s 
threatening discourse lie undertones of sexual violence and erotic desire. This can be felt for 
example when he describes his quasi-hallucinatory morbid fantasies—his “vicious 
imaginations”—of Trilby’s corpse exhibited in a “little mahogany glass case” in the Musée de 
 
1050 Ibid., 107. 
1051 In The Sympathetic Medium, Galvan even compares her to “a broadcast or mass medium, combining the power to 
record information with the power to disseminate it.” Galvan, 106-107. 
1052 Jonathan Freedman, The Temple of Culture: Assimilation and Anti-Semitism in Literary Anglo-America. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000), 101.  
1053 Indeed, as Pamela Thurschwell has noted, at the end of the nineteenth century “the sexual is being constructed 
amidst wide-ranging doubts about the efficacy of individual agency in relation to the invasive potential of art, literature 
fashion, new technologies, mass media, political movements, and advertising…The hypnotic aesthete threatens an 
eroticized, potentially soul-sucking manipulation of his audience through style as well as sex, and through market 
choices, as well as hypnotic imposition.” Pamela Thurschwell, Literature, Technology and Magical Thinking, 1880–
1920 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 38-40.  
1054 Pick, 95; 97. Furthermore, as Weliver notes, “part of the Victorian fascination with the image of singing woman 
was the inherent difficulty of distinguishing whether she was angel or siren.” Weliver, 7. And indeed, Trilby is a fallen 
woman, who has inherited “all of the virtues but one.” Du Maurier, 65. For critics like Thurschwell, her “palimpsestic 
history” of trauma is in great part what makes her “vulnerable to the hypnotic effects of Svengali,” since “she is a 
barrier that has already been broken.” Thurschwell, 51. Furthermore, since nervous diseases such as neuralgia were 
“explicitly connected” to hysteria in Victorian medical texts, Trilby’s her migraines can be interpreted as symptoms 
which convert and express in somatic form her traumatic history, likely “caused by uncompromising, Victorian 
values.’ Weliver, 259. 
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Médecine, as if she were to complete Charcot’s anatomic-pathological collection at the 
Salpêtrière.1055 Of course, the magnetotrope is also used to describe Trilby’s own attractiveness: 
“grace, charm, magnetism—whatever the nameless seduction should be called that she possessed 
to such an unusual degree,” confirming the idea that fears about hypnosis are used to express and 
process underlying concerns about female sexuality and independence.1056 
Nevertheless, although in the eyes of Taffy, the Laird and Little Billee, Svengali’s 
influence upon “our Trilby” is monstrous and morally corruptive, upon closer inspection, it seems 
that her objectification occurs well before Svengali lays his hands on her. For instance, as Du 
Maurier’s biographer Leonée Ormond notes, “by sitting as a model for many of the artists in Paris, 
Trilby has already been appropriated as an object before Svengali ever sees her.”1057 Indeed, as 
Thurschwell has shown, “in the economy of the novel, Trilby’s body is aestheticized, dissected 
and evaluated in market terms.”1058 Early on in the narrative, her body is “mutilated and fetishized” 
by the gaze of the male painters, who “reduce her to a perfect foot, larynx or mouth.”1059 According 
to Showalter, such fragmentation can be seen as displacements of and defenses against a 
potentially terrifying female sexuality.”1060  
In this sense, the attempts of the British painters to “save” Trilby from Svengali can also 
be interpreted as attempts to maintain control over female sexuality, and keep her confined to 
domestic roles—such as working as a blanchisseuse de fin, her “clean old trade”—which is 
“predestined” for her, as it was for Zola’s Gervaise.1061  
Indeed, Du Maurier’s text constantly emphasizes Trilby’s “almost too exuberant 
joyousness and irrepressible vitality,” which the male characters all strive to contain by shaping 
 
1055 Du Maurier, 92. 
1056 Ibid., 261. Trilby indeed possesses her own hypnotic powers, which appear in the text well before she turns into 
La Svengali. For instance, in passages describing the effect of Trilby’s gaze on Little Billee, the trope of hypnotic 
attraction and absorption serves to describe romantic love: “Little Billee would look up… and find her grey eyes fixed 
on him with an all-enfolding gaze, so piercingly, penetratingly… that… in a waking dream, he would remember that 
his mother had often looked at him like that.” Du Maurier, 65, emphasis added. Further on, her eyes are also described 
as “twin grey stars—or rather planets” which gave of light “which was not entirely their own.” Du Maurier, 90. Other 
characters also fall under her hypnotic ‘spell’: Marta is “bound” to her “hand and foot… by a kind of slaving 
adoration.” Once Trilby is no longer a threat to her son’s social status, Mrs. Bagot—whose “quick susceptibility to 
such impressions was just as keen as her son’s”—, is “fascinated and entranced” by Trilby’s “childlike simplicity,” 
calling her “irresistible” and asking “didn’t you meet… anybody that wasn’t fond of you?” Du Maurier, 266; 274. 
1057 Leonée Ormond, “Introduction” to Trilby (London: J.M. Dent, 1992), xi.  
1058 Thurschwell, 53. 
1059 Showalter, xiv. 
1060 Ibid., xiv. 
1061 Du Maurier, 263. 
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her into expected and gendered Victorian forms of life.1062 From the beginning of the novel, the 
three painters take it upon them to give Trilby the proper, “English” education she has not received: 
“They lent her books—English books: Dickens, Thackeray, Walter Scott. She grew more English 
everyday; and that was a good thing.”1063 This leads Trilby to experience a “new born feeling of 
shame” when Little Billee walks in on her posing in the nude in a painting studio, his moral outrage 
leading her to question the modeling job that up until then, had posed no moral dilemma to her.1064 
Later on, when Mrs. Bagot—Little Billee’s mother—convinces Trilby to refuse her son’s marriage 
proposal for reasons purely based on social class, Trilby becomes “the one sinner that repenteth” 
and out of love, gives up her hopes of marriage.1065 Once she has been “set” in her “proper”—that 
is, moral and social—place, the best prospect she can hope for, rather than marrying him, is 
becoming Little Billee’s “servant.”1066  
In this sense, although they are not explicitly mentioned as such in the text, becoming La 
Svengali offers tremendous secondary benefits for Trilby, allowing her to break away from the 
rigidly predetermined forms of life that British society attempts to force her into. These benefits—
although the Victorian male painters can only interpret in terms of moral corruption and violation, 
and the text as automatism with undertones of hysteria—might thus also be read as emancipatory. 
In any case, in light of this analysis, the demonizing of Svengali and anxiety-ridden discourse 
about hypnotic seduction in Trilby can be interpreted as attempts to keep sexuality contained, and 
maintain women in the roles attributed to them by male-dictated Victorian moral and social values.  
 
2.2.3.3. Feminist Readings of Trilby: Hypnosis as Activity 
 
Unlike The Parasite, by representing a female victim of a male hypnotist, Trilby seems to 
perpetuate, rather than disrupt, gender roles that structure the history of hypnosis up until the late 
twentieth century. Nevertheless, recent feminist reception of the novel—which emphasizes the 
agency of the female character who remains ‘voiceless’ in the text for lack of access to her inner 
life—reveals that Trilby is perhaps more active than it seems. If this is true, then the conception of 
 
1062 Ibid., 90. 
1063 Ibid., 64. 
1064 Ibid., 82. Indeed, such moral guilt and turmoil never occurred before Trilby undergoes Little Billee’s disapproval. 
As she explains: “it seemed as natural for me to sit as for a man. Now I see the awful difference.” Ibid., 85. 
1065 Ibid., 128. 
1066 Ibid., 133. 
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hypnosis should not be reduced to the dangers we have mentioned so far but extended to 
incorporate the activity of the subject. In this final section, I propose that such a reading of hypnosis 
in Du Maurier’s text is possible. As I hope to show, beyond the male characters’ opinions and the 
narrator’s explicit discourse, rather than an unnatural state of pure alienation, hypnosis can also be 
conceived as a tool which brings out, reveals and strengthens Trilby’s natural potential. In fact, 
some critics have ever argued that “Trilby is the great artist of this story,” since hypnosis “turns 
her consciousness back towards her inner self, the source of her creative genius.”1067 Instead of the 
domination of one mind over another, the hypnotic relations in Trilby have also been read in terms 
of mutual dependency, and even, to a certain extent, to cooperation between Trilby and 
Svengali.1068 Such a reading would then confirm the hypothesis by which Trilby is less a victim of 
hypnosis per se than of patriarchal, Victorian morality—that is, of “puritanism, the double sexual 
standard, normative views of gender and class, and established religion.”1069 In these readings, “far 
from being totally victimized by Svengali or upper-class judgements, Trilby rises above attempted 
methods of containment” and has “some measure of control, though the men in charge of telling 
her story, conducting her performance … might not be aware of the woman’s participation, 
however slight.”1070  
Indeed, some aspects of the novel point to Trilby’s agency and ability to resist male 
attempts at control. For Phyllis Weliver, for instance, Svengali “does not succeed in mastering 
Trilby.”1071 In fact, for her, “in all late Victoria novels depicting mesmerizing music masters, the 
female subject cannot be fully mesmerized against her will.”1072 Indeed, Trilby’s strength and 
 
1067 Stephen Kern, Eyes of Love, The Gaze in English and French Paintings and Novels 1840-1900. (London: Reakton 
Books, 1996), 96. 
1068 For example, Weliver emphasizes the shared ownership, rather than pure recuperation, of Trilby’s voice: “While 
the narrator and the male artists believe female vocality to be controlled by male manipulation, ownership of Trilby’s 
voice is actually shared while she is mesmerized and then appropriated by Trilby after Svengali dies.” Weliver, 247. 
Furthermore, these readings also argue that Trilby’s despair after the rejection from Little Billee’s family and the death 
of her brother explains her voluntary choice to follow Svengali, rather than her passive submission to him: “Trilby 
disrupts the paradigm of control that he has imagined because she chooses him.” Weliver, 257, emphasis added. This 
confirms the idea that her passivity is a construction that neglects her own participation in the creation of La Svengali, 
a role which is only acceptable for her as long as she appears to be an automaton acting as an instrument for a—
male—conductor.  
1069 Showalter, xvii. In this reading, “Trilby’s illness, like Billee’s results from the interference of upper-class mores 
instead of Svengali’s mesmerism.” Weliver 257-258. 
1070 Weliver, 261. 
1071 Ibid., 257.  
1072 Ibid. 
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mutability has been emphasized as proof of her resistance and autonomy.1073 For Nina Auerbach, 
Trilby’s “power of metamorphosis defines her character” and “counter-point[s] her passive and 
stupefied role in the plot.”1074 This mutability operates on the physical level1075 as well as on moral 
level, as her character bridges the gap between seemingly incompatible roles available to Victorian 
women: “as simultaneous siren and angel, she haunts Little Billee as an image of infinite 
change.”1076 Furthermore, through her singing, Trilby is also able to demonstrate further ability for 
metamorphosis and variation, which Auerbach considers as further proof of her agency: “Finally 
the role of magus and mythmaker passes to her. Her ability under hypnosis to ring endless 
variations upon familiar tunes is the power of her character to transform itself endlessly and, in so 
doing, to renew endlessly the world around her.”1077 As Weliver argues, rather than being a mere 
passive vessel or instrument, Trilby also “contributes more to La Svengali’s performance than 
simply providing the physical instrument.”1078 On her deathbed, “she exercises her own will” by 
indicating her wish to sing again and requests a beat: “This is not an imitative automaton, but an 
equal who likes to sing.”1079 These readings are significant for our purposes as they convey an 
alternative sense of the hypnotic experience of a character whose interiority remains out of reach 
in Du Maurier’s text. If Trilby’s agency is preserved, this implies that she enters the state of 
hypnosis voluntarily and actively participates in the constitution of her experience. In claiming 
 
1073 Nina Auerbach describes her as a giantess, for whom “the novel's world is simply too small for her to live in,” and 
arbors both masculine and feminine traits (“she would have made a singularly handsome boy”) which defy pre-
distributed gender roles in the text. Nina Auerbach, “Magi and Maidens: The Romance of the Victorian Freud.” 
Critical Inquiry 8 (Winter 1981): 284.  
1074 For instance, throughout the text and before she becomes La Svengali, Trilby constantly switches language, 
occupations and lifestyles. Auerbach, 285-286., Hilary Grimes attributes this ability to switch between cultures as part 
of Trilby’s history. For her, Gecko’s belief that Svengali has created ‘two Trilbys’ is thus undermined by the fact that 
she is referred to as doubled long before she becomes La Svengali. Indeed, “Trilby speaking French and Trilby 
speaking English were two different beings.” Her duality also is exemplified in her friendship with the three 
Englishmen, as she begins to divide her time between “being a French model for the body and being a friend and all-
around helping hand” to the painters. Therefore, it is not hypnosis but Trilby’s history and the culture in which she 
evolves that is the primary cause for the splitting occurring in her: “Trilby’s self is doubled by her adoption of two 
cultures and languages, not by Svengali’s hypnotic passes.” Grimes, 78. 
1075 For instance, Little Billee muses about the “little innocent, pathetic, ineffable, well-remembered sweetness of her 
changing face.” Du Maurier, 223-4, emphasis added. 
1076 Auerbach, 285. By the end of the novel, both of these qualities have merged as Trilby is “simultaneously seductive 
and angelic”—qualities which are “celebrated” rather than cursed by the end of the story. Weliver, 274; 18. 
1077 Auerbach, 286. 
1078 Weliver also notes various examples which show that Trilby is more than a mere automaton under the control of 
Svengali. Drawing on the fact that while she sings on stage, Trilby displays one foot on a stool, just as she used to 
while modeling, Weliver argues that because her past identity and mannerisms are not abdicated while mesmerized, 
“Trilby’s personality creates at least part of her image as La Svengali.” Weliver, 264, emphasis added. 
1079 Weliver, 264. 
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that he has absolute control over his subject, then, Svengali himself is perhaps subject to 
narcissistic delusion and despite his technical mastery, to prevalent theoretical misconceptions 
about the nature and functioning of hypnosis itself.  
One consequence of such readings is that, rather than simply instrumentalizing Trilby, 
Svengali has in fact—perhaps unknowingly—“helped to perfect” her musical ability and develop 
her own, preexisting, potential.1080 This would explain why descriptions of Trilby’s voice that 
precede her transformation into La Svengali already stress her natural predispositions for singing, 
despite her being tone-deaf.  
In fact, contemporary reviews such as that of James Coates—author of a handbook titled 
Human Magnetism or How to Hypnotise (1904)—did defend the idea that hypnosis could be 
considered as a natural state which merely exacerbates the potential of the subject. In this sense, 
whereas Svengali claims to sing through Trilby, hypnosis actually merely “expresses aspects of 
Trilby’s natural state” just as it elicits natural response in her audience.1081 Indeed, as Coates 
argues, emphasizing the natural dimension and pedagogical potential of hypnosis: 
I am quite willing to grant the impossibility of a tone-deaf girl becoming a brilliant diva; but the fact remains 
that many subjects give extraordinary display of faculty in hypnosis, which neither they nor their most 
intimate friends imagined them to possess. The operator must ever remember that whatever powers are 
displayed in hypnosis these must be innate, for hypnosis ... cannot create any faculty. Every human faculty, 
as well as those of sensation, can be stimulated or exalted in hypnosis. ... I may say that Trilby had her 
prototype in Manchester about fifty years ago, and Dr. Braid was the clever, but in this instance reputable 
Svengali.1082 
 
Furthermore, for Coates, one enters hypnosis voluntarily: “the mesmerist is powerless to do 
anything ‘contrary to the [subject’s] will’ and ultimately mesmerism only highlights the subject’s 
innate disposition.”1083 It can thus be argued that hypnosis, as a form of training, “makes it possible 
for Trilby to learn and to overcome hearing deficiencies, just as Braid discovered in his 
experiments with deaf-mutes that qualities of hearing are often mind-induced, or at least curable 
though psycho-suggestion instead of being irreparable physiological defects.”1084 In this sense, 
Svengali does not act through her. Rather, “Trilby evolves from Svengali’s training.”1085  
 
1080 Grimes, The Late Victorian Gothic,78. 
1081 Weliver, 253. 
1082 Coates, Human Magnetism, 185. 
1083 James Coates, Human Magnetism or How to Hypnotise: A Practical Handbook for Students of Mesmerism. New 
revised edition (London: Nichols, 1904), 209. 
1084 Weliver, 264. Indeed, as Gecko explains that he and Svengali taught Trilby “for three years—morning, noon and 
night—six—eight hours a day,” taking her voice “note by note.” Du Maurier, 296. 
1085 Weliver, 268. 
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By describing hypnotism as “unnatural,” the male characters are thus denying the natural 
potentialities which it contains and unleashes. Attributing her singing to Svengali’s powers denies 
Trilby recognition for her own talent and technical prowess. In this sense, “by not recognizing that 
Trilby may become extraordinary when mesmerized and not crediting her own powers of 
creativity,” the British painters construct her as a passive victim, in yet another attempt to “manage 
her power and sexuality, just as they sought to contain it by making her responsible for her 
modeling and fallen status.”1086 Emphasizing the benefits that Trilby receives from becoming La 
Svengali therefore reinforces her agency, redefines hypnosis, and “debunks” the idea that 
hypnotism alone is responsible for Trilby’s singing.”1087 
Following this conception, distribution of authority can be disrupted and overturned with 
hypnosis, rather than against it. Rather than reinforce her servitude, hypnosis can participate in 
breaking social conventions for Victorian woman, as Svengali “trains Trilby to break boundaries 
that normally constrained female speech in sensation fiction,” allowing her to step outside the 
private sphere and produce music publicly and professionally.1088  
Rather than pure domination, the Trilby-Svengali rapport can also be conceived as a form 
of cooperation, in which “the mesmerist/hypnotist and the mesmerized/hypnotized share the site 
of power,” and a relation akin to mutual dependency emerges.1089 For instance, “La Svengali” can 
be conceived as a collaborative creation that merges the talents of both Trilby and Svengali. As 
Weliver argues, for instance: “two people are involved in the creation of La Svengali, and they 
share one will: to sing. In ‘La Svengali’ therefore, a superior being to either mesmerizer or subject 
is created, and it is one whose identity depends upon her female voice.”1090 Indeed, Svengali cannot 
succeed alone, as he is “absolutely without voice, beyond the harsh, hoarse, weak raven’s croak 
he used to speak with.”1091 Furthermore, as Galvan observes, Svengali must also operate through 
Trilby for reasons that have “as much to do … with her femininity as with his ethnic difference,” 
as he initially inspires repulsion and fear in the community and audience he attempts to conquer.1092 
In the end, both “need each other to fulfill their desires to sing,” that is, to produce the work of art 
 
1086 Ibid., 262. 
1087 Ibid., 260.  
1088 Ibid., 269. 
1089 Grimes, 2016, 64; 78 
1090 Weliver, 266. 
1091 Du Maurier, 42. 
1092 Galvan, 105. 
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and the aesthetic experience.1093 The music-master and hypnotist is thus dependent on the 
performer, just as the text depends on the reader in order to be actualized.1094 Their merging in the 
single name “La Svengali” indicates that have become “subsumed by one another.”1095 Indeed, as 
the popularity of La Svengali increases, their identities become “easily and increasingly 
interchangeable” and after Svengali’s death, once the connection between them is severed, “neither 
is able to withstand the fallout of power that ensues.”1096 Therefore, in Trilby, hypnotism per se is 
not held responsible for moral and social degradation. Rather, downfalls’ such as Trilby should be 
attributed to social and environmental factors on the one hand, and the abuse of power by self-
interested and power-hungry practitioners on the other, as well as to the novelistic necessity and 
(mis)conceptions of hypnosis to which her character is submitted.1097 
 
      *** 
 
In his novel, Du Maurier both reflected and helped to shape public anxieties of his time, 
producing a simplification of hypnosis that, like an illustration from Punch, was passed on in 
 
1093 Weliver, 266. 
1094 For Hilary Grimes, Svengali and Trilby have in essence hypnotized one another. Indeed, Svengali becomes 
“infected” with Trilby, his obsessive love—“how beautiful you are! It drives me mad! I adore you!”—echoes the idée 
fixe he previously planted in her mind about him. Grimes, 2016, 72; Du Maurier 104, 1994 ed. 
1095 Grimes, 78. 
1096 Ibid., 78. Simultaneously, Du Maurier’s text poses the question of the reader’s response—her implication, 
participation in the discourses circulating in the narrative, her own activity and passivity, and suggestibility. For 
Athena Vrettos, for instance, Trilby leaves the reader two highly gendered, options: either one becomes a “voyeur” 
who watches Trilby’s performance “from a stance of esthetic distance and sexual desire,” or one can “overidentify 
with the heroine and become feminized, indeed hypnotized, by her performance into a state of emotional collapse.” 
In this alternative between distance (aestheticization) and proximity (absorption, mimetic contagion), the hypnotic 
powers of literature reveal themselves. For Vrettos, these ‘powers’ lie, precisely, in the ambiguous structure of fear 
and fascination at the heart of Du Maurier’s representation of hypnosis : “Du Maurier shapes the scene so that we, 
along with the other spectators, are encouraged to respond to her deathbed performance with both fascination and 
horror.” For Vrettos, hypnotic “horrors” satisfy our own voyeuristic fantasies, scopic drives and desire. Indeed, the 
power of Svengali’s vision to ultimately “transcend the grave” and claim Trilby as his instrument during her moment 
of transition from life to death—like Valdemar’s own suspension between life and death—creates “an imaginative 
link between aesthetic appreciation, medical experimentation and necrophilia. By revealing the uncanny source of our 
aesthetic pleasure, Du Maurier thus “questions how we view what we view, identifying both our own susceptibility 
(like Trilby’s and her various audiences) to readerly suggestion and our compromised innocence in viewing the scenes 
before us.” By emphasizing our own role in such economies of vision, Du Maurier therefore “simultaneously 
encourages and disempowers the sympathetic audience.” Vrettos, 103-105. 
1097 As Weliver has noted, “Trilby does not critique mesmerism … but rather Svengali’s abuse of his human instrument 
and the social codes that drive Trilby to seek a cure from Svengali.” Weliver, 261. 
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ulterior (mis)conceptions of the practice.1098 In Du Maurier, as in Maupassant and Doyle,  “cultural 
assumptions that were tied up with the earlier technique and practice were transferred to the 
hypnotic relation as well, regardless of the fact that practitioners of hypnosis who were working at 
the time the novel was written took particular pains to distinguish their practices from those 
associated with mesmerism.”1099 These fin-de-siècle tropes of absolute domination, somnambular 
automatons, and quasi-supernatural hypnotic phenomena are far from having disappeared, as 
“centuries-old assumptions about the hypnotic relation and the nature of hypnosis” survive today 
to varying degrees in popular belief and practice, despite being “widely discredited by researchers 
who reject them as myths.”1100  
Nevertheless, narratives such as Trilby, The Parasite or Le Horla also used fascination as 
a corollary to fear, producing ambiguous responses in their readers in the same way that their 
villains, both frightening and fascinating, “cloud[ed] the moral and psychological oppositions on 
which their stories simultaneously depended: conscious/unconscious, man/woman, inside/outside, 
west/east, ape/human, subject/object, virtue/vice, Jew/gentile, the self-possessed/the hypnotized, 
and so on.”1101  
Indeed, one of the most fundamental structures revealed in the late-century representations 
of hypnosis is the inextricable relations between fear and fascination for the same object. As Daniel 
Pick has noted, “in the localized case of Svengali, and in the phenomenon of mesmerism in general, 
one repeatedly encounters this ambiguous ‘structure of feeling.’”1102 The representations we have 
examined in this chapter are fictionally (re)imagined extensions of the medical hypotheses and 
unanswered questions that the field of hypnotism opened up, as early as the 1784 commission.  
As Pintar and Lynn have noted, the assumptions about hypnotism unveiled in these texts—
and still surviving to this day—“are important in this history of hypnosis not because they are 
damaging misconceptions that need to be once and for all unmasked as false—but because they 
have become mythical, meaning that they are cultural images,” which can in turn serve to represent, 
 
1098 Indeed, the myth of Svengali is constructed on sharp, simplified, binaries. It “encodes a specific kind of malign 
alliance and establishes a clear division of roles between the participants: active/passive, corrupter/corrupted, 
hypnotizer hypnotized.” Pick, 215. 
1099 Pintar and Lynn, 10. 
1100 Ibid., 2. 
1101 Pick, 222. As Weliver argues “Just as upper-class ideals are set up only to be redefined in the course of the novel, 
so is Trilby’s performance first depicted in terms of passive female display but is then redefined and owned by Trilby 
herself.” Weliver, 247. 
1102 Pick, 209. 
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conceptualize or symbolize aspects of our form of life that they illuminate.1103 The myths 
surrounding hypnosis reveal more about the psychological, esthetic, cultural or ethical tensions 
and anxieties which produced them, than about the practice of hypnosis per se. 
 In this sense, one can draw out several key aspects which traverse each of the texts that 
we have examined so far, regardless of the mode of representation of hypnosis—parodic, 
enthusiastic, fearful or fascinated—that was used.  
First, each story functions on a disruption of the initial balance and characters’ 
preconceptions of the relations between the material and the spiritual. As Bertrand Méheust has 
noted, with this specific question, nineteenth-century fiction overpowered reality by literalizing 
and radicalizing elements which were merely hypothesized or evoked as possibilities in the 
medical texts. The stakes are especially high for many of the characters who believe they are on 
the brink of finally understanding the relations between mind and matter, such as Conan Doyle’s 
Gilroy (who is writing a paper titled “The Relation between Mind and Matter”), Balzac’s Raphael 
Valentin (who has composed a treatise titled “Theory of the Will”), Poe’s Doctor Templeton (who 
speaks of being “on the verge of some stupendous psychal discoveries”), and Maupassant’s Dr. 
Parent (who believes he is “on the point of discovering one of the most important secrets of 
nature”).1104 The fictional space is the ideal, and perhaps only, space in which to stage this power 
of expansion that hypnotic phenomena impose upon materialist positions.  
Second, in each of these stories, the narrative authority is in constant negotiation with the 
authority of medical discourse, alternating between varying degrees of criticism, conflict, 
alignment or complicity. In some occasions, medical authority and the apology of hypnosis overlap 
completely, as in Le Horla, where the Dr. Parent both represents scientific progress and practices 
hypnosis himself. In other occasions, the figure of the medical doctor becomes the object from 
which the narrative voice distances itself, in an effort to destabilize the certainties of orthodox 
medical discourse and scientific positivism. Often aligned with an initially skeptical position such 
as that of Flaubert’s Dr. Vaucorbeil—one of the rare doctors whose skepticism is never renounced 
and who never “converts” to mesmerism—the medical gaze, when confronted with the “fact” of 
hypnotism, serves to guarantee the “reality” of the phenomena under observation. In cases where 
the sanity and reliability of the narrator is compromised but the narrative remains framed by the 
 
1103 Pintar and Lynn, 2. 
1104 Doyle, The Parasite, 53; Balzac, La Peau de Chagrin, Poe, Mesmeric Revelation, 224; Maupassant, Le Horla, 17. 
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guarantee of this “objective,” medical perspective—as in the first version of The Horla—the 
“realism” of the text rests on the authority—or fragility—of a diagnosis which either confirms the 
claims of the character and thus extends the domain of science, or dismisses them as the 
pathological manifestation of insanity. In the second version of Maupassant’s Le Horla and Conan 
Doyle’s The Parasite, the diary entries narrated in the first-person remove such framework, 
dramatically increasing the undecidability already at the heart of hypnotic phenomena, 
transforming the conflict between narrative voice and medical discourse into a purely internal, 
psychical conflict. In all cases, figures of rationality—the skeptical or “converted” doctor, and the 
rational observer or experimenter—strengthen hypnosis’ claims to rationality, renegotiating the 
boundaries of what is to be included in the realm of Nature and its laws.  
Finally, whereas in the medical field, the dematerialization and transformation of 
mesmerism into hypnotism was linked to an increase in scientific legitimacy, in fictional literature, 
this movement did not follow such a linear process. While early and mid-century texts, with their 
curious enthusiasm, used mesmerism for philosophically oriented inquiries, the late-century texts 
used hypnotism to process fears centered on individual and collective dispossession. It is worth 
noting that Doyle and Du Maurier’s anglophone texts, although they still conveyed racial prejudice 
about the foreign other, did complicate the classic image of the male operator and passive female 
subject which remained a French topos well into the twentieth century. As feminist readings of 
Trilby have shown, hypnosis can also reveal the creative potential of the subject, thereby 
undermining narratives of pure passivity.  
As the century progressed, the acknowledgment of the ubiquity of suggestion in general 
helped popular and medical culture move away from conceptions of hypnosis as a pathological 
state which only concerns vulnerable, hysteric or neurotic women. As the roles of subject and 
operator became more permutable—as seen in Conan Doyle—the stage was set for a practice no 
longer constituted of susceptible subjects and powerful operators, but rather, of hypnotic 
phenomena and utterances, impacting all individuals, regardless of genetic predisposition, gender 
roles or cultural capital. With the rise of modern technology, media, transportation and advertising 
that made the use of suggestion visible all over the public space, hypnosis in the twentieth century 
was theorized as a phenomenon potentially undergone by all individuals, including “healthy” ones. 
Once overshadowed by the birth and rise of psychoanalysis however, hypnosis quickly lost its 
scientific legitimacy. Rather than an epistemological concept serving to probe into the nature of 
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the mind, hypnosis now served as a metaphor to explore esthetically and politically, rather than 
scientifically or purely medically, oriented questions.  
After the turn of the century, while hypnosis no longer served as a central means of 
psychological investigation, it still left behind a haunted/ing trace of fascination, that would be 
picked up again, this time in the aesthetic realm, by the Surrealist poets. Just like—as we showed 
in Chapter 1—hypnosis had to transform itself and reappeared unnamed in a variety of ways in the 
therapeutic setting, in the realm of literature, it survived the turn of the century by becoming a tool 
for artistic creation, rather than an object of representation. As the Surrealists experimented with 
inductions and automatic writing as a means to create a spontaneous work of art mimicking the 
automatism of the mesmerized subject, hypnosis transformed once more, reappeared structurally 
and formally in the very process writing, becoming linked to the formal experimentations that 
appeared at the beginning of the century.  
Furthermore, after the birth and rise of psychoanalysis, hypnosis in literature ceased to be 
directly associated with medical questions and became a more indirect means for novelists to 
explore the mechanisms of suggestion in a variety of fields, beyond the field of mental science. As 
we will show in the next chapter, although it no longer served to pose the central epistemological, 
philosophical and psychological questions that it did during the nineteenth century, hypnosis can 
nevertheless be traced, albeit unnamed, in the psychological processes underlying aesthetic 
creation and reception itself, in the “hypnotic” power of the literary text. As I will argue in Chapter 
3, the hypnotic dimension of literature, and novelistic prose in particular, lies not in the submission 
of one subjectivity to another, but rather, in the experience of absorption into fictional worlds, and 
in the suggestive dimension of literary evocation itself. This is why, rather than discuss the 
relations between hypnosis and writing, I will now turn to the analogy between the state of 
hypnosis and the act of reading itself, focusing especially on novelistic prose, and its ability—











Chapter 3. The Literary Dimension of Hypnosis and 
Hypnotic Dimension of Literature. 
 
 
 The house was quiet and the world was calm. 
 The reader became the book; and summer night 
 Was like the conscious being of the book 
—Wallace Stevens, 1972. 
 
Our conceptions expand—we become part of what we behold 
—Thomas Cole, 1836. 
 
I imagined that God had created light so that people could read, and through reading, 
see other worlds. 
—Evariste Galois, 1811-1832. 
 
A book is the dialogue it establishes with its reader… not an isolated entity: it is a 
relationship, an axis of innumerable relationships. 




Among other absorptive activities, the experience of finding oneself immersed in the world 
of a novel is a common trope, which hypnotists use with their patients or audience, before 
beginning hypnosis proper.1105 The purpose of this analogy—between hypnotic trance and the act 
of reading—is to dismantle and reframe potentially limiting beliefs which might impede hypnotic 
immersion, and reassure the subject by invoking the existence of a “common everyday trance,” 
that is, the variety of immersive activities in which humans regularly engage, and from which they 
emerge intact.1106 This common everyday trance refers to any activity—aesthetic or ordinary—
 
1105 In therapeutic contexts, the analogy between novel reading and hypnosis is therefore already a suggestion—that 
of the harmless, natural nature of hypnotic trance—and can become part of the strategic, “illusory” dimension involved 
in the induction of the hypnotic state. 
1106 Such activities include as driving, contemplating nature, beholding a painting, watching a film, walking or sitting 
meditation, being engaged in conversation, etc. As Roustang notes, “A book, a film, a voice, an inquiry can spark our 
interest, absorb or fascinate us.” Roustang, Qu’est-ce que l’hypnose?, 66. For Rossi, “in everyday life, consciousness 
is in a continual state of flux between the general reality orientation and the momentary micro dynamics of trance,” 
and therefore, “trance experience and hypnotherapy are simply the extension and utilization of these normal 
psychodynamic processes.” Rossi, in Hypnotic Realities. The Induction of Clinical Hypnosis and Forms of Indirect 
Suggestion (New York: Irvington Publishers, 1976), 230.  
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“wherein we are absorbed in a moment of inner reverie or preoccupation,” and go about our daily 
routine “somewhat automatically,” as “much of our attention is focused inward.”1107 In this sense, 
hypnotic trance is not exceptional but occurs spontaneously in the lives of human beings. It 
“resembles everyday experiences when one is so absorbed in something—a book, a film, some 
music or one’s own daydreams—that one may not even respond to one’s name when it is 
called.”1108 
 
The Analogy Between Reading Fiction and Hypnosis: Similarities and Differences 
In this chapter, I will be focusing specifically on this type of aesthetic experience in order 
to underline parallels between hypnotic and novelistic immersion.1109 At first glance however, the 
comparison between hypnosis and novel reading might not seem the most obvious choice, given 
the numerous other possible comparisons with various other illusionist or absorptive art forms. 
For instance, hypnosis is more often compared to drama than it is to novels, given its 
performative dimension and its association with the question of simulation, which we discussed in 
Chapter 1.1110 Furthermore, because hypnosis often involves a subject enthralled in mental 
imagery, a comparison with visual arts—such as painting, or cinema, in which images are in 
 
1107 Rossi, Ibid., 1. 
1108 Heap et al, The Highly Hypnotizable Person, 11. 
1109 In this chapter, we will be using the term “hypnosis” in this extended sense: “if we begin to realize that words, 
and other forms of communication, may cause an individual to turn inward and create a hallucinated world to which 
the individual responds, we have broadened our concept of hypnosis.” In this context, the distinction between modern 
definitions of hypnotic trance and aesthetic absorption can sometimes be surprisingly difficult to pinpoint. Indeed, the 
definition of hypnosis as an introspective and imaginative response to language makes it difficult to distinguish from 
absorptive reading. For instance, hypnosis is defined as “a person turning inward and having an inner experience that 
becomes more profound or more important than the outer consensual reality … any transaction and communication 
that causes an individual to go into their own experiences and call upon their own imagination in order to respond.” 
Steven Heller and Terry L. Steele, Monsters and Magical Sticks, There’s no such thing as Hypnosis? (Temple, AZ: 
New Falcon Publications, 1987), 38; 24. 
1110 See for instance: “No longer do the ‘circus horses’ of the Salpêtrière perform before visitors as in the palmy days 
of Charcot… Seldom indeed is the clinician witness to the elaborate and protracted hysterical fits whose theatrical 
features were drawn with artistic skill by Paul Richer.” S. A. Kinnier Wilson, 1931, quoted in Mark Micale, “On the 
‘Disappearance’ of Hysteria. A Study in the Clinical Deconstruction of a Diagnosis.” Isis 84, no. 3 (September 1993): 
502. Regarding the theatrical and performative dimension of hypnosis, see G. Didi-Huberman, The Invention of 
Hysteria, M. Borch-Jacobsen, The Affective Tie, M. Micale, Approaching Hysteria and R. Leys, Trauma: a Genealogy. 
See also Haley: “Hypnotic subjects are often better subjects on stage when in a triangle with the audience than when 
in a dyad alone with the hypnotist.” Jay Haley, The Contribution the Therapy of Milton H. Erickson,” in Ericksonian 
Approaches to Hypnosis and Psychotherapy (New York: Brunner/Mazel, Inc., 1982), 12. Hypnotic subjects, like 
readers, can be compared to “audience members who can march up onto the stage and become various characters, 
altering the action by what they say and do in their roles.” Brenda Laurel, Computers as Theater (Menlo Park, Ca: 
Addison Wesley, 1991), 16. 
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motion—might seem more à propos than with the novelistic genre.1111 Of course, due to the 
inductive dimension of poetic verse and rhythm, the comparison with poetry—to which we will 
return further on—might also seem much more appropriate than with narrative prose.1112 Finally, 
virtual reality and its interactive immersivity, where “we act within a world and experience it from 
the inside,” might also appear as a much better candidate than novels—provided we are willing to 
consider it (if not as a “metaphor for total art” as Marie-Laure Ryan does) as an art form.1113 Indeed, 
in its ability to create hallucinatory worlds, virtual reality offers a model which is extremely close 
to the hypnotic experience: both involve the activity of the subject and the experience of 
unmediated access to the virtual environment.1114 Unlike cinema, where the screen cuts the viewer 
off from the fictional world, hypnosis and virtual reality directly immerse the subject, creating the 
impression of embodied localization in space, and allowing interaction from within the “virtual,” 
mimetic universe.1115  
 
1111 See for instance: “A painting, it was claimed, had first to attract [attirer] and then to arrest [arrêter] and finally to 
enthrall [attacher] the beholder; that is, a painting had to call to someone, bring him to a halt in front of itself, and 
hold him there as if spellbound and unable to move.” Michael Fried, Absorption and Theatricality, 92. Wolf: “[Film 
is] the most powerful illusionist medium of our time,” whose “performative multimediality and partial iconicity” cause 
a strong inducement of experiential illusion and immersion. See Werner Wolf, “Aesthetic Illusion(s)? Towards a 
Media-Conscious Theory of Media-Elicited Immersion as a Transmedial Phenomenon.” in The Aesthetic Illusion in 
Literature and the Arts (London and New York: Bloomsbury, 2017), 53; Terrone: “Films supplement the aesthetic 
illusion with a temporal component, and involve a temporal presentness without necessitating spatial presence. 
Presentness (unlike presence) is not perceptually neutralized by the surface of screen.” Enrico Terrone, “Neither Here 
nor There, but Now: Film Experience and the Aesthetic Illusion,” in The Aesthetic Illusion in Literature and the Arts 
(London and New York: Bloomsbury, 2017), 109; and Felski: “film will soon supplant the novel as the medium most 
often accused of lulling its viewers into a trance-like fascination with unreal worlds.” Felski, Uses of Literature, 53. 
See Cavell, The World Viewed, Reflections on the Ontology of Film (New York: The Viking Press, 1971); and 
Ingarden: “the spectator ceases to see the screen, and in its place sees in almost perceptual manner things and people” 
Roman Ingarden, The Ontology of the Work of Art, trans. J.T. Goldhwait (1962; Athens: Ohio University Press, 1989), 
326. 
1112 Because it is centered on the imaginative process of immersion into fictional worlds, my scope of inquiry here 
focuses on the relations between modern indirect, permissive hypnosis and novelistic prose, and the shared poetic, 
narrative and fictional aspects of their discourse. This implies that we will not examine the trance-inducing aspects of 
poetry in the narrow sense, which, although undeniable, participate in a conception of hypnotic trance as a dulling, 
rather than a stimulation, of the recipient’s awareness. 
1113 Marie-Laure Ryan, Narrative as Virtual Reality: Immersion and Interactivity in Literature and Electronic Media. 
(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 20. Indeed, Ryan argues that until the appearance of VR (a 
technology which offers “the synthesis of all media toward a total experience,” the creation of a sense of immersion 
was the “prerogative of art.” Ryan, Ibid, 114; and “Immersion vs. Interactivity: Virtual Reality and Literary Theory.” 
SubStance 28, no. 2 (1999): 102. 
1114 “Far from being associated with passive immersion, semiotic transparency is conceived by VR developers as a 
way to facilitate interactivity.” Ryan, “Immersion vs. Interactivity,” 123. 
1115 See Cavell: “A screen is a barrier … it screens me from the world it holds—that is, makes me invisible. And it 
screens that world from me—that is, screens its existence from me.” Cavell, The World Viewed, 24. Like hypnosis, 
virtual reality implies an active simulative system which responds and produces non-iterable, different sequence of 
events with every experience. Like hypnosis, it is “not a narrative, but a narrative matrix… It is open to all the histories 
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In addition to this variety of other available comparisons, medium-based differences 
between novelistic texts and hypnotic communication further complicate our analogy. While the 
semiotic transparency of virtual reality facilitates a comparison with the immediacy of hypnotic 
hallucination, the visual deciphering of textual graphemes and material presence of the book-object 
reinforce the indirect, mediated process of novel reading, which involves analytic and 
interpretative acts, as well as the exercise of conscious awareness.1116 Unlike the deeply relational 
nature of hypnotic rapport and communication, reading is also a silent and solitary act which 
temporarily cuts the reader off from social, intersubjective relations.1117 When it is carried out 
professionally, or when it is “informed” and “sophisticated,” reading often includes forms of 
aesthetic, critical, sometimes evaluative distance, which further broadens the gap between 
suggestible hypnotic subjects and the literary reader or critic.1118 While aesthetic distance can be 
considered as “a consequence of the culturally acquired awareness of the fictional quality of the 
artifact … and of the illusionary status of the dominant effect induced by it,” in hypnosis, this 
distance seems to become lost, and the distinction between illusion and delusion difficult to 
pinpoint.1119   
From this standpoint, hypnosis and literature might appear two irreducible domains, 
pertaining respectively to the psychological and the textual. Any confusion of these on the part of 
 
that could develop out of a given situation,” each session actualizing a potential story, like a book “which vanishes 
when the writing is complete.” Ryan, “Immersion vs. Interactivity,” 123. 
1116 Another difference is that while the reader holds a book which will still exist after it is put down, the hypnotic 
subject is submitted to a stream of immaterial and ephemeral oral utterances which disappear after the experience. 
Furthermore, while the immaterial text remains cut off from the empirical world of psychology and the ending of the 
novel is written in advance, the contingency of hypnotic interaction is governed by no such novelistic necessity. In 
this sense, modern hypnosis resembles improvisational art more than the novel, since its outcome is never 
predetermined and its attempts constantly exposed to possible failure, as both operator and subject are engaged in a 
process of discovery and co-construction rather than following a teleological track leading towards a predetermined 
goal.   
1117 “Novel reading requires prolonged solitude and stillness. It takes place in a context of isolation, if not physical 
confinement… [it] demands the singular concentration of the seated meditator, in whose silent awareness an encounter 
with consciousness itself unfolds.” Yi-Ping Ong, The Art of Being: Poetics of the Novel and Existentialist Philosophy 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018), 8. 
1118 “The default position of contemporary criticism is best described as one of “standing back”—keeping one’s 
distance from a work of art in order to place it in an explanatory frame.” Felski, 57, emphasis added. 
1119 Werner Wolf, “Aesthetic Illusion as an Effect of Fiction.” Style 38, no. 3 (Fall 2004): 331. Hypnotic hallucination 
and aesthetic absorption therefore seem to mobilize different forms or regimes of belief. As Gregory Currie suggests, 
what distinguishes the reading of fiction from nonfiction is perhaps not the activity of the imagination but the attitudes 
we adopt toward the content of what we “read”: “make-belief in one case, belief in the other.” Gregory Currie, The 
Nature of Fiction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 21. 
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the critic—any bridging of the gap between mind and text—might seem naïve or imprecise.1120 
Even worse, it runs the risk of committing two equally “sinful” acts: that of psychologizing the 
aesthetic on the one hand,1121 and of aestheticizing the psychological on the other.1122 Insofar as 
aesthetic illusions and immersivity have been relegated to somewhat antiquated, potentially 
conservative aesthetic forms, a study of aesthetic absorption might also appear as retrograde and 
oblivious to the subversive—rather than the lulling, hypnotic—power of literature. Indeed, “the 
history of Western art has seen the rise and fall of immersive ideals, and their displacement, in the 
twentieth century, by an esthetics of play and self-reflexivity that eventually produced the ideal of 
an active participation of the appreciator … in the production of the text.”1123 Immersion has been 
 
1120 See for instance: “losing oneself in a fictional world is the goal of the naive reader or one who reads as 
entertainment” David Bolter, Writing Space: The Computer, Hypertext, and the History of Writing (Hillsdale, NJ: 
Lawrence Erlbaum, 1991),155. 
1121 “Structuralism, post-structuralism, deconstruction, new criticism, formalisms of all kinds have all taught to 
apprehend the text as a separate, an “autonomous verbal structure.” Northrop Frye, Anatomy of Criticism (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957), 122. See also: “in fiction… even a well-known real locality is divested of any 
question as to its reality,” and the here and now “no longer possesses any character of reality.” Käte Hamburger, The 
Logic of Literature, trans. M. Rese (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973), 24; 111. See also: “The meaning 
or the goal of this effort is to substitute the instance of discourse for the instance of reality (of the referent), which has 
been, and still is, a mythical ‘alibi’ dominating the idea of literature and instance of discourse.” Roland Barthes, “To 
write, an Intransitive Verb?” in R. Macksey and E. Donato, eds., The Structuralist Controversy (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University, 2007), 144. See also: “The discourse, or better, the language, speaks: nothing more” (Le discours, 
ou mieux encore, le langage parle, c’est tout).” Barthes, S/Z (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1970), 48; English transl., 41. 
“The function of narrative is not to ‘represent,’ it is to put together a scene which … does not belong to the mimetic 
order in any way. … What goes on in a narrative is, from the referential (real) point of view, strictly, nothing. What 
does ‘happen’ is language per se, the adventure of language, whose advent never ceases to be celebrated”” (“La 
fonction du récit n’est pas de ‘représenter’, elle est de constituer un spectacle qui … ne saurait être d’ordre 
mimétique… ‘ce qui se passe’ dans le récit n’est, du point de vue référentiel (réel), à la lettre : rien ; ‘ce qui arrive’, 
c’est le langage tout seul, l’aventure du langage, dont la venue ne cesse jamais d’être fêtée”). Barthes, “Introduction à 
l’analyse structurale des récits,” Communications 8 (1966): 26-27, English trans., 271. For the poetic function of 
language, where focus is placed “on the message itself” (“l’accent [est] mis sur le message pour son propre compte”), 
and the autoreferentiality of literature, see Roman Jakobson, “Linguistique et poétique,” in Essais de linguistique 
générale (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1963), 218, English trans., 356. In these accounts, the act of reading itself becomes 
a specifically literary activity which excludes all possibility of referential interpretations.   
1122 On other end of the spectrum, one can emphasize the ways in which fictional worlds and characters impact reality 
and our lives, how “fictional beings enter readers’ lifeworlds.” See Marco “Reading for the Mind; Aesthetic Illusion, 
Fictional Characters and the Role of Interpretation.” In The Aesthetic Illusion in Literature and the Arts. Edited by 
Tomáš Koblížek (London and New York: Bloomsbury, 2017), 133. See also Felski, Uses of Literature. As will become 
apparent in this chapter, my analogy rejects the “elitist fallacy” according to which “as sophistication in reading grows, 
coarser tastes wither away” and “the critic’s mind has nothing of cultural importance in common with those of the 
lower class that they study.” Victor Nell, Lost in a Book. The Psychology of Reading for Pleasure. New Haven and 
(London: Yale University Press, 1988), 4. In this chapter I will also use the term “literature” in Ohmann’s 
“nonhonorific” sense. As opposed to the honorific or normative sense, which comprises only works of high quality, 
the “non-honorific” sense includes “the sum total of all actual (and perhaps possible) literary works,” including “bad” 
ones. Richard Ohmann, “Speech Acts and the Definition of Literature.” Philosophy and Rhetoric 4 (1971): 1. 
1123 Ryan, Narrative as Virtual Reality, 2. Ryan sees a split in twentieth-century novels, with an intellectual avant-
garde committed to new self-reflexive esthetics, and a “popular branch faithful to the immersive ideals and narrative 
techniques of the nineteenth century.” Ryan, Ibid., 5. While it ultimately seeks to soften a hard distinction between 
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“either ignored or dismissed as the holdover of a now-discredited aesthetics of illusion that 
subordinates language to its referent, and ignores its power of configuration over the reality it is 
supposed to represent.”1124 Postmodern theory and aesthetics in particular—where immersion is 
often conceived as “passive subjection to the authority of the world-designer” and signs, rather 
than disappear, must be made visible “for their role in the construction of a reality”—suggest that 
“a mode of communication that strives toward transparency of the medium bereaves the user of 
his critical faculties.”1125  
As I will argue in this chapter, such dismissals of aesthetic immersion stem from a 
misconception about the nature and dynamics involved in the production and reception of aesthetic 
“illusions,” which occur both in novel reading and hypnosis.1126 As I will argue, immersive 
experiences are not incompatible with aesthetic distance, and should not be reduced to mere 
trickery or delusion on the part of the recipient. As Marie Laure Ryan argues about virtual reality, 
rather than encourage passivity, they engage the activity and the “participation of the whole of the 
individual in the artistic experience.”1127 
Our analogy between hypnosis and the act of reading therefore neither entails descriptions 
of unreflective “hypnotic” devouring of popular fiction, nor does it neglect the subtle inter- and 
intratextual dynamics which constitute the signification of literary texts. Rather, it seeks to draw 
out common characteristics between hypnotic and readerly subjectivity, by situating the recipient’s 
 
“mimetic” and “self-reflective” fiction, the examination of explicitly meta-narrative (namely, postmodern) literature 
will help draw out the limits of our narrative-dependent analogy, and note the places in which it ceases to illuminate 
either field. For now, one can note that the eighteenth-century novel took an ambiguous stance towards immersion, 
cultivating immersive effects by simulating nonfictional narratives modes (such as memoirs, letters, autobiography, 
etc.) and yet “hold[ing] immersion in check through a playful, intrusive narrative style that directed attention back and 
forth from the story told to the storytelling act.” Ibid., 4. Postmodernist texts on the other hand, in which meaning is 
“unstable, decentered, multiple, fluid, emergent,” cultivate an even more explicit “playful attitude towards the 
medium” that privileges form over content, emphasizes spatial relations between words, puns, intertextual allusion, 
parody, self-referentiality, subverts plot and character, experiments with open structures, etc. Ibid., 5. For Ryan, 
hypertext literature (in which the reader determines the unfolding of the text by clicking on certain areas) can be 
regarded as the “fulfillment of the postmodern conception of meaning,” because its interactivity “transposes the ideal 
of an endlessly self-renewable text from the level of the signified to the level of the signifier.” Ibid. The question of 
whether such interactivity is compatible with out description of the hypnotic experience will be examined further 
down.  
1124 Ryan, “Immersion vs. Interactivity,” 111. 
1125 Ibid., 120.  
1126 For Wolf, “aesthetic illusion” is a transmedial concept. Illusion-creating media include fiction, but also “visual 
arts, the theater, opera, comics, radio drama, film and computer-created virtual realities.” Wolf, “Aesthetic Illusion as 
an Effect of Fiction,” 326. Nonrepresentational art such as abstract painting and instrumental music therefore “cannot 
elicit aesthetic illusion.” Wolf, “Aesthetic Illusion. Towards a Media-Conscious Theory,” note 9, 348. 
1127 Ryan, “Immersion vs. Interactivity,” 21. 
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experience on a spectrum that fluctuates between varying degrees of immersion and distance, and 
engages cognitive, imaginative, affective, and physiological responses in the subject. Our purpose 
in this chapter is to thus to illuminate, redefine, and reframe the shared aesthetic structures and 
aspects at work in both hypnosis and novel reading, that their treatment as absolutely separate 
fields would have left unnoticed. 
Indeed, once they are examined in relation to each other, novelistic prose and the hypnotic 
experience offer numerous similarities that distinguish them from other media.1128 The first of 
these is a common cognitive engagement involved in the translation of verbal discourse into an 
imagined reality. Indeed, hypnotic suggestions share a common indeterminacy with novelistic 
discourse, whereas “to a large extent, film does not ask for a guided mental projection but furnishes 
the audience with the essentials of the represented world.” 1129 Indeed, unlike cinema, “insofar as 
it relays sensations through the imagination, literary language can offer data to all of the senses, 
thus increasing the vividness of the representation. It has been said that a book is ‘cinema in your 
head’.”1130 
Readerly subjectivity, like hypnosis, involves a double dimension of spectatorship and 
participation: the reader is acted on by the world of the novel, and yet the world depends on the 
act of reading for its existence and actualization.1131 Thus not only do novelistic prose and modern 
hypnotic discourse create a change in consciousness in their recipients, they make similar demands 
 
1128 In this respect, it is interesting to note that many of the examples of absorptive paintings chosen by Michael Fried 
in Absorption and Theatricality represent the act of reading. See for example, Chardin, Un Philosophe occupé de sa 
lecture (Salon of 1753), Jean-Baptiste Greuze, Un Pére de famille qui lit la Bible à ses enfants (1755), Fragonard, La 
Lecture (1780), and Van Loo, Lecture espagnole (Salon of 1761). 
1129 Wolf, “Aesthetic Illusion(s)?,”52. Like hypnosis, “In fiction, the world in which we may be immersed is 
reconstructed from exclusively symbolic verbal signs and takes place exclusively in our minds. In contrast to this, 
when watching a film in a cinema, the reception situation, which is a performative one, does play a role: we are 
confronted with a dynamic show… and yet we are sitting in static seats, which are visibly distanced from the screen, 
and may feel our bodies curled in these seats and see ourselves surrounded by other spectators. These factors may 
distract from the impression of immersion… however our skill in ‘reading’ cinema film and aesthetic illusion are 
strong enough to bridge these distancing elements and draw us into the represented world. If this happens the space 
between our bodies and the screen is experienced as a continuum located on the same ontological level (the diegetic 
world), and the onscreen world is perceived as three-dimensional … while our awareness of all this is kept in latency 
mode” Wolf, Ibid., 49. 
1130 Daniel Fischlin and Andrew Taylor, “Cybertheater, Postmodernism, and Virtual Reality. An Interview with Toni 
Dove and Michael Mackenzie,” Science Fiction Studies 21 (1994): 13. 
1131 Indeed, “understanding [the suggestion] requires that [the subject] acts it out to a certain degree.” Milton Erickson, 
Hypnotic Realities; The Induction of Clinical Hypnosis and Forms of Indirect Suggestion (New York: Irvington 
Publishers, 1976), 129. 
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on them in terms of creative and imaginative responses. In both cases, these demands are made 
not directly but through specific, literary or poetic, uses of language.1132  
Like hypnosis, fiction is “a verbal artifact, an illusion created by a particular selection and 
combination of words” which can create worlds, as they blend in with the subject’s internal mental 
activity.1133 Both reader and hypnotic subject must interpret and convert the received discourse 
which leads to the creation of an internally generated scene rather than the viewing of an external 
spectacle—or tableau, as in theater or cinema. Hypnosis and novel reading thus turn us inward by 
paradoxically giving the impression of taking us out of ourselves and of taking over our 
consciousness.1134  
As Peter Kivy describes it, despite the vividness of the impressions and sensations that can 
emerge from it, the experience of reading novels, like hypnosis, is first and foremost an internal, 
“mental” one: 
Neither its entire aesthetic and artistic payoff, nor any part thereof, lies in direct aural or visual acquaintance 
with an object or event present to the external senses. It lies, rather, in the reader’s direct acquaintance with 
his or her conscious states. … It’s all in the mind.1135 
 
Kivy’s description brings novel reading and hypnosis together in the idea of an aural, rather than 
visual internal experience. For him, the silent experience of reading novels is comparable to an 
internal performance occurring in the reader’s mind.1136 This “silent performance of the notated 
work” resembles what occurs when a musician internally “hears” the music while score reading, 
as if an “inner Ion” was reciting the story to the mind’s ear.1137 For Kivy, this means that “at least 
 
1132 As it will become apparent further on, the term “poetic” is used extensively and includes the novelistic genre. It 
refers to the opposition between literary and non-literary texts, rather than novelistic and poetic ones (in the narrow 
sense).  
1133 Lilian Furst, All is True. The Claims and Strategies of Realist Fiction (Durham and London: Duke University 
Press, 1995), 145. When beholding a painting, “I do not think the thoughts of another as I would with a narrator.” 
Benson, The Absorbed Self, 170.  
1134 In Chapter 4, this process will be referred to as “unselfing.” 
1135 Peter Kivy, “The Experience of Reading,” in A Companion to the Philosophy of Literature (Malden, MA and 
Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 106. See also cognitive psychologist Keith Oatley: creating a work of fiction is “an 
externalized simulation” which “can be internalized as we read it to augment our internal simulation.” Keith Oatley, 
“Worlds of the possible. Abstraction, imagination, consciousness,” Pragmatics and Cognition 21 (2013): 462.  
1136 “The novel, the paradigm instance of silently read literary fiction, is, au fond, a performing art, its silent readings 
being its performances. … As we know from Plato’s Republic and Ion, as well as from numerous other ancient texts, 
the Homeric epics were performed works, given to audiences in public recitations, and were no more intended 
primarily to be read to oneself in private. … Poetry, in the ancient world, was a performing art … Even when read in 
private, by servant to master, or read aloud to oneself, they were experienced aurally … [as] a performance.” Ibid., 
108-109.  
1137 Kivy, “The Experience of Reading,” 111; 116. Score reading is defined as “the internal realization of the sound of 
a work by means of simply reading the score.” Don Michael Randel, (ed.), The Harvard Dictionary of Music, 4th ed. 
(Cambridge, MA, and London: Belknap Press, 2001), 766. 
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some conscious thought” consists in “hearing voices” in one’s “head”: “the experience of thought 
as a kind of inner colloquy seems to be a common human experience.”1138 This description of 
reading is significant for our purposes as it depathologizes—while simultaneously de-
visualizing—the hallucinatory aspects of hypnosis and underlines their similarity with reading 
fiction.  
In addition to this common activity on the part of the recipient, hypnosis and novel reading 
also enable specifically fictional modes of experiencing, which, as Dorrit Cohn has shown, are 
impossible in ordinary life: “the special lifelikeness of narrative fiction—as compared to dramatic 
and cinematic fictions—depends on what writers and readers know least in life: how another mind 
thinks, another body feels.”1139 The perspectival mobility which allows to fictionally “see” into the 
minds of others is shared by the novelistic and hypnotic imagination alike, as spatial and temporal 
laws fall away for both narratorial and readerly subjectivity.1140 Indeed, both illusionist 
representations and hypnotic inductions provide recipients with new “deictic centers” or vantage 
points from which to experience represented worlds, allowing for aesthetic transportation and 
absorptive decentering and recentering, in which mobility and localization play central roles.1141  
 
 
1138 Kivy, Ibid., 111. See also: “Are not thought and speech the same, with this exception, that what is called thought 
is the unuttered conversation of the soul with herself?” Plato, The Sophist, in The Dialogues of Plato, trans. B. Jowett 
(New York: Random House, 1937), 274. See also: “Not only do we talk to ourselves silently, but sometimes we do 
this in a particular tone of voice.” Daniel Dennett, Consciousness Explained (Boston, TOR and London: Little; Brown, 
1991), 195. For Kivy, Dennett’s idea of “a tone of voice” fits the idea that we read expressively when we read out 
loud.  Just as in hypnosis, conscious thought can still be present and “comment” on the internal experience, “the silent 
reader of serious novels has an Ion within, who tells the reader the story… and… comments on the serious 
propositional content of the story, if such content it has. In the latter capacity he (or she) is Plato’s “unuttered 
conversation of the soul with herself.” Kivy, 118. 
1139 Cohn, Transparent Minds, 5. “Depicting the inner life, the novelist is truly a fabricator. Even as he draws on 
psychological theory and on introspection, he creates what Ortega calls ‘imaginary psychology… the psychology of 
possible human minds’.” Ibid. See also Ryan: “To the extent that the narrator's sensations become the reader's, fiction 
offers a mobility of point of view at least as extensive as that of VR systems. The development of a type of narrator 
specific to fiction–the omniscient, impersonal narrator–has freed fictional discourse from the constraints of 
pragmatically possible human communication. The disembodied consciousness of the impersonal narrator can 
apprehend the fictional world from any perspective, adopt any member of the fictional world as focalizer, select any 
of observation, narrate in every temporal direction (retrospectively, simultaneously, even prospectively), and switch 
back and forth among these various narrative modes. Fiction, like VR, allows an experience of its reference world that 
would be impossible if this reference world were an objective, existing, material reality. … The effacement of the 
impersonal narrator and his freedom to relocate his consciousness anywhere, at any time and in whatever body or 
mind conveys the impression of unmediated presence: minds become transparent, and events seem to be telling 
themselves’.” Ryan, “Immersion vs. Interactivity,” 119-120, emphasis added. 
1140 As we saw in Chapter 2, this falling-away of spatial and temporal laws is a central component of the fascination 
that mesmerism exerted on literary authors of the nineteenth century. This shows the intimate link between hypnosis 
as a thematic object, and fictionality itself. 
1141 Zwaan, quoted in Wolf, “Aesthetic Illusion(s)?,” 39. 
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The Hypnotic Dimension of Realist Aesthetics 
Although my argument also aims to encompass modernist and postmodern fiction, in this 
chapter I will mainly focus on realist aesthetics, which offer a particularly telling example of the 
dynamics of immersive de-centering and re-centering that I am looking to draw out in both novel 
reading and hypnosis.1142 Indeed, as Ryan puts it (somewhat bluntly), like hypnosis, high realism 
“effaced the narrator and the narrative act, penetrated the mind of characters, transported the reader 
into a virtual body located on the scene of the action, and turned her into the direct witness of 
events, both mental and physical.”1143 I will thus consider the narrative and realist illusions as 
paradigmatic cases of aesthetic illusion or absorption and a fertile grounds to examine the 
immersive similarities it shares with hypnotic experiences.1144 Indeed, as Werner Wolf observes, 
“during an illusionist reading, the actual mediation through the level of discourse is mostly 
disregarded, and we appear to ‘witness’ the storyworld as if it were located in a realm beyond the 
text and even, albeit paradoxically, independently of it, hence with a feeling of “immediacy.”1145 
However, in this chapter, the analogy between the hypnotic experience and novel reading 
will not limit itself to acknowledging this shared “immediacy” or “transparency.” As I will argue, 
what brings realism and hypnosis together is that both are based on a fundamental paradox, 
 
1142 Indeed, like hypnosis, realist novels “powerfully draw their readers into their worlds by maintaining a feeling of 
verisimilitude and experientially while minimizing aesthetic distance.” Wolf, “Aesthetic Illusion. Towards a Media-
Conscious Theory of Media-Elicited Immersion as a Transmedial Phenomenon.” In The Aesthetic Illusion in 
Literature and the Arts (London and New York: Bloomsbury, 2017), 37. See also Todorov: “Le vraisemblable est le 
masque dont s’affublent les lois du texte, et que nous sommes censés de prendre pour une relation avec la réalité” 
(“Verisimilitude is the mask which is assumed by the laws of the text and which we are meant to take for a relation 
with reality”). Todorov, Poétique de la prose (Paris : Le Seuil, 1971), 94, English translation, 83. See also James: 
“The air of reality … seems to me to be the supreme virtue of a novel… if it be there [its merits] owe their effect to 
the success with which the author has produced the illusion of life. The cultivation of this success… form[s], to my 
taste, the beginning and the end of the art of the novelist.” Henry James, The Art of Fiction (Boston: Cupples, Upham 
and Company, 1885), 66. See also Nell: “[realism] renders the novel’s power to absorb the reader superior to that of 
fable and myth, in which the protagonists have no personal background and move in a timeless and elemental terrain.” 
Nell, Lost in a Book, 54.    
1143 Ryan, Narrative as Virtual Reality, 4. 
1144 On the other end of the spectrum, anti-illusionist works (either in postmodern texts, or eighteenth-century works 
such as Sterne’s Tristram Shandy or Diderot’s Jacques le fataliste et son maître) deploy distancing devices to  keep 
the reader outside of the possible world, devaluing the story level and foregrounding instead the level of discourse, 
emphasizing self-referentiality and self-reflexivity. As Werner Wolf notes, however, “Generally, anti-illusionism in 
fiction and elsewhere is a derivative phenomenon and always presupposes the existence of aesthetic illusion, be it in 
the same work or as a convention in the cultural context. Historically, anti-illusionism is almost as old as illusionism. 
In addition to the cultural context, the individual recipient and the work (and its performance) are as much factors in 
the breaking of illusion as in its formation. In its essence the breaking of illusion can be defined as the realization and 
“inflation” of the potential of distance that already exists latently within the aesthetic illusion itself at the pole opposite 
to immersion.” Wolf, “Aesthetic Illusion as an Effect of Fiction,” 342.  
1145 Wolf, “Aesthetic Illusion as an Effect of Fiction,” 332. 
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consisting in the simultaneous acknowledgment and concealment of the conventionality, the 
artificiality, and the illusory dimension of this very “transparency.”1146 Indeed, realist novels and 
hypnotic discourse proceed in similar ways when it comes to soliciting temporary adherence and 
make-believe on the part of the recipient. In both cases, their aesthetic strategies involve a form of 
“trickery” that, beyond the diegetic level and narrative plot, also operates on the level of linguistic 
form: both attempt to conceal the strategies which guarantee their efficaciousness, and feign the 
adoption of a transparent, descriptive discourse in order to achieve their desired effects.  
As I hope to show, in its efforts to downplay its textual and fictional nature and give the 
impression of continuity between reality and fictive worlds, the realist novel operates like the 
hypnotist, who must gradually ease the subject into the hypnotic experience and conceal most of 
the immersive techniques and suggestions that are used to do so, which help circumvent the 
subject’s resistance and illusion-breaking thought processes.1147 The realist novel thus operates 
“strategically” in its efforts to “conceal its own devices, including its frame” and “its endeavor to 
pass itself as ‘truth.”1148 As Lilian Furst notes, “the task it sets itself of seducing readers to enter 
its portals without disclosing their lineaments is thus an extraordinarily tricky one,” and one shared 
with the hypnotic operator.1149  
In order to draw out the common modes of aesthetic awareness and sensibility involved in 
hypnotic and novelistic subjectivity, I will propose a threefold argument.  
First, I will examine the ontological status of hypnotic and literary discourse. Using speech 
act theory and reader-oriented literary criticism, I will argue that the utterances found in narrative 
literature and hypnosis are neither mere descriptive statements, nor ordinary communicative 
utterances. Both hypnotic nor literary discourse “violate” the usual conditions of ordinary speech 
situations, and neither are apprehended in terms of ascribing truth value or falsity, as we would of 
everyday assertions. As I will show, in both hypnosis and narrative literature, the subject engages 
 
1146 “Since immersion depends on vividness, its factors are closely related to the devices that lead to realism in 
representation.” Ryan, “Immersion vs. Interactivity,” 112. Such devices involve transparency of discourse, as seen in 
modern hypnosis and in “invisible” or omniscient nineteenth-century realist narrators. See Mukařovský: realism 
“completed the mechanism of the novel” and aims to create the illusion of immediate viewing of reality, by “leaving 
the narrator at most the function of the lens in a camera or an accurately recording scientific instrument.” Mukařovský, 
Studie II, (Brno: Host, 2001), 403. Whereas modernism reveals and emphasizes the manner in which the story is told 
(including the difficulties involved in the process), realism deliberately obscures it.  
1147 In this sense, the realist novel “effaces” the narrative act (as Ryan put it higher up), by concealing it, but it does 
not remove it altogether. 
1148 Furst, All is True. 50. 
1149 Ibid., 50. 
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in subtle yet powerful games of “make-believe,” which can create strong affective, cognitive, and 
even physiological effects, without this having to mobilize any beliefs about the actual world. In 
other words, both fiction and hypnosis are able to create very “real” effects by using inherently 
illusory—“unreal”—means.1150 
Secondly, I will suggest that literary texts bear striking similarities with the hypnotic 
experience, in their ability to create strong absorptive and immersive experience. Both hypnosis 
and narrative literature can be considered as two instances of the “aesthetic illusion,” in which the 
recipient temporarily and willfully suspends their ordinary relation to the world and lets themselves 
be absorbed into the work of art, and/or the fictional universe. In order to illustrate this point, I 
will offer a close reading of Virginia Woolf’s To The Lighthouse as an example of readerly 
absorption. I will then turn to literary theory, in order to track various “hypnotic” metaphors that 
illustrate how literary text and hypnosis work in similar ways, in their ability to create strong 
illusory experiences, which depend on the subject’s activity and willingness to be temporarily 
“tricked,” on the as if mode. 
In the third part of my argument, I will argue that due to its strong similarities with literary 
discourse, hypnosis can, in turn, be considered as an aesthetic, “poetic” use of language. Taking a 
closer look at the workings of hypnotic suggestions, I underline their similarities with literary 
discourse. As I will show, the felicity of hypnotic utterances depends in great part on the operator’s 
attention to the formal, stylistic aspects of the operator’s discourse. However, hypnotic authority 
or efficacy should be shifted back, not to the operator-author or to the “power” of poetic language 
itself, but most importantly, to the subject who actualizes and performs the hypnotic “text” which 
 
1150 In this sense, by examining the “truth value” of literary utterances in general, this chapter also aims to reexamine 
or reassess the “naivety” of the realist enterprise in particular, suggesting that the claims to truthfulness of realist 
fiction and the problem of referentiality no not exhaust the question of its relation to “reality.” Furthermore, it is 
important to note, that just as the characteristics of trance vary historically and geographically, as Gombrich and Wolf 
argue, “verisimilitude—and with it aesthetic illusionism—are to a considerable extent historically and culturally 
variable” and the aesthetic illusion—which also depends on cultural conventions and a repertoire of contents and 
expectations—abolishes the “myth” of an “innocent eye.” Wolf, Ibid., 333; Gombrich, Art and Illusion, 14; 298. As 
a result, the same work or similar techniques of representation can change in their illusionist valeur according to 
temporal and spatial parameters.” Wolf, Ibid, 333. Dorrit Cohn has also noted that our standards for what counts as a 
“realistic” portrayal or mimetic representation of consciousness evolve in history: “The first generation of Ulysses 
readers … could only have experienced Bloom‘s and Stephen’s mental productions as radical departures from realistic 
representation,” whereas “today’s reader is more likely to take Joyce’s conception of verbal thought for granted … 
and to accept the monologues of Ulysses as supremely convincing achievements of formal mimeticism.” Cohn, 
Transparent Minds, 93. 
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is presented to her. As in literature, the recipient’s engagement, rather than the intention of the 
“speaker,” constitutes the meaning and the “literariness” or “hypnotic quality” of language. 
On the aesthetic level, hypnotic and novelistic immersion thus illuminate one another, via 
their shared illusionist nature, as well as their conventional and formal, “artificial” nature. Both 
create an experience of immersion in which the subject remains highly active, unlike what is often 
portrayed in depictions on hypnotic or aesthetic absorption as a process of automatic, passive, or 
blind receptivity. 1151 On the contrary, the creative process of make-believe at work in hypnosis 
and novel reading is one of temporary adherence and active conversion of words into (fictional) 
worlds.  
 
3.1.  How to Do Strange Things With Words. The Ontological Status of 
Hypnotic and Literary Utterances 
 
3.1.1.  The Power of Words: Literature and Hypnosis as Speech Acts 
 
Literary texts, like hypnosis, are special kinds of uses of language. Although they 
sometimes take on the appearance of descriptive statements, they are not ordinary descriptions of 
the state of the world, and we do not attribute truth value or falsity to them in the same way that 
we do of everyday assertions.  Secondly, they seem to set up a communicative situation of sorts, 
between a writer, text or speaker, and a recipient. In The Nature of Fiction, for example, Gregory 
Currie proposes that “we think of reading as a limiting case of conversation: a conversation in 
which one party does all the talking.”1152 In All is True, Lilian Furst also describes reading novels 
as “an implied communicative situation in which readers respond to signals emitted by the 
narrator’s text.”1153 However, upon closer inspection, they cannot be considered as ordinary forms 
of communicative acts, as both violate the usual conditions of every day communication or speech. 
 
1151 While assuming that the whole enterprise of the realist illusion rests on a claim to transparency which is, as in 
hypnosis, a mask for its conventionality and for the limited, subjective nature of all perspectives, our response will 
also have to steer between “the Scylla of the referential fallacy that the realist novel is simply a faithful mirror to 
everyday life and the Charybdis of the linguistic fallacy that it is simply a web of words.” Furst, All is True, 22. 
1152 Currie, The Nature of Fiction, 29. Walton disagrees strongly with claims like those of Currie according to which 
fictional utterances require fictive intent. Indeed, he rejects the conception of fiction as vehicle for illocutionary acts, 
and argues that there can be fiction without intention or speaker. With the famous case of “’cracks in a rock spelling 
out ‘once upon a time there were three bears’… the realization that the inscription was not made or used by anyone 
need not prevent us from reading and enjoying the story… it may be entrancing.” Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-
Believe (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1990), 87, emphasis added. 
1153 Furst, Ibid., 66. 
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In what follows, I will use speech act theory and ordinary language criticism to examine in 
which sense the relations between hypnosis and literature could be conceived as two forms of 
“communicative” acts, and in which sense this “communication” differs from ordinary speech 
situations.1154 Rather than consider the reading and hypnotic process as the imposition of a given 
discourse onto a passive recipient, I will also draw on literary theory which acknowledges the 
reader’s active participation in the constitution of the meaning of the text, and brings a corrective 
to “a hermeneutic tradition that has tended to view all literary texts as locutions without 
interlocutors.”1155 Indeed, verbal texts—both hypnotic and literary—serve “only as a guiding script 
for a ‘projection’ that exclusively takes place in our minds,” and “ demands a considerable 
reception activity.”1156  
 The conception of literature as communication is unpopular in formalist criticism, where 
poetic discourse defines itself in opposition to communicative, ordinary language.1157  Indeed, in 
formalism, language “has either a communicative function, that is, it is directed toward the 
signified, or a poetic function, that is, it is directed toward the sign itself.”1158 Nevertheless, despite 
this distinction, can literature and hypnosis not be considered as poetic-communicative acts 
involving a “speaker” (an author, implied author, narrator/hypnotic operator)1159 emitting a 
“discourse” (a literary text/hypnotic suggestion) directed towards a “recipient” (a reader—whether 
informed, implied, ideal, etc./hypnotic subject), who must respond appropriately for the utterances 
to be felicitous? From there, what is the ontological status of such utterances: is their force an 
essential component of the utterances themselves or is it produced by their reception and their 
context—rather than their content or the underlying intention of their “speaker”?   
 
1154 Cognitive science inspired criticism questions the shunning of the communicative aspect of literary texts and the 
“taboo” in speaking of “the text as an act of communication among real people in the world.” Susan S. Lanser, The 
Narrative Act: Points of View of Prose Fiction. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), 46; Lisa Zunshine, Why 
We Read Fiction, 81. 
1155 Clayton Koelb, Inventions of Reading: Rhetoric and the Literary Imagination (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1988), 21. 
1156 Wolf, “Aesthetic Illusion(s)?,” 47. 
1157 More specifically, “the violation of the norm of the [communicative] standard, its systematic violation, is what 
makes possible the poetic utilization of language.” Mukařovský, 1932, 20, quoted in Pratt, Toward a Speech Act 
Theory, 199.  
1158 Cercle Linguistique de Prague, 1929, 14 trans. Marie-Louise Pratt, in Toward a Speech Act Theory of Literary 
Discourse (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977).  
1159 See for example: “The narrator is a fictional figure that performs the speech acts of the writer’s text.” Richard 
Gerrig, Experiencing Narrative Worlds: On the Psychological Activities of Reading (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 1993), 179; or Currie: When reading, we pretend that the “speaker (the fictional author) expresses himself “by 
using language in the way a real person does: sometimes literally and sometimes not,” sometimes ironically, 
metaphorically, etc. Currie, The Nature of Fiction, 116.   
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3.1.1.1.  Literature and Hypnosis as Speech Acts? 
 
Literary and hypnotic utterances share a certain number of common features, which can be 
traced back to the mysterious origins and “powers” of language, that the hypnotist was traditionally 
believed to channel.1160 The curative powers of language are precisely what is at stake in the birth 
of psychoanalysis, as Freud writes in “The Question of Lay Analysis,” linking words to their 
“magical” origins:  
Words, words, words, as Prince Hamlet says... So it is a kind of magic… you talk and blow away his 
ailments…Quite true. It would be magic if it worked rather quicker… And incidentally do not let us despise 
the word… originally the word was magic—a magical act; and it has retained much of its ancient power.1161 
 
As we saw in Chapter 1, analysis defines itself by banishing all “fascinating” properties, all 
enchantment from logos, by extracting the “‘rational kernel’ from magical speech and removing it 
from its ‘mystical shell’ (notably hypnotic).”1162 Despite this gesture of separation, critics like 
Borch-Jacobsen argue that in fact, “in its curative effectiveness,” psychoanalysis “never does 
anything but return to the ancient ‘magic power of words.”1163 Regardless of whether it does or 
not, the Freudian gesture of banishment is in any case an acknowledgment of the magic of words.    
Furthermore, as Rita Felski notes, since antiquity, “art in general—especially popular art—
has faced accusations of “bewitching and disorienting its audience, calling up an association … 
with magic.”1164 As a special kind of use of language, literature has even more so been associated 
with extraordinary, spellbinding powers.1165 Indeed, literary texts have a haunting ability to conjure 
 
1160 See Freud’s comments on the Bernheimian method: “A layman will no doubt find it hard to understand how 
pathological disorders of the body and mind can be eliminated by ‘mere’ words. He will feel that he is being asked to 
believe in magic. And he will not be so very wrong, for the words which we use in our everyday speech are nothing 
other than watered-down magic.” Sigmund Freud, “Psychical (or Mental) Treatment,” The Standard Edition of the 
Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. 7, 1890, 283.  
1161 Freud, “The Question Lay Analysis,” (1926), SE, 20:187-188. 
1162 Ibid., 32. Maurice Blanchot describes the Freudian gesture as a profession of faith in the ‘God Logos’: “What 
confidence in the liberating power of language. What virtue accorded to the simplest relation: a man who speaks to 
another man who listens. And here, not only spirits are cured, but bodies. This is admirable, this now goes beyond 
reason. To avoid any grossly magic interpretation of this marvelous phenomenon, Freud had to make a stubborn effort 
at elucidation, all the more necessary since his method had an impure origin, having started very close to magnetism, 
hypnosis and suggestion” (Blanchot, 1969, 343, translation D. Brick). 
1163 Borch-Jacobsen, “Talking Cure,” Oxford Literary Review 12, No. 1/2 (1990): 31. 
1164 Felski, 52. 
1165 As we saw in Chapter 1, this suspicion towards poetic rapture can be traced back to Plato’s Ion, where possession 
and inspiration are also described as conditions for poetic creation: it is only when the poet is “out of his senses” and 
“the mind is no longer in him” that he can compose his “beautiful poems.” Plato, Ion, 533d. Nidesh Lawtoo has 
recently shown how in his later writings (namely The Case of Wagner describing Wagner’s “hypnotic” powers), 
Nietzsche uses and applies Plato’s criticism of mimesis in the psychological realm. By pointing out the contagious 
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up absent realities with mere words. As Michel Butor puts it: “from where does this singular power, 
to make absent things present, this haunting, come?... and yet, these objects are merely made of 
words.”1166  
Not only do stories create presence out of absence, they also deeply impact their audience: 
“Odysseus’ tale was finished, and such was the spell he had cast on the whole company that not a 
sound was herd throughout the shadowy hall.”1167 In the modern era, the novel is the genre which, 
as Felski observes, has been most reproached for bewitching its audience:  
For much of the longue durée of modernity, the novel is the genre most frequently accused of casting a spell 
on its readers; like a dangerous drug, it lures them away from their everyday lives in search of heightened 
sensations and undiluted pleasures. Disoriented by the power of words, readers are no longer able to 
distinguish between reality and imagination; deprived of their reason, they act like mad persons and fools.1168 
 
From this perspective, the analogy between hypnosis and reading seems to emphasize the 
similarities between author-narrator and hypnotist (rather than reader and subject), especially in 
the case of texts with authoritative narrators: “implicit in stories about the spell of storytelling is 
the narrator’s own sense of power, the awareness that a recalcitrant audience may be bent to one’s 
will and swayed by one’s moods. It is a power relationship that strongly parallels the induction of 
hypnotic trance.”1169  
Indeed, some literary texts even contain instructions, or suggestions on how they are to be 
read, as did the numerous explanatory prefaces to the nineteenth-century realist novels of Zola or 
Balzac for example. As Todorov notes, before the emergence of literary criticism of the novel, the 
 
dangers of affective mimesis, he gives a platonic description of the pathological impact or affective contamination 
that the actor imposes upon the spectator. Like Plato, he points out the dangerous influence of effect on the crowd and 
on young people; its irrational and blinding properties. In the crowd, it spreads like a disease, through the instinctual 
and physiological mirroring-process of affective mimesis. In the case of Wagner, however, he emphasizes the dangers 
of the “hypnotic” powers of theatre. For him, the “power of hypnosis, or of suggestion” is what explains Wagner’s 
power to “persuade” the masses. Lawtoo, The Phantom of the Ego, 70. For Nietzsche, this is the pathology of the 
modern subject: he is excessively suggestible, dispossessed of his choices and values. His ego is a mere reflection –a 
phantom–that mirrors thoughts, opinions and moralities passively received from the outside.  
1166 (“D’où vient ce singulier pouvoir, rendre présents les objets absents, cette ‘hantise’? ... et pourtant ces objets sont 
à leur tour des mots.” Michel Butor, “Le Roman et la poésie,” in Répertoire I (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1960), 8.  
Like hypnotic hallucinations, fiction produces “un stable fantasme,” a phantasy that seems as “stable” as reality. Ibid. 
1167 Homer, Odyssey, XIII. This spellbinding quality is found in a wide array of narrative traditions. In the field of 
anthropology for example, Marivate writes that among the Tsonga of North Natal in South Africa, a taboo was 
enforced against storytelling before sunset, as otherwise, the indulgence in the leisurely pastime would take up too 
much of the time of the working day. Nowadays, the Tsonga’s storytelling is broadcast on the radio in the Transvaal 
province of South Africa, where orators “keep their audience hypnotized with their performance and dramatic artistry.” 
See C. T. D. Marivate, “Tsonga Folktales: Form, Content, and Delivery.” M.A. Thesis, University of South Africa, 
1973, 26, quoted in Nell, Lost in a Book, 30.  
1168 Felski, 52-53. 
1169 Nell, 48. 
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realist narrative “contained within itself directions for its own consumption.”1170 In fact, as Furst 
observes, until the middle of the twentieth century, not only readers, but also “the majority of 
critics were guided in their approach to realist fiction by the reading instructions enunciated by the 
novelists themselves … implicitly subscribing to referentiality as the ‘appropriate mode of 
reading.’”1171  
From here, if receiving or reading a realist novel “adequately” is comparable to accepting 
a suggestion, then conversely, writing it must imply a process akin to hypnotic influence. As Furst 
argues, “to read a realist narrative is to submit to an act of persuasion, the aim of which is to 
convert readers to the belief that ‘all is true’” and writing realist fiction is “as much an exercise in 
persuasion as advertising or political rhetoric.”1172  
Like the hypnotic subject who must follow the rhythm of the operator’s words, the reader 
is submitted to the pace of the literary text. As Wolf notes, this “subjection” is in part what brings 
novel reading closer to the experience of the everyday. Indeed, with novelistic texts, the reception 
contract entails our willingness to “follow the flow of words” without interruption, to encounter 
textual elements “at the pace of the text and not our own” and to be “somehow subject to it in a 
way analogous to our being subject to the vicissitudes of life.”1173 Balzac’s descriptions offer a 
 
1170 Todorov, “Reading as Construction,” in The Reader in the Text, ed. S. Suleiman and I. Crosman (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1980), 77. 
1171 Furst, All is True, 13. For Furst, this explains in great part why it took so long for criticism to consider realism as 
yet another set of conventions: “if the realist novel was for over a century the victim of simplistic readings, it was 
because critics took it as its face value, accepting the self-image that the realists actively propagated of themselves as 
artless chroniclers of their day.” Ibid.  
1172 Furst, All is True, 26; 56, emphasis added. The lexical field of hypnosis permeates Lilian Furst’s descriptions of 
the realist contract: “The words printed on the page are designed to act on readers in certain ways: to encourage belief 
in the illusion by fostering a shared angle of vision with the narrator and, at times, with the protagonists.” Ibid., ix, 
emphasis added. “The frame that surrounds a fiction is fashioned cooperatively by the joint venture in pretense on the 
part of the narrator and readers… The narrator, through suggestive strategies, acts as the instigator of the illusion… 
In so doing, he functions as one half of the frame. Its complementary other half is provided by the assenting audience 
through its willingness to enter into that pretense in response to the invitation extended by the narrator. In its readiness 
to comply with the narrator the audience is engaging in the game of make-believe that animates realist fiction.” Ibid., 
49. These descriptions of the dynamics of suggestion and compliance could all apply to the hypnotic session, 
particularly to the initial framework which establishes the hypnotic contract and rapport. While the latter is often 
explicit and customary in modern hypnosis, it is often left implicit in the traditional authoritative model, in the same 
manner that realist fiction avoids meta-narrative commentary that would foreground its textual nature. 
1173 Wolf, “Aesthetic Illusion(s)?,” 44-45. The novel distills information in a temporal process of gradual unfolding. 
It creates a teleological structure that the reader can only discover, not control. As Iser has shown, this temporal flow 
is the movement of reading itself, in which each new moment “stands out against the old,” the past remaining in the 
mind “as a background to the present” and becoming “itself being modified by the present”  as each segment also has 
a retroactive effect. This two-way influence is “a basic structure in the time flow” of the reading process and “brings 
about the reader’s position within the text.” Iser, The Act of Reading, 114. See also: “language can afford only a 
gradual approach to the textual world … as a temporal medium it discloses its geography detail by detail, bringing it 
slowly into the reader’s mind.” Ryan, Narrative as Virtual Reality, 122. 
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good example of this process, as they do not function in a static, synoptic, or panoramic manner—
as in a photograph. Rather, they are deambulatory, following the movement of the characters and 
the narrative thread with a moving point of view, tracing a spatial and temporal parcours, a 
promenade. In Le Père Goriot for instance, the narrative perspective “trace[s] a precise itinerary 
through the fictional world” and “inspects the building in a systematic manner … as would a real 
estate agent or a prospective tenant.”1174 In order to penetrate the fictional world, the reader must 
follow this movement and its direction as it unfolds, just as the hypnotic “universe” seems to 
emerge from the stream of utterances pronounced by the operator. 
Despite this apparent “subjection,” however, it is the performance aspect of literary 
utterances, the response they elicit in the recipient, that brings them close to hypnotic discourse 
and enables one to consider literature as an act of communication. As Iser has shown, “literary 
texts initiate ‘performances’ of meaning rather than actually formulating meaning themselves” and 
in this sense, “produce something that they themselves are not.”1175 As I suggest in this chapter, 
hypnotic suggestions function much in the same manner.  Once one takes into consideration not 
only the effect of the text on the reader-subject, but also the reader’s active role in the constitution 
of the text and its meaning, the communicative—and as will argue, the cooperative or 
contractual—aspect of both literature and hypnosis can appear more clearly. Currie’s claim about 
the unidirectional nature of literary communication, cited in the introduction to this section, can in 
this sense be nuanced: readers’ responses directly participate in the constitution of literary 
utterances.1176 These preliminary remarks shed new light on the common adage according to which 
all hypnosis is in fact, self-hypnosis.   
 
 
1174 Ryan, Ibid., 125. 
1175 Iser, The Act of Reading 27. 
1176 The aesthetic illusion caused by the novel can be conceived as “a mental reaction to the act of perception of various 
forms of texts … designed for the purpose of specific communication between the producer and the receiver.” Bohumil 
Fořt, “Aesthetic Illusion Between the Prague School and Fictional Worlds Theory,” in The Aesthetic Illusion (London 
and New York: Bloomsbury, 2017), 274. For Fořt, fictional worlds are “mental entities encoded by the poetic (writing) 
activity of their authors and decoded by the reception (reading) of the recipient,” and are “based on the author-recipient 
contract that allows them to produce and perceive/receive fictional worlds as fictional worlds.” Ibid., 284. For the 
recipient, to receive is to have produced: the communication is, just as in hypnosis, far from being unidirectional.  
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3.1.1.2. Hypnotic Speech Acts?  
This being said, in which sense can hypnotic suggestions be considered as specific—that 
is, performative, or illocutionary—speech acts?1177  
In “Convention and Meaning: Derrida and Austin,” Jonathan Culler discusses the 
“collapse” of J. L. Austin’s distinction between constative and performative utterances.1178 As 
Culler notes, upon closer inspection, the constative is a special case of performative: the utterance 
“the cat is on the mat” is the same as “I hereby declare the cat is on the mat” (an invisible 
performative lurks behind the constative). Indeed, it would be possible to lengthen an utterance to 
include the “underlying strings” which specify its illocutionary force, to utter the underlying, 
“deletable” clause, which we do without in ordinary speech.1179 Significantly, the same argument 
can be applied to hypnotic suggestions, which can also be described as constatives behind which 
lurk performative utterances. For instance, in the classical (direct) suggestion, “You feel your hand 
becoming heavier,” the performative “I hereby declare and ask/command that you feel your hand 
becoming heavier” can be identified behind the apparent description. In the (direct) suggestion “In 
a few seconds you will go into trance,” the imperative (in italics) is disguised under the predictive 
statement. In the (indirect) suggestion: “When they close their eyes, most people go into trance,” 
the hidden imperative (the direct suggestion, also in italics) is disguised behind the third person 
evocative, i.e. descriptive, statement. In each case, commands/performatives/illocutionary acts are 
cloaked as descriptions/constatives—or in Searle’s terms, directives as representatives.1180 
 
1177 In Searle’s 1973 classification of the five basic categories of illocutionary acts, one can underline those that 
correspond to the usual illocutionary force of hypnotic suggestions (here in bold): 
1. Representatives: presenting a state of affairs, past, present, future or hypothetical, [e.g. claiming, hypothesizing, 
describing, predicting, telling, insisting, suggesting, swearing that something is the case] 
2. Directives:  designed to get the addressee to do something [requesting, commanding, pleading, inviting, daring] 
3. Commissives: acts that summit the speaker to doing something [promising, threatening, vowing (a hypnotic 
suggestion, in that it is a “gamble” of sorts, can also be considered as an implicit commissive. E.g.: [“I promise that] 
your hand will become lighter”)] 
4. Expressives: that express only the speaker’s psychological state [congratulating, thanking, deploring, condoling, 
welcoming] 
5. Declarations: that bring about the state of affairs they refer to [blessing, firing, baptizing, bidding, passing sentence 
on]. 
1178 Culler, 28. 
1179 Ibid., 17. 
1180 Representatives include “statements, assertions, descriptions, characterizations, identifications, explanations, and 
numerous others.” John Searle, “The Logical Status of Fictional Discourse,” New Literary History 6 (1975): 325, note 
5. 
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However, this is only the case if the hypnotic suggestion “takes hold”—if it is accepted and enacted 
by the subject—which is to say, if the utterance is felicitous.  
Furthermore, while constative utterances are true or false, performatives are neither true 
nor false—they merely perform the action to which they refer. Direct hypnotic suggestions, 
however, go one step further. Not only are they illocutionary and often perlocutionary acts,1181 if 
they are felicitous, they turn out to be retrospectively true. In this sense, they can count as true 
constatives a posteriori. At the moment of the utterance however, the operator takes a risk by 
anticipating that once—and if—they are enacted, they “will have been true.”1182 Here perhaps lies 
hypnotic performativity on the side of the operator:1183 the truth value of his utterance depends on 
its becoming true for the subject, even if momentarily. Hypnotic felicity depends on the 
cooperation and authentic performance of the subject. If it occurs, it is performed simultaneously 
with the operator’s utterance, whenever the subject experiences the hypnotist’s words as “his own 
thoughts,” in a direct manner, or when the suggested phenomenon unfolds in a seemingly 
involuntary manner. The “magic” of hypnotic discourse is therefore that with which one’s words 
become another’s reality, in a seemingly unmediated way.  
 
1181 See Austin: “Saying something will often, or even normally, produce certain consequential effects upon the 
feelings, thoughts, or actions of the audience, or of the speaker, or of other persons: and it may be done with the design, 
intention, or purpose of producing them; and we may then say, thinking of this, that the speaker has performed an act 
in the nomenclature of which reference is made either only obliquely, or even not at all, to the performance of the 
locutionary or illocutionary act.” Austin, How to Do Things With Words (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1962), 102. Austin specifies that almost any utterance can have perlocutionary force: “Any, or almost any, 
perlocutionary act is liable to be brought off, in sufficiently special circumstances, by the issuing, with or without 
calculation, of any utterance whatsoever, and in particular by a straightforward constative utterance (if there is such 
an animal). You may, for example, deter me from doing something by informing me, perhaps guilelessly yet 
opportunely, what the consequences of doing it would in fact be.” Ibid., 111. Hypnotic discourse also creates reactions 
in the listener which are caused not in the act of saying but by the utterance–convincing, persuading, deterring, 
surprising, misleading, and so on. 
1182 “We must be ready to draw the necessary distinction… between the act of attempting … to perform a certain 
illocutionary act, and the act of successfully achieving or consummating or bringing off such an act.” Austin, 106-
107. Culler also underlines this “risky” dimension: “the possibility of failure is internal to the performative”; 
“Something cannot be a performative unless it can go wrong.” Jonathan Culler, “Convention and Meaning: Derrida 
and Austin.” New Literary History13, No. 1 (Autumn, 1981): 18. 
1183 Deconstructive readings of Austin emphasize the indissociability of performative and performance–iterability, 
citation, framing, nonserious parasitic reiterations, etc.–which Austin seems to refuse by excluding the “nonserious,” 
literary speech acts from his examination. From a Derridean perspective according to which imitation is the condition 
of possibility of the authentic-original, Austin’s serious performatives are only “a special case of performances.” 
Culler, “Convention and Meaning,” 22. Furthermore, for Derrida “performatives depend upon the iterability that is 
most explicitly manifested in performances.” Derrida, in Culler, 22. Derrida thus doubts whether a performative could 
work if it did not depend on an iterable convention, “if it were not identifiable in some way as citation.” Derrida, Ibid., 
21.  
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However, the mere act of uttering a hypnotic suggestion is in itself not sufficient for it to 
be felicitous.1184 This being said, a precise account of the appropriateness or felicity conditions for 
hypnotic speech acts is difficult to produce, given the special nature of the hypnotic speech 
situation.1185 Indeed, in hypnosis, it is tacitly implied that the subject’s conscious understanding 
and awareness are neither a hindrance nor a necessity for the felicity of hypnotic utterances, which 
is taken to address the subject’s “unconscious mind.”1186 The hypnotic situation is particular in 
 
1184 See Austin: “Besides the uttering of the words of the so-called performative, a good many other things have as a 
general rule to be right and to go right if we are to be said to have happily brought off our action.” Austin, How to Do 
Things With Words, 14). 
1185 Culler notes—following Derrida—that it is impossible to exhaust the contextual possibilities to specify the limits 
of illocutionary force: “Meaning is context bound, but context is boundless. Culler, “Convention and Meaning,” 24. 
Nevertheless, hypnotic utterances often violate the appropriateness conditions of ordinary speech acts. The four rules 
of an assertion as stated by Searle are the following:  
(I) The essential rule: the maker of an assertion commits himself to the truth of the expressed proposition. 
(2) The preparatory rules: the speaker must be in a position to provide evidence or reasons for the truth of the expressed 
proposition 
(3) The expressed proposition must not be obviously true to both the speaker and the hearer in the context of utterance 
(4) The sincerity rule: the speaker commits himself to a belief in the truth of the expressed proposition. Because the 
“truth” of a hypnotic assertion will be revealed after the fact, the speaker cannot commit to it a priori—only 
retrospectively. The way in which he is committed to the belief in the truth of his assertion is ambiguous–it is done on 
the as if mode, yet with a belief in the fact that this mode has the power to produce a real phenomenon. The operator 
thus violates the sincerity rule while adhering to it on another level: he remains strongly committed to the truth-to-be 
of his utterance, without which it will most likely fail. This level can be distinguished from the “fictional” anecdotes 
told by the hypnotist, which resemble the utterances of the authors of novels who have “no commitment” to the truth 
of their “assertions” according to Searle. Searle, “The Logical Status of Fictional Discourse,” 321. For representatives, 
whose sincerity conditions include the different “degree of belief or commitment towards the truth of what is being 
represented,”  the operator carries out a gamble of sorts: he describes while feigning truth or belief (and to a certain 
degree, must believe in order to be congruent), and if the subject responds appropriately, then the utterance is 
successful. For directives, with which a preparatory condition is that “the addressee must be able to carry out what is 
being asked of him,” the operator cannot tell in advance whether the subject is capable or not, and must once more 
gamble precisely on this fact. However, hypnosis (especially in the authoritative model) relies strongly on the fact that 
“many declarations have appropriateness conditions requiring that the speaker be endowed with institutional authority 
to perform the act in question” : hypnotic setting, reputation, framing, therapeutic authority, cultural norms defining 
trance, etc., all act as suggestions which are operative before the act of hypnosis begins, that is, before any utterance 
is even made. In modern hypnosis, the authority is in great part acknowledged to lie on the side of the subject, and 
depend on his or her belief system. It is thus easier to examine the appropriateness conditions of hypnotic utterances 
not on the level of discrete individual sentences, but rather on the level of discourse at a whole (“hypnotic language”). 
In this sense, a story told by Milton Erickson in a therapeutic setting, one told in casual conversation, and another told 
by an individual testifying in court will all differ in terms of their contrasting effects and appropriateness conditions, 
not their content. The main contextual prerequisites for the felicity of hypnotic utterances might consist in the subject’s 
willingness to cooperate, and a sense that the operator both 1) knows what he is doing and 2) has ethical norms that 
ensure the subject’s trust and safety (necessary for 1).  
1186 For example, conversational and covert hypnosis work with the assumption that the subject’s knowledge that 
hypnosis is being performed is not required. This contradicts Searle’s notion that illocutionary acts cannot be felicitous 
if the addressee “does not speak the language in question, is out of earshot, or is otherwise incapable of understanding 
the utterance.” Pratt, Toward a Speech Act Theory of Literary Discourse, 84. Subjects in a deep somnambulistic trance 
don’t seem to be (or report to having been) focusing their awareness on the words, and yet they enact the suggestions 
nonetheless. The operator is thus in a sense addressing another through the subject. Because the success of the 
utterances will be measured in terms of the subject’s reaction and yet, because these actions can be purely internal and 
thus escape exterior observation, it is empirically difficult to measure levels of success other than with suggestibility 
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that it seems to involve two recipients, a subject who is both asleep and awake, there and not there, 
and therefore, is divested of the capacity for understanding which is ordinarily implied in rational, 
conscious awareness and self-mastery. These conditions nullify the subject’s authority and status 
as listener in an everyday communicative situation.1187 In a sense, the main addressee of hypnotic 
discourse (the unconscious of the subject) remains inaccessible, and yet must exist for the 
suggestion to be “heard” and enacted. Conversely, if a hypnotized individual become the subject 
of enunciation and speaks under hypnosis, the question of who is speaking becomes equally 
problematic. Indeed, as Mikkel Borch-Jacobson describes it, under hypnosis: 
I speak (myself) transfixed, traversed by the other that I am. … Mimetic speech is too truly a speech act and 
perhaps even the speech act par excellence. But it is the speech act of the “other me”—of that other (who 
perhaps is really nothing other than language) who I am in saying it.1188 
 
In this situation, the subject who pronounces the utterance is absent to itself, and is thus not even 
a subject. Rather, it is a split subjectivity where “I” is possessed by another, who speaks through 
it, like an actor. In this context, self-narration is impossible, since strictly speaking, as Vincent 
Descombes puts it, “the subject does not know what he is saying.”1189 
Where, then (if not in the mere act of uttering) does the “literary” or “hypnotic” quality of 
an utterance lie?  
As Austin has shown, in a linguistic exchange, “the occasion of an utterance matters 
seriously,” and “the words used are to some extent to be 'explained' by the 'context' in which they 
are designed to be or have actually been.”1190  
Given that the felicity conditions of hypnosis depend in great part on the setting, the belief 
system of the subject, and the “authority” which they invest in the operator, it is therefore neither 
content nor intention that determines whether an utterance counts as “hypnotic” or not, but 
 
scales or retrospective (subjective) feedback from the subject. Post-hypnotic amnesia further complicated the process. 
Yet, therapeutic change can occur despite the memory of the session having disappeared. The notion of 
“understanding” operating in speech act theory is thus difficult to transpose to the hypnotic speech-situation, as 
conscious understanding is neither sufficient nor necessary for the felicity of the hypnotic utterance. 
1187 In fact, Culler mentions hypnosis in passing as a contributing factor to the failure of performative acts (a situation 
in which the conditions fit but the utterance cannot have the illocutionary force it should) in the example of the 
marriage ceremony: “Suppose that the requirements for a marriage ceremony we met but that one of the parties were 
under hypnosis, or again that ceremony were impeccable in all respects but had been called a rehearsal.” Culler, 
“Convention and Meaning,” 23. Here, hypnotic trance cancels out the value of assent, and nullifies it. 
1188 Borch-Jacobsen, “Talking Cure,” 51-52.  
1189 (“Le sujet ne sait pas ce qu’il dit.”) Vincent Descombes, L'Inconscient malgré lui (Paris: Gallimard, 1977), 85. As 
I will argue in Chapter 4, this is an extremely reductive portrayal of hypnotic speech, that overshadows the narrative 
potential of the hypnotic experience and the reflexive awareness of the hypnotic subject.  
1190 Austin, How to Do Things, 101. 
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context.1191 In other words, the illocutionary force of hypnotic speech acts depends heavily on the 
characteristics of the speech situation, and “what [the speaker] had in mind at the moment of 
utterance does not determine what speech act his utterance performed.”1192 With hypnotic 
utterances, the operator’s belief in the force and meaning of his discourse is practically irrelevant 
as long as he acts as if he believed in them, that is, in a congruent manner. Like the Placebo effect, 
the efficacy of hypnotic suggestions can occur independently of the operator’s internal state.1193  
Similarly, speech act theorists have argued that the condition for literariness does not lie in 
the utterance itself, in the text’s content or form. Debates involve determining whether it lies in 
the intention of the speaker/author, or in the receptive activity of the reader, and thus in the context 
of the reception situation. In strong opposition to the distinctions between ordinary and poetic 
discourse theorized by the Russian formalists and the Prague school, 1194 Searle argues that 
literariness is not an internal property of the text itself:  
There is no trait or set of traits which all works of literature have in common and which could constitute the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for being a work of literature. Literature, to use Wittgenstein's 
terminology, is a family-resemblance notion. … ‘Literature' is the name of a set of attitudes we take toward 
a stretch of discourse, not a name of an internal property of the stretch of discourse.1195 
 
 
1191 As Derrida has noted, the intentions of the speaker are neither transparent nor complete, and the unconscious 
manifests itself as a problem for the subject of enunciation. Unconscious desire should indeed also be taken into 
account in the possibilities of further specifications of context. For example, promising “something the listener wants 
but unconsciously dreads” might turn the promise into a threat. See Derrida, Limited Inc, a b c…, 215. 
1192 Culler, 24. If after the marriage the minister says he was joking all along, the illocutionary force of his utterances 
is not cancelled out, the marriage still occurred. 
1193 Suggestions in this sense resemble Austin’s utterances, which are not “an inward and spiritual act.” Culler, 18. If 
ordinary speakers intend to perform felicitous assertions, hypnotists (and fictional authors) only seem to “pretend” to 
do so (the question as to whether pretense counts as deception will be examined further down). 
1194 “If a scientific poetics is to be brought about, it must start with the factual assertion, founded on massive evidence, 
that there are such things as ‘poetic’ and ‘prosaic’ languages, each with their different laws.” Šklovskij, 1919, in Pratt, 
Toward a Speech Act Theory, 4. 
1195 Searle, “The Logical Status of Fictional Discourse,” 320. Searle distinguishes fiction from literature: “Some works 
of fiction are literary works, some are not [e.g. jokes, comic books]. Nowadays most works of literature are fictional, 
but by no means all works of literature are fictional [e.g. autobiography].” Fictionality depends on authorial intention, 
whereas literariness does not: “whether or not a work is literature is for the readers to decide, whether or not it is 
fiction is for the author to decide.” Searle, Ibid., 319; 320. See also Marie Louise Pratt, for whom literariness or 
poeticality is “anchored in the circumstances surrounding the utterance” rather than an intrinsic property or function 
of the utterance itself. Pratt, 73. Also, in Stanley Fish’s famous 1980 experiment, students from a poetry class 
interpreted a vertical list of proper names of famous linguists on the blackboard—from the previous class—as a token 
of the religious poem they had been studying. Fish, Is There a Text in This Class? (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1980), 322-323. Thus, “it is not that the presence of poetic qualities compels a certain kind of attention but the 
paying of a certain kind of attention results in the emergence of poetic qualities. Fish, Ibid., 326, emphasis added. See 
also Gerrig: “The ‘look’ of the language cannot differentiate factual and fictional assertions.” Gerrig, Experiencing 
Narrative Worlds, 101. 
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 Similarly, in Toward a Speech Act Theory of Literary Discourse (1977), Marie Louise Pratt 
refuses the formalist and structuralist claim that the language of literature is formally and 
functionally distinct from ordinary discourse; which is to say, that it has observable “properties 
that other utterances do not possess and is defined by those properties.”1196 As is the case for 
hypnosis, for Pratt, literariness or poeticity resides not “in the message” but in the literary speech 
situation, in the “particular disposition of the speaker and audience with regard to the message.”1197 
Like hypnosis, “literature is a context, too, not the absence of one.”1198 Like the hypnotic subject, 
readers “constitute [themselves] into a voluntary audience,” bringing generic expectations to the 
text, assuming that “it has been prepared, preselected and every part of it is intentional.”1199  
Our response to literature and hypnosis can thus be considered as one of cooperation, where 
the subject or reader helps fulfill the felicity conditions of the speech situation, by “understanding 
them in terms of the context in which they are made” literary, or hypnotic.1200 A single, identical 
utterance can thus count as poetic, hypnotic or ordinary, depending on the context in which it is 
uttered, and more importantly, received. 
 
3.1.1.3. Suspending Seriousness: The Pretense Theory 
 
In this section I will briefly retrace the main arguments of the pretense theory, which 
emerged from Austin’s famous description of the use of language in fiction as “nonserious,” and 
states that literary utterances are stripped of their illocutionary force:  
A performative utterance will, for example, be in a particular way hollow or void if said by an actor on the 
stage, or if introduced in a poem, or spoken in a soliloquy. … Language in such circumstances is in special 
ways—intelligibly—used not seriously, but parasitic upon its normal use. 1201   
 
As Searle formulates it, the pretense theory asserts that fictional texts are composed of 
pretended illocutions, that are “made possible by a set of conventions which suspend the normal 
 
1196 Pratt, Toward a Speech Act Theory of Literary Discourse, 4. 
1197 Pratt, Ibid., 99. 
1198 Ibid., 99. 
1199 “According to the rules for writing, a novel reader will assume the text is itself definitive, accurate, complete, 
stylistically appropriate, free of gross accidental errors, and ‘worth it’ unless he is invited to think otherwise.” Pratt, 
206. Similarly, although their sense might not always be clear to him, the hypnotic subject assumes that the utterances 
he receives are intentional, rather than attributing them to chance or an error on the part of the operator. Genres and 
subgenres can therefore to a certain extent be defined as systems of appropriateness conditions for literary texts. 
1200 Ibid, 121. 
1201 Austin, How To Do Things, 22. 
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operation of the rules relating illocutionary acts and the world.”1202 In this sense, “if I say, 
beginning a story, ‘Once upon a in a faraway Kingdom a wise King who had a beautiful daughter,’ 
that remark is literal but not serious.”1203 From this perspective, both novelists and hypnotists can 
be considered as “pretending ... to make an assertion, or going through the motions of making an 
assertion, or imitating the making of an assertion…as if one were doing or being the thing and is 
without any intent to deceive.”1204  
Significantly, as Searle specifies, this form of pretending is nondeceptive, and should be 
clearly distinguished from lying: “what distinguishes fiction from lies is the existence of a separate 
set of conventions which enables the author to go through the motions of making statements which 
he knows to be not true even though he has no intention to deceive.”1205 In literature, “the pretended 
reference … creates the fictional character”—the novelist pretends that there is an object of 
reference, which “creates a fictional person” who readers can then [really] “refer to.”1206 The 
serious message of a work of literature is not its pretended assertions, but rather the non-
represented speech act that is implicitly conveyed by the text.1207 
Richard Ohmann also proposes a conception of literature as devoid of illocutionary force, 
where the author’s speech-acts’ lack “sincerity.” For Ohmann, literary works are made up of quasi-
 
1202Ibid., 326. For Searle, fictional works can include nonfictional statements, such as Tolstoy’s opening line “Happy 
families are all happy in the same way, unhappy families unhappy in their separate, different ways,” which for him is 
a serious, not a fictional utterance. It is a genuine assertion, part of the novel but not of the fictional story. A work of 
fiction thus does not consist entirely in fictional discourse. Gerrig on the other hand objects to Searle that the “normal 
operation of the rules” can also be suspended when we read certain nonfictional texts, like an old newspaper using 
deictic references such as “this morning.” Gerrig, 129.   
1203 Searle, Ibid., 321. In literature the usual conventions between language and reality suspend the illocutionary force 
of the utterances. For Searle, “telling stories is a separate language game” with a “separate set of conventions” but it 
is not a separate illocutionary act (for the meaning of the words don’t change and we are not committed to the 
utterances as we would be to assertions). Ibid., 325. 
1204 Searle, 324, emphasis added. The author of fiction engages in a “nondeceptive pseudo performance which 
constitutes pretending to recount to us a series of events.” He “pretends to perform illocutionary acts which he is not 
in fact performing.” Ibid, 325. 
1205 Ibid., 326. 
1206 Ibid., 330. Regarding the truth value of fictional propositions: David Lewis includes the reader into the scope of 
the pretense theory: “the storytellers pretends to pass on historical information to their audience; the audience pretends 
to learn from their words, and to respond accordingly” (David Lewis, Postscript to “Truth in Fiction.” In Philosophical 
Papers, vol 1. (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 276.  For Lewis, truth in in fiction cannot be 
reduced to what is explicit in the text. The concept of S-world states that the fictional world is composed of what is 
explicitly established as true by the text and whatever other information fills in the blanks. There may thus be several 
S-worlds. As Currie notes, in some S-worlds, Sherlock Holmes can be a robot, in others a Martian, and the text can 
remain unchanged. Currie, 63.  
1207 Searle, Ibid., 332. Like the embedded hypnotic suggestion or “message,” the implicit literary speech act is 
“conveyed by the text but not in the text,” except in children’s stories or, Searle even adds, in “tiresomly didactic 
authors such as Tolstoy.”  
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speech acts, their illocutionary force being suspended and “purportedly imitative.”1208 This 
suspension is what allows us to relate to literary utterances in a specifically “literary” manner, by 
attending to their implicit meanings or responding to them emotionally, rather than 
“pragmatically”:  
Since the quasi-speech-acts of literature are not carrying on the world’s business—describing, urging, 
contracting, etc.—the reader may well attend to them in a non-pragmatic way, and thus allow them to realize 
their emotive potential. In other words, the suspension of normal illocutionary forces tends to shift a reader’s 
attention to the locutionary acts themselves and to their perlocutionary effects.1209  
 
In this sense, our readiness to “discover and dwell on the implicit meanings in works of literature—
and to judge them important” is a consequence of our knowing them to be literary works, rather 
than what indicates to us their “literary” nature.1210  
 
3.1.1.4. Fictional Illocutionary Acts? 
 
For Searle, it would be inconsistent with the “functionality principle” to claim that fiction-
making is an illocutionary act.1211 Nevertheless, some critics reject the pretense theory, and 
 
1208 Richard Ohmann, “Speech Acts and the Definition of Literature,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 4 (1971): 14. “The 
writer pretends to report discourse, and the reader accepts the pretense. Specifically, the reader constructs (imagines) 
a speaker and a set of circumstances to accompany the quasi-speech act, and makes it felicitous (or infelicitous–for 
there are unreliable narrators, etc.)… a literary work purportedly imitates (or reports) a series of speech acts, which in 
fact have no other existence. By so doing, it leads the reader to imagine a speaker, a situation, a set of ancillary events, 
and so on.” Ibid. 
1209 Ohmann, “Speech Acts and the Definition of Literature,” 17. Due to the suspension of their illocutionary force, 
literary utterances are also “impaired and incomplete” speech acts, which must be “complete[d] by supplying the 
appropriate circumstances.” Ibid. 
1210 Pratt, Toward A Speech Act Theory, 116. Pratt objects to Ohmann that his definition of literariness relies on 
fictivity, when in fact “our daily discourse is full of fictive speech acts,” such as jokes, parables, fables in political 
speeches, advertisements, thought experiments in philosophy, etc. For Pratt fictionality is not sufficient to distinguish 
literature from non-literature, as lack of illocutionary force can occur in a war scenario or scientific hypothesis, and is 
thus not specific to fiction: “it is not its quasi-ness that gives literature its world-creating capacity. Nonfictional 
narrative accounts are world-creating in the same sense as are works of literature, and, say, accounts of dreams.” Ibid., 
91; 95.  
1211 The functionality principle states that “the illocutionary acts performed in the utterance of a sentence is a function 
of the meaning of the sentence” and implies that a same sentence with the same meaning performs the same 
illocutionary acts. Searle, 320. Saying that fiction making is an illocutionary act would imply that the same sentence, 
with the same meaning, might then occur in fiction and nonfiction, and that we would therefore have the possibility 
that “distinct illocutionary acts could be performed on two occasions of utterance of one and the same sentence.” 
Currie, The Nature of Fiction, 14. However, the same sentence uttered inside and outside of the hypnotic office will 
produce two different illocutionary acts. Thus, we would side with Currie, for whom “the same sentence can be used 
to perform distinct illocutionary acts.” Currie also cites an example in Austin, where a burglar intent on seeing the 
contents of a room might pretend to clean the windows, and although he is actually removing the dirt with the 
appropriate materials in the appropriate way, cannot be considered as cleaning them. Currie, Ibid., 15. See Austin 
“Pretending” in Philosophical Papers (New York: Oxford University press, 1961). In hypnosis however, even if the 
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emphasize instead the “serious” dimension of literary utterances, or their illocutionary force.1212 In 
The Nature of Fiction, for example, Gregory Currie argues that fictive utterances are genuine 
illocutionary acts. For him, fiction-making is the act of performing a fictive, yet communicative 
utterance, in order to fulfill specific, “fictive intentions.”1213 Fiction-making is thus a genuine, 
“characteristically fictional, illocutionary act.”1214  
For Currie, fictional status is acquired by a work not in the process of its reception, but of 
its making: “it is not any linguistic or semantic feature of the text that determines its fictionality, 
nor is it anything to do with the reader’s response.”1215 Rather, the author’s “fictional intent” is a 
determining criterion for fictionality. In the act of writing fiction, the author “intends” that the 
reader adopts a specific propositional attitude and “make believe that the story as uttered is 
true”:1216  
When we make believe the story we make believe that the text is an account of events that have actually 
occurred … we have to see the text as the product of someone who has knowledge of those events. … Our 
make believe  is not merely that the events described in the text occurred but that we are being told about 
 
operator only pretends to assert x, and the subject genuinely pretends that x is true, x most of the time, actually becomes 
true.  
1212 In Experiencing Narrative Worlds, for instance, Richard Gerrig argues instead that authors perform serious acts 
with every utterance. For Gerrig, fictional propositions are “serious and sincere informative statements,” directed at 
readers who take on the role of intended “side-participants”–that is, neither direct addressees nor mere overhearers. 
Unlike overhearers, side-participants are intended by the author to be “genuinely informed by narrative utterances” 
and must “construct a context different from the here and now that enables them to understand the fictional text.” For 
Gerrig, side participation is “one of the unchangeable rules of the games of make-believe readers play with respect to 
[literary] texts.” The intention of the author is thus a crucial component for determining fictionality: “the chief goal 
of reading is to recover the author’s intended meanings in performing the utterances of a narrative.” Gerrig, 130; 110; 
137; 132. For Iser also, fictional language has the properties of the illocutionary act: it relates to conventions, entails 
procedures, which in the form of strategies help “guide the reader to an understanding of the selective processes 
underlying the text.” It also has “the quality of performance” in that it “makes the reader produce the code covering 
the selection as the actual meaning of the text.” Iser, The Act of Reading. 61. 
1213 Currie, The Nature of Fiction, 11. 
1214 Ibid., 14. 
1215 Ibid., 12. Also “the presence of a preferred set of structural-generic features in a work cannot be sufficient 
conditions for its being fictional” For example a historical narrative does not become fictional by being given the 
structure of a tragedy.” For Currie, “truth value offers no theoretically decisive test for fiction.” Indeed, nonfictional 
texts—such as scientific treatises—often prove to be false, and conversely, “fictional texts, like texts of other kinds, 
can have the semantic properties of truth value and reference.” Ibid., 4; 9. The fiction-nonfiction distinction is therefore 
a distinction between two kinds of illocutionary acts. “The claim that sentences in fiction have no truth value is based 
on a confusion of meaning and force” For Currie, sentences in fiction have no assortative force, but do have truth 
value: “they are sentences, true or false, that the author of fiction may produce without asserting them” Fictional 
authors have no assertive intention, otherwise Robinson Crusoe would be a lie, not a work of art. But while the 
proposition “Holmes smokes” is not true, the proposition “it is fictional that Holmes smokes” is true. Ibid., 6-7. 
1216 Ibid., 18. Similarly, deciding whether P belongs to the story is deciding whether F(P) is true: fictionality is a 
function, a ‘propositional operator’ from propositions to truth value. Also, since there is “no linguistic feature 
necessarily shared by all fictional works and necessarily agent from all nonfictional works” and as “it is possible for 
two works to be alike in verbal structures–right down to the details of spellings and word order–yet for one to be 
fiction and the other not.” Ibid., 2-3. 
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them by someone [fictional] who has knowledge of them. … To make believe a fictional story is not merely 
to make-believe that the story is true, but that it is told as known fact.1217 
 
For Currie, in the act of reading, we thus “make-believe that there is a teller who does believe these 
things and whose beliefs are reliable.”1218 Fictional truths take the form: “It is true that in Anna 
Karenina, Anna dies.” Reading or remembering a novel thus involves, “playing the [one player] 
Anna Karenina game,” where while we read, we make-believe that the proposition “Anna dies” is 
really true.1219 Telling the story or reading it to another person is playing the game with two people. 
While discussing a novel in a group, “players make-believe they are debating about events that 
have occurred and about people who really exist,” and so on.1220 For Currie, the specificity of such 
games of make-believe is their “very loose formal structure,” and the fact that they “depend heavily 
for their continuation on the creative imaginations of the players, and can be played without an 
intention on anybody’s part of winning.”1221 
According to Currie, the two conditions for fictivity are the relations between the narrative 
events and actual events, and the fictive intentions on the part of the author: fictional truths are 
“jointly the product of the story’s explicit content and what is true of the actual world,” that is, 
“what is explicit in the story and overtly believed in the author’s society.”1222 However, for him, 
fictionality is defined merely as a propositional attitude, that produces only quasi-beliefs. In 
hypnosis on the other hand, make-belief (momentarily) produces a reaction on a mode that 
resembles the effects of actual belief, with bodily and affective responses that occur without the 
subject having to consciously ascribe “truth value” to a body of propositions, even in pretense 
fashion.  
 
1217 Ibid., 73.   
1218 Currie, Ibid., 73. Currie’s version of make believe differs from Walton’s in that for Currie, “make-belief” is not 
something we do but a propositional operator, an attitude towards utterances: we don’t “play,” we attribute truth value 
to propositions. Or rather, “Each reader’s reading generates a fiction …in which the reader plays the role of one in 
touch with the events of the story.” Ibid. 
1219 And in this sense treating characters as if they were humans is necessary to forming a background for our 
understanding of the fictional work. 
1220 Ibid., 71. 
1221 Currie, 71. 
1222  Ibid., 65-67. For instance, in Henry James’ time, the governess of The Turn of the Screw will be judged differently 
than in post-Freudian criticism. Currie then mobilizes the concept of an “informed reader,” who “knows the relevant 
facts about the community in which the work was written,” and is necessary since “the fictional author speaks to an 
audience of his own time and most likely, of his own culture.” Ibid., 79- 80. One can see how this easily leads to an 
elitist conception of reading literature. 
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Therefore, Walton’s concept of make-believe as something we do seems more adapted to 
the “hypnotic illusion” than Currie’s definition of fictionality as the “speaker’s” intention that the 
recipient temporarily relates to his propositions as if they were true. 
 
3. 1. 2.  Hypnotic Utterances as Serious Play 
 
3.1.2.1. The Truth of Make-Believe 
 
Hypnotists often invoke the example of children’s games of make-believe to introduce and 
facilitate the production of hypnotic phenomena.1223 As Marie Laura Ryan suggests, we learn to 
make-believe before we learn to “recognize the rigidity of the ontological boundary” that separates 
story-worlds from physical realities.1224 In fact, for Kendall Walton, our responses to fictional 
worlds reveal a porosity between them and the actual world: we have a “strangely persistent 
inclination to think of fictions as sharing reality with us,” a tendency “to regard them as part of our 
reality, despite our knowledge that they are not.”1225 For Walton:  
In order to understand paintings, plays films and novels, we must first look at dolls, hobbyhorses, toy trucks 
and teddy bears. … I advocate regarding these activities as games of make-believe themselves, and I shall 
argue that representational works function as props in such games, as dolls and teddy bears serve as props in 
children’s games.1226  
 
According to this famous description, fictional texts are also used as “props” in a game which 
consists in looking at something and regarding it as something else.1227 When reading fiction, 
“players project themselves as members of the world” and play the game by generating fictional 
truths or propositions which are true in the game of make-believe.1228 As part of games of make-
 
1223 See Gombrich: “In the world of the child there is no clear distinction between reality and appearance… the basin 
does not “represent” a crash helmet, it is a kind of improvised helmet… there is no rigid division between the phantom 
and reality, truth and falsehood.” Gombrich, Art and Illusion, 99. See also: “In the game of make-believe, stumps do 
not signify bears, they are seen as present animals. Every time a child sees a stump, she performs an action that counts 
in make-believe as an encounter with a bear… every time a player performs a legal move, she makes a contribution 
to the set of fictional truths that describes the game-world.” Ryan, Narrative as Virtual Reality, 107.  
1224 Ryan, Narrative as Virtual Reality, 105. 
1225 Walton, “How remote are fictional worlds from the real world?” Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 37, no. 1 
(1978): 19-20. 
1226 Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe, 11. For Walton the game of make-believe of the reader involves three mutually 
dependent operations, which also occur in hypnosis: imagining oneself a member of the fictional world, pretending 
the propositions asserted by the “text” are true, and fulfilling the text’s prescription to the imagination by constructing 
a mental image of the world.  
1227 The literary text is a prop which stands for the text of the narrator who tells the story as true fact. 
1228 Ryan, “Immersion vs. Interactivity,” 116. For Walton, the basic fictional truth generated by a fictional text is that 
“it is fictional of the words of a narration that someone [other than the author] speaks or writes them.” Walton, 
Mimesis, 356. Then, “propositions which are ‘true in a novel,’ ‘true in (the world of) a picture,’ etc. are ‘fictionally 
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believe, appreciators of fiction pretend to believe in characters. While readers do not really believe 
in the existence of fictional characters, nevertheless, “the emotions experienced in make-believe 
in the fictional world may carry over to the real world,” causing “physical reactions such as crying 
or tensing up with fear,” as they do in hypnosis.1229  
In both literary and hypnotic games of make believe, participants willfully and temporarily 
focus their attention away from the fictionality of the world in which they are engaged. This 
involves a process of “entering” or “stepping into” a specific mode of being in which the aesthetic 
illusion operates thanks to the active performance of the reader-subject. Lilian Furst emphasizes 
this dimension in the act of reading realist fiction, “where we enter a realm which departs from the 
ordinary.”1230 As Furst explains, just as the traditional Esto served as a frame for poetry and 
 
true.’ A novel or picture determines what is fictionally true; it “generates fictional truths. … Roughly, a fictional world 
consists of the fictional truths generated by a single work.” For him, the work generates the “fictional truth that the 
narrator utters (or writes) certain words, viz., the words contained in the text, which implies “all the other fictional 
truths which the work generates.” Walton, “Points of View in Narrative and Depictive Representation.” Noûs 10, no.1 
(1976): 49; 54.  
1229 Ryan, “Immersion vs. Interactivity,” 116. However, as Walton notes, fictional make-believe involves a different 
regime of belief and affective reaction than that involved in the everyday. For instance, if “Charles” was at the movies 
watching a horror movie about a creature made of slime taking over the city, “even a hesitant belief, a mere suspicion 
that the slime is real would induce any normal person seriously to consider calling the police” whereas in this case, 
“Charles is not uncertain whether the slime is real; he is perfectly sure it is not.” Walton, “Fearing Fictions,” Journal 
of Philosophy 75, no. 1 (1978): 5- 7. Similarly, for Currie, “believing someone is in danger may cause me to alert the 
police; making believe he is will not.” Currie, The Nature of Fiction, 197. While emotional responses are penetrated 
with beliefs, quasi-emotions merely involve make-beliefs. As Charles is participating in a game of make believe, so 
he is merely experiencing a quasi-fear of the slime : “the fact that Charles is quasi-afraid as a result of realizing that 
fictionally the slime threatens him is what generates the truth that fictionally he is afraid of the slime.” Walton, 
Mimesis, 245. Similarly, for Gerrig, as a “side participant” rather than a direct addressee of the panicked news bulletin 
about the slime, Charles is not called to action. Gerrig, Experiencing Narrative Worlds 189. In hypnosis however, 
disbelief may be suspended in a way such as that the awareness of the game of make-believe does not always prevent 
reactions which blur the boundary between the “real” and the “imagined,” as in hallucinations. In the same way, Gerrig 
notes that in many instances, such as those involving anomalous suspense or anomalous replotting, “reminding oneself 
that this is only fiction will not generally eliminate the effects of fictional information in the real world.” Gerrig, 233. 
Illusion and strong affective reactions don’t always imply belief. See Tamar Gendler’s notion of “belief discordant-
alief.” Gendler defines aliefs as “innate or habitual propensities to respond to (possibly accurate) apparent stimuli in 
ways that are associate and automatic,” such as clutching the seat while watching a horror film. For Gendler, “a 
paradigmatic alief is a mental state with associatively linked content that is representational, affective and behavioral, 
and that is activated—consciously or nonconsciously—by features of the subject’s internal or ambient environment. 
Aliefs may be occurrent or dispositional.” Gendler, “Alief and Belief,” Journal of Philosophy 105, no. 10 (2008) 642. 
As Stjernberg notes, they correspond to a “cognitive state where we are affected by something that does not amount 
to a fully belief-inducing process,” and differ from beliefs, which are “evidentially sensitive commitments to content.” 
Fredrik Stjernberg, “A Puzzle of Fiction and Cognitive Impenetrability,” in The Aesthetic Illusion in Literature and 
The Arts, 145; Gendler, Intuition, Imagination and Philosophical Methodology (Oxford: Oxford University press, 
2010), 14. Aliefs involve the “activation of an associative chain,” similarly to the anchors—the association of an 
image, sound, word or other stimulus with an emotional reaction, belief, thought, etc.—used by hypnotists. Gendler, 
650. Unlike the spectators of the Lumières Brothers watching L’Arrivée d’un train en Gare de La Ciotat, who mistook 
the thing representing for the thing represented, we don’t run out of the cinema. The hypnotherapy client, on the other 
hand, if overwhelmed by affect, will open their eyes and exit the hypnotic experience.  
1230 Furst, 32. 
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classical literature,1231 an implied “I imagine myself” or “let’s pretend,” also  stands at the “portals” 
of realist fiction:1232  
Let’s pretend’ translates, linguistically, into the perception of the verbal artifact as a performance by readers. 
The command governing their performance would be ‘imagine’ in the case of a poem or fantastic fiction, 
‘suppose’ or ‘let’s pretend’ for a realist narrative. The introductory illocutionary word, though usually not 
voiced, forms a frame for the fictive discourse. It is this enframing that distinguishes an ordinary declarative 
sentence … from fictive discourse that contains as context a ‘higher’ sentence, such as ‘I imagine (myself in) 
and invite you to conceive a world in which…1233 
 
In both realism and hypnosis, this implied frame is the “portal of fiction” that traces the boundaries 
of the imaginary world, serving the double function of “containing” it and “bridging” the gap that 
separates fiction and reality.1234 As a framing device, it also reiterates the “central paradoxically” 
of realist fiction in its “twin thrust toward truth and artifice.”1235  Like hypnotic subjects, when as 
readers, we skip the introductory phrase “it’s fictional that x” or “in the novel,”  we are willfully  
“engaging in the pretense that underlies our readings.”1236  
Like the reader, the hypnotic subject is actively involved in the performance which 
“completes the frame by actualizing the illusion in their minds.”1237 Indeed, during a hypnotic 
induction, each proposition or suggestion includes “as context” the implied “imagine” without the 
 
1231 Esto (“Soit,” “admettons”): “it shall be,” “let us admit, etc. Barthes describes it as the “sous-entendu au seuil de 
tout discours Classique” (“implied at the opening of all classical discourse”). See Barthes, “L’effet de réel,” 
Communications 11 (1968): 88. See also Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, 2: 6. 
1232 Furst, All Is True, 32. In S/Z Barthes uses the image of the “empty frame which the realist author always carries 
with him (le cadre vide que l’auteur réaliste transporte toujours avec lui).” Barthes, S/Z, 61. Hypnosis makes an explicit 
use of framing techniques which circumscribes the ‘realm’ of the hypnotic experience and paradoxically eases the 
subject into it by making the transition from reality to hypnosis more reassuring. These techniques vary on a spectrum 
ranging between the extremes of deceitfully denying the presence of hypnosis altogether and calling it “pretending” 
on the one hand, and formally or exaggeratingly inflating the operator’s “powers” as in the authoritative model on the 
other. 
1233 Furst, Ibid., 44. Final ellipsis in the text. 
1234 Furst, Ibid.., 48-49. Lisa Zunshine in Why We Read Fiction, provides an amusing explanation of Don Quixote’s 
delusion by transposing this principle into cognitive terms: “from a cognitive psychological point of view… Don 
Quixote suffers from a selective failure of source monitoring. He takes in representations that ‘normal’ people store 
with a restrictive agent-specifying source tag such as ‘told by the author of a romance’ as lacking any such tag. He 
thus lets the information contained in romances circulate among his mental databases as architectural truth, corrupting 
his knowledge about the world.” Our tendency to forget to add the “fictional” source tag is due to habit and energy 
saving cognitive priorities: “we do not trace back to the author every single representation contained in the text (once 
we have bracketed off the whole fictional text as metarepresentation. Lisa Zunshine, Why We Read Fiction, Theory of 
Mind and the Novel (Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University Press, 2006), 75; 80. In a similar vein, for Currie, 
“The operator F [fictional] is often suppressed in our ordinary talk” if it is agreed that we are talking about the fictional 
world: we need not specify it with every utterance. Currie, 57.  
1235 Furst, All is True, 49. 
1236 Furst, Ibid., 32. 
1237 Ibid., 65. In reading, the “imaginative response” of the reader “is a performance, an implementation of the assent 
to pretense,” as “the construction of the text by readers who proceed as if they believed in it leads to the actualization 
of the text as realistic.” Ibid., 33. 
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operator having to repeat it with every utterance.1238 In realist aesthetics and traditional hypnosis, 
the implied instruction is often kept inconspicuous, to suppress, as far as possible, those elements 
that would reveal the fictional status of the discourse.  
Hypnotic games of make-believe often find the subject becoming so engaged that the very 
question of the ontological status of the “reality” being experienced is set aside and becomes 
secondary, even if temporarily.1239 Indeed, in hypnosis there comes a point where the question of 
drawing out a precise boundary between the real and imaginary becomes irrelevant. Similarly, as 
Gombrich writes about aesthetic reception, “In the twilight region of the symbolic, the distinction 
between reality and make-believe is itself unreal … no such questions are asked, and therefore no 
answers need be given.”1240 Once the recipient has crossed the frame and ‘entered’ the domain of 
fiction, “reality” no longer refers to the actual existence of objects in the “exterior” world, but 
rather, qualifies the depth and detail with which objects present themselves to the attention—which 
is to say, how real they appear in the moment, within the “brackets” of the attention field.1241  
 
3.1.2.2.   Active Actualizations: The Role of the Subject 
 
Although the aesthetic illusion depends on the conjunction of multiple factors—involving 
subject, creator, and context—hypnosis and novel reading ascribe similar roles to the subject in 
the constitution of the work.1242 As I will argue in this section, even if the recipient’s mind’s is 
“guided” by the illusionist artefact, the hypnotic-novelistic subject is not passive but rather a co-
 
1238 On the other hand, preserving and pronouncing the explicit instruction “pretend/imagine that” can (as is often 
practiced in modern hypnosis) also encourage immersion in the subject, who is reassured by the ‘fictional’ dimension 
of the experience, and thus enters it more readily. 
1239 In permissive hypnosis, the “as if” model allows the operator to reassure the subject by announcing that there is 
absolutely no need to ascribe any ontological status to the “truths” or “phenomena” generated by the hypnotic 
discourse. Similarly, on the side of the author, the “implied utterance” preceding the fictional proposition might thus 
merely declare the presence of a fictional statement without involving the question of its sincerity or truth value. See 
for example Genette: “For a story beginning with once upon a time, the author’s speech act can be paraphrased as “I, 
author, hereby decided fictionally, by adapting both the words to the world and the world to the words and without 
fulfilling any sincerity condition (without believing it or asking [the reader] to believe it), that p….” Gérard Genette, 
“The Pragmatic Status of Narrative Fiction.” Style, 24 (1990): 63.   
1240 Gombrich, Art and Illusion, 99. 
1241 For example, in many novels, round, fictional characters can feel more “real” (that is, complex) than the flatter 
albeit “real” (i.e. “immigrant” or “surrogate”) objects or figures which are represented in the fictional world. 
1242 “The conjunction of factors that … are located in the artefact ([or] performance) itself, in the recipient, and in 
certain cultural and historical contexts.” Wolf, “Aesthetic Illusion as an Effect of Fiction,”330. 
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creates the work by actively participating in the aesthetic illusion.1243 In this sense, a similar 
movement can be traced in the history of hypnosis and of literary theory, where authority and 
responsibility for the success of the aesthetic-hypnotic illusion has shifted, from the author-
operator, to the active, imaginative, and meaning-constituting intentionality of the subject.1244 This 
activity of the subject and the individuality of each actualization are the two aspects that bring 
hypnotic and readerly subjectivity together. 
Reader-response theory and phenomenologically oriented criticism have insisted heavily 
on the reader’s role in the constitution of the literary text, arguing that “the author brings the words, 
the reader the meaning.”1245 As Roman Ingarden famously argued, the literary work of art (in its 
written form) is an incomplete object that must be actualized by the reader into an aesthetic object, 
which the reader performs by filling in the gaps, the places of indeterminacy—the 
Unbestimmheitsstellen—in the text, on the basis of their own unique experience and 
knowledge.1246 Similarly, the hypnotic subject must fill in the indeterminacies left by the operator, 
and must both constitute and perform the meaning of the hypnotic utterances. This notion is built 
into the presuppositions of permissive, modern hypnotherapy: “frequently, Erickson will suggest 
or imply that what he says is not important. Only the patient’s interpretation of what he says is 
important … so that each client could ‘fill in the blank’.”1247 The reader and subject must decipher, 
 
1243 For its success, aesthetic illusion presupposes “the implicit acceptance of a ‘reception contract’.” Wolf, “Aesthetic 
Illusion. Towards a Media-Conscious Theory of Media-Elicited Immersion as a Transmedial Phenomenon,” 33. 
Conversely, “illusionist texts and artefacts do not merely offer experiential immersion in a passive way; they actively 
appeal to the readers and thereby also contribute to minimalizing aesthetic distance” Wolf, “Aesthetic Illusion as an 
Effect of Fiction,” 341.See also Gombrich’s notion of “guided projection.” Gombrich, 169. 
1244 “Immersion requires an active engagement with the text and a demanding act of imagining.” Ryan, Narrative as 
Virtual Reality, 15. Indeed, as Ryan notes, it is a demanding mental activity to “form a mental image of the fictional 
world” and “convert the temporal flow of language into a spatial configuration of meaning.” While visual media are 
inherently immersive, “text requires a far greater mental activity to translate its signs into representation… it takes 
concentration to achieve immersion, because language itself offers no data to the senses (except for the look, feel and 
the smell of the book, which are usually not related to the message). All sensory data must therefore be simulated by 
the imagination.” Ryan, “Immersion vs. Interactivity,” 125; 133 
1245 Frye in Iser, The Act of Reading, 27. See also See Stanley Fish: interpreters “do not decode poems, they make 
them.” Fish, Is There a Text?, 327. 
1246“The medium dependent, unavoidable indeterminate areas of in verbal discourse, similar to the grain in analog 
photography.” Ingarden, Das literarische Kunstwerk (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1931), 261; Wolf, Aesthetic Illusion(s)?,” 
44.  
1247 Rossi, Hypnotic Realities, 272; Slosar, in Ericksonian Approaches to Hypnosis, 123. See also Gombrich: “the 
amount of information reaching us from the visible world is incalculably large, and the artist’s medium is inevitably 
restricted and granular. Even the most meticulous realists…. will have to rely on suggestion when it comes to 
representing the infinitely small”; “The beholder [of the painting] must mobilize his memory of the visible world and 
project it into the mosaic of strokes and dabs on the canvas before him… Here… the principle of guided projection 
reaches its climax. The image… has no firm anchorage left on the canvas—it is only ‘conjured up’ in our minds. The 
willing beholder responds to the artist’s suggestion because he enjoys the transformation that occurs in front of his 
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convert or translate utterances or signifiers, constituting them into an internal experience which is 
stable and meaningful enough to then serve as a basis to interpret the rest of the (hypnotic or 
literary) work  as it unfolds.1248 As Ryan notes, “from the point of view of the reader … the text is 
like a musical score waiting to be performed.”1249 As with hypnotic discourse—which relies 
heavily on the verbally-centered interpretative acts of the recipient for the constitution of its 
meaning and efficacy—“it is in the reader that the text comes to life.” 1250 
This is not to say that the recipient does not let himself be guided by the text. As Furst 
describes it, the “creativity” of the author/narrator serves as “the triggering part” of a more 
extensive process in which readers’ imagination is an indispensable agent.1251 
 Just as for Wolfgang Iser, the literary work itself is neither the text, nor the concretization, 
but rather, “must be situated somewhere between the two,” the hypnotic experience is a 
collaboration between operator and subject in which the subject produces the meaning of the 
speaker’s utterances.1252 In hypnosis, the subject reacts to the suggestions in a manner very close 
to Iser’s description of the reader: “the reader is not simply called to ‘internalize’ the positions 
given in a text, but he is induced to make them act upon and so transform each other, as a result of 
which the aesthetic object begins to emerge.”1253 Hypnosis is thus a subtle and sophisticated act of 
creating and allowing an aesthetic object to emerge through acts of interpretation, imagination, 
and the effect of these act on one another, following the unfolding of the verbal utterances.  
In the case of the realist novel, the aesthetic illusion—like hypnotic rapport—depends on 
a certain degree of faith in the narrator’s trustworthiness and reliability.1254 To establish this trust, 
 
eyes… The artist gives the beholder increasingly ‘more to do’, he draws him into the magic circle of creation and 
allows him to experience something of the thrill of ‘making’ which had once been the privilege of the artist”; All 
painting, even naturalist, “relies on our knowledge, on our faculty to project and to supplement what was left 
indistinct.” Gombrich, 220; 202; 217, emphasis added. 
1248 See also: “There are obviously two conditions that must be fulfilled if the mechanism of projection is to be set in 
motion. One is that the beholder must be left in no doubt about the way to close the gap; secondly, that he must be 
given a ‘screen’, an empty or ill-defined area onto which he can project the expected image.” Gombrich, Art and 
Illusion, 208. 
1249 Ryan, Narrative as Virtual Reality, 45. See also: “When we hold a book in our hands, all we hold is paper. The 
book is elsewhere.” Robert Escarpit, The Book Revolution (London: Harrap, 1966), 17. 
1250 Iser, The Act of Reading, 19. As Gombrich has shown, the beholder of a painting also engages in the act of 
interpreting conventions and translation of information.  
1251 Ibid., 72. 
1252 Iser, The Act of Reading, 21. As Iser notes, in literature, the meaning must be produced by the reader “even though 
it is restructured by the signs given in the text.” Ibid. 
1253 Ibid., 203. 
1254 “Readers’ willingness to (pretend to) believe is dependent on the degree of trust that the narrative voice can 
evince.” Furst, All is True 55. 
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like hypnotic operators, realists authors “took care to cultivate the image of reliability and stability 
in their narrators” who “can have unhampered access to the systems of knowledge that inform and 
govern the text.”1255 It is important to note that both in literature and in hypnosis, establish 
reliability does not necessarily entail the display of omniscience, in a Balzacian fashion. For 
example as Furst observes, the Jamesian narrator—like the modern hypnotist who adopts a 
position of “unknowing”—establishes his own reliability by making “repeated confessions of not 
knowing” and admitting his own limitations to “enhance the profile of honesty.”1256 In fact, the 
shift from omniscient narration to an “honest yet limited” perspective in novelistic aesthetics 
mirrors the shift, in the history of hypnosis, from the omnipotent to the permissive operator: 
whereas the former was invested with knowledge and power, the latter gains trust by adapting 
horizontally to the level of the subject’s worldview. In the history of hypnosis and of the novel, 
“the balance changes with the decline in the narrator’s absolute suzerainty over the fiction and the 
concomitant expansion of the readers’ input.”1257  
As in modern hypnosis, for Furst, realist “consensus” is best achieved through co-
construction, cooperation, and “entering together” the realm of fiction or “conjoint fashioning of 
the frame.”1258 Fictional narrators and hypnotic operators can thus be described in similar fashion:  
To read realist fiction is to engage in a performative act. It is a cooperative venture transacted in the medium 
of the text by narrator and readers functioning in a consensual entente. The narrator initiates, directs, and 
prompts the delineation and unfolding of the fictional world, which readers grasp through the denotative and 
connotative aspects of language as well as through metaphor.1259  
 
Similarly, the utilizational approach in modern hypnotherapy stresses the interactional nature of 
the hypnotic relationship. The hypnotic endeavor is “a cooperative effort in which responsibility 
is mutually assumed” and where “the hypnotist’s task is to guide and supervise the subject,” whose 
“task is to decide if, how, and when to respond to the hypnotist’s communications.”1260 In this 
context, trance is defined not as the dissolution of self or annihilation of the intellect, but as “an 
opportunity for the subject to set aside his identification with any limiting conscious processes and 
shift into a context where he/she can access and utilize unconscious resources for therapeutic 
 
1255 Ibid., 55. 
1256 Ibid.. 
1257 Ibid., 65. 
1258 Ibid., 66. 
1259 Ibid., 172-173. 
1260 Stephen Gilligan, “Ericksonian Approaches to Clinical Hypnosis,” in Ericksonian Approaches to Hypnosis and 
Psychotherapy, ed. J. Zeig (New York: Brunner/Mazel, Inc., 1982), 89. 
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gain.”1261 Like the novelist, the hypnotist works to “secure and hold” the subject’s attention, not 
subject him.   
And indeed, as François Roustang observes, if the hypnotic subject feels compelled to obey 
a suggestion, it is not because of the irresistible power of the operator but because he or she feels 
bound by the contract which he has implicitly agreed to, on which the experience depends to 
succeed.1262 This act of voluntary cooperation occurs both in modern permissive and older 
authoritative models of hypnosis. While the former makes it visible—as do eighteenth-century, 
and postmodern narrators—however, the latter strives to dissimulate it—as do realist ones. In the 
first case, this freedom is acknowledged, while in the other, its acknowledgment is temporarily or 
functionally suspended, placed in the background.  
In both cases, however, in “binding” himself in the hypnotic contract he makes with 
himself (rather than the operator), the subject remains free and autonomous throughout. A similar 
type of cooperation occurs in the implicit contract that ties narrators and readers together in 
immersive reading.1263  
Richard Gerrig emphasizes this “optional” dimension of readerly participation: since “a 
text cannot force a reader to experience a narrative world,” an author’s “expertise consists partially 
in creating circumstances that will reliably prompt readers to undertake optional activities.”1264 As 
in modern permissive hypnosis, readers can either participate in the game, or stay skeptical. 
Specifically, faced with the claims to truthfulness of realist narrators, “we as readers have a number 
of options. We may choose to enter into a collusive complicity with the narrator. Willingly 
suspending disbelief, and agreeing to accept the narrative as a paradigmatic sample” of real events, 
or adopt a posture of detachment, maintaining our skepticism, vis à vis “an artifact of the 
 
1261 Gilligan 89. Indeed, the operator’s responsibility is to stimulate and maintain the subject’s interest and cooperation 
by adapting to them. Especially, subjects in a deep trance must be dealt with “very gingerly to keep from losing their 
cooperation” as they “successfully resist when unwilling or more interested in other projects.” Erickson, Hypnotic 
Realities, 19.  
1262  “[The suggested task] is a task which awaits me and I cannot abandon it without breaking the contract by failing 
to respect the conditions of the experience which I wish to go through. Roustang, 60. 
1263 For example, Furst’s description of the narrative contract strongly resembles those of hypnotic rapport found in 
medical literature: “the establishment of a sound, trusting relationship between narrating voice and readers, a secure 
narrative contract that dispose readers to persuasion by the rhetoric.” Furst, All is True. ix. See also descriptions of the 
novel as pretense descriptive utterances made by a trusted speaker. For example: “Realistic novels… are like the 
experience of being told about life by someone whom we trust.” Douglas Hewitt, The Approach to Fiction (London: 
Longman, 1972), 55. 
1264 Gerrig, Experiencing Narrative Worlds 5; 241. 
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imagination.”1265 Hypnosis and realism thus depend heavily on the recipient’s compliance for their 
success,1266  and immersion is the result of the act or activity of reading: the product of the reader, 
not the author or the text.  As Iser shows, subscribing to the aesthetic illusion of realism is a 
performance carried out by the recipient: 
The aesthetic semblance can only take on its form by way of the recipient’s ideational, performative activity, 
and so representation can only come to full fruition in the recipient’s imagination; it is the recipient’s 
performance that endows the semblance with its sense of reality.1267  
 
Indeed, in hypnosis as in literature, the aesthetic illusion is not “a kind of mental state generated 
in the reader’s mind by the aesthetic powers of the text” but a “stance or attitude that the reader is 
supposed to adopt, by making certain interpretive moves, in order to get access to the literary 
functions of the text.”1268 The reader does something to allow the text to fulfill its literary functions, 
just like the hypnotic subject grants and gives permission (mainly to themselves) in the implicit 
hypnotic contract. 
Just as for Dewey, “to perceive, a beholder must create his own experience,” all hypnosis 
is—as we mentioned higher up—ultimately, self-hypnosis.1269 This explains why the same 
utterances and behavior on the part of the operator, even the same hypnotic script or recording, 
will not only produce different results in different subjects, but will likely also differ for the same 
individual in different occurrences.1270 As with literature, hypnotic “interpretation” differs with 
 
1265 Furst, All is True, 12. 
1266 The imaginary in Iser’s sense does not refer to a fictional or factual object represented by the text, but to a reality 
built up by the reader, an “unformed reality that is to be construed in the process of reading.” Tomáš Koblížek, 
“Introduction,” in The Aesthetic Illusion in Literature and the Arts (London and New York: Bloomsbury, 2017),18. 
Iser’s concept emphasizes not merely the ability of literary texts to draw the reader into the represented world, but 
rather, like hypnosis, in its ability to “engage the reader in the very process of the world-making” Ibid.,18. For Iser’s 
replacement of the fiction-reality dyad with the “fictive-real-imaginary” triad, see The Fictive and the Imaginary 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University press, 1993), 1-4. See also Barthes: “L’enjeu du travail littéraire (de la littérature 
comme travail), c’est de faire du lecteur non plus le consommateur, mais un producteur du texte (What is at stake in 
the literary work (in literature as work), is not to make the reader not the consumer, but the producer of the 
text).”Barthes, S/Z, 10. 
1267 Iser, “Representation: A Performative Act,” in The Aims of Representation, ed. Murray Krieger (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1987), 226. 
1268 Petr Kotátko, “Fiction, Illusion, Reality and Radical Narration,” in The Aesthetic Illusion in Literature and the 
Arts (London and New York: Bloomsbury, 2017), 193. 
1269 John Dewey, Art as Experience, 54. Similarly, “the reader is absorbed into what he himself has been made to 
produce through the image; he cannot help being affected by his own production.” Iser, The Act of Reading, 140. 
1270 See Derrida to Ornette Coleman: “we know ourselves by what we believe... it's universal, we know or believe we 
know what we are through the stories that are told to us.” Jacques Derrida, “The Other’s Language: Jacques Derrida 
Interviews Ornette Coleman, 23 June 1997,” trans. T. S. Murphy, Genre: Forms of Discourse and Culture 37:2 (2004): 
326. See also Wolf: “a recipient’s illusionist response is not only subject to external, contextual circumstances but is 
also heavily dependent on individual factors such as his or her range of experience, age, gender, interests, cultural 
background, and ability to “read” works of art aesthetically. The illusionist response further depends on the reception 
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every act of interpretation, and “stems from the complexity of the mediation between what is there, 
physically [a stream of utterances/words], and what is made out of it.”1271 This also explains the 
anti-theoretical, constructivist framework of modern permissive hypnosis, which provides the 
flexibility required to adapt to each empirical hypnotic situation.  
 
3.1.2.3. Who Says I?  
 
Modern hypnosis and novels are narrative activities that reveal, shape, and filter our 
comprehension of the world.1272 Both rely on the idea that our descriptions, concepts, and belief-
systems influence the way we see reality.1273 According to the constructivist framework used by 
modern hypnosis, “the experiencing consciousness creates structure in the flow of its experience,” 
which is then experienced by the individual as “reality.”1274 Rather than passively acquired, 
knowledge thus “originates as the product of an active subject’s activity,” taking place “within the 
experiential world of a goal-directed consciousness.”1275 Therefore, the world we experience is, 
 
conditions, e. g., whether a novel is read for the first time or not, and, last but not least, on the recipient’s willingness… 
to become immersed in an illusionist reception.” Wolf, “Aesthetic Illusion as an Effect of Fiction,” 334. 
1271 Ryan, Ibid., 45. 
1272 Indeed, “languages of description are not neutral. Every descriptive language makes assumptions, and these help 
to shape what is described.” Benson, The Absorbed Self, ix.  
1273 Implicit in the therapeutic use of this framework is the idea that the usefulness of a belief or proposition is of 
greater importance than its truth value. This mirror the question addressed to novels (what “knowledge” comes out of 
fictional or imaginary experience? Rather than skepticism, relativism or nihilism, radical constructivism opens up the 
space to absolute freedom and responsibility of the subject. As a form of self-knowledge rather than passivity, hypnosis 
places us, like novel reading, in a position of responsibility towards these “very beliefs, attitudes, and intentions that 
constitute one’s inner life.” Ong, The Art of Being, 4. Furthermore, the phenomenological concept of the world existing 
only insofar as it is posited by a subject also allows one to defend hypnotic and poetic discourse against accusations 
of mystification (one of their principle epistemic ‘dangers’) once it is assumed that there is no natural or objective 
reality to be driven away from. 
1274 Ernst Von Glasersfeld, “An Introduction to Radical Constructivism,” in The Invented Reality, ed. Paul Watzlawick 
(New York and London: Norton & Company, 1984), 38. See also Gombrich:  the “inductivist ideal of pure observation 
[naturalism] has proved a mirage in science no less than in art. The very idea that it should be possible to observe 
without expectation, that you can make your mind an innocent blank on which nature will record its secrets, has come 
in for strong criticism. Every observation, as Karl Popper has stressed, is a result of a question we ask nature, and 
every question implies a tentative hypothesis. We look for something because our hypothesis makes us expect certain 
results”; “what we see does not directly and immediately reveal to us ‘what is there’… we can only guess, and our 
guess will be influenced by our expectation”; “expectation create[s] suggestion” ; “When we are aware of the process 
of filing, we say ‘interpret’, where we are not we say ‘we see.’ From this point of view, there is also a difference of 
degree rather than of kind between what we call a ‘representation’ and what we call an ‘object of nature’.” Gombrich, 
321; 249; 204; 105, emphasis added.   
1275 Ibid. 31-32. Radical constructivism defines knowledge as “exclusively an ordering and organization of a world 
constituted by our experience” and the “selecting activity” of consciousness. Indeed, “the radical constructivist has 
relinquished metaphysical realism once and for all and finds himself in full agreement with Piaget, who says 
‘intelligence organizes the world by organizing itself.’” Ibid., 24. See Jean Piaget, La Construction du réel chez 
l’enfant (Neuchâtel: Delachaux et Niestlé, 1937), 311; and: “a statement about the world is not straightforwardly either 
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and must be, as it is, because we have put it together in that way.”1276 Like a novel, it is a 
composition.1277  
More specifically, according to Ernst Von Glasersfeld’s “Introduction to Radical 
Constructivism,” a cognitive organism or consciousness “produces” regularities in its experiential 
world via “assimilation,” even when experience is “chaotic.”1278 To the assimilating 
consciousness, what an object is, matters much less than whether it “fits” in the system, whether 
it performs or behaves in the way that is expected of it.1279 Knowing is thus not “the search for an 
iconic representation of ontological reality” but “a search for fitting ways of behaving and 
thinking.”1280 For the radical constructivist, reality is “created almost entirely without the 
experiencer’s awareness of his or her creative activity” and “comes to appear as given by an 
independently existing world.”1281  
As Furst notes, “the ultimate message of constructivism is the need to study how worlds 
are constructed” instead of “sizing [them] up against some in itself indisputable ‘reality’ for their 
degree of truthfulness or distortion.”1282 Indeed, the most fundamental trait of constructivist 
epistemology is that “the world which is constructed consists of experiences and makes no claim 
whatsoever about ‘truth’ in the sense of a correspondence with ontological reality.”1283 
 
true or false,” it “may be true of the world relative to one theory and false relative to another.” Currie, 105. As Currie 
notes, this statement implies the abandonment of realism. See Nelson Goodman, Ways of Worldmaking (Indianapolis: 
Hackett, 1978), x. 
1276 Von Glasersfeld., 30. “The extent to which this will succeed depends far more on the goals and the already 
constructed starting points than on what might be given in so called ‘reality.’ But in our experience, which is always 
determined by the goals we have chosen, we … tend to ascribe the obstacles we meet to a mythical reality rather than 
to the way in which we operate.” Ibid. 37. On a psychological level this corresponds to the filtering out of experience 
via cognitive biases and to the unconscious reproduction of cycles of information selection which confirm the subject’s 
preexisting beliefs. It is important to note that in this sense, “goals” can also be destructive or misery inducing, as in 
symptom formation for example. 
1277 “Every man’s world picture is and always remains a construct of his mind and cannot be proved to have any other 
existence.” Erwin Schrödinger, Mind and Matter, in The Invented Reality, epigraph. 
1278 Von Glasersfeld, 30. For example, categories like “sameness” or “difference” are always the result of an 
examination with regards to specific properties, the criteria by means of which we establish them are “created and 
chosen by the judging, experiencing subject and cannot be ascribed to an experiencer-independent world.” So “both 
regularity and constancy presuppose repeated experience, and repetition can be established only on the basis of a 
comparison that yields a judgment of sameness,” which is always relative. Ibid., 35-36. 
1279 See also: “reading” [an image] is “testing it for its potentialities, trying out what fits.” Gombrich, Art and Illusion, 
227. 
1280 Von Glasersfeld, 39. 
1281 Ibid., 38. 
1282 Furst, 41. Indeed, “once the idea of some aboriginal reality is relinquished, the criterion of correspondence is 
supplanted as the primary way of distinguishing true from false models of the world” (Furst, 40). See also Todorov: 
Fiction can be “neither true nor false but simply fictional.” Todorov, “The Notion of Literature,” New Literary History 
5, no.1 (1973): 7. 
1283 Von Glasersfeld, “An Introduction to Radical Constructivism,” 29. 
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On a psychological level, the assimilating action of consciousness leads to a circular regime 
of causality, most notable in the creation of unconscious self-fulfilling prophesies, which constitute 
and solidify the subject’s experience and conception of reality.1284 As Paul Watzlawick argues in 
The Invented Reality, “an action that results from a self-fulfilling prophecy itself produces the 
requisite conditions for the occurrence of the expected event” and thus “creates a reality which 
would not have arisen without it.”1285  Because all perception of reality involves this process, “there 
is no illusion, because there is only illusion.”1286 Similarly, in Art and Illusion, Gombrich has 
emphasized the interpretative dimension of sensory—especially visual—perception:  
It is the power of expectation rather than the power of conceptual knowledge that molds what we see in life 
no less than in art…Every time we scan the distance we somehow compare our expectation, our projection, 
with the incoming message. It is always we who send out these tentacles into the world around us, who grope 
and probe, ready to withdraw our feelers for a new test.1287   
 
In beholding images, but also in reading and listening to speech or verbal utterances, it is difficult 
to distinguish “what is given to us” from “what we supplement in the process of projection which 
is triggered off by recognition”—or, as Gombrich also calls it, “guessing.”1288 In other words in 
 
1284 “The course of events is induced by the very measures which are undertaken as a (supposed) reaction to the 
expected event in question... what is supposed to be a reaction (the effect) turns out to be an action (the cause); the 
solution produces the problem; the prophecy of the event causes the event of the prophecy.” Paul Watzlawick, “Self-
Fulfilling Prophecies,” in The Invented Reality (New York and London: Norton & Company, 1984), 97.  
1285 Watzlawick, “Self-Fulfilling Prophecies,” 96. “The action that is at first neither true nor false produces a fact, nd 
with it its own ‘truth’… An assumption believed to be true creates the assumed reality.” Ibid., 97. 
1286 Watzlawick, “The Illusion of ‘Illusion’,” in Aesthetic Illusion, ed. F. Burwick and W. Pape (Berlin and New York: 
De Gruyter, 1990), 27. 
1287 Gombrich, Art and Illusion, 225. “We all probe the distant and indeterminate for possible classifications, which 
we then test and elaborate in a game of projections… We must always rely on guesses, on the assessment of 
probabilities, and on subsequent tests, and in this there is an even transition from the reading of symbolic material to 
our reaction in life” E.g. “interpreting, classifying a shape affects the way we see its color,” and we are often in a state 
of “readiness to start projecting, to thrust out the tentacles of phantom colors and phantom images which always flicker 
around our perceptions.” Ibid., 225; 227. See: “what is perceived shapes the subjectivity of how it is perceived, and 
allows for novel expansions of perceiving.” Benson, The Absorbed Self, 161. 
1288 Gombrich, Ibid., 242. For Gombrich, our interpretations are all selections, without which we would be lost, since 
“our inability to see ambiguity often protects us from the knowledge that ‘pure’ shapes allow of an infinity of spatial 
readings.” In this sense, “What we call seeing is invariably colored and shaped by our knowledge (or belief) of what 
we see. This becomes clear enough whenever the two are at variance” (it is because we can take one thing for another 
that the eye can be deceived by an illusionist picture”). “The ‘Egyptian’ [i.e. painting what we know rather than what 
we see] in us can be suppressed, but he can never be quite defeated… [He] ultimately stands for the active mind, for 
that ‘effort after meaning’ which cannot be defeated without out world’s collapsing into total ambiguity.” Ibid., 221-
222; 394-5. See also Wollheim’s Kleinian account of the developmental origins of projection: “expulsive phantasy 
dyes the world, and it is the dye that gives the world its new projective properties,” and his concept of expressive 
perception, whereby “emotion, aroused by what we see, comes to color our perception of what we see.” Richard 
Wollheim, Painting as an Art (London: Thames and Hudson, 1987), 84; and The Thread of Life (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1984), 138. See Benson, The Absorbed Self, 157; 161. 
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finding the world as we do, “we forget all we did to find it as such. … A description, when carefully 
inspected, reveals the properties of the observer.”1289  
Modern hypnotherapists adopt this constructivist framework because of its strong 
therapeutic potential, which stems from the possibilities that open up once the subject begins to 
acknowledge and explore alternative ways to “construct” reality. Indeed, as Watzlawick writes:  
He who suffers from his own being in the world is caught in his own fly-bottle; the attempted ‘solution’ is 
his problem, and only by stepping outside the vicious circle of problem-‘solution’ and ‘solution’-caused-
problem can he discover that reality can be constructed differently. Of course, this other reality is again 
precisely this: a construction, but a construction that fits better, will not only be less painful to live in but will 
convey that undefinable feeling of being ‘in tune’ without which man cannot survive psychologically.1290  
 
The power of “reframing” or “restorying” is thus at the heart of therapeutic approaches based on 
the constructivist model. Nevertheless, this conception does not go without its ethical and political 
dangers:  
The discovery that we create our own realities is comparable to the expulsion from the paradise of the 
presumed suchness of the world, a world in which we can certainly suffer, but for which we need only feel 
responsible in a very limited way. And here lies the danger … the insights of constructivism … can also be 
abused. Advertising and propaganda are two especially repugnant examples… thanks to this brainwashing 
the world is then seen as ‘thus’ and therefore is thus.1291  
 
Indeed, as Gillian puts it, “while tools are value-free, their capacity to enhance or create is 
equivalent to their potential to oppress or destroy.”1292 According to Watzlawick, the antidote 
against these potential abuses lies in the ethical framework of the practitioner, as well as the 
acknowledgment of the responsibility of the subject.1293 The freedom, cooperation, activity, and 
 
1289 Fransisco Varela, “A Calculus for Self-Reference.” International Journal of General Systems 1, no. 2 (1975): 24. 
1290 Watzlawick, “The Fly and the Fly-Bottle,” in The Invented Reality (New York and London: Norton & Company, 
1984), 255. 
1291 Watzlawick, “Self-Fulfilling Prophecies,” in The Invented Reality, 111-12. As Joseph Goebbels himself noted in 
a lecture to managers of German radio station on March 25, 1933: “This is the secret of propaganda: To totally saturate 
the person, whom the propaganda wants to lay hold of, with the ideas of the propaganda, without him even noticing 
that he is being saturated. Propaganda has of course a purpose, but this purpose must be disguised with such 
shrewdness and virtuosity that he who is supposed to be filled with this purpose never even knows what is happening.” 
Quoted in Watzlawick, Ibid., 112. Saturation is indeed an induction technique commonly used by hypnotists–
sometimes called cognitive overload. Here one can also note the vocabulary of passivity and the metaphor of being 
“filled up,” which correspond to the nineteenth-century popular conception of hypnosis as a dangerous practice. 
1292 Stephen Gilligan, “Ericksonian Approaches to Clinical Hypnosis,” 101. 
1293 The moral integrity of the operator is the sine qua non for both the ethical foundation and the therapeutic success 
of hypnosis, which cannot do without the subject’s cooperation–based on trust. In the Ericksonian context, the integrity 
of the operator is defined as “the degree to which the hypnotist is able to refrain from imposing his own solutions and 
beliefs on the subject” and instead fully support the subject in his quest for change and discovering his own resources. 
Without this fundamental integrity, an operator can “obtain hypnotic phenomena” (as in stage hypnosis) but “not 
hypnotherapeutic changes.” Indeed, “most hypnotic subjects will quickly learn to distrust and hence not cooperate 
with a non-supportive hypnotist.” Gilligan, Ibid., 102-103. No facts, only interpretations: “No first-order Reality 
exists, just an infinite number of second-order realities with no criteria for judging them except, perhaps, utility.” John 
O. Beahrs, “Understanding Erickson’s Approach,” in Ericksonian Approaches to Hypnosis and Psychotherapy (New 
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thus responsibility, of the latter are thus crucial components in preserving both the ethical 
foundations and the therapeutic success of hypnosis. As Watzlawick writes: 
The invented reality will become ‘actual’ reality only if the invention is believed … with the better 
understanding of self-fulfilling prophecies our ability to transcend them grows. …The possibility of choosing 
differently (of being a heretic) and of disobeying always exists. …A prophecy that we know to be only a 
prophecy can no longer fulfill itself.1294 
 
The malleability of the self can also be understood with pragmatist philosophy. Indeed, in 
“Does consciousness exist?,” William James defines consciousness not a separate and autonomous 
spiritual entity but as an organizing function, an activity, a center of reference within the field of 
givenness or pure experience.1295 For James, “I” and “me” signify no transcendental substance, 
but rather, are “names of emphasis.”1296 In this context, “the word ‘I’ is primarily a noun of 
position, just like ‘this’ and ‘here’.”1297 It is an “indexical,” a demonstrative, belonging to that class 
of “words that require a familiarity with the context in which they are being used before that to 
which they are referring can be known.”1298 As Benson notes, although it forms the origin of a 
complex system of coordinates, an active centered position from which and to which references 
are made, “this position is not fixed and given; it is instead incessantly mobile.”1299 In this sense, 
I is nothing but a succession of changing plural points of view, there can be no single abiding point 
of view. Rather, points of view are “inherently relational,” always on or about something.”1300 
They are “constituted and sustained by interaction with the world,” they are “labile and 
 
York: Brunner/Mazel, Inc., 1982), 62. See also: “a photograph [taken] from any perspective is no more ‘true’ nor 
‘false’ than another; it is a valid portrayal of one aspect of Reality, but different from equally valid photographs taken 
from different perspectives.” None approaches reality more than another, but “we know more of it [reality] when we 
view it from more perspectives.” The therapist then must “become proficient with several seemingly different 
frameworks.” Ibid., 62; 80. Hence the (ethical) importance of flexibility. 
1294 Watzlawick, “Self-Fulfilling Prophecies,”113. Wittgenstein also notes that certain games can be won with a simple 
trick:  if someone calls our attention to this trick, we no longer have to continue playing naively and keep losing the 
game. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1956), 100. Nigel 
Howard states a similar idea: “if a person becomes ‘aware’ of a theory concerning his behavior, he is no longer bound 
by it but is free to disobey it.” Nigel Howard, “The Theory of Metagames” General Systems 11 (1967): 167.  
1295 William James, “Does Consciousness Exist?” Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 1, no. 
18 (Sept. 1904). In John McDermott, ed. The Writings of William James (New York: Random House, 1968), 169-183. 
According to James’ anti-dualism, the field of pure experience contains no given distinction between a subject-entity 
and independent object-entities. As Benson notes, it is “given with the body as its center.” Benson, 89. 
1296 James, The Principles of Psychology, vol. 1 (London: Dover Publications, 1950), 341. 
1297 James, Essays in Radical Empiricism (London: Longmans, Green & Co,1912), 69. 
1298 Benson, Ibid., 89. Indexicals include terms such as ‘This’, ‘here’ or ‘now.’ As Benson notes, indexicals “always 
insist on bringing their context with them”: the word “now,” for instance, needs to have its boundaries specified to 
have meaning. The goal is to show how the indexicality of the linguistic “I” then influences the context dependency 
of the psychological “I.” Benson, 91, emphasis added. 
1299 Ibid., 90. 
1300 Ibid., 122.  
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mobile.”1301 In non-referential theories of the self like James’, a personal point of view is a point 
in the stream of consciousness,  a “moving point,” comparable to the “restless cursor on the 
computer screen” which “moves and changes with the stream of experience. It especially changes 
with shifts of intentionality [thought-content].”1302 Here too, “there is no subject to which I refers, 
only I-thoughts.”1303  
Furthermore, as Benson notes, “if I is indeed a word of position and emphasis … then it 
also follows that I is of its nature intimately linguistic as a psychological phenomenon.”1304 Indeed, 
social constructivism has shown how the sense of self is contingent upon the acquisition of 
language, the ability to think symbolically, and the “correct use of the first person personal 
pronoun” which is “plainly a sociopsychological phenomenon.”1305 In other words, one can argue 
that “I finds its meaning and usefulness by virtue of belonging to a particular theory of self which 
new members of a culture acquire and use to organize their experience.”1306 Indeed, for Rom Harré, 
the self is “an organizing theory whose form and content is social in origin.”1307 Self is inferred, 
rather than directly intuited. Its indexical function “is a quintessentially social act which serves to 
ground both interpersonal and interpersonal relationships.”1308 By positing that the self is a solid 
entity, we have thus reified and granted an ontological status to a mere indexical function, a name 
for a theory we have generated, when in fact:  
There is no autonomous self functioning to organize experience. There is only a theory of “myself as subject 
of my experience,” which organizes beliefs, memories plans … acquired in the course of development, and 
appropriated from a community which has itself acquired, held and perhaps subtly modified the theory over 
time.1309 
 
1301 Ibid., 122. As Benson notes, a point of view is always incomplete, because perspectival (Just as for Merleau-Ponty 
our bodies set us to experience as present the sides of the object that not currently visible).  
1302 Ibid., 92.   
1303 Ibid., 93. The similarities with Buddhist thought (in which I is not a fixed central solid entity with properties) are 
strong here. See also Glover: to be a person is to have a single stream of “I thoughts.” Jonathan Glover, The Philosophy 
and Psychology of Personal Identity (London: Penguin, 1989), 61. 
1304 Ibid., 92. 
1305 Rom Harré, Personal Being: A Theory of Individual Psychology (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983), 77.  
1306 Benson, 94. Also, Peirce’s semiotic theory of self, based on the triad of object–sign–interpretant, shows how the 
self can be thought of as a sign, embedded in a context, formed within a community of interpretation, constituted by 
and arising from social relations, themselves understood as sign relations. “Self is an extremely complex semiotic 
system of hierarchically organized habits… an immensely complex sign in the process of perpetual development… 
also an embodied semiotic process in continual dialogue with itself and with others.” It is a being in communication, 
an embodied social semiotic being, finding its starting point is the public, linguistic world: “The forms of the ‘inner’ 
subjective world are dialogic, and the dynamics of those dialogues are intersubjective in origin… the form of a person 
is the form of a community.” Benson, 117; 118. 
1307 Ibid., 123. 
1308 Ibid., 94.  
1309 Ibid., 124. 
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Therefore, as Benson demonstrates, drawing both on American pragmatism and social 
constructivism, not only are subjectivity and identity constructed, they can also be modified, 
depending on the subject’s field and object of attention. Indeed, using Wollheim’s terminology, 
Benson contends that a change in “intentionality” creates a change in “subjectivity”: that 
modifications of the content or context of thoughts, of the objects of attention, of the field of 
experience in which one is centered, will impact the state of the individual.1310 In this sense, 
hypnotic change—both in the context of hypnotic induction and of therapeutic change—can be 
conceived as nothing more than a change in subjectivity caused by a change in intentionality. The 
argument that Benson makes about the constructed, indexical and malleable self, can therefore be 
traced in Watzlawick and Ericksonian hypnotherapists’ description of the therapeutic power of 
reframing.   
Constructivism and pragmatism thus help shed light on the liberating potential that stems 
from acknowledging the original indeterminacy of experience, and the idea that “there is no inside 
and no outside, no objective world facing the subjective, rather, that the subject-object split… does 
not exist, that the apparent separation of the world into pairs of opposites is constructed by the 
subject, and that paradox opens the way into autonomy.”1311 This is applicable to literary 
narratives, whose fictionality reveals the constructed quality of the all worlds. As Currie notes:  
To think about the world as theory … is to think of the world as not constituting a determinate reality 
independent of us. To think similarly about fictions is to think anti-realistically about them. And that, it seems 
to me, is the correct way to think about them.1312 
 
From a different perspective, these remarks also allow us to propose an extended concept of 
“realism,” which can be redefined in literature as the ability to represent—as in modernist fiction—
the fluctuations and limitations of the mind and the impossibility of objectivity. In this sense, as 
Terence Doody notes, “realism achieves its objectivity by recognizing the inviolable subjectivity 
of all its human characters, the potentially equal value and authority of every individual, the 
possibility of another point of view.”1313 As Furst points out:  
 
1310 See Wollheim, The Thread of Life, 42-43. 
1311 Fransisco Varela, “Epilogue,” in The Invented Reality, The Invented Reality, ed. P. Watzlawick (New York and 
London: Norton & Company, 1984), 330. 
1312 Currie, The Nature of Fiction, 106. 
1313 Terence Doody, “Don Quixote, Ulysses, and the Idea of Realism,” NOVEL: A Forum on Fiction 12, no. 3 (Spring, 
1979): 201. We will examine the question of the therapeutic and ethical dimension of the novel in Chapter 4. 
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With the increasing refinement of narrative strategies from Flaubert onward, the narrator’s optic, so dominant 
in Balzac, tends to recede and to yield to the protagonist’s vision. As a result, the realist novel’s much vaunted 
objectivity is permeated with subjective apprehensions, which throw into question this traditional 
dichotomization into opposing pairs.1314 
 
Precisely, is in part this representation of multiple and limited perspectives that grants the novel 
its “air of reality” (as Henry James puts it). In this sense, modernists like Joyce and Woolf are “the 
consummate realists” as they explore the reality of the human psyche and its relation to the 
world.1315  
The ‘loss of authority’ of the narratorial discourse and mingling of voices which occurs in 
the novel’s shift from realist to modernist aesthetics is a process which mirrors the movement in 
the history of hypnosis. Just as realist fiction allows easy transitions or relocation from mind to 
mind,1316 modern hypnosis allows the subject to move back and forth between different 
perspectives in time, space, or change characters, which allows for the creation of new narratives 
and new beliefs to emerge. Furthermore, as we saw in Chapter 1, during the twentieth century, 
hypnosis saw an increase in adaptation of the operator to the perspective of the subject, which in 
Ericksonian hypnosis merge together as they would in a stream of consciousness novel. 
     
     *** 
 
As I hope to have shown in this first section, hypnotic and literary utterances are 
comparable “illusions”—or apparently “nonserious” forms of discourse—which nevertheless 
create observable effects and elicit “real” responses in the recipient. As we saw, their “fictional” 
or “hypnotic” dimension is in great part dependent on the performance of the subject, whose active 
participation is necessary to constitute the meaning of a hypnotic-novelistic “text.” Both novels 
and hypnotic suggestions are “illusions” in the sense that they create something out of nothing, 
 
1314 Furst, 117. 
1315 Ibid., 118. 
1316 See Cohn, Transparent Minds and Auerbach, Mimesis: For Auerbach, modernism is “realistic” in that it produces 
“a natural and even, if you will, a naturalistic rendering of those processes” of “the continuous rumination of 
consciousness” in their “peculiar freedom.” Auerbach, 538. Also, there is “no viewpoint at all outside the novel from 
which the people and events within it are 'observed, any more than ·there seems to be an objective reality apart from 
what is in the consciousness of the characters.” Ibid., 534. 
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produce truth out of falsity.1317 Both can be considered as forms of serious play, where the recipient 
intentionally and temporarily lets him or herself be “tricked” by the illusion. 
As we saw, this “trickery” occurs on two main levels. First of all, it comes in to play on the 
level of the aesthetic illusion: in order to be felicitous, realistic fiction and hypnotic discourse tend 
to hide their artificial dimension. Just as for almost two centuries hypnosis hid the subject’s 
performance under the “supreme fiction” of the operator’s power, 1318 novelistic prose, “insofar as 
it claims the reality of its reference world,” also “implies its own denial as fiction.”1319 As Furst 
argues, the realists’ claim of truthfulness is a “decoy,” serving to distract the reader away from 
“the artistic processes involved in the weaving of the textual web,” cultivating a style that will 
“seem transparent.”1320 In other terms, in realism, “poiesis is … masked as mimesis.”1321 Furst’s 
claim also applies to hypnosis, which “has its own conventions, of which the major one is the 
concealment of those very conventions in a pretense of simplicity.”1322 However, “even while 
pretending to believe,” both readers and hypnotic subjects “maintain an awareness, on another 
level, that they are engaging in a pretense of belief.”1323 In both cases, the recipient’s heteronomy 
(his or her ability to be “tricked or “duped”) can be considered as—temporary and voluntary—
role, as an essential part of the game of make-believe.  
In addition to concealing their artificial nature, literary works and hypnosis also “trick” us 
by violating the conventions that govern ordinary communication, as they both “tolerate and relish 
linguistic deviance.”1324 Both hypnotic and novelistic forms of discourse are saturated with 
suggestive or implicit meaning which overflows from the explicit content of their propositions.1325 
 
1317 See also: “The Sosein of an Object is not affected by its Nichtsein (non-existence).” Meinong, “The Theory of 
Objects,” 86, quoted in Furst, 39.  
1318 See Fried, Absorption and Theatricality, 108.  
1319 Ryan, “Immersion vs. Interactivity,” 126. 
1320 Furst, 189-190, emphasis added. 
1321 Furst, Ibid, 190. 
1322 Ibid. 
1323 Ibid., 34. 
1324 Pratt, Ibid., 199. 
1325 As Pratt notes, “the coherence of any conversation, text, or extended utterance almost invariably depends a great 
deal on implicatures”–i.e. the calculations by which we make sense of what we hear, since what a speaker implies is 
not always equivalent to what he says. (For example, causal and chronological sequences are often established by 
implicature: the term “and” is often interpreted as “and because of that,” a process which is frequently used by 
hypnotists, who present contiguous utterances as having causal relations when they are merely juxtaposed). For her, 
the reader comes to the novel with a certain set of expectations, with a predefined idea of the “nature of the [literary] 
communication situation” and are “required to decode what the author is implying” on the level of the narrative 
discourse, which is not interpreted literally as it would in an ordinary speech situation : readers “decode the work 
according to the assumptions unless they are overtly invited or required to do otherwise.” For her, literature can still 
be said to follow Grice’s concepts of Cooperative principle and Conversational implicature despite the apparent 
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When we read fiction or walk into the hypnotist’s office we expect the text to not always mean 
what it says, and to use “the full range of nonliteral devices: metaphors metonymy, irony, 
understatement.”1326 In both cases, violations of ordinary rules—such as Grice’s conversational 
maxims, which govern “any cooperative, rational human activity”1327-—are carried out frequently 
and intentionally, with the recipient being not only aware of it, but also willing to playfully 
cooperate with the process.  
Therefore, novelistic-hypnotic illusions and “trickery” should not be reduced to mere 
deception. Rather, both combine trickery together with sincerity, in a single experience. As Pratt 
argues, for instance, literary discourse operates on two levels (narratorial and authorial), and only 
the former involves deceptive “trickery.” Similarly, in hypnosis, only the narrow, specific 
(sometimes even intentionally incomprehensible) content of the operator’s utterances involves 
deception, while the broader, implied message of the hypnotist (which contains the “hidden” 
meanings of suggestive language, therapeutic strategy, nonverbal cues, and “metacognitive” levels 
of communication, analog to the “authorial level” of literary texts) remains “sincere.”1328 As with 
literature, while the former can trick us and violate conversational maxims, the latter is bound by 
ethical, therapeutic and communicative maxims and considerations.1329  
 
multitude of violations which occur in literary texts: “given the definition of a story and the assumption that the 
Cooperative Principle is in force,” when reading literature, “we calculate countless implicatures in our dealing with 
narrators,” judging them on the background of what it would be to narrate in good faith. Indeed, Pratt argues that 
violations happen only on the level of the narrator’s discourse, whereas authorial discourse always respect the 
cooperative principle : “intentional failure to fulfil a maxim in literature always counts as flouting,” that is, “blatantly 
failing” to fulfill the maxim without attempting to mislead or opt out of the communication situation, which “is always 
resolved by implicature.” As Pratt notes about the readers: “Challenging novels or anti-novels such as Finnegans 
Wake, Beckett’s Trilogy or the Nouveau Roman, can thus be explained as displaying a “radical increase in the number 
and difficulty of implicatures required to make sense of the given text” sometimes creating “complete narrative and 
evaluative paralysis” as in Robbe-Grillet’s La Jalousie.” Pratt, 155; 2014, 211; 158; 163; 211. Globally, flouting 
through the narrator’s violations however does not endanger the Cooperative principle: it is the only kind of 
“nonfulfillment” possible in and specific to the literary speech situation. 
1326 Currie, The Nature of Fiction, 28. We assume that the narrative is “the product of an intention agent, whose 
meaning in making a certain utterance may be different from the literal meaning of the utterance.” Ibid.  
1327 Which are divided into the maxims 1. of manner (be perspicuous, avoid obscurity of expression, and ambiguity, 
be brief, be orderly,” 2. of relation (be relevant), 3. of quality (make your contribution one that is true, do not say what 
you believe to be false, or that for which you lack adequate evidence), 4. of quantity (make your contribution as 
informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange), do not make it more informative than required) 
1328 For Pratt, the reader must assume that regardless of what the fictional speaker is doing, “the author is observing 
the Cooperative Principle as defined for display texts and must calculate all the implicatures necessary to maintain 
this assumption.” When a fictional speaker fails to maintain a maxim, usually “the author is implicating things in 
addition to what the fictional speaker is saying or implicating.” In both literature and hypnosis, the narrator-speaker 
thus “produces a lack of consensus” (between him and the reader), “and the author implicates that this lack of 
consensus is part of what he is displaying, part of what he wants us to experience, evaluate, and interpret.” Ibid., 199.  
1329 A lot of the power attributed to hypnotic discourse lies precisely in this gap between what is said and implied, or 
what is heard and what is taken to have been be meant – the skilled operator will vary the degree of distance between 
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In other words, illusion and trickery are part of the novelistic or hypnotic contract.1330  “In 
order to cooperate,” the reader-subject must thus “interpret the violation as being in accord with 
the ‘accepted purpose or direction of the exchange’ in which he and the author [or operator] are 
engaged.”1331 As we will see in what follows, this explains why modern hypnotic discourse, like 
modernist or postmodern fiction, can adopt a playful form which openly displays the “violations” 
which it carries out, and use them strategically for therapeutic or inductive purposes.1332 In 
literature and hypnosis, non-cooperativeness can be taken lightly, due to the “bracketing” of 
ordinary speech-situations and contexts, which invites us confront the text in a specifically literary, 
that is, non-literal way. 
Therefore, rather than merely deceive us, hypnosis and the novel use illusion or “trickery” 
to prompt their recipient to engage in complex activities of meaning-making and make-believe. In 
this very process, they are able to communicate or convey certain kinds of truths—whether 
narrative or therapeutic—pertaining to reality and its constructed dimension. 1333 This is what 
allows us to argue, with Iser,  that “fiction is a lie in terms of given reality; but it gives insight into 
the reality it simulates, if one defines it in terms of its function namely, to communicate.”1334 
In the next sections of this chapter, I will explore the formal similarities shared by hypnotic 
and literary discourse, underlining the hypnotic dimension of literary discourse and the literary 
dimension of hypnotic discourse.  
 
both levels. This distinction between two levels of “speaking” in a single utterance also saves hypnotic discourse from 
being nonsensical: although it may occasionally seem incomprehensible to conscious awareness, all violations are 
implicitly to be considered as voluntary–the listener assumes there is another, inaccessible sense to be heard and 
“understood” by the unconscious addressee. As Walton notes, “What readers ‘know’ is ambiguous… between what 
they ‘know’ qua participants in their games of make-believe and what they know qua observers of a fictional world 
(the work world or the world of our games), between what is fictional that they know and what they know to be 
fictional.” Walton, Mimesis as Make-believe, 270. 
1330 From another perspective, if all communication is indeed suggestion, “you cannot not affect another person’s 
behavior … all behavior is manipulation.” Gilligan, “Ericksonian Approaches,” 102.  Hypnosis, rather than being a 
deceptive art of influence, therefore merely makes explicit the ways in which we are constantly influencing each other. 
1331 Pratt, 198-199. 
1332 As Pratt notes, “it is possible for the fictional speaker of a work of literature to fail to fulfill the Cooperative 
Principle and maxims in at least the following ways: opting out [i.e. indicating that he is unwilling to cooperate in the 
way the maxim requires], clash, unintentional failure, violation and flouting….In all such cases the fictional speaker’s 
failures count as flouting on the part of the author”—i.e. “authors can mimetically represent all kinds of nonfulfillment, 
for what counts as a lie, a clash, an opting out of an unintentional failure on the part of the fictional speaker (or writer) 
counts as flouting on the part of the real-world author and involves an implicature that the nonfulfillment is in accord 
with the purpose of the exchange in which the reader and author are engaged.” Pratt, 198; 174, emphasis added. 
1333  In 1979, at a conference of the École Freudienne de Paris, Lacan also notes that the curative power of speech, of 
the ‘operation of the signifier,’ is a “question of truquage.” In Borch-Jacobsen, “Talking Cure,” 33. 




3.2. The Hypnotic Dimension of Literary Discourse 
3.2.1. Absorptive Reading and The Aesthetic Illusion 
 
3.2.1.1.   Novelistic Absorption and its Dangers 
 
One of the main similarities between hypnosis and the novel is their tendency to create 
absorption in their recipient.  
As Yi-Ping Ong points out in The Art of Being, critics of the novel have historically been 
“more concerned with the dangers of absorption and not theatricality.”1335 The major objection 
against novelistic absorption is its “alleged incompatibility of the experience with the exercise of 
critical faculties.”1336 Indeed, Emma Bovary, Gerty McDowell, Don Quixote have all fallen prey 
to fiction’s suggestive and “dangerous” power to alter the reader’s mind. Fears surrounding 
novelistic absorption were especially present in nineteenth-century medical discourse, according 
to which novel reading supposedly encouraged reverie, automatism, moral corruption and 
physiological “degeneration.” 1337 Such fears were especially manifested in regard to more 
“vulnerable” subjects, who were taken to be more suggestible than other, more self-possessed and 
rational—mostly male—readers.1338 
For instance, in The Woman Reader, Kate Flint shows how novels consistently figured 
among the stimuli it was considered advisable for Victorian women to avoid.1339 As Martyn Lyons 
 
1335 Ong, The Art of Being, 7. 
1336 Ryan, Narrative as Virtual Reality, 10. 
1337 The moral condemnation of novels insisted on "standard tropes of succumbing to erotic desire, empathetic 
identification and self-aestheticization” and lasted well into the twentieth century. Ong, 3. See for example: excessive 
novel reading is “a sign of vice.” Queenie D. Leavis, Fiction and the Reading Public (1932; London: Chatto and 
Windus, 1965), 50. As for the physiological dangers of reading, most were based on concerns centered around the 
excessive nervous sensibility of the subject. Victorian observers feared that as reading became more and more passive, 
“the eye would remain active, but the nerve that connected it with the brain would simply wither away from disuse.” 
See R. D. Atlick, The English Common Reader: A Social History of the Mass Reading Public 1800-1900 (Chicago: 
Chicago University Press, 1963), 370.  
1338 For nineteenth-century publishers, “the woman reader was above all a consumer of novels. … Although women 
were not the only readers of novels, they were regarded as a prime target for popular and romantic fiction. The 
feminization of the novel-reader seemed to confirm dominant preconceptions about the female’s role and her 
intelligence.” As the “antithesis of practical and instructive literature,” novels, “dealing with the inner life, were part 
of the private sphere to which the nineteenth-century bourgeois women were relegated.” Lyons, “New Readers in the 
nineteenth Century,” in Cavallo and Chartier, eds., A History of Reading in the West, 319. 
1339 Kate Flint, The Woman Reader, 1837-1914 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 60. The Baudelairian figure of the 
“hysterical” poet—and its “feminine” aspects—can thus be considered as an aesthetic reappropriation and 
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shows, novel-reading thus also indirectly carried a certain danger for the nineteenth-century 
bourgeois husband and paterfamilias: 
The novel could excite the passions, and stimulate the female imagination. It would encourage romantic 
expectations … make erotic suggestions that threatened chastity and good order. The nineteenth-century 
novel was thus associated with the (supposedly) female qualities of irrationality and emotional 
vulnerability.1340 
 
Nineteenth-century medical texts also emphasized the dangers of novel reading for the child’s 
malleable mind. In Diseases of the Nervous System (1855) for example, A.B. Carter writes: 
It will be difficult to find a better illustration of complete automatic attention than is constantly furnished by 
a child with a novel; and this attention, interfering, as it does, with a volitional fixing of the thoughts, is not 
at all to be desired. The strong emotions too, which, in a susceptible mind, may be called forth by fiction, 
and, especially, by accounts of situations to which the events of daily life afford no parallel, are often hurtful; 
and good novels may serve only to excite a craving, which, with an immature judgment, bad ones will be 
sufficient to satisfy.1341 
 
As in Janet’s conception of hypnosis as pathological automatism and monoideism, novel reading 
is considered as an activity which inhibits the “healthy” exercise of rational, cognitive and 
volitional capacities. In suggestible subjects, novel reading may thus exacerbate dangerously 
intense affective reactions or desires, possibly leading to moral dissolution or to the abnegation of 
one’s responsibilities towards others.1342 As Flint observes, by the mid nineteenth-century, the 
trope of fiction as a fast route to corruption became so familiar that it was present in novels 
themselves, both in “dramatic scenarios” used to illustrate the dangers of over-absorption, 
escapism, and erotic misbehavior, and as a way of “encouraging the reader to think critically about 
her own practices when consuming novels.”1343 Hypnosis and the novel were both linked to 
hysteria and condemned for both physiological reasons (reading leads to nervous exhaustion) as 
well as moral ones (reading encourages escapism, corruption, and delusion).  
The “Madam Bovary problem” (as Felski calls is)—the fear that “credulous persons,” 
having their reason “befuddled” and their senses “bewitched,” might “lose all ability to distinguish 
 
transformation of these anxieties. See Kayoko Kashiwagi, “Emma Bovary: parfaite hystérique ou ‘poète hystérique’?” 
In Madame Bovary et les savoirs (Paris: Presses Sorbonne Nouvelle, 2009).  
1339 Lyons, New Readers in the nineteenth Century,” 319 
1340 Lyons, New Readers in the nineteenth Century,” 319. 
1341 A. B. Carter, On the Influence of Education and Training in Preventing the Diseases of the Nervous System 
(London: John Churchill, New Burlington Street, 1855), 429. 
1342 Condemnations of mass reading, rooted in class inequality and prejudice, were also frequent. See for example 
Coleridge, who describes the majority of the public as engaging not in reading but in a “beggarly day-dreaming, during 
which the mind of the reader furnishes for itself nothing but laziness, and a little mawkish sensibility.” Coleridge, 
Biographia Literaria, in Atlick, 369. 
1343 Flint, The Woman Reader, 263-266. 
 287 
between the real and imagined world”1344—is thus at the core of anxieties which bring hypnotic 
and novelistic subjectivity together. Both are taken to create absorptive experiences that are so 
strong that “all pretense of aesthetic distance” is completely “wiped out.”1345 In these 
“conventional accounts of what it means to read a novel,” the fear of ontological confusion, and 
of the moral dangers stemming from it, are similar to those usually associated with hypnotism.1346 
However, once the twentieth century declared the “death” of both author and hypnotist, 
novelistic and hypnotic absorption were stripped of their pathological connotations, and their 
“creators” of their authority.1347 From this standpoint, in what follows, I will discuss the similarities 
that remain between both fields once the traditional question of their supposed dangers for the 
rational subject is set aside. What might be the other “hypnotic” aspects of novel reading, beyond 
classic tropes of pathology and delusion? In other words, which commonalities do hypnotic and 
novelistic subjectivity share once the distinction between illusion and delusion is clarified and both 
fields are stripped of their mythologization?1348 Before examining the various “hypnotic” 
metaphors used in literary theory to express the immersive quality of narrative literature, I will 
first turn to an example of non-pathological readerly absorption, to distinguish aesthetic immersive 
experiences from common tropes of “dangerous” absorptive dissolution and loss of self. 
 
3.2.1.2.  An Example of Non-Pathological Absorptive Reading: Virginia Woolf’s To The Lighthouse 
 
As we will see in this chapter, like hypnosis, the novel creates worlds out of words, 
producing an impression of truth through a “trickery” of sorts, an aesthetic illusion. By 
constructing fictional worlds, the novel simultaneously reveals and performs its own power, 
indicating the paradoxical nature of its ontology: it is simultaneously true and false, and creates 
worlds that seem “real,” both because and in spite of their falsity.1349  
 
1344 Felski, Uses of Literature,74. 
1345 Ibid., 53. 
1346 Ong, 3. 
1347 See Barthes, “The Death of the Author,” Aspen: The Magazine in a Box 5+6. 1967; and J. Zeig (ed.). Ericksonian 
Approaches to Hypnosis and Psychotherapy (New York: Brunner/Mazel, 1982). 
1348 One might argue that such a demythologization or demystification depends on the modern subject’s capacity to 
acknowledge and reconnect with the innocuous, beneficial and instructive dimensions of enchantment, which for 
Felski needs to be “acknowledged as part of modernity rather than antithetical to modernity” if it is to become “a 
plausible concept for literary and cultural theory.” Felski, 67. 
1349 See also: Realism “rests on making tacit what, if brought out into the open and critically examined, might cause 
the whole theoretical edifice to collapse.” Christopher Prendergast, The Order of Mimesis (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1986), 26.  
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Although the realist novel can serve as “prototype” for illusionist texts, all illusionist texts 
are not realistic.1350 Readerly immersion, strictly speaking, require neither mimesis nor character 
identification to occur.1351 In this sense, modernist texts, science-fiction novels and fairy tales can 
be just as immersive—each in their own way—as nineteenth-century realist novels. Although most 
experience of readerly absorption involve immersion in a narrative world, one can also find oneself 
absorbed by a text as a whole, by its voice or atmosphere, and even by the form of the text itself. 
Readerly immersion can also occur in texts that incorporate aesthetic distance, and even meta-
narrative allusions or intrusions, like those frequently seen in eighteenth-century or postmodern 
fiction. Therefore, while realism is the genre that can seem most fitted to illustrate the workings of 
the aesthetic illusion, the reader’s sense of being immersed in a fictional universe, ultimately, is 
“independent of the verisimilitude of the textual world.”1352  
Although in the next sections of this Chapter I will focus more specifically on realist 
aesthetics, first, I will undertake a close reading of excerpts from Virginia Woolf’s To The 
Lighthouse, a modernist—yet immersive—text which, in its representation of the hypnotic 
dimension of the act of reading, provides a striking illustration of how representations of 
absorption need not always be realistic, and are in themselves, highly absorptive. As I will show, 
Woolf’s text uses the representation of the fictional characters’ absorption to work-through its own 
relation to the dynamics of immersion and distance, which are at the heart of novelistic 
representation. In the excerpts I will examine, Woolf introduces the hypnotic power of language 
in the context of a scene of bedtime storytelling, and in one of reading in the bedroom.1353 In both 
passages, hypnosis and novelistic absorption come together, not as manifestations of a pathological 
loss of self, but rather, as forms of immersive, sometimes rapturous experience, that share similar 
aesthetic and ethical value, and reveal the ways of looking at the world that are found in both 




1350 Wolf, “Aesthetic Illusion as an Effect of Fiction,” 337. 
1351 In fact, as Ong notes, the “immersive spell that the realist novel casts upon its readers relies not only upon its 
representation of character life, but also on its capacity to engulf her entirely, within the wholeness and intricacy or 
another world.” Ong, 154. This process can occur in non-realist texts, with the immersion into a non-realist world. 
1352 Ryan, Narrative, 130. Similarly, in hypnosis, the subject becomes intensely absorbed into imaginary universes 
that often bear little resemblance to everyday, ordinary life.  
1353 The metaphorical association between sleep (bed), hypnosis and absorption, here goes without saying.  
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As a text which itself thematizes the relations between solidity and dissolution, eternity 
and transience on both aesthetic and existential levels, To The Lighthouse, introduces hypnosis in 
descriptions of fleeting shimmering moments of beauty, as they reveal themselves to human 
consciousness. In a description of the “silver light” dancing on the bedroom floor, for example, 
Mr. and Mrs. Ramsay watch “with fascination, hypnotized,” as the perceptual experience creates 
feelings of “exquisite happiness” and a burst of “ecstasy”—“waves of pure delight” that culminates 
in the recognition of the completeness of the world, with the thought that “it is enough! It is 
enough.”1354 Hypnotic-absorptive ways of looking at the world are thus linked to a sense of being 
struck by a sense of aesthetic completion or perfection.  
In Woolf’s novel, aesthetic absorption is also linked to the trance-inducing power of 
evocative and rhythmic language, and a sensitivity to the beauty of shared hypnotic reverie. In a 
passage where Mrs. Ramsay puts Cam to sleep, for example, the strong bond between mother and 
child recalls the intimacy of hypnotic rapport, as Mrs. Ramsay gently leads the child to 
imaginatively explore a dream landscape, an oneiric world populated with natural creatures. As 
the mother lulls the child to sleep with her evocative words, these take on a world-creating, 
hypnotic power of their own, materializing and flowing almost automatically, in a selfless stream: 
1355 
She could see the words echoing as she spoke them rhythmically in Cam’s mind, and Cam was repeating 
after her how it was like a mountain, a bird’s nest, a garden, and there were little antelopes, and her eyes were 
opening and shutting, and Mrs. Ramsay went on speaking still more monotonously and more rhythmically 
and more nonsensically, how she must shut her eyes and go to sleep and dream of mountains and valleys and 
stars falling and parrots and antelopes and gardens, and everything lovely, she said, raising her head and 
speaking more and more mechanically, until she sat upright and saw that Cam was asleep.1356 
 
Here, the “nonsensical” dimension of Mrs. Ramsay’s words matches the “irrational” patterns of 
association found in primary process thinking and unconscious material, which are occur both in 
the manifest content of dreams and in hypnotic imagery. Their form, on the other hand, is lulling 
and monotonous, like the tone of the hypnotic operator in traditional hypnotic inductions.1357 A 
 
1354 Virginia Woolf, To The Lighthouse (1927; New York and London: Harcourt Brace & Co, 1981), 65. 
1355 Not unlike Vautrin’s “maternal” and hypnotic lullaby in Le Pére Goriot, which resembles the Abbé Faria’s 
induction method, described in Chapter 1. See Balzac: “il le baisa chaleureusement au front, en chantant: Dormez, 
mes chères amours!/ Pour vous je veillerai toujours.” (He placed a wam kiff on his forehead and sng: Go to sleep, my 
dears!/I will always watch over you”) Balzac, Le Pére Goriot, ed. Philippe Berthier (Paris: Flammarion, 2006), 243, 
emphasis added.   
1356 Woolf, To The Lighthouse, 115. 
1357 Indeed, many modern hypnotic inductions no longer rely on the “lulling” dimension of monotonous speech, nut 
on the contrary, introduce rhythmical variations and play on tonal inflection in order to create dynamic and contrasting 
effects. See also the description of Vautrin’s berceuse in Balzac, evoked in Chapter 2.  
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relation of synchronization or mirroring also takes place, as the child “repeats the words back” to 
the mother, and both descriptions seem to merge into a single, shared, imagined, and absorptive 
experience. Absorption here appears in the context of a co-created, ephemeral dream-world, where 
the child’s imagination is set free yet contained in the “holding”  environment of maternal care, 
which matches descriptions of the hypnotic relation found in the work of Erika Fromm, for 
instance.1358 After this initial introduction of the dream-inducing power of hypnotic evocation, the 
dreamlike flight of the birds and the garden, then reappear in the next chapter, when Mrs. Ramsay 
goes into a reading-induced trance of her own.  
 
Reading in the Bedroom 
Chapter XIX presents a scene of the married couple reading in the bedroom. Unlike the 
shared absorption occurring with Cam’s bedtime story, however, here each adult experiences their 
own, private immersion, as Mr. and Mrs. Ramsay read in silence, side by side. The scene alternates 
between exterior descriptions of both protagonists’ readerly immersion, and internal focalized 
descriptions of their inner state, including the limited perspectives and projections that color their 
own interpretations of the experience of the other. 
In this passage, Woolf’s text constructs a sharp contrast between two kinds of “readerly 
trance,” not only between different texts, but also between two literary genres. Indeed, while Mr. 
Ramsay is absorbed in a novel by Sir Walter Scott, Mrs. Ramsay reads a collection of poetry, 
where one finds “Luriana Lurilee” by Charles Isaac Elton, “A Siren’s Song” by William Browne, 
and one of Shakespeare’s Sonnets.1359  
As this passage shows, by describing opposed modes of readerly absorption, Woolf’s novel 
ironically invites its reader to rise, both esthetically and ethically, above Mr. Ramsay’s “self-
absorbed absorption.” However, rather than genre-based (which is to say, stemming from the 
difference between novelistic and poetic absorption), the difference between Mr. and Mrs. 
Ramsay’s modes of absorption might be due to differences in sensibility and character. By 
 
1358 See Chapter 1 and the idea that the hypnotist provides a holding environment for the subject, like the “good” 
mother.  
1359 Based on Leonard Woolf’s 1902 transcript. Mr. Ramsay is reading a passage of The Antiquary, (1816), where the 
son of a fisherman, Steenie Meiklebackit [Woolf misspells the name] drowns in a storm. The passage describes how 
“deep and how terrible was the agony of a father's sorrow.” Walter Scott, 253-54, in Allyson Booth, “Mr. Ramsay, 
Robert Falcon Scott, and Heroic Death.” Mosaic: An Interdisciplinary Critical Journal 40, No. 4 (December 2007): 
143. 
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describing these two forms of reading, Woolf’s novel delineates two opposed modes of esthetic—
and ethical—sensibility, and simultaneously emphasizes its own entrancing power by representing 
the differences between novelistic and poetic absorption, from within the medium of novelistic 
form. 
     *** 
 
Although hypnosis is not explicitly mentioned in this scene, the act of reading is described 
with the vocabulary of hypnotic immersivity, which runs throughout the chapter. Even before the 
reading scene occurs, “hypnosis” is already indirectly present, as Mrs. Ramsay is knitting and falls 
in an initial state of absorption, suggested by the association of “stillness,” “floating,” and “depth,” 
which are common signs of hypnotic trance states (“she grew still like a tree which has been tossing 
and quivering and now, when the breeze falls, settles, leaf by leaf, into quiet”; “as one passes in 
diving, now a weed, now a straw, now a bubble … sinking deeper”).1360 In its very form, the text 
also indirectly adopts a rocking and lulling movement—similar to that with which Mrs. Ramsay 
put Cam to sleep—by multiplying dyadic or triadic rhythmic patterns, which recall the repetitions 
occurring in hypnotic inductions: “now, now, now”; “felt, felt”; “something, something”; “deeper 
and deeper.”1361  
It is from this “hypnotically prepared” context that the words from “Luriana Lurilee” 
appear in Mrs. Ramsay’s mind, which are experienced, as they would be in hypnosis,  on the mode 
of an external entity, a verbal stream, entering into—and altering—the private, inner space of her 
consciousness. Here again, the words seem to materialize, moving from side to side in the space 
of the psyche that becomes a quasi-synesthetic, spatialized echo chamber, in which they 
reverberate both visually and aurally: 
And slowly those words … began washing from side to side of her mind rhythmically, and as they washed, 
words, like little shaded lights… lit up in the dark of her mind, and seemed leaving their perches up there to 
fly across and across, or to cry out and be echoed, so she turned and felt on the table beside her for a book.1362 
 
 
1360 Woolf, To The Lighthouse, 118. 
1361 Ibid., 118-119. The text’s undetermined and ambiguous terms (“something”), combined with the lexical field of 
depth and the description of eyes closing strongly resembles classic formulations used in Ericksonian inductions. 
Compare: “There is something I want—something I have come to get, and she fell deeper and deeper without knowing 
quite what it was, with her eyes closed.” Woolf, 119. And the vagueness of Ericksonian suggestions: “Your 
unconscious mind can listen / to me without your knowledge/ and also deal with something else at the same time 
(Pause).” Erickson, Hypnotic Realities, 38. 
1362 Woolf, To The Lighthouse, 119, emphasis added. 
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Here, poetic language—which is not yet read, but simply recalled—becomes hypnotic, taking on 
a life of its own, its oscillating movement reminiscent of the back and forth of a pendulum 
swing.1363 As the words fly across and “light up” the space of the mind, their “rhythmic” power 
leads Mrs. Ramsay to mechanically, almost somnambulistically, reach out to grab the book next 
to her.1364 
As the act of reading proper begins, readerly attention follows the motion which has just 
been thematically suggested by the poetic and metaphorical content in the preceding lines: Mrs. 
Ramsay reads “at random”; “swinging herself, zigzagging this way and that”; “climbing 
backwards, upwards” as if in a flower.1365 Like what often occurs in the hypnotic experience, 
proportions and sizes are inverted as big becomes small, while direction is simultaneously 
reversed, switching from the previous sinking motion, to the present ascension of climbing. As the 
attention hops to the next line (this time taken from William Browne’s “The Siren’s Song”), the 
“winged pines” extend the metaphor of flight, and color the readerly experience by injecting the 
movement of flight into the reading process itself. The text then confirms this inversion, by 
crystallizing the metaphor it has been suggesting: Mrs. Ramsay (whose being is here reduced, or 
identified with, her readerly-awareness) has become the bird which perches and flies “from one 
line to another as from one branch to another.”1366  
As the object of awareness controls and colors the way in which it is apprehended by 
consciousness (for a poem about flight to transform reading into a kind of flight), the suggestive 
power of poetry creates an experience which blurs the boundary between subject and object, as 
described by Benson. The parallel between literature and hypnosis is strengthened by the fact that 
the swift and swooping motion of reading lines of poetic text is focused on form, rhythm, and 
 
1363 This swinging, alternating motion is the rhythmic foundation of the poem, and its association with the swooping 
flight of birds and the sensation of falling asleep permeate the other (uncited) lines of the poem, which color and 
contaminate the characters’ inner associations from afar, in virtue of their mere virtual presence. For example, in the 
last stanza: “Swing, swing on the cedar bough! /Luriana Lurilee/Till you sleep in a bramble-heap.” Charles Isaac 
Elton, “A Garden Song.” https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Luriana,_Lurilee. 
1364 Here the automatic dimension of her gesture is further suggested by the causality implied with the conjunction 
“so.” Furthermore, the repetition of “and”—especially in clauses such as “and as they washed”—is highly reminiscent 
of the flowing chain of loosely related clauses in modern inductions, where continuity is presented as causality (usually 
repeating several clauses connected with “and,” the chain culminating with “so” or “because”). See Erickson: “and 
that will remain/and when you awaken ... and I want you to be curious about ... because everybody handles the situation 
differently.” Erickson, Hypnotic Realities, 99. See also the comparison between ratification loops and the passage 
from Anna Karenina discussed further on in this chapter. 
1365 Woolf, 119. 
1366 Ibid. 
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musicality, on color and aesthetic impression, rather than on content or meaning: “she only knew 
this is white, or this is red. She did not know what the words meant at all.”1367 Here, the hypnotic 
dimension of reading is thus intimately linked to the literariness of the text, and to its poetic, rather 
than referential dimension. 
 
Mr. Ramsay 
 What of novelistic absorption, then?  
As husband and wife exchange a silent gaze, the text switches to the description—through Mrs. 
Ramsay’s perspective—of Mr. Ramsay, viewed from the outside as he engages in his own act of 
absorptive reading, not of poetry but of a novel by Walter Scott.1368 Here, despite Mrs. Ramsay’s 
attentiveness, there seems to be no communication between husband and wife, as he is in rapport 
with the novel, and not with her—he is temporarily oblivious to her presence.  
Hence Mrs. Ramsay is left observing the effect of the “life” and  “power” of the novel on 
her husband, who is so immersed that he seems cut off from his surroundings: he “slaps his thighs,” 
his “lips twitched” as he “went on reading” and seemed to say, “don’t interrupt me.”1369 In the 
description of Mr. Ramsay, the trope of possession is even used, pointing from without to the 
impression given off by the absorbed subject: “it filled him.”1370  
As the perspective then shifts to Mr. Ramsay’s inner experience, it becomes apparent that 
his absorption is linked to the strong affective response elicited by the events in the fictional world. 
Mr. Ramsay’s emotional reaction, however, cannot be reduced to mere feelings of empathy or 
compassion for the tragic situation of the protagonists. Indeed, although Mr. Ramsay is crying, his 
emotional reaction also comprises an “astonishing delight and feeling of vigor.”1371 His reading 
“made him feel so vigorous so relieved of something that he felt roused and triumphant and could 
not choke back his tears.”1372 In other words, his tears are inseparable from an intensely pleasurable 
 
1367 Ibid 
1368 Minds are not transparent here: Mrs. Ramsay can but infer his inner life from the observation of her husband’s 
exterior behavior, whom she loves but nevertheless remains separate from. 
1369 Ibid. 
1370 Ibid. 
1371 Ibid., 120.  
1372 Ibid. 
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experience, which indicates that novelistic absorption, like hypnosis, always contains an element 
of distance, without which it would not be a properly aesthetic experience.1373  
In fact, for Mr. Ramsay, reading appears as a means of imaginative transportation, away 
from the dissatisfaction of the everyday. To describe this dimension—which, pushed to its 
extreme, would lead to the escapism invoked in the context of the “dangers” of novelistic 
absorption—the text sets up a gradation, from forgetting the smaller concerns and anxieties of the 
everyday, to forgetting one’s whole sense of self: “he clean forgot all the little rubs and digs of the 
evening,” he “forgot his own bothers and failures completely in poor Steenie’s drowning,” he 
“forgot himself completely.”1374 As Mr. Ramsay finishes the chapter, the description of novelistic 
absorption has reached a point of culmination, as his self-forgetfulness is crowned by a moment 
of amnesia, recalls the post-hypnotic amnesia sometimes experienced by hypnotic subjects: “He 
must read it again. He could not remember the whole shape of the thing.”1375 
 However, Mr. Ramsay is not prey to a complete dissolution of the self. Indeed, despite 
this moment of forgetting, analytic thought remains operative throughout the experience, as it does 
in the context of a hypnosis session. Indeed, Mr. Ramsay’s absorptive experience does not prevent 
him in engaging “one or two reflections about morality and French novels and English novels,”1376 
as well as “Scott and Balzac.”1377 Woolf’s text thus demonstrates an awareness that immersive 
experience is not incompatible with reflection. Once absorption is defined as a state of 
concentration on a given object, temporary self-forgetfulness can occur without complete loss of 
self. A latent awareness of fictionality and reflective distance can coexist with the intensity of an 
affectively and imaginatively engaged being in the (fictional) world. 
Performing the swinging, back and forth motion with which it opened, the text then shifts 
to Mr. Ramsay’s observation of his wife: “he looked at her reading. She looked very peaceful, 
reading.”1378 The narrative perspective then completes the movement, by returning to Mrs. 
Ramsay’s own, internal perspective with the use of free indirect discourse, which is permeated 
 
1373 Indeed, if Mr. Ramsay’s tears were out of actual despair for the fate of the characters, he would be oblivious to 




1377 Ibid., 121.  
1378 Ibid. 
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with the previous metaphors and reveals her sleepy reluctance to “awaken” of the absorptive trance 
state: 
like a person in a light sleep [she] seemed to say that if he wanted her to wake she would, she really would, 
but otherwise might she go on sleeping, just a little longer, just a little longer? She was climbing up those 
branches, this way and that… Stuck to this magnet, her mind felt swept, felt clean.1379 
 
Here, the appearance of the magnetotrope, the repetition of the child-like request to go on “just a 
little longer,” and the emptiness suggested by the double sense of “swept” (both kinetic and 
domestic), all participate in suggesting an irresistible movement of being pulled into—and 
maintained in—a pleasant state of contentment, reminiscent of Puységur’s magnetic sleep: “how 
satisfying, how restful.”1380 This peaceful state contrasts with the agitation characteristic of Mr. 
Ramsay’s fast-paced, novelistic enthrallment. The “cleanliness” of Mrs. Ramsay’s mind is then 
linked to the “clarity” of the poetic insight which follows, as she beholds the “essence sucked out 
of life and held” in the form of the Shakespearean sonnet.1381 Unlike her husband, who is unable 
to remember the “whole” of the novel, Mrs. Ramsay is able to contemplate the unity of the sonnet, 
“suddenly entire.”1382 There seem to be crucial differences, then, between husband and wife’s 
respective modes of being absorbed. 
The most notable difference, however, lies less in the difference between poetic and 
novelistic genres, than in the capacity for attention of each protagonist. Indeed, the conjunction 
“but” which marks the beginning of a paragraph (“But she was becoming conscious of her husband 
looking at her”1383) marks a rupture, both in the flow of the text and of Mrs. Ramsay’s reading 
trance. Rather than indicate a fragility and weakness in her capacity for attention (or suggesting 
that her absorption is easily disturbed), it suggests a greater sophistication than the coarse, 
oblivious, mode of attending of her husband.  
Indeed, Mrs. Ramsay’s capacity for awareness (of the other) echoes a similar mention on 
the previous page (“a little sound roused her—her husband slapping his thighs”1384), which 
indicates her ability to tune into the subtle details and cues emanating from others, to interrupt her 
experience upon noticing the presence, the actions, or needs of others. In comparison, Mr. 







1384 Ibid., 119. 
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the hypnotic operator, who must maintain a similar attentiveness to the subject, and like the subject, 
who maintains a latent awareness of the outside world during the immersive experience, Mrs. 
Ramsay, on the other hand, is able to be intensely immersed and freely move back and forth 
between absorption and reality-observation. 
Rather than noticing the subtle manifestations in others’ behavior, Mr. Ramsay even seems 
to projects his own (insecure) pre—or misconceptions of the female reader onto his wife, reducing 
her to an object of aesthetic enjoyment:  
he wondered what she was reading, and exaggerated her ignorance, her simplicity, for he liked to think that 
she was not clever, not book-learned at all. He wondered if she understood what she was reading. Probably 
not, he thought. She was astonishingly beautiful.1385 
 
Reminiscent of the nineteenth-century medical gaze imposed on the hypnotic patient, Mr. Ramsay 
reduces female absorption to a blank, ignorant state of mindless immersion, and his wife’s being 
to a beautiful body which lacks the understanding of the male rational subject—when it is he who 
lacks a concept of selfless understanding, and fails to grasp what it means to decode the subtlety 
of human behavior from within a context of aesthetic enjoyment. 
By contrasting two incommensurable modes of absorptive reading, the text stages a 
confrontation between two opposed forms of attention, which ultimately fail to meet—hence the 
sense of separation with which the scene comes to a close.1386 Although at first glance, the duality 
might seem to oppose the novelistic and the poetic genres, or even the male and female gender, I 
would suggest that the underlying dichotomy is rather ethical in nature. It opposes two form of 
absorption: that of self-absorbed, self-reassuring, self-interest on the one hand, and selflessness on 
the other. As Alysson Booth has noted, while Mr. Ramsay cannot resist using Scott to “make a 
point about his own work” and “soothe his professional insecurities,” Mrs. Ramsay is simply 
immersed in the experience of beauty while remaining attentive to what lies beyond herself. 1387  
Her ability to slip in and out of trance, which is deeper than her husband’s, mirrors her ability to 
notice the needs and existence, the “reality” of others.  In other words, expertise in moving in and 
 
1385 Ibid., 121. 
1386 Ultimately, Mr. Ramsay’s silence is self-absorbed, his body language even seems to mimic or parody the gestures 
of a nineteenth century hypnotist, as if his own state of obliviousness to the outside (and to his wife) lingered on after 
he has put down the book, as he remains focused on his own interests: “He was silent, swinging the compass on his 
watch-chain to and fro, and thinking of Scott’s novels and Balzac’s novels.” On the other hand, Mr. Ramsay’s silence 
seems expectant—an unformulated, nonverbal request which goes unnoticed by her husband: “Say anything, she 
begged, looking at him, as if for help”; “Will you tell me for once that you love me?” Ibid., 122; 124. 
1387 Booth, “Mr. Ramsay,” 143. 
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out of aesthetic absorption, is an antidote to self-absorption.1388 In a letter to Ether Smyth, Woolf 
explicitly emphasizes the parallel between the magnetic power of reading and its ethical 
implications, by using the analogy with hypnosis:  
I think heaven must be one continuous unexhausting reading. It’s a disembodied trance-like intense rapture 
that used to seize me as a girl, and comes back now and again down here with a violence that lays me low… 
the state of reading consists in the complete elimination of the ego; and it’s the ego that erects itself like 
another part of the body I don’t dare to name.1389 
 
Through contrasted descriptions of the phenomenology of reading, the novel is therefore able to 
lay out various possible responses to aesthetic objects, and sketch out their ethical implications. 
Literary absorption seems associated with sensitivity and deep attention, payed both to the beauty 
of language and to others. Needless to say that if Woolf’s text is able to represent both and 
incorporate the aesthetic, hypnotic and ethical powers of poetic language into the novelistic prose, 
the absorption created by the modernist novel reaches beyond the mere “immersive” effects of 
character identification and referential illusions, incorporating aesthetic distance and ethical 
considerations into a readerly experience similar to modern hypnotic states. By representing 
various forms of readerly absorption through the medium of novelistic prose, it reveals the latent 
aesthetic distance that is compatible with intense, rapturous immersion. Like hypnosis, the novel 
can incorporate absorption and reflexivity in a single experience.  As in hypnosis, both mimesis 
and anti-mimesis are present simultaneously.  
 
3.2.1.1. The Aesthetic Illusion. Celare Artem 
 
After having examined this example of non-pathological readerly absorption, I will now 
turn to the theorization of the hypnotic dimension of narrative literature, in its capacity to create 
strong immersive and “illusory” experiences for the reader. Before examining specific metaphors 
used by literary critics and theorists to capture this hypnotic dimension in the next section, here, I 
will briefly establish in which sense both novelistic and hypnotic experiences can be considered 
as instances of the “aesthetic illusion,” rather than mere delusion.  
 
1388 Chapter 4 will examine this question more in depth.  
1389 Virginia Woolf, Letter to Ether Smyth, 29 July 1934, in The Letters of Virginia Woolf, ed. N. Nicolson and J. 
Trautmann (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1978), 319, emphasis added. 
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Werner Wolf argues that “delusionary” states differ from the aesthetic illusion in that they 
are “entered upon involuntarily, and lack the required distance between the experiencer and the 
fictional world.”1390 In opposition to delusion, he defines the aesthetic illusion as: 
an impression of variable intensity, of being imaginatively immersed in a possible world that is constituted, 
or referred to, by the artefact, and of experiencing this world in a mainly sensory (visual) and emotional way 
as if it were a slice of life. In spite of a dominant and willed feeling of experiential immersion, aesthetic 
illusion, as opposed to delusion, is characterized by a latent rational distance. This distance is a consequence 
of the culturally acquired awareness of the fictional quality of the artefact (performance) and of the illusionary 
status of the dominant effect induced by it.1391 
And: 
a basically pleasurable mental state that emerges during the reception of many representational texts, artifacts 
or performances. These representations may be fictional or factual, and in particular include narratives. Like 
all reception effects, aesthetic illusion is elicited by a conjunction of factors that are located (a) in the 
representations themselves, (b), in the reception process and the recipients and (c) in cultural and historical 
contexts. Aesthetic illusion consists primarily of a feeling, with variable intensity, of being imaginatively and 
emotionally immersed in a represented world and of experiencing this world in a way similar (but not 
identical) to real life. At the same time, however, this impression of immersion is counterbalanced by a latent 
rational distance resulting from a culturally acquired awareness of the difference between representation and 
reality.1392 
 
Like hypnotic trance, the aesthetic illusions is a spectrum, it is “gradable,” according to the degrees 
of immersion or distance in reception situations and is in this sense, “unstable.”1393 Following Wolf, 
“agency” and responsibility for the “illusionist” experience is spread between the artistic 
work/hypnotic experience, the author/operator and the historical context which defines norms for 
the illusion to take place successfully in either case.   
As stated higher up, the best representative of the “hypnotic” power of the aesthetic illusion 
in the literary field is the nineteenth-century realist novel, whose goal is “making believable the 
world inhabited by the characters.”1394 As Furst shows, the mimetic and referential ambition of the 
 
1390 Wolf, “Aesthetic Illusion as an Effect of Fiction,” 328. These include 1) “a nonexperiential, referential illusion 
(or ‘delusion’)” in the sense of an erroneous attribution of a reality status to something fictional or invented such as 
trompe-l’oeil techniques in the visual arts and ‘fictions of authenticity’ in literature or 'particularly convincing 
imitations of factual texts]; and 2) frequently occurring in parallel to, or as a consequence of, such referential delusions, 
“an experiential delusion without distance… the most advanced form of which to date is that of computerized virtual 
realities.” Ibid. 
1391 Wolf, “Aesthetic Illusion as an Effect of Fiction,” 331. 
1392 Wolf, “Illusion (Aesthetic),” in Handbook of Narratology, ed. P. Hühn, vol. 1(Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2014), 
270. 
1393 Wolf, Ibid., quoted in Troscianko, “How Should We Talk About Reading Experience?” in Aesthetic Illusion, ed. 
T. Koblížek (London and New York: Bloomsbury, 2017), 270. 
1394 Furst, All is True, ix, note added. See for instance: “the illusionist prototype of the past few centuries is the 
nineteenth-century realist novel,” which “has always been accorded a particularly high potential for eliciting illusionist 
immersion.” Wolf, “Aesthetic Illusion as an Effect of Fiction,” 335. See also: immersion in a textual world depends 
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realist novel can be summed up by Balzac’s prefatory framing device, that precedes the description 
of the Vauquer boarding house in the opening of Le Père Goriot: “All is true.”1395  
Indeed, the realist text “is invested with truth through belief in the power of representation, 
which was thought to reside in the referential force of the word.”1396 By placing the novel under 
the heading of truth, Balzac breaks with the category of the fictitious that governed the eighteenth-
century novel, and attributes to the writer the task of becoming a “more or less faithful painter” of 
reality.1397 The task of the fiction-maker thus becomes to reproduce: “French society would be the 
real author; I should be only the secretary.”1398 The function of the novel then becomes that of a 
mirror, which is to faithfully reflect, copy, or record in narrative form the events and truths of “real 
life,” as the narrative voice becomes inconspicuous.1399 Indeed, as Lilian Furst notes, this image 
of the mirror attenuates the fictive status of the text, “masking its existence as a verbal system,” 
and thereby “deny[ing] the discrepancy between language and actuality.”1400 The idea that 
language can function as a transparent mirror, an innocent eye, or an open window, endowed with 
a capacity for faithful representation, is indeed crucial to realist esthetics, which can then “ascribe 
 
on “pretended belief in a solid extratextual reference world” and “looks through the signs toward the reference world.” 
Ryan, “Immersion vs. Interactivity,” 132; “The predominant heteroreferentiality of realist fiction is actually a 
consequence of the more general fact that all illusionist artefacts, even those that ultimately play with illusion,… are 
representational: they evoke or “represent” a world that is seemingly outside the artefact, which therefore appears to 
refer to something other than itself.” Wolf, “Aesthetic Illusion as an Effect of Fiction,” 337. Although they “do not 
totally eschew strategies such as metafictional self-referentiality,” realist and illusionist stories are characterized by a 
“predominance of fictional (hetero)referentiality over self-referentiality. This referentiality can point to possible 
worlds of outer “reality” (as in realist fiction and in drama) or of inner, psychological “reality” (as in the more 
“subjective” illusion created by modernist interior monologue or stream-of-consciousness fiction.” Wolf, Ibid., 339. 
The question of the “hypnotic” nature of modernist and postmodern texts will be raised further down.  
1395 Balzac, 2:848. “Ah! Sachez-le: ce drame n’est ni une fiction, ni un roman. All is true, il est véritable, que chacun 
peut en reconnaître les éléments chez soi dans son coeur peut-être.” Balzac, La Comédie Humaine, ed. M. Bouteron. 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1976), 2:848. 
1396 Furst, All is True, 8. 
1397 (“un peintre plus ou moins fidèle”) Balzac, Ibid., 1:7. The novel would merely be an “auguste mensonge (a 
complete lie)”if it were not “vrai dans les détails (true in its details).” Balzac, 1:11. 
1398 Balzac 1:7. As shown in Chapter 1 and our analysis of Ursule Mirouët, this portrayal of the Balzacian novel as 
purely mimetic has been long since questioned: Balzac himself declared that he is writing under the “light of the two 
eternal truths or Religion and Monarchy,” Gautier called him a “visionary,” Baudelaire affirmed that “all his stories 
are colored like dreams” and Gaetan Picon argues that he “struggles against the unknown.” See Lubomír Doležel, “La 
Comédie Humaine and the Illusion of Reality,” in Aesthetic Illusion, 190. 
1399 Furst retraces the history of the metaphor of the novel as mirror in realist fiction: for example, Dickens speaks of 
it as a “great looking-glass.” Dickens, Our Mutual Friend (New York: New American Library, 1980), 24. Stendhal 
describes realism as “un miroir qu’on promène le long d’un chemin (a mirror that one runs along a path).” Stendhal, 
epigraph to Chapter 13 of Le Rouge et le Noir. Zola uses the image of the eye (which “also reiterates the fallacies of 
the mirror image, by representing the eye as a passive registering device, a camera of sorts”). Henry James uses the 
image of the window.  Furst argues that the mirror image itself is however “laden with ambiguities” and potential for 
distortion, and may also connote optical illusion –even in the Latin root mirare linking it to “mirage.” See Furst, 9. 
1400 Furst, All is True, 9.  
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truthfulness to the ‘transparent’ reflection produced, assimilating the novel to documentary.”1401 
However, as Furst argues, this is but a “wish scenario” that suppresses the differences between 
mirrors and works of art: rather than describe the actual workings of the novel, the mirror image 
is but its announced ambition, its explicitly formulated aspiration, when in fact, it helps to “pass 
off illusion as truth.”1402 The mirror is thus both the symbol of realism and the incarnation of the 
mimetic pretense that it tries to maintain, acting not as a reflection but as a “prism” in the artist’s 
“evaluating mind.”1403  
Despite the impossibility of pure transparency, the realist novel nevertheless corresponds 
to a genre whose “mediality” tends to disappear during the act of reading, just as the verbal medium 
of hypnotic discourse dissolves and lets the experience emerge in the foreground of the subject’s 
mind.1404 As Felski also notes, immersion and enchantment in fiction can be so strong that “readers 
are so entirely caught up in what they are reading that the verbal medium is effaced: they no longer 
perceive or register the words they are scanning, but feel themselves to be fully subsumed with an 
imagined world.”1405 Indeed, as Ryan puts it, “textual representation behaves in one respect like 
holographic pictures: you cannot see the worlds and the signs at the same time. Readers and 
spectators must focus beyond the signs to witness the emergence of a three-dimensional life-like 
reality.”1406 Without taking a stance on the “life-like reality” of novelistic or hypnotic worlds, one 
can note for now that both hypnotic and novelistic immersion are “reached through a mental 
activity that must ignore itself in order to reach its goal.”1407  
 
1401 Ibid. 
1402 Ibid. As Gombrich notes, “works of art are not mirrors, but they share with mirrors the elusive magic of 
transformation which is so hard to put into words.” Gombrich, 6.  
1403 Furst, Ibid., 9 One can indeed argue that even in the realist or naturalist novel, there is no such thing as pure 
transparent narration, and one might even consider narrators as subjectivities that could be included in the novel’s 
character space, with their own landscapes of consciousness. Even Zola’s naturalism does not imply the systematic 
use of a distant scientific perspective: it contains variations in the modes of narration, shifts in focal perspectives, 
disseminated bursts of suggestive or poetic language, as in the descriptions of the colorful dye running in the water in 
Zola’s L’Assommoir. See also: “It is legitimate to see the narrator, too, as a kind of filter, through whose consciousness 
the scene is mediated. The ideal of narratorial impersonality launched by the realists themselves as an integral part of 
their claim to truthfulness, is exposed for what it is: a mere myth.” Furst, 121.   
1404 Victor Nell gives examples of reader responses in which medially disappears as absorption increases. One subject 
for example describes his experience as follows: “the more interesting it gets, the more you get the feeling you’re not 
reading any more, you’re not reading words, you’re not reading sentences, it’s as if you are completely living inside 
the situation.” Ockert, quoted in Nell, 290. 
1405 Felski, 68. 
1406 Ryan, “Immersion vs. Interactivity,” 132, emphasis added.  
1407 Ryan, Ibid., 133. “Any attempt to increase this activity is likely to lead to self-reflexivity, thereby destroying the 
delicate balance between constructing the textual world and experiencing it as language-independent presence” (ibid). 
Similarly, during traditional hypnotic inductions the operator limits self-reflexivity as much as possible, to avoid the 
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The realist novel’s tendency to present itself as a text with an inconspicuous narrative 
discourse, to eliminate metanarrative allusions, and downplay its fictionality and textuality, all 
resemble the technique of the hypnotists, who must “cover their tracks” and disguise the illusionist 
nature of the experience for it to succeed.1408 In this sense, Furst’s contention that realism’s 
“success in covering its own tracks and concealing its artifices” has ironically led it to be mistaken 
for an “artless form,” can just as well be applied to hypnosis.1409  
As they both “avoid highlighting the mediacy or fictionality of the artefact,”1410 hypnosis 
and realist novels thus follow the Celare artem principle—which simultaneously conceals and 
confirms their artificial dimension, while minimizing aesthetic distance.1411 Indeed, both hide the 
fact that within the medium of language, the artist has no choice but to “select, to combine, to 
shape the material, in short, to create rather than to copy.”1412 Like the absorptive painter, who as 
Michael Fried has shown, must draw attention away from the fact that the painting is being 
“beheld,” as Furst argues, the novel must conceal “its writerly inner organization beneath a surface 
 
risk of the subject coming “out of trance” due to either external or internal (e.g. emotional), disturbance. Highly 
analytic subjects are thus often thought to be less “receptive” to hypnosis when one might argue that the difficulty is 
merely due to self-reflexive awareness being more prominent than the desire for immersion, not unlike a reader who 
has trouble “getting into” a book. In any case, Ryan defines the “virtual reality effect” as “the denial of the role of 
signs (bits, pixels, and binary codes) in the production of what the user experiences as unmediated presence” – which 
can be applied to the verbal medium of both novelistic and hypnotic discourse. Ryan, Ibid., 113. 
1408 It “conceals fictionality by avoiding paradox-creating devices such as (non-naturalizable) metalepsis and generally 
by abstaining from overly intrusive metareferential elements that would lay bare the constructedness of the 
representation.” Wolf, “Aesthetic Illusion(s)?,” 40. They also avoid carnivalesque humor, as in Tristram Shandy. As 
described by Bakhtin, Carnivalesque laughter is antagonistic to illusionist immersion for two reasons:  “Owing to their 
tendency to establish a subversive community without hierarchical differences (“familiarization”), carnivalesque 
topsy-turvy worlds frequently disregard thresholds, including, in comic texts, the threshold between the real and the 
fictional world (e.g., in metalepses or the parabasis of comedy). Such “impossible” blurrings highlight the fictionality 
of the comic world and thus create distance from it. Secondly, distance from comic objects is also implied in the very 
nature of loud laughter, which requires an anesthésie momentanée du coeur.” Bergson in Wolf, “Aesthetic Illusion as 
an Effect of Fiction,” 336-337.  Aesthetic illusion, on the contrary, “has an affinity with emotional involvement, and 
this in turn correlates with seriousness, as can also be seen in drama. Tragedies tend towards aesthetic illusionism 
(Aristotle’s “catharsis” in fact presupposes it to a large extent), while comedies frequently have a propensity towards 
the breaking of illusion.” Wolf, Ibid., 337. 
1409 Furst, All is True, 22. 
1410 Wolf, Ibid., 336. 
1411 Celare Artem, the “concealment” of the “artistic” nature of art, refers back to the rhetoric and aesthetics of 
antiquity, the Renaissance, and the eighteenth century. Wolf notes this formula is used by Dryden in “An Essay of 
Dramatick Poesie.” Wolf, Ibid., 341; 66.  
1412 Furst, Ibid., 5, emphasis added. 
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of readerliness.”1413  Disguising itself as “nonliterary writing,” the realist novel keeps its narratorial 
discursive level relatively inconspicuous.1414  
In the same way, the hypnotist avoids drawing attention to his existence as a separate 
individual, banishing formulations that point to his own conceptual map, belief-system, and 
physical presence, and removing all signs of personal “style” from his discourse.1415 Like an 
impersonal or invisible narrator, he aims to disappear and dissolve into hypnotic discourse itself. 
As Roustang notes, from the subject’s perspective, the hypnotist is nothing but the words which 
are being uttered, and which often blend together with—or are experienced as—the subject’s own 
thoughts.1416 This process is reminiscent of descriptions found in the phenomenology of reading: 
“When I read, “it is not so much that I am thinking [the thoughts in the book] as the thoughts of 
the other; instead, as I think them they are mine.”1417 
Like hypnosis, the realist paradigm of a “true and faithful copy of reality” demands “an 
apparently autonomous action emanating from an impersonal, disembodied, imperceptible voice.” 
Like the narrator, the hypnotist “wants to become ‘a presence that strives to appear solely as an 
absence’.”1418 It is this impersonal, present-absent quality that then endows the operator’s 
discourse with the authority and inconspicuousness necessary to create the “hypnotic illusion.”  As 
 
1413 As Diderot writes in a letter to Sophie Volland from July 18th, 1762, “Si quand on fait un tableau, on suppose des 
spectateurs, tout est perdu. Le peintre sort de sa toile, comme l’acteur qui parle au parterre sort de la scène” (“If, when 
one makes a painting, one supposes beholders, everything is lost”). In Fried, Absorption, 147-148; Furst, Ibid., 22. 
1414 David Lodge, Modes of Modern Writing (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), 97. For Wolf, the transparency 
of illusionist discourse is what “permits the recipient’s attention to focus, in a relatively ‘easy reception,’ on the story 
rather than on the discourse.” Wolf, “Aesthetic Illusion as an Effect of Fiction,” 340. Ryan proposes a similar idea: 
readers “turn the pages without paying too much attention to the letter of the text: what they want is the plot, the least 
language-dependent dimension of narrative communication.” Ryan, “Immersion vs. Interactivity,” 118. This 
conception of immersion being linked to the reader’s focus on plot rather than form will be questioned further on. 
Furthermore, as Furst has noted, the idea of an absolutely “invisible” or transparent narration (just like that of an 
absolutely absent or invisible hypnotist) is itself an illusion: “even if it chooses to feign absence as Flaubert’s does, it 
is the cornerstone of the entire fictional edifice.” Furst, Ibid., 49. A total absence of the narrator or operator’s voice 
would correspond to the absence of the aesthetic experience altogether.  
1415 Rather than imposed from without by direct suggestions, to be efficacious, hypnotic change must emerge from 
within the world of the subject, into which the hypnotist enters almost as one enters the world of a novel: by 
temporarily adopting its facts—the sum of propositions used by the subject to describe it—as true in this world. 
1416 “The person of the operator does not interest [the subject] … as he is reduced to what is being suggested” (“la 
personne de l’éveilleur ne l’intéresse pas [le sujet] … parce qu’elle est réduite à ce qui est suggéré”) Roustang, 59.  
1417 Benson 151, emphasis added. See also Merleau-Ponty: “When we read a text which sits in front of us, if its 
expression is successful, our thinking does not take place in parallel of the text itself, its words occupy our whole 
mind, they fulfil our expectations exactly.” (“Quand on lit un texte devant nous, si l’expression est réussie, nous 
n’avons pas une pensée en marge du texte lui-même, les mots occupent tout notre esprit, ils viennent combler 
exactement notre attente,” de sorte que “la fin du discours ou du texte sera la fin d’un enchantement”), our translation. 
1418 Gregory Lucente, The Narrative of Realism and Myth, Verga, Lawrence, Faulkner, Pavese (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1981), 11. 
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in Flaubert’s famous aesthetic theory of impersonality, “the artist must be in his work as God is in 
creation, invisible and all-powerful; one must sense him everywhere but never see him.”1419 Both 
the hypnotist and the realist narrator “disappear into the fictional world, ceasing to be an 
identifiable personality, becoming instead a nobody, dematerialized, unindividualized and non-
corporeal.” 1420 Significantly, this invisibility allows them to become more “audible” and permeate 
every corner of the subject’s mind.  
Nevertheless, although they appear to strive towards an ideal of transparent discourse, by 
concealing their own artificiality, both modern hypnosis and literature acknowledge that there is 
no such thing as neutral descriptive language, or an absolutely transparent narrator. Indeed, “the 
filter of the perceiver necessarily entails a significant modification of the implied ideal of a faithful 
representation of an independently existent actuality.”1421 In both cases, the narrative voice can 
recede and be made less conspicuous, but never totally disappear. Even in realist aesthetics, formal 
signs such as the use of the third person past tense, or descriptive passages all betray the presence 
of a narrative voice, and thus the impossibility of pure transparent, unmediated experience. 
Similarly, despite his attempts to “synchronize” and mirror the hypnotic subject, the operator can 
never fully espouse another’s worldview, and must therefore strive towards a goal which is, de 
facto, aspirational.  
 
3.2.2. Hypnotic Metaphors for the Aesthetic Illusion 
 
As we have established so far, hypnosis and novel reading are both forms of aesthetic 
illusions, that create states of absorption in the subject by concealing—and thus, implicitly, 
acknowledging—their own mediality and “artificial” nature. In this section, I will examine various 
metaphors of “immersion” which are used in literary criticism to refer to this illusory process, and 
all point toward what can be called the “hypnotic” dimension of novel reading.  
 
3.2.2.1. World Creation 
 
 
1419 (“L’artiste doit être comme Dieu dans la Création, invisible et tout-puissant, qu’on le sente partout, mais qu’on ne 
le voie pas”). Flaubert, Correspondance, 2: 691. 
1420 Lucente, The Narrative of Realism and Myth, 22. 
1421 Furst, All is True, 4. 
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In possible worlds theory, “what we take for the world is itself no more nor less than a 
stipulation couched in a symbol system.”1422 As I will show in this section, literary criticism 
inspired by possible world theory and phenomenology emphasizes the “world-creating” power of 
literature, in different ways.1423 In both cases, however, “the essence of a text with regard to the 
production of aesthetic illusion is its ability to found worlds” or constitute them.1424  
More specifically for our purposes, phenomenologically inspired literary theory helps to 
draw out similarities between Husserl’s concept of epochē, the experience of reading fiction, and 
the practice of modern hypnosis. 1425 Indeed, hypnosis and novelistic immersion involve the 
bracketing of exterior reality, as well as the awareness that this bracketing ends as soon as 
“ordinary life” resumes its course—whether this means putting down a novel, ending a 
hypnotherapy session, or returning to the everyday natural attitude. Although hypnotic subjects 
and novel readers do not fit Husserl’s conception of the transcendental subject (due to their 
empirical, emotional, bodily, social, and even political dimensions), the hypnotic-novelistic 
experience gives rise to worlds that exist only insofar as they are posited by a subject.1426 For 
instance, as Roman Ingarden argues, in novel reading: “a whole world is created with variously 
determined elements and the changes taking place in them, as the purely intentional correlate of a 
 
1422 Bruner, Actual Minds, Possible Worlds (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), 105. “What we call a 
world is a product of some mind whose symbolic procedures construct the world… none is ontologically privileged 
as the unique world.” Bruner, Ibid., 96. 
1423 For criticism inspired by phenomenology see Iser, Ingarden, Felski, Poulet, Moi, etc. For fiction and Possible 
World theory, see Eco, Doležel, Ronen, and Pavel: “Actual worlds appear to be undoubtedly real, complete and 
consistent, while fictional worlds are intrinsically incomplete and inconsistent.” Thomas Pavel, Fictional Worlds, 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986), 74. See also Ryan, for whom the reader must fill in the gaps left open 
by the incompleteness of fictional worlds : “the reader knows that fictional worlds are incomplete, but when he ‘plays 
the game’, when he submerges in a fiction, he pretends to believe that this world is complete,” and fills in the gaps, 
obeying the “principle of minimal departure,” that states that “we reconstruct the central world of a textual universe 
in the same way that we reconstruct the alternate possible worlds of nonfactual statements: as conforming as far as 
possible to our representations of the Actual World. We will project upon these worlds everything we know about 
reality, and we will make only the adjustments dictated by the text.” Then, “once we become immersed in fiction, the 
characters become real for us, and the world they live in momentarily takes the place of the actual world” Marie-Laure 
Ryan, Possible Worlds, Artificial Intelligence, and Narrative Theory (Bloomington: Indiana University press, 1991), 
51; 21. This process of filling in the gaps of the possible world with the knowledge of the actual world recalls  “trance 
logic,” according to which the subject fills in the gaps left incomplete by the operator but also modifies and transforms 
his view of posthypnotic reality by rendering “ordinary” information consistent with the operator’s suggestion–as does 
the narrator’s cousin in Maupassant’s Horla.   
1424 Fořt, “Aesthetic Illusion Between the Prague School and Fictional Worlds Theory,” 274. 
1425 See Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations: an Introduction to Phenomenology, trans. D. Cairns. (The Hague: 
M. Nijhoff, 1960). 
1426 This allows both hypnotic and poetic discourse to escape accusations of mystification once it is assumed that there 
is no objective reality to be driven away from. 
 305 
sentence complex. If this sentence complex finally constitutes a literary work, then I call the whole 
stock of interconnected intentions sentence correlates the ‘portrayed world’ of the work.”1427  
In possible worlds theory, possible worlds are the “products of mental activities such as 
dreaming, wishing, forming hypotheses, imagining, and writing down the products of the 
imagination in the forms of fiction.”1428 Literary criticism that draws on this theoretical branch 
underlines the similarities between the ontological status of fictional and of possible worlds.1429 
Fictional worlds can then be defined as “mental entities based on a specific contract between the 
author and the reader, which are encoded in fictional texts and are ‘brought to life’ by the decoding 
activity of the reader during the act of reading.”1430 As we will see, fictional worlds can be 
“hypnotically” accessed via several modes, ranging from immersion (which implies a visual, 
contemplative mode of attention),  transportation (which implies an embodied, re-located mode of 
attention), to possession (which is the most extreme metaphor used to depict novelistic-hypnotic 
absorption).  
 
3.2.2.2.  Immersion 
 
Aesthetic illusions create an immersive feeling of “being present in the imaginary world in 
a ‘natural,’ unmediated way.”1431 Indeed, as Walton argues, readers often experience fictional 
worlds on a mode that approaches actuality:  
 
1427 Ingarden, The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art, trans. R. A. Crowley and K. Olson (Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 1973), 31. 
1428 Ryan, “Immersion vs. Interactivity,” 114. 
1429 For Kotátko, “The literary functions of a text of narrative fiction require from the interpreter that she approaches 
in the as if  mode, its sentences as records of utterances of an inhabitant of the actual world—the narrator who tells us 
what happened in this world… the role of the reader includes the presumption of the narrator’s credibility, which can 
be withdrawn if the latter proves unreliable. The text requires us “more than to register” the utterances: to “imagine 
the state of affairs “ specified by the content of its sentences and “we are supposed to accept these states of affairs, in 
the as if mode, as actual, or … to pretend to believe that they are actual—or to indulge in the illusion that they are 
actual (i.e. facts about the world). Kotátko, “Fiction, Illusion, Reality and Radical Narration,” 197-201. For, Doležel, 
Balzac’s Comédie Humaine can be described as a “fictional superworld” whose ontological status is situated between 
“actual world” and “fictional illusion,” sharing features of both.  With individual fictional worlds, it shares “its 
ontological status as a possible world; its being created by a fiction maker.” With the actual world, it shares two 
features “it is open, expanding, and is Balzac’s special device for strengthening the illusion of reality. It provides an 
illusory ‘universe of discourse’ for all fictional worlds of the cycle. It is a substitute of the historical actual world, 
which allows Balzac to represent reality according to his ‘vision’.” Doležel, “La Comédie Humaine and the Illusion 
of Reality.”190. 
1430 Fořt, Ibid., 276. It is important to note than in these theories, “Fictional worlds are firmly connected to narratives 
and narrativity as such,” not fictionality. Ibid., 277. 
1431 Wolf, Ibid., 332, emphasis added. Wolf enumerates various factors which contribute to the immersion in a 
storyworld. Some of these include: Extension: “Illusionist worlds typically have a certain extension, because aesthetic 
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We don’t just experience fictional worlds from without. … True, these worlds are merely fictional, and we 
are well aware that they are. But from inside they seem actual—what fictionally is the case is, fictionally, 
really the case—and our presence in them… gives a sense of intimacy with characters and their other 
contents.1432  
 
Similarly, Wolf stresses the experiential quality of this immersion in fictional worlds: “one does 
not just watch this world from a distance but has the impression of being present in it and, above 
all, of experiencing it in a way similar to that in which one experiences life.”1433 In this sense, 
“aesthetic illusion shares with hallucinations (and also dreams) a vivid impression that can be 
described as a feeling of being ‘immersed in an imaginative possible world’.”1434 Hypnotic and 
novelistic immersion can both produce an “experience through which a fictional world acquires 
the presence of an autonomous, language independent reality populated with live human beings” 
 
illusion emerges during a process, the process of transition from normal perception to aesthetic, illusionist reception. 
If this process is too short, because the text is too brief, immersion will not so easily take place.” Complexity: 
“complexity is a feature that ties in with the general quality of aesthetic illusionism, namely that of recentering the 
recipient in a possible world, whose quality as “world” is enhanced by both extension and complexity… These worlds 
possess not only a spatial but also—and predominantly—a temporal dimension, as they are organized around a 
dynamic story which forms their backbone.” Accessibility: “an enhanced accessibility facilitates illusionist immersion, 
and this is why illusionist works tend to lower the threshold of access as much as possible and even “lure” their readers 
into their worlds. In realism, this tendency shows in the presentation of fictional worlds that generally seem to be an 
extension of the recipients’ real world in terms of spatial, temporal (contemporary), and social settings but also, e.g., 
in terms of norms, ideals, and epistemological preconceptions about the “readability” of reality. “Strongly illusionist 
narratives typically do not merely sketch a possible world.” The world must be “furnished” with objects “well-known 
to the reader” (places, events, public persons, institutions, etc.) and show “a tendency towards imitating” the “wealth 
of details perceived in everyday life … Such descriptions facilitate readerly immersion and frequently create 
memorable “scenes,” which “dovetails with the claim made by cognitive psychologists that stories tend to be imagined 
as sequences of pictures.” Consistency: “illusionist worlds tend to be informed, at least in fundamental, logical and 
epistemological respects, by rules that are compatible, or identical, with the rules governing real life,” are “internally 
coherent” and “meet basic expectations of meaningfulness that also apply to real- life experience, e.g., concerning the 
absence of unresolvable contradictions, the consistency of time and place, causality, teleology, the difference between 
reality and fiction, etc.” This does not entail however that the text must be realistic: Wolf explains that consistency 
operates according to Ryan’s “principle of minimal departure” and is a default option: “departures are possible, and 
can even remain compatible with illusion, provided they are marked and explained or linked, e.g., to generic 
conventions and thus obtain a secondary kind of plausibility.” Respecting the conventions of the medium or genre: 
“surprising departures from generic conventions would foreground these conventions as such and would therefore 
shift the reader’s attention from the possible world as the center of aesthetic illusion to the conditions of its 
construction.” Wolf, “Aesthetic Illusion as an Effect of Fiction,” 335-341.   
1432 Walton, Mimesis, 273. 
1433 Wolf, Ibid., 327-328. 
1434 Ryan, Possible Worlds, 21-22. Ryan nevertheless stresses the as-if dimension involved in experiencing the possible 
world as actual: “This gesture of recentering involves no illusion, no forgetting of what constitutes the reader's native 
reality. Non-actual possible worlds can only be regarded as actual through Coleridge's much quoted "willing 
suspension of disbelief." The reader of a fiction knows that the world displayed by the text is virtual, a product of the 
author's imagination, but she pretends that there is an independently existing reality serving as referent to the narrator's 
declarations.” Ryan, “Immersion vs. Interactivity,” 115. 
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or “objects.”1435 This involves an imaginative dimension which is absent from other absorptive 
media such music, chess, or non-fictional texts, such as philosophical ones.1436  
Indeed, the hypnotic and novelistic imaginations frequently involve “intend[ing] an object 
as if it really was present’.”1437 This is why in both of these fields, fictional worlds can “appear to 
have a quasi-sensory quality.”1438 For Ryan, they can even acquire a hallucinatory vividness, as 
“language must find a way to pull its referents into the theater of the mind, and to coax the 
imagination into simulating sensory perception.”1439 In this way, “verbal texts can create the 
equivalent of a multimedia show in our minds by the sheer evocative power of words without the 
complicated technical means other media would require to produce similar effects; provided we 
have the gift of transforming words into mental ‘images’.”1440  
These accounts, in which the visuality of immersion is underlined, seem to equate the act 
of interpretation with image-creation.1441 For example, Wolf notes that “owing to the paramount 
importance of visual perception in most human beings, visual ‘imagination’ … predominate[s],” 
 
1435 Ryan, “Immersion vs. Interactivity,” 15, emphasis added. 
1436 Regarding the increase in visual details in the history of the novel, see for example: “Since the eighteenth century 
the tendency towards descriptive visualization in illusionist fiction… was supported (and even propelled) by an 
increasingly visual culture that relied more and more on the empirical, outer appearance of things and produced a 
growing mass of pictures”; “Although narrative perspective is primarily cognitive, from the later eighteenth century 
onwards perspective as a pro-illusionist device in fiction has also often included the imitation of visual perspective.” 
Wolf, “Aesthetic Illusion as an Effect of Fiction,” 349; note 12, 348. 
1437 Benson, 102. 
1438 Wolf, Ibid., 329. 
1439 Ryan, Narrative as Virtual Reality, 122. 
1440 Wolf, “Aesthetic Illusion(s)?”43-44.  
1441 The description of novel writing as the process of allowing the reader to see is also used in novels: See for example: 
“My task which I am trying to achieve is, by the power of the written word, to make you hear, to make you feel–it is, 
before all, to make you see.” Conrad, Preface to The Nigger of the Narcissus (London: Dent, 1974), xxvi; or “You 
shall see them, reader. Step into this neat garden-house on the skirts of Whinbury, walk forward they are there at 
dinner...You and I will join the party, see what is to be seen, and hear what is to be heard.” Charlotte Brontë, Shirley 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1979), 9. For a non-novelistic example, see Ignatius de Loyola’s spiritual exercises prescribed to 
the readers of the bible. See also Aristotle, for whom image making and knowledge are closely linked: Aristotle 
recommends “simulation” or visualizing for writers of tragedy: “When constructing plots or working them out 
complete with their linguistic expression, one should as far as possible visualize what is happening. By envisaging 
things very vividly in this way, as if one were actually present at the events themselves, one can find out what is 
appropriate, and inconsistencies are least likely to be overlooked.” Aristotle, Poetics, 8.3, 27. See also the association 
between the emphasis on visuality and the lexical field of hypnosis. For example: “A text induces its interpreter to 
construct an image, or maybe a set of alternative images. The image the interpreter creates early in the text guides his 
interpretation of successive portions of the text and these in turn induce him to enrich or modify that image. While the 
image-construction and image-revision is going on, the interpreter is also trying to figure out what the creator of the 
text is doing—what the nature of the communication situation is. And that, too, may have an influence on the image-
creating process.” Fillmore, 1974, IV, 4, in Pratt. 
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although “other sensory experiences, in particular aural “imaginings” of voices, noises, and music, 
can also play a role.”1442 This equivalency can also be found in Iser’s description: 
A reality that has no existence of its own can only come into being by way of ideation, and so the structure 
of the text sets off a sequence of mental images which lead to the translating itself into the reader’s 
consciousness. The actual content of these mental images will be colored by the reader’s existing stock of 
experience, which acts as a referential background against which the unfamiliar can be conceived and 
processed.1443  
 
However, as reader-response theory and hypnotherapeutic case studies show, experiencing 
fictional worlds not always involve mental imagery, and in any case, always mobilizes a variety 
of sensory modalities, in addition to visual images.1444  
3.2.2.3.  Transportation 
 
This is why the metaphor of transportation captures a second aspect of novelistic absorption more 
accurately. For the experience to be properly “hypnotic,” an element of interactivity must be added 
to that of immersivity. The spatial metaphor of “transportation” (which is frequently used in 
hypnotic inductions for its homonymy with the term “trance”) involves the imaginative traveling-
towards and entering into a fictional world, and presupposes the ability to reorganize one’s spatial 
coordinates in order to localize oneself in the fictional space.1445 This relocation first and foremost 
 
1442 Wolf, “Aesthetic Illusion as an Effect of Fiction,” 329. Imaginative visual perception (including hypnotic 
hallucination) can be thought of as an “internal” extension of ordinary vision. A similar idea is delineated by Merleau-
Ponty, for whom “vision teaches us … that through it we come into contact with the sun and the stars, that we are 
everywhere all at once, and that even our power to imagine ourselves elsewhere… borrows from vision and employs 
means we owe to it.” Merleau-Ponty, The Primacy of Perception, ed. J. Edie (Chicago: Northwestern University Press, 
1964), 187. 
1443 Iser, The Act of Reading, 38. 
1444 Although for Wolf, “most readers of literature should have” this ability, many critics reject the contention that 
mental imagery is an essential component of reading. For example: “when reading fiction, I typically take in the verbal 
meaning without much sensual imagining of any sort… There can be absorbed attention without visual imagery… 
Images may appear more or less irrelevant, an almost shocking addition to the real content of the text.” Anders 
Pettersson, “Skeptical Reflections on the Concept of Aesthetic Illusion,” in The Aesthetic Illusion in Literature and 
the Arts, 292-4. Iser also criticizes Ingarden’s idea that “a concretization must produce the object in such a way that it 
gives at least the illusion of a perception.” Iser, 177. For Iser, this illusion is merely “one paradigmatic instance of 
image-building and is in no way identifiable with the whole process of ideation. The mental image of the old man can 
be just as concrete without our giving him grey hair.” For Iser, “the most that can be said of the indeterminacies is that 
they may stimulate, but not that they demand completion from, our existing store of knowledge.” Ibid., 177. Similarly, 
a hypnotic hallucination in no way requires to be as vivid as visual perception. A nuanced position would thus take 
into all the gradations between “seeing” and imagining “without seeing” that are produced by both hypnotic and 
readerly subjectivity, which can include degrees of vagueness, internal aural perception, conceptual thought, and do 
not require completely formed visual images.       
1445 A parallel can be drawn with Michael Fried’s analysis of Diderot’s Salons of 1767 and of the 1770s, which contain 
a “fiction of physically entering the painting.” Fried, 118. As he imagines himself in the paintings of Vernet 
(landscapes) and Robert (ruins), Diderot’s descriptions recall the process of the hypnotic subject entering a world and 
exploring it, imagining himself in it : “je me trouve bien là… j’irai m’asseoir à coté du jeune garçon”  (“I actually find 
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involves an imaginary turning-away, or “departure,” from the subject’s immediate surroundings. 
As Gerrig notes, “a defining feature of the experience of virtually all narratives is that readers are 
transported away from the here and now.”1446 By describing fictional worlds as actual—and using 
in language the indicative rather than the conditional mod—novels and hypnotic discourse takes 
the appearance of factuality, and asks its users to “transport themselves in imagination into this 
foreign world.”1447  
Like hypnotic “susceptibility,” the ability to be narratively transported evolves through 
time and with experience. As Victor Nell argues, although “all readers are capable of performing 
the cognitive activities that enable them to be transported to narrative worlds … less skilled readers 
find it harder to become thoroughly immersed.”1448 Similarly, although “trained” hypnotic subjects 
experience more complex hypnotic phenomena, as Bernheim and Delboeuf argue, this capacity is 
acquired, rather than innate.1449 In the same way that every hypnotic experience is unique, each 
new reading of a text produces a different understanding. Indeed, as Iser notes: “a second reading 
of a piece of literature often produces a different impression from the first. … The increased 
information that now overshadows the text provides possibilities of combination that were 
obscured in the first reading. Familiar occurrences now tend to appear in a new light and seem to 
be at times corrected, at times enriched… the reader himself produces these innovative 
readings.”1450  
 
myself there… I shall go and sit next to the boy”). In Fried, 121. As Diderot writes, “a painting which puts you in the 
scene … is never a bad painting.” In Fried, 121. Fried however speaks of the “wholly passive receptivity” of the 
beholder when absorbed in front of the painting, experiencing a form of “enchantment” and suspension of time, a state 
of “essential reverie,” a “repos délicieux,” a “particular psychophysical condition” which resembles trance but is never 
named as such. Fried, 130. Self-forgetfulness is a strong component of this experience: “on s’oublie devant le tableau, 
c’est là la plus forte magie de l’art” (“One forgets oneself in front of the painting; there lies art’s most powerful 
magic”). In Fried, 127. However, this insistence on passive receptivity neglects the strongly active dimension of the 
subject who engages in an exploratory déambulation or promenade in the space of the painting. Indeed, Diderot also 
uses verbs of movement and future tense to capture the experience: “j’irai m’asseoir” (I shall go and sit), in Fried 121. 
His depiction thus underlines the imaginative activity that is the counterpart of the passive receptivity of the body 
before the painting. 
1446 Gerrig, 128. For Gerrig, by addressing readers as “side participants,” novels and transport them into the narrative 
world, and in this process, make certain aspects of the real world inaccessible. 
1447 Ryan, “Fiction, Cognition, and Non-Verbal Media,” in M. Grishakova and Ryan, eds. Intermediality and 
Storytelling (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2010), 14. 
1448 Nell, in Gerrig, 19. 
1449 See Chapter 1. 
1450 Iser, “The Reading Process, a Phenomenological Approach,” New Literary History 3, no. 2 (Winter, 1972): 286. 
One can compare this to Erickson’s presentation to a subject of her second hypnotic experience as a simplification, a 
stripping, an undoing (rather than an increase in knowledge): “It is often said,/we learn to skate in the summer/and to 
swim in the winter./ We achieve certain/level of learning/to skate in the winter./But the next winter/we start skating 
with a higher degree of excellence/because the random movements off skating/that complicated the first learning/have 
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Upon closer inspection, a double movement can be identified in hypnotic-novelistic 
transportation. As Ryan argues: 
Narrative phenomenology involves not just one but two acts of recentering, one logical and the other 
imaginative. The first—the constitutive gesture of fictionality—sends the reader from the real world to the 
nonfactual possible world created by the text; the second, an option available in principle to both fiction and 
nonfiction… relocates the reader from the periphery to the heart of the story-world and from the time of 
narration to the time of the narrated.1451  
 
Transportation, then, occurs first from the actual to the fictional world, and then, takes place 
“inside” fictional space and temporality. Because the concept of transportation does not capture in 
detail the numerous directions in which various aesthetic “relocations” can occur, the concept of 
aesthetic “recentering” seems more appropriate, as it presupposes a multiplicity of points of 




Ciarán Benson’s theorization of literary absorption as “recentering” is in this sense 
especially relevant to our purposes. As Benson argues in The Absorbed Self, recentering is the 
process by which we make “ours” another “center of consciousness,” whether animate or 
inanimate.1452  
According to Benson, subjective experience is composed of “different types of experiential 
fields” and “different ways for the self to be centered within such fields.”1453 As he argues, 
although the first person pronoun is the typical “functional center” of symbolic thinking, in 
numerous acts of perception, it is not always around an “I as centre” that perceptual experience is 
organized. 1454 Indeed, “there can be a virtual merging or fusing of the subject’s perceptual position 
with the ‘that’ which is perceived.”1455 While I am absorbed, “it is as though I have been 
 
dropped out./And the first winter/the random movements/were still fresh in mind (Pause)/Now you can go/much 
deeper/because / there are many fewer/random movements/or processes.” Erickson, Hypnotic Realities, 284, emphasis 
added. 
1451 Ryan, Narrative as Virtual Reality, 139. 
1452 Benson, 167. 
1453 Benson, The Absorbed Self, xi. 
1454  “It is always an I that acts as a functional center for symbolic thoughts.” Benson, 101. See also Iser: “As 
perspectives are continually interweaving and interacting, it is not possible for the reader to embrace all perspectives 
at once … The structure of theme [the perspectival view in which the reader is involved] and horizon constitutes the 
vital link between text and reader, because it actively involves the reader in the process of synthesizing an assembly 
of constantly shifting viewpoints, which not only modify one another but also influence past and future syntheses.” 
Iser, The Act of Reading, 97. 
1455 Ibid., 101. 
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temporarily recentred and am where the object of my perception appears to be… the particular 
object almost entirely and exclusively occupies my field of awareness—its now is my now; but 
my here somehow becomes its here.”1456 In this kind of perceptual act, the subject is 
phenomenologically “transported spatially to where the object of intention is … the there and 
now… can carry the perceptual subject with them, just as the subject as indexical carries the here 
and now.”1457 For Benson, all forms of aesthetic absorption involve a “transition/transformation of 
one form of centeredness into another.”1458 
By “altering the context of I” in this way, aesthetic experiences such as reading invite us 
to “temporarily occupy” other points of view and adopt a new “I perspective”: 
Stories may be presented from the perspective of a narrator which a reader may adopt for all or some of the 
reading of the story. To the extent that one does not deploy one’s own perspective but stands in a relationship 
to the narrative happenings which is the narrator’s …  the reader’s ‘I’ has occupied that other perspective.1459 
 
As I will argue in Chapter 4, recentering is at the heart of the ethical and therapeutic value of 
hypnotic and novelistic narratives, since “to be aesthetically absorbed in a book of narrative fiction 
is, in part, to be in the same state of thinking and feeling as that other ‘centre of consciousness’ in 
so far as that other centre becomes, for the duration, my centre.”1460 
Furthermore, Ryan describes this process as not merely entering a fictional world, but also 
reorganizing it around a new center: “in the space-travel mode, represented by fiction and now by 
VR technology, consciousness relocates itself to another world, and recenters the universe around 
this virtual reality.”1461 Indeed, constructing a mental representation of a scene involves getting a 
“general spatial orientation” from the text.1462 The concept of recentering is thus also strongly 
linked to the impression of being situated, as a body, in space. Both hypnosis and the novel involve 
“a sense of being located, localized, of being a significant point of reference for other objects 
occupying the same space.”1463 This impression of spatial localization is essential to the absorptive 
 
1456 Ibid., 99.  
1457 Ibid., 99-100.  
1458 Ibid., xi. 
1459 Ibid., 96. 
1460 Ibid. 
1461 Ryan, “Immersion vs. Interactivity,” 115, emphasis added. Ryan even compares the recentering in VR to the 
hallucinatory centering of shamanic subjectivity: “in the virtual environment, as in certain shamanistic rituals 
described by Mircea Eliade, the body stands at the center of the world, and the world irradiates from it.” Ryan, 72. 
See also: “Virtual reality “is like having shared hallucinations, except that you can compose them like works of art; 
you can compose the external world in any way ay all as an act of communication.” Zhai, Get real, 182, in Ryan, 
Narrative as Virtual Reality, 15. 
1462 Wolf, “Aesthetic Illusion(s)?,” 44. 
1463 Benson, 141. 
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dimension of the aesthetic experience. Indeed, “if a mind may conceive a world from the outside, 
a body always experiences it from the inside.”1464 During hypnotic inductions, this dimension is 
explored in depth with techniques that purposefully explore, deepen, and modify the subject’s 
sense of spatial situatedness and proprioception. 
As Ryan describes it, during the process of recentering, the “relocated consciousness” of 
the reader “grows an imaginary body that takes up residence in the fictional world.”1465However, 
with Ryan’s description, a notable difference between novelistic and hypnotic worlds appears: 
whereas the reader cannot modify the environment described by the text, hypnosis—like virtual 
reality—is both immersive and interactive: it allows the subject, not only “to apprehend a world 
as real” by feeling “surrounded by it, physically with it,” but also, gives one “the power to modify 
this environment.”1466 Although they offer different levels of interactivity, in both hypnosis and 
the novel, the immersive quality of aesthetic recentering reveals a “sense of being-in-the-world at 
the core of the theory and poetics of immersion.”1467 
Indeed, to a certain degree, novelistic action also unfolds “in a world where our selves 
move and experience one another.”1468 Like illusionist paintings, the novel mobilizes “techniques 
that imitate the perspectivity of everyday experience, that is, the inevitable limitation of perception 
according to the point of view and horizon of the perceiver,” and in this sense, strengthen the sense 
of spatial localization.1469 By multiplying descriptive details which “fix an atmosphere,” novels 
 
1464 Ryan, “Immersion vs. Interactivity,” 134. Ryan argues that with Virtual Reality, the user is immersed “in a world 
experienced as already in place” and therefore that “For the first time in history, the possible worlds created by the 
mind become palpable entities.” Ibid., 114. We would object however that this is already the case in hypnosis. As 
Merleau-Ponty has shown: “The speaking ‘I’ abides in its body. Rather than imprisoning it, language is like a magic 
machine for transporting the ‘I’ into the other person’s perspective… There can be speech (and in the end personality) 
only for an ‘I’ which contains the germ of a depersonalization. Merleau-Ponty, The Prose of the World, trans. J. 
O’Neil. (Evanston: Northwestern University press, 1973), 19-20. 
1465 Ryan, “Immersion vs. Interactivity,” 116. 
1466 Ibid., 111. 
1467 Ryan, Narrative as Virtual Reality, 14. See also Merleau-Ponty: “The perceiving mind is an incarnated mind”; we 
must not “forget … the insertion of the mind in corporeality”; “ It is by imagining ourselves physically reaching out 
to grab x that I acquire a sense of its presence: “We grasp external space though our bodily situation. A ‘corporeal or 
postural schema’ gives us at every moment a global, practical and implicit notion of the relation between our bodies 
and things, of our hold in them. A system of possible movements, or ‘motor projects’ radiates from us to our 
environment. Our body is not in space like things; it inhabits or haunts space.” Merleau-Ponty, The Primacy of 
Perception and Other Essays on Phenomenological Psychology, the Philosophy of Art, History and Politics, trans. J. 
Edie (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1964), 3; 4; 5. See also: “my body… is my point of view upon 
the world” and constitutes a “general means for having a world.” Phenomenology of Perception, trans D. Landes 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2012), 73; 147. 
1468 Ralph Freedman, “The Possibility of a Theory of a Novel,” in The Disciplines of Criticism, ed. P. Demetz, T. 
Greene and N. Lowry (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968),72. 
1469 Wolf, “Aesthetic Illusion as an Effect of Fiction,” 340. 
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also convey “a sense of the presence of the setting and facilitates spatial immersion.”1470 Realist 
novels “keep the readers ‘recentered’ because they successfully maintain a feeling of 
verisimilitude and experientiality while minimizing aesthetic distance.”1471 
Therefore, reading does not involve the mere contemplation of the novelistic world. Like 
hypnosis, it involves imaginatively inhabiting the fictional space, a process which incorporates a 
certain degree of mobility, and allows the recentered consciousness to occupy various successive 
points of view, and project itself into virtual “bodies” and perspectives. As Ryan notes, it is 
recentering that allows us to experience fictional worlds—i.e. “nonfactual possible worlds”—as 
actual, which forms the basic condition for immersive reading.”1472 
A new conception of hypnotic dissociation can thus emerge from this analysis of novelistic 
recentering. Indeed, in hypnotic dissociation we lose touch of our surroundings simply because we 
are in touch with another, imaginary, reality. This is why Roustang defines hypnotic trance not as 
a “special state” but as a mere shift in the object of attention:1473  
Unlike what one might expect, dissociation is not a state or mode of being which can be circumscribed. 
Dissociation is ‘dissociating from’. It does not separate two elements; it does not point to an empty space 
between two distinct or opposing entities.1474  
 
 
1470 Ryan, Narrative as Virtual Reality, 130. 
1471 Wolf, “Aesthetic Illusion as an Effect of Fiction,” 335. 
1472 Ryan, Narrative as Virtual Reality, 103. 
1473 See Roustang: “A book, a film, a voice, a searching spark our interest, absorb or fascinate us. But if they take us 
out of an environment, it is only because they have offered us another one. Therefore, here, we merely have a shift in 
attention, a change in the object of awareness.” Roustang, Qu’est-ce que l’hypnose?, 66, our translation. Hypnotic 
absorption is thus: “an intensification and redistribution of attention,” with the converse effect that “the light on the 
rest on the attentional spectrum is decreased… the rest of the surrounding world dies away.” Göran Rossholm, 
“Mediating Immediacy,” in The Aesthetic Illusion in Literature and the Arts, 88. 
1474 Roustang, “Se dissocier: mais comment faire autrement?,” 28-29, our translation. Roustang furthermore 
emphasizes the “wokeness” and lucidity involved in the process, rather than a dulling of the mind. Indeed, he calls 
hypnosis “veille paradoxale,” a state of being paradoxically awake, not “asleep,” with a strongly active mind, whose 
activity differs from that of conscious awareness. He calls the ordinary state of consciousness “veille restreinte” 
(restricted awareness), as opposed to “veille généralisée,” (generalized awareness) the latter being constituted of the 
hypnotic extension of the former. His vocabulary therefore does not suggest a difference in kind between ordinary and 
“abnormal” states of consciousness, but rather, varying degrees in the scope of awareness. With this reframing, 
absorption can be defined as a form of concentration and trance as a focusing, a narrowing of the attention which 
remains sharp as it concentrates on internal objects. See also: “the persuasive representation of absorption 
characteristically entailed evoking the obliviousness or unconsciousness … to everything other than the specific 
objects of their absorption.” Fried, 31, emphasis added. Unconsciousness, then, is not an absence of awareness in 
general, but a disregard of anything other than the object of attention. Indeed, “in trance there is a reduction of the 
patient’s foci of attention to a few inner realities; consciousness has been fixated and focused to a relatively narrow 
frame of attention rather than being diffused over a broad area, as in the more typical general reality orientation of our 
usual everyday awareness… We narrow the focus of attention to the point where one’s usual frames of reference are 
vulnerable to being depotentiated” Rossi, in Hypnotic Realities, 227.  
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Rather than as a pathological loss of touch with reality, hypnotic dissociation is the mirror opposite 
of absorption, stemming from a shift in the object of awareness. 
 
3.2 2.5.       Situation and the Adventure of Reading 
 
Simone de Beauvoir’s theory of novel reading in her essay “Literature and Metaphysics” 
and her contribution to Qu’est-ce que la literature? provides an account of novelistic immersion 
that describes reading as a process of becoming absorbed and situated into another “other” world, 
which neither actual life, nor other genres of writing allow us to experience.1475  
As Toril Moi and Yi-Ping Ong show in their reading of her texts, for Beauvoir, a non-
fictional text or essay doesn’t “draw the reader in the same way” as a novel does—“a scholarly 
book fails to transport the reader out of herself,” it does not lead the reader to “change 
universe.”1476 In a journalistic or sociological account for instance, “I remain at home, in my 
room,” and the knowledge about the individuals I read about remains “theirs,” in “their world.”1477 
Novels, on the other hand, “invite me and convince me, to settle down, at least for a moment, in 
the heart of another world,” which is to say, to temporarily assume another ‘I’ and hence, another 
“situation.”1478  
 Reading novels, therefore, provides an experience reminiscent of hypnosis, first because 
of the spellbinding power of their mode of world-disclosure. In Beauvoir’s account, the reader is 
“bewitched by the tale that he is told,” reacting “as if he were faced with lived events.”1479 As Moi 
 
1475 Simone de Beauvoir, in Que Peut la Littérature?, ed. Yves Buin (Paris: Union Générale d’Éditions, Coll. 
10/18,1965); English translation, “What can Literature do?” trans. M. Timmermann, in The Useless Mouths and Other 
Writings, ed. M. A. Simmons and M. Timmermann, (Urbana: University of Illinois University Press, 2011), and 
“Literature and Metaphysics,” in Philosophical Writings (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 2014), 270. For 
readings of Beauvoir’s theory of the novel, see Yi-Ping Ong, “Detotalized Totality: Situation, World, and Being-in-
the-Novel,” in The Art of Being, 151-193; Toril Moi, “What Can Literature Do? Simone de Beauvoir as a Literary 
Theorist.” PMLA 124, no. 1 (2009): 189-198; and “The Adventure of Reading: Literature and Philosophy, Cavell and 
Beauvoir,” in Literature and Theology 25, no. 2 (June 2011): 125–140. 
1476 Moi, “The Adventure of Reading,” 133-4; Beauvoir, in Que Peut la Littérature?, 82. “A metaphysical novel that 
is honestly read, and honestly written, provides a disclosure of existence in a way unequaled by any other mode of 
expression.” Beauvoir, “Literature and Metaphysics,” 276. 
1477 Beauvoir, “What can Literature do?” 201. 
1478 Beauvoir, Ibid. Indeed, we do not see the world as a totality but rather, we inhabit it as individual agents and are 
situated in it, in relation to it. See for instance: “Situation is the common product of the contingency of the in-itself 
and of freedom,” the “total facticity, the absolute contingency of the world, of my birth, of my place, of my past” but 
also “that which unifies and explains all these facts, that which organizes the, in a totality capable of description 
instead of making of them a disordered nightmare.” Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans. Hazel E. Barnes (New York: 
Philosophical Library, 1956), 488; 548-49, quoted in Ong 163-64.  
1479 Ibid. 270.  
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notes, all her life, “Beauvoir praised novels that allowed her to feel immersed, absorbed, 
spellbound. A novel had to ‘take’ [prendre]: take her in (make her believe in it) and take her over 
(spellbind her).”1480 Furthermore, Beauvoir—who, as Moi indicates, thinks of language as speech 
acts—also insists on the importance of the author’s voice as the key characteristic of literature, 
which ties form and content together.1481 It is partly the experience of being “taken by” a world 
created by “the presence of a human voice” that lies the power of novelistic absorption.1482 In this 
sense, the psychological identification with fictional characters is not the only criterion for 
absorption to occur. As Yi-Ping Ong shows, the novel’s absorptive force relies “not only upon its 
representation of character life, but also on its capacity to engulf [the reader] entirely within the 
wholeness and intricacy of an other-world.”1483  
Indeed, absorption here stems from the feeling of adopting another situation of being 
immersed in (and identified with) a world: “whether there is a character or not, for reading to 
‘take,’ I have to identify with someone: with the author; I have to enter into his world, and his 
world must become mine.”1484  
This absorptive experience is one of being transported, not merely into a world, but into 
another “relation to the world.”1485  
Indeed, in novel reading we are led to relate to the fictional world from a specific point of 
view, which resembles that of hypnosis, and lies on a central paradox: the novel provides access 
to the “detotalized totality” of another world as it appears to (and is perceived by) another 
consciousness, which is impossible in ordinary life.1486 The novel “allows us to see the world from 
 
1480 Moi, “The Adventure of Reading,” 134. 
1481 Moi, “What Can Literature Do?,” 194; “To find a way of telling a story is at once to find a rhythm and a subject 
matter.” Beauvoir, in Que Peut La Littérature? 84-85. 
1482 Moi, Ibid. This of course recalls the ability of hypnotic discourse to dissociate the subject and re-associate him or 
her to the imaginary world. In both cases, the world cannot exist without the voice which both carries and creates. One 
of the difficulties posed by Beauvoir’s concept of voice is the criteria for generic distinctions in literature: “Novels, 
autobiographies, and essays can all be literature, as long as they have the necessary voice.” Beauvoir, in Que Peut La 
Littérature? 84.   
1483 Ong, 154. 
1484 (“Il faut que j’entre dans son monde et que ce soit son monde qui devienne le mien”) Beauvoir, in Que Peut La 
Littérature? 81-82. 
1485 “What distinguishes the novel as an aesthetic form from mere information, and what evokes its reader’s absorption 
in the reality it narrates, is in part its effective representation of a worldhood as the detotalized totality of a situation” 
Ong, 159. This does not imply identification with a psychological author–rather it involves switching perspectives: 
Moi notes that identifying with the “person” of the author here specifically means “to occupy the same position (the 
same spatial coordinates as it were) in relation to the world” as her. Ibid., 193. 
1486 As Beauvoir argues, in existential philosophy, we do not see the world as a totality in its unity, that is, as something 
immutable that one could survey as a world map. Rather, as Sartre showed, the world is a “detotalized totality”: “there 
is a world that is indeed the same for us all, but on the other hand, we are all in situation in relation to it. … What is 
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the point of view of the other without ceasing to be ourselves.”1487 On the one hand,  “the spell” 
of novelistic absorption depends on our being led to “inhabit” the fictional universe and thus on 
“the illusion or fiction that the novelistic world has become—for the reader-made-believer—the 
world.”1488 As Ong observes, this process “enables the representation of world to unfold as if 
independently of the totalizing perspective of an author/beholder.”1489 In this context, the 
“miracle” of literature lies in effacing our awareness of relating to the work or art qua work of art,  
and in how reading can seems to be able to bridge the gap that inevitably separates individual 
“solitudes” in the actual world.1490 It gives us the “taste of another life,” helping us overcome the 
ineluctable existential separation present in the everyday and in this sense, communicates the 
uncommunicable.1491 On the other hand however, in novel reading I am  “fascinated by a singular 
world that overlaps with mine and yet is other.”1492 This world remains other and conversely, 
readerly absorption does not lead to a total loss of self:  “another truth becomes mine without 
ceasing to be other. I renounce my own “I” in favour of the speaker; and yet I remain myself.”1493 
A “good novel” transports the reader into its world, but it does not so much make him or her “take 
the fiction for reality, as be able to experience the fiction as deeply as reality, while full well 
knowing that it is fiction.”1494 We are thus transported, but “without ceasing to be ourselves.”1495  
Finally, novel reading resembles hypnosis as it involves a willingness to risk opening up 
to this other word or voice. As Moi writes, “a good novel, for Beauvoir, is an invitation to the 
reader to share the author's sense of exploration and discovery, to join her on an 'authentic 
adventure of the mind’,” and expression Moi borrows from Cora Diamond.1496 Participating in the 
 
most essential in the human condition and man’s relation to the world is precisely what is defined by this unity of the 
world that we express and yet at the same time this singularity, this demoralization of the points of view we take on 
it. … The situation in which we find ourselves in relation to it.” Beauvoir, “What can Literature do?” in The Useless 
Mouths, 198-99.  
1487 Moi 134. 
1488 Ong, 162. “Situation is precisely that which allow the detotalized totality of a world to appear to emerge 
independently of the necessity of positing an objective perspective upon that world.” Ong, 165. 
1489 Ong, 162.   
1490 The separation is that “I will die a death that is absolutely unique for myself.” Beauvoir, “What can Literature 
do?” 199-201. 
1491 Moi, Ibid., 193-4. 
1492 Beauvoir, Que Peut, 82; emphasis added. 
1493 Beauvoir, Ibid., 82-83 in Moi, “The Adventure,” 134. 
1494 Moi, Ibid. 
1495 Beauvoir, Ibid, in Moi, Ibid. 
1496 Moi, 133. Cora Diamond notes that for Henry James, the adventurous reader is one who is immersed in a particular 
kind of attention to things, and “delights in there being more in things than meets the eye.” Ibid., 136. See Cora 
Diamond “Missing the Adventure: Reply to Martha Nussbaum,” Journal of Philosophy 82, no. 10 (1985): 530-531. 
This account of absorption-as-adventure answers potential fears of dispossession and loss of self, raised by the 
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novelistic adventure, like hypnosis, involves letting oneself be absorbed: like the hypnotic subject, 
the novel reader “has to be-open-minded. She has to be willing be willing to take up the writer's 
invitation to join her on an adventure.”1497 This does not involve being merely deluded. Rather, 
reading novels, like hypnosis, is “not so much to take the fiction for reality, as to be able to 
experience the fiction as deeply as reality.”1498 In this context, a reader who “willingly participates 
in the adventure of the novel lets herself be absorbed by it.”1499 
Here, the “adventure” of novelistic absorption is less a matter of dispossession than a 
disposition and openness to the experience of otherness. Like hypnosis, it involves a willingness 
to fully experience the world as it is presented by another voice, and implies an active participation 
leading to inhabit another situated perspective, rather than a passive “taking over” of the mind.  
 
3.2.2.6.   Possession 
 
The most extreme metaphor that links novelistic and hypnotic immersion is that of 
possession, which we discussed in Chapter 2 in the context of nineteenth-century 
conceptualizations of the “hypnotic unconscious” and (dis)possession in The Horla. 
 A telling example of the use of possession in the field of twentieth-century literary 
criticism, however, is formulated by George Poulet, in his 1969 paper “Phenomenology of 
reading.”  
In the opening paragraphs of this article, Poulet describes reading as a mutual  
interpenetration between subject and object: “The extraordinary fact in the case of a book is the 
falling away of the barriers between you and it, You are inside it; it is inside you; there is no longer 
either outside or inside.”1500 This fusion with an “other I,” is not with that of the author, but with 
a consciousness that exists only in the work. As Poulet writes: it is “open,” it “welcomes me, lets 
 
“hypnotic” powers of literature, as described in Chapter 2. In the case of hypnosis, “missing the adventure” would 
involve the operator lacking adaptability and/or the subject rejecting hypnotic suggestions in a therapeutic context. 
Ordinary Language Criticism might point out that such resistance would be less a failure of the hypnotist than an act 
of self-exposition on the part of the subject, a revealing of what matters to him; perhaps of a lack of openness–caused 
by fear, inattention, or even conscious refusal to engage in the experience of the ‘other world.’ It would correspond to 
the psychological equivalent of a refusal of the ‘illumination’ offered by literature as it is described by Beauvoir. Moi; 
137. We will return to this question of the ethical dimension of literature and absorption in Chapter 4. 
1497 Moi, 134. 
1498 Ibid. 
1499 Moi, “The Adventure of Reading,” 134. This involves a special kind of attentiveness, as “adventure and attention 
are intrinsically linked,” a question to which I will return in Chapter 4. Ibid., 137. 
1500 Georges Poulet, “The Phenomenology of Reading,” New Literary History 1, No. 1 (Oct. 1969): 54. 
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me look deep inside itself, and even allows me … to think what it thinks and feel what it feels.”1501 
During this process, the book as material object disappears and leads to an experience which, like 
hypnosis, takes place on the plane of the immaterial: while I read, the material is dematerialized 
and objects become mental, objects of consciousness.1502    
Significantly, Poulet’s description emphasizes the autonomy of such significations and 
objects, which consciousness has no control over, and yet constitutes, giving them a “home”: “in 
this interior world where, like fish in an aquarium, words, images and ideas disport themselves, 
these mental entities, in order to exist, need the shelter which I provide; they are dependent on my 
consciousness.”1503  
The lexical field of surrender and subjection then brings Poulet’s description of reading 
close to traditional hypnotic tropes: “As soon as I replace my direct perception of reality by the 
words of a book, I deliver myself, bound hand and foot to the omnipotence of fiction… I become 
the prey of language. There is no escaping this take-over.”1504 Here, as in hypnosis, the reader 
becomes the subject of the thoughts of another and experience them as his or hers: “Because of 
the strange invasion of my person by the thoughts of another, I am a self who is granted the 
experience of thinking thoughts foreign to him. I am the subject of thoughts other than my own. 
 
1501 Poulet, Ibid., 54. 
1502 “While reading, I perceive in my mind a number of significations which have made themselves at home there. 
Doubtless they are still … objects of my thought… [The book] is nowhere.” Ibid., 54. “That thing made of paper, as 
there are things made of metal or porcelain, that object is no more, or at least it is as if it no longer existed, as long as 
I read the book. For the book is no longer a material reality. It has become a series of words, of images, of ideas which 
in their turn begin to exist. And where is this new existence? Surely not in the paper object. Nor, surely, in external 
space. There is only one place left for this new existence: my innermost self.” They “lose their materiality,” become 
“images, purely mental entities… in order to exist as mental objects, they must relinquish their existence as real 
objects.” This blurs the subject-object division: “since everything has become part of my mind, thanks to the 
intervention of language, the opposition between the subject and its objects has been considerably attenuated.” We 
share a strong sense of intimacy with these objects which have become mental, Poulet describes as rapport: “it replaces 
those external objects with a congeries of mental objects in close rapport with my own consciousness.” Poulet, Ibid., 
54-55, italics in original. See also Benson’s account of aesthetic absorption (absorptive reading “breaks down initially 
given divisions” and the self “gives itself over to the power of the object”), based on Dewey’s anti-dualistic notion of 
the aesthetic experience, in which “no such distinction of self and object exists.” Ciarán Benson, The Absorbed Self, 
12; 150; John Dewey, Art As Experience (New York: Capricorn Books, G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1958), 249. Benson’s 
account is also relevant to our purposes as it is based on psychoanalytic theories of infantile undifferentiation. See for 
instance Margaret Mahler’s definition of symbiosis as “a state of undifferentiation, of fusion in which the ‘I’ is not 
yet differentiated from the ‘not I’ and in which inside and outside are only gradually coming to be sensed as different… 
The essential feature of symbiosis is hallucinatory or delusional, somatopsychic fusion with the representation of the 
mother and, in particular, the delusion of a common boundary of the two actually and physically separate individuals.” 
Mahler, On Human Symbiosis and the Vicissitudes of Individuation, vol 1. (London: The Hogarth Press, 1969), 9. See 
Benson, 12-22. 
1503 Poulet, Ibid., 54-55. 
1504 Ibid., 55. 
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My consciousness behaves as though it were the consciousness of another.”1505 Here, self-
possession seems to have turned into dispossession, threatening my existence as reader and 
subject: “here I am thinking a thought which manifestly belongs to another mental world, which 
is being thought in me just as though I did not exist.”1506  
As in Maupassant’s Le Horla, Poulet’s description of reading involves a strong sense of 
alienation and invasion, which moves from the exterior toward the interior: “this thought which is 
alien to me and yet in me, must also have in me a subject which is alien to me” … When I read… 
The I which I pronounce is not myself.”1507 Poulet even goes as far as to personify the work that 
comes alive in the reader’s mind:  
So long as it is animated by this vital inbreathing inspired by the act of reading, a work of literature becomes 
at the expense of the reader whose own life it suspends a sort of human being, that is a mind conscious of 
itself and constituting itself in me as the subject of its own objects.1508    
 
Like in Le Horla, a “second self” seems to have taken over, “which thinks and feels for me.”1509  
However, in Poulet’s account—as in the hypnotic trance—this is not a total obliteration. Rather, 
it is a temporary surrender, a suspension: “whatever sort of alienation I may endure, reading does 
not interrupt my activity as subject.”1510  
Reading is the act during which “the subjective principle which I call I, is modified in such 
a way that I no longer have the right, strictly speaking, to consider it as my I. I am on loan to 
another, and this other thinks, feels, suffers, and acts within me.”1511 This “alienation” thus 
resembles Benson’s concept of recentering much more than Maupassant’s inescapable possession: 
“my subjectivity alters with the alteration of intentionality.”1512  
Indeed, for Poulet “the annexation of my consciousness by another (the other which is the 
work) in no way implies that I am the victim of any deprivation of consciousness.”1513 Indeed, in 
a description reminiscent of Ernest Hilgard’s “secret observer,” Poulet mentions the presence of 
 
1505 Ibid., 56. 
1506 Ibid., emphasis added. 
1507 Ibid. “Reading is just that: a way of giving way not only to a host of alien words, images, ideas, but also the very 
alien principle which utters them and shelters them” … “any feeling proposed to me is immediately assumed by me.” 
Ibid., 57. Further on, Poulet also uses a vocabulary similar to that of Maupassant: “spell”; “possession”; “taken over”; 
“dispossession”; “takes hold”; “appropriates,” etc. Ibid., 59. 
1508 Ibid., 59. 
1509 Ibid., 57. 
1510 Ibid. 
1511 Ibid., emphasis added. 
1512 Benson, The Absorbed Self, 152. 
1513 Poulet, “Phenomenology,” 59.  
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an observer or a critic, who remains active throughout the process and shares consciousness with 
the work.1514 This presence makes itself felt with a temporal lag—a dissociated split of sorts—in 
a manner reminiscent of hypnosis, where the self is able to observe the experience which unfolds: 
in the “common consciousness” or “community of feeling” where the work “occupies the 
foreground,” I “record passively all that is going on in me. A lag takes place, a sort of schizoid 
distinction between what I feel and what the other feels; a confused awareness of delay.”1515  
Poulet’s account is thus useful to us in that it allows for variation in degrees of critical 
awareness, a spectrum between distance and fusion:  
Critical consciousness does not necessarily imply the total disappearance of the critic's mind … criticism can 
pass through a whole series of nuances … discovering the various forms of identification and non-
identification … the variations of which this relationship—between criticizing subject and criticized object—
is capable.1516  
 
As Benson notes, as it is described by Poulet, the experience is both temporal and 
temporary: “what matters is to live, for the time of reading, inside the work that is ‘inside’ me.”1517 
As in hypnosis (and unlike what occurs in Maupassant), the “possession” is a voluntary “loan,” in 
which the changes in subjectivity caused by the change in intentionality only take place as long as 
one is willing and as allows the experience to last. At any moment, temporary and willing 
dispossession can turn back into repossession of subjective experience as mine.1518 This temporary 
and gradual dimension shows that, even with strong metaphors of reading as possession, the 
complete annihilation of subjectivity on the recipient’s side is just as impossible to achieve as 
absolute transparency is on the narrator-operator’s side.  
 
      *** 
 
1514 “This astonished consciousness is in fact the consciousness of the critic.” Ibid., 60. 
1515 Ibid., 59-60. 
1516 Ibid., 60. 
1517 Benson, 152, emphasis added.  
1518 In response to Poulet’s argument, Norman Holland explicitly draws the parallel between hypnosis and the act of 
reading: “the subject / hypnotisand feels the personality of the hypnotist as though it is a part of himself, and when the 
hypnotist says ‘your hand feels cold’: your hand does feel cold, which I think is rather like the way we respond to a 
book.” Norman Holland, Response to “Criticism and the Experience of Interiority,” in The Structuralist Controversy, 
ed. R. Macksey and E. Donato (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University, 2007), 87. However, Poulet refuses the 
parallel and says his conception of reading involves an action we perform on a “fully conscious” level, with a cogito 
still operating. However, he then concedes there can be a “sort of cloudy consciousness” (not the subconscious proper, 
he says). Ibid., 88. Richard Macksey proposed “preconscious.” Given our definition of hypnotic trance as a spectrum 
which allows for the presence of consciousness, Poulet’s account (of being “on a loan to another”) is not incompatible 
with our analogy. Poulet, “Phenomenology,” 57. For another perspective, see also Peirce: thoughts are “mine” for as 
long as I think them, “as long as I am their subject and they are my present thoughts,” in Benson, 151. 
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From this exploration of the various “hypnotic” metaphors for novelistic immersion, a 
similar element reemerges in each instance: every time, a certain degree of distance and awareness 
remains on the part of the subject. In other words, regardless of the degree of immersion, the 
illusory dimension of the aesthetic experience, whether novelistic or hypnotic, is never total. 
Rather, an irreducible trace seems to remain, pointing toward the artificial and conventional nature 
of the aesthetic medium, despite all efforts on the part of the creator to conceal the “trickery” with 
which aesthetic illusions are carried out. As we saw in the various hypnotic-immersive metaphors 
used in literary criticism, this artificial dimension can never be fully eliminated, only willfully and 
temporarily suspended. This process, as I argue, is also at the heart of the hypnotic experience.   
As we saw, even in realist fiction “the illusion of reality is created by artistic means, by 
selection, concentration, ordering, webs of images, metaphorization, repetition, stylization,” and 
so on.1519 As J. Hillis Miller notes, although they present themselves as mimesis, they “contain the 
linguistic clues allowing to recognize” their fictionality.1520 In the same way that a “tremendous 
gulf,” as Gombrich writes, “separates the reading of pictures from the sight of the visible world,” 
realist narratives are the product of the “artificiality of art.”1521 To confuse the representation with 
its object and “equate the one with the other,” as Gombrich notes, is to “bar one’s way to the 
 
1519 Furst, 42. 
1520 J. Hillis Miller, “The Fiction of Realism: Sketches by Boz, Oliver Twist and Cruikshank’s Illustrations,” in Dickens 
Centennial Essays, ed. A. Nisbet and B. Nevius (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), 104. 
1521 Gombrich, Art and Illusion, 229; Furst, 42. 
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understanding of representation.”1522 Indeed, as Flaubert famously wrote to Louise Colet, “La 
première qualité de l’Art et son but est l’illusion.”1523  
And indeed, the Balzacian maxim “all is true” should not overshadow nineteenth-century 
novelists’ own awareness of the “artificiality” of their art, even in the case of realism. For instance, 
in “Le Roman”—his 1888 Preface to Pierre et Jean—Maupassant describes the thin, “almost 
invisible” strings which the realist author must “pull” to compose his work.1524 Underlining the 
conventionality and artificiality of the genre, Maupassant writes of the novelist: “He must therefore 
compose his work in a manner so skilled, so concealed, and of such simple appearance, that it is 
impossible to perceive and point out its structure (son plan) and uncover its underlying 
intentions.”1525 Realist authors must: 
make necessary corrections to events and favor verisimilitude at the expense of truth, because sometimes, 
truth is not realistic (vraisemblable) … Art, on the other hand, consists in using precautions and preparations, 
to create subtle and concealed translations, to bring into full light, with mere skill of composition the essential 
elements, and give to all others a suitable degree of relief, depending on their importance, so as to produce a 
deep impression of the special truth which one wants to show. … Producing the effect of truth (faire vrai) 
thus consists in giving the complete illusion of truthfulness. … I conclude from this that talented Realists 
should rather be called Illusionists.1526 
 
1522 Gombrich, Ibid. Gombrich offers examples taken from the visual arts. Perspective, for instance, does not reproduce 
“the appearance of things”; rather, it is a set of conventions that create an illusion by relying on our ingrained 
expectations and assumptions as beholders. For Gombrich, all artistic discoveries are “discoveries not of likeness but 
of equivalences which enable us to see reality in terms of an image and an image in terms of reality. And this 
equivalence never rests on the likeness of elements so much as on the identity of responses to certain relationships.” 
Indeed, “as we scan the flat pigments for answers about the motif ‘out there’, the consistent reading suggests itself 
and illusion takes over. Not … because the world really looks like a flat picture, but because some flat pictures really 
look like the world. … Long before experimental psychology was ever thought of, the artist had devised this 
experiment in reduction and found that the elements of visual experience could be taken to pieces and put together 
again to the point of illusion.” And just as the hypnotic experience implies the subject’s cooperation and transformation 
of utterances into an internal world, “the interpretation of art is the act by which the beholder “collaborate[s] with the 
artist” to “transform a piece of colored canvass into a likeness of the visible world.” For Gombrich, “All 
representations are grounded on schemata which the artist learns to use. …The achievement of the innocent eye … 
turned out to be not only psychologically difficult but logically impossible. The stimulus … is of infinite ambiguity, 
and ambiguity as such … cannot be seen–it can only be inferred by trying different readings that fit the same 
configuration.” Gombrich, 261; 313; 345; 329; 292.  
1523 “The most important quality and aim of art is illusion.” Flaubert, Letter to Louise Colet of September 16, 1853, 
Correspondance, 2: 483.  
1524 “All the threads, so thin, so secret, almost invisible, used by certain modern artists in place of the single string that 
was once called: Plot.” Maupassant, “Le Roman,” (1888) in Pierre et Jean (Paris: Garnier Flammarion, 2018), 14. 
Our translations.  
1525 Maupassant, “Le Roman,” 41.  
1526 Ibid. 16. Maupassant then goes on to describe a worldview which shares similarities with the radical constructivism 
of modern hypnosis: “What childishness, furthermore, to believe in reality since we each carry our own in our thoughts 
and our organs, Our eyes, our ears, our smell, our taste are all different and create as many realities as there are men 
on this earth. And our minds which receive the instructions from our organs, receiving various impressions, 
understand, analyze and judge as is each and every one of us belonged to a different race. Therefore, we all create for 
ourselves an illusion of the world, a poetic, sentimental, joyful, melancholic, dirty or gloomy illusion, depending on 
one’s nature. The writer’s sole mission is thus to faithfully reproduce this illusion with all the artistic means which he 
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Even in realism, then, immersion is dependent on illusion. 1527 As Furst puts it, to recognize realism 
as a set of literary conventions—as does Maupassant—is to liberate it from the “crushing burden 
of mimesis.”1528 Once it is considered as “just another set of conventions,” themselves “no closer 
to ‘the real’ than any other period style,” realism reveals how, like other artistic genres, “its truth 
is that of illusion, not of imitation.”1529 Realism  is not the art of revealing ‘how things are’ but, 
like hypnosis, of “getting the reader involved in the narrated events.”1530 A similar, central paradox 
thus lies at the heart of both hypnosis and the realist aesthetics. As Furst argues, we must: 
avow and accept a certain contradictoriness as a central feature of realism. That contradictoriness surfaces at 
the outset when Balzac proclaims his faith in the realist fiction’s absolute truthfulness by citing a phrase from 
Shakespeare. The paradox of this self-validation must not be forgotten; it represents the crack inherent in the 
texture of realism, which can be overlaid only by readers’ allegiance to “Let’s pretend.”1531 
 
This crack, on which realist fiction is constructed, is both the weakness and the condition of the 
hypnotic—illusionist—experience. However, as I have argued, it is in the reader-subject’s ability 
to “overlay” the crack via active participation in the game of make-believe, that lies the truly 




has learnt and can utilize… Let us not confront any theory, as each of them is simply the generalized expression of a 
temperament which analyzes itself.” Ibid.  
1527 See also: “recognition of credibility [not so much lifelikeness as lifeliveliness].” Northrop Frye, “Myth, Fiction, 
and Displacement,” in Fables of Identity (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1963), 29. 
1528 Furst, All is True, 23. For her, the strategies and “overt and covert signals emitted by the text” allow us to “extricate 
realism from the quagmire of mimesis” Ibid., 16. Ryan  even points out that “the ‘reality effect’ of nineteenth-century 
fiction is achieved by the least natural, most ostentatiously fictional of narrative techniques, such as omniscient 
narration, free indirect discourse, variable focalization,” all of which “presuppose morphing narrators whose 
manifestations oscillate between embodied, opinionated human beings and invisible recording devices.” Ryan, 
Narrative as Virtual Reality, 159 
1529 Ryan, Ibid., 159.; Furst, 16. Using the example of the nineteenth-century belief in causality, as opposed to the 
twentieth-century conception of reality as “ungraspable,” Ryan also reminds us that “every period has a different view 
of reality and every stylistic innovation is made in the name of this interpretation.” Ibid., 160 Nelson Goodman also 
notes that realism involves not resemblance but of ease of decoding and depends on the reader or spectator’s familiarity 
with a certain set of representational techniques. Goodman, “Reality Remade,” 293, in Ryan, Ibid. 
1530 Ryan, 161. In fact, Ryan  even points out that “the ‘reality effect’ of nineteenth-century fiction is achieved by the 
most ostentatiously fictional of narrative techniques—such as omniscient narration, free indirect discourse, and 
variable focalization—all of which “presuppose morphing narrators whose manifestations oscillate between 
embodied, opinionated human beings and invisible recording devices.” Ryan, 159.  
1531 Furst, All is True, 47. 
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3.3. The Literary Dimension of Hypnosis 
 
You are the music / While the music lasts 
—T.S. Eliot, 1969. 
 
In the previous section, I discussed the hypnotic dimension of literary discourse, by 
underlining the immersive, yet conventional, dimension of the aesthetic and realist illusions. In the 
last section of this chapter, I will explore its mirror opposite—the literary dimension of hypnotic 
discourse—by underlining the poetic dimension of hypnotic utterances. While I temporarily 
extend my analogy beyond novelistic prose and include poetry into my scope of inquiry, I do so 
to underline the literariness of hypnosis, as opposed to non-literary forms such as the philosophical 
text, historical treatise, or journalistic essay. Once the poetic dimension of hypnosis discourse has 
been established, in Chapter 4, I will narrow down my claim once again, to draw out the similarities 
between hypnotic and specifically novelistic forms of narration.  
 
3.3.1. The Poiesis of Hypnotic Discourse  
 
In 1929, the Prague School claimed that language “has either a communicative function, 
that is, it is directed toward the signified, or a poetic function, that is, it is directed toward the sign 
itself.”1532 Furthermore, according to Jakobson’s famous definition of the poetic function of 
language, “poeticalness is not a supplementation of discourse with rhetorical adornment but a total 
re-evaluation of the discourse and all its components whatsoever.”1533 Can similar definitions 
 
1532 Cercle Linguistique de Prague, 1929, 14, in Pratt. As Pratt notes, the “devaluation” of ordinary language is used 
by literary authors themselves, who proclaim the superiority of poetic discourse. For example, Valery describes 
“everyday language” as a “medium essentially practical, perpetually changing, soiled, a maid of all work.” Paul 
Valéry, “Poetry and Abstract Thought,” 81, emphasis added. Similarly, Mallarmé describes ordinary communication 
or speech as “no more than a commercial approach to reality.” Mallarmé, “Crisis in Poetry,” 41. Rilke claims that 
“The poet’s task is increased by the strange obligation to set apart his word from the words of everyday life thoroughly 
and fundamentally. No word in a poem is identical with the same-sounding word in common use and conversation… 
the constellation it occupies in verse or artistic prose, changes it to the core of its nature, renders it useless, 
unserviceable for mere everyday use, untouchable and permanent.” Rilke, “Letter to Countess Margo Sizzo-Crouz,” 
trans. E. Rennie, in Selected Letters (New York: Double Day, 1960). 
326. 
1533 Jakobson, “Linguistics and Poetics,” 376-77. For Jakobson, despite its lack of poeticity, novelistic prose represents 
“a transitional linguistic area… between strictly poetic and strictly referential language.” Jakobson, Ibid.  
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illuminate the workings of hypnotic discourse? That is, can the latter be considered as a form of 
poetic discourse, or if not—as Jakobson thought of novelistic prose—an in-between between 
purely “referential” ordinary communicative language, and “strictly poetic” language?  
In an article titled “How to Use Ericksonian Approaches,” psychiatrist Richard Van Dyck 
points out the “stylistic and aesthetic qualities” in Erickson’s work, which according to him 
participate in constituting therapy “into an art.”1534 Although Van Dyck claims these aesthetic 
qualities “are not indispensable for a satisfactory outcome in treatment,” for him, they indicate a 
“clear departure from earlier unsophisticated methods which sought to eliminate symptoms by 
direct and repetitious suggestion.”1535 Indeed, like literary texts, hypnotic language pays close 
attention to the form, rather than the explicit message, of what it strives to express. Hypnotic 
discourse is founded on the premise that imaginatively evocative language is more powerful than 
explicit, paraphrasable content. A defining aspect of hypnotic communication is that its form 
affects and determines its content. As I will argue in what follows, in the sense that they are 
unparaphrasable, hypnotic propositions make use of what may be considered an aesthetic use of 
language.1536 
 
3.3.1.1.  Musicality 
 
The first aspect that comes to mind when the poetic dimension of hypnotic discourse is 
brought up, is the musical and rhythmic qualities involved in the traditional, trance-inducing 
aspects of hypnosis—which also justify the comparison between versified poetry and hypnosis. 
As we saw in Chapter 1, not only has music accompanied hypnosis since the time of Mesmer and 
his glass harmonica, hypnotic rapport itself, was conceptualized with the lexical field of harmony. 
Even in its modern definition—that is, when it refers to the hypnotist’s ability to adapt his or her 
linguistic and communicative strategies to the individuality and uniqueness of the subject1537—
rapport is frequently described with tropes pertaining to the musical universe.  
 
1534 Van Dyck, “How to Use Ericksonian Approaches,” 43. See also:  therapy is “an art in itself.” Haley, “The 
Contribution to Therapy of Milton H. Erickson,” 18. 
1535 Van Dyck, Ibid., 43-44. 
1536 See Martha Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 16.  
1537 Just as for Iser, “each text constitutes its own reader.” Iser, The Act of Reading, 157. In Ericksonian models, each 
hypnotic relation is conceived of as unique: “a hypnotic induction need[s] to vary with the type of person the hypnotist 
was, the nature of the subject, and the particular situation.” Haley, “The Contribution,” 16. See also: “every time we 
open the pages of another piece of writing, we are embarked on a new adventure in which we become a new person… 
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Indeed, the utilizational approaches found in modern, permissive hypnosis show strong 
similarities with the qualities involved in musical cooperation, especially in the context of 
improvisational music: 
He [the operator] freely admits that he does not know exactly which path will lead to the desired state ... But 
he does know that he can get “in tune” with the subject, thereby establishing a rhythmic, continuous feedback 
loop on which one closely observes, accepts and utilizes the subject’s ongoing response. In this sort of 
interaction, the trek toward the desired state unfolds in a nonlinear, spiral-like fashion.1538  
 
Induction is a process in which the hypnotist uses his body as a musical instrument, tuning it to get into 
rhythm with the “behavioral dance” of the subject.1539 
 
The hypnotist synchronizes himself with the subject, accepting and utilizing any material … much like an 
improvisational musician.1540 
 
In this sense, as Gilligan argues, “there really is no such thing as resistance in a utilization 
approach.”1541 Indeed, “resistance” is but a “message” signaling that the operator is “out of tune” 
 
We assume, for the sake of the experience, the set of attitudes and qualities which the language asks us to assume.” 
Gibson, 1980, 1, in Gerrig. 
1538 Gilligan, “Ericksonian Approaches,” 90, emphasis added. The image of musical “tuning” (which is not innate to 
the musician but can be acquired via technique) brings hypnosis close to theater once more: as the therapist effaces 
himself and adopts a variation of roles depending on the case at hand, he or she uses “the self in a wide range of ways 
from being authoritative to being helpless.” Haley, “The Contribution,” 13. The main resource of nineteenth-century 
and authoritative models of hypnosis (the power or authority of the operator) thus counts as one role–or therapeutic 
strategy–among many: as in literary texts, play has taken the place once occupied by the “center” that was the author. 
Indeed, Jay Haley notes the extreme flexibility involved in the utilization approach and how Erickson “expected a 
therapist to have an actor’s control of his own use of body movement and vocal intonation.” Haley, Ibid. 
1539 Gilligan, 101, emphasis added. 
1540 Erickson and Rossi, Hypnotherapy, An Exploratory Casebook (New York: Irvington Publishers, 1979), 32. See 
also Derrida’s interview of Ornette Coleman, in which reading is compared to free jazz improvisation: “The very 
concept of improvisation verges upon reading, since what we often understand by improvisation is the creation of 
something new, yet something which doesn't exclude the pre-written framework that makes it possible… Repetition 
is already in improvisation: thus when people want to trap you between improvisation and the pre-written, they are 
wrong.” Derrida, “Jacques Derrida Interviews Ornette Coleman,” 323. For descriptions by free-jazz musicians of the 
similarities between improvisation and the state of hypnosis, see also: “If you’re doing it right there is hypersensitivity 
and hyperawareness of all sound that is coming in and feeds the improviser’s output… Often, one is often in a state 
of heightened vulnerability and the self ceases to matter… the watcher and doer disappear. In free improvisation… I 
sometimes mimic, sometimes follow, sometimes ignore, but it’s always going through me and being filtered, always 
being honored. One needs a very high degree of technical familiarity with one’s instrument, and to be in a state of 
highly attuned awareness. Many of the improvisors whom I have played with in my life unfortunately don’t seem to 
be playing with the other musicians as much as they are playing for the audience.” J. Gilgore, alto saxophonist, 
personal communication, 2018. See also: “Improvisation is not the art of making up, it is the art of emptying oneself 
of all preset ideas, not making up music but just praying and attempting to live a life in the spirit…. it’s order being 
inside you. The poet is born from this concept, it is not about art or music, it is about the vision of life without war 
and starvation and all the things that make us less human. We step on flowers and do not feel them. Every day we are 
stepping on some kind of flower, crushing it, asking it to grow on our terms, instead of allowing it to grow on its own.” 
William Parker, Who Owns Music, trans. R. Da Rin (Köln: Buddy's Knife Jazzed Edition, 2007). 
1541 Gilligan, 92. 
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and needs to “synchronize” himself—behaviorally or verbally—with the subject, using the 
“resistance” to his advantage.1542  
In addition to operating as a metaphor to describe hypnotic rapport, musicality is also 
involved in the very form of hypnotic utterance. Indeed, some excerpts from hypnotic inductions 
are indistinguishable from poetic verse when taken out of context, as is the following passages 
taken from an Ericksonian induction: 
 
In my voice you can hear/  
The whispering wind, /  
The rustle of leaves./ 
(Pause)  
And then my voice becomes that of some neighbor/  




You get the feel of a poem/ 
the feeling of a picture/ 
the feeling of a statue/ 
we do not just feel with the fingers.1544 
 
Significantly, these passages are annotated as such (in “verse” form, with the sign / in 
between clauses) in the manual in which they are published, and could very well be read as poetry 
by Stanley Fish’s students in Is There a Text in This Class?1545  
If one adopts a formalist conception of poetic discourse such as those used by the Prague 
school, which assume that “rhythmic organization is alien to non-literary discourse and can thus 
be taken as a distinctive feature of the poetic language,” then hypnosis and poetry no longer seem 
like absolutely heterogenous and unrelated forms of language.1546 For instance, if one follows Osip 
 
1542 Ibid.  
1543 Erickson, Hypnotic Realities, 91. 
1544 Ibid., 252. 
1545 See Stanley Fish, Is There a Text in This Class? The Authority of Interpretive Communities. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1980. 
1546 Pratt, Toward a Speech Act Theory, 13. 
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Brik’s definition of verse in terms of the interaction of rhythm and syntax, a hypnotic induction 
can be considered as a form of poetic discourse: 
Verse … is regulated by the laws of rhythmic syntax, that is, a syntax in which the usual syntactic laws are 
complicated by rhythmic requirements… The very fact that a certain number of words coexist with the two 
sets of laws constitutes the peculiarity of poetry.1547 
 
Based exclusively on formal criteria, the poetic-nonpoetic language distinction—which would 
“view style as an exclusively or predominantly literary phenomenon” and “equate style outside 
literature with mere grammaticality and conventional appropriateness”—would have to include 
hypnotic discourse into the category of the poetic.1548   
Conversely, in his 1930 study titled Hypnotic Poetry, Edward D. Snyder classifies poems 
into two opposed categories, distinguishing “intellectualist poems” on the one hand and “hypnotic” 
or “spell weaving poems” on the other.1549 In the latter, “hypnotic” sort, one finds a “soothing 
rhythmic monotony” and “a certain kind of rhyme” which put listeners “into a light state of trance” 
when “read aloud under favorable conditions.”1550 As they fall into “poetic trance,” their 
“emotional sensitiveness” then “grows more and more, sometimes reaching the point of 
ecstasy.”1551 Significantly, this is due to the fact that listeners have their attention “drawn to the 
sound rather than the sense” of the poem.1552  
For Snyder, the hypnotic dimension of poetry is caused “pleasing” formal traits and 
“dreamy and harmonious” sounds—such as the repetition of pleasant liquids and nasals—and to 
 
1547 Osip Brik, 1927, 121-122, quoted in Pratt, Ibid. 
1548 Pratt, Ibid., 15. 
1549 Snyder, Hypnotic Poetry; A Study of Trance Inducing Technique in Certain Poems and its Literary Significance 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1930). Snyder’s early twentieth century notion of hypnosis, which 
he conceives as a former of stupor and opposes to “mental alertness,” appears as conservative and antiquated to the 
modern permissive practitioner. His criteria for the “poetic” and contextual requirements for the hypnotic reception to 
occur are extremely narrow. For instance, for him free verse—which he describes as “the unorganized product of an 
undisciplined mind”—is too irregular to “fix the attention on a sound pattern and deaden mental alertness.” Snyder, 
69; 114. Although he insists in the importance of reciting or reading out loud, he does concede that a “silent yet 
auditing” reading of a poem can “produce a state of light trance.” He also notes a similar transference of hypnotic or 
“power” from the author to the reader a in Plato’s Ion: “we should find little interest in the ‘inspired trance’ of the 
poet unless he had the power to put his readers into something of a trance.” Snyder, 35; 21. 
1550 Snyder, 26; 17; 22. As examples of hypnotic poems, Snyder mentions the iambic opening of Coleridge’s Kubla 
Kahn, Annabel Lee, “the popular ballads rich with incremental repetition, in the majestic blank verse soliloquies of 
Marlowe and Shakespeare, in the grandest passages of Milton. One feels its soothing dignity in Gray’s Elegy and its 
potent malignity in the curse of his Bard. One finds it again in the lilting melodies of Burns’s lyrics, and on throughout 
the golden pages of nineteenth-century poetry. It still lives today [in the 1930s] in the most effective passages of 
Kipling and Noyes.” Snyder, 156.  
1551 Ibid., 31. 
1552 Ibid., 42. 
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trance-inducing patterns of rhythm, rime, refrain, etc.1553 In other words, hypnotic and poetic 
efficacy are associated with classical aesthetic norms of regularity and harmony, and to the fact 
that the poet uses “the very highest artistry to satisfy the ear.”1554 
Snyder’s depiction of hypnotic rhythm as “soothing monotony,” however, is highly 
reductive. Indeed, in modern hypnosis, the operator introduces multiple moments of variation, 
silence, acceleration and deceleration, which are dictated by the pace of the subject. In a process 
called “cross-behavioral pacing and leading” for instance, the operator synchronizes one of his 
behavioral parameters (such as the rhythm of his or her breathing, or the tonal inflection in his or 
her voice), to match a parameter of the subject.1555 In this way, both individuals form a rhythmic 
duo that evolves in improvised unity, and makes room for a wide diversity of inflections. 
Paying special attention to the rhythm of delivery, the operator uses dynamics of “pacing” 
(that is, following or mirroring) and “leading,” to create a suggestive push-pull effect in the 
communication situation. When the hypnotist stops mirroring the subject and begins to “lead” or 
influence the rhythm of the “duo,” he or she should be able to shift between a “quick tempo” and 
“dramatically reduce it to create contrast,” to “master his tone” and speak “meaningfully, 
impressively, congruently,” quietly, softly or authoritatively, etc., depending on the desired 
effect.1556  
 
1553 Ibid., 52; 75. 
1554 Ibid., 52. 
1555 Gilligan, “Ericksonian Approaches,” 91. For example, every time the subject breathes out, the tonal inflection of 
the operator goes down. This process is a specific form of a more general process of mirroring which aims to first 
reflect back the subject’s nonverbal and paraverbal communication before beginning to insert modifications into them. 
“Control” of the subject is thus not achieved via coercion but indirectly, by (re)directing their attention in order to 
allow suggestions to be accepted and enacted. Another example is the “interspersal technique” with which suggestions 
are “planted,” usually with a slightly different tone of voice and “in the form of a truism,” within the broader context 
of a general conversation “about a topic which the patient can easily identify with.” The therapist then “quickly moves 
on” to the general conversation “before the patient can react to the suggestion. The same is done with embedded 
stories:  a series of four or five nested stories is begun, with a central suggestion placed in the middle, before the series 
of nested stories is “closed.” This usually results in an amnesia: the suggestion is often forgotten because of the 
cognitive overload involved in following the thread of the embedded narratives. Pacing and leading are furthermore 
merely technical aspects of the more general implementation of hypnotic rapport, in which the hypnotist himself goes 
into an “externally-oriented trance” and observes the subject so closely that “the sole contents of the hypnotist’s 
consciousness are the subject’s behavior rather than the internal imagery that normally pervades thinking processes.” 
This form of close attention therefore produces “a paradoxical state in which the hypnotist simultaneously experiences 
complete rapport with the subject and an observational detachment from the interaction.” Gilligan, 91-93. The 
necessity for the operator to be in trance rather than operate solely from rational and analytic thought is often 
encouraged: “to enjoy skiing and truly master the art… you must learn to integrate your movements with your 
changing perceptions at speeds too fast for the conscious mind.” Paul Carter, “Rapport and Integrity for Ericksonian 
Practitioners,” in Zeig (ed.), Ericksonian Approaches, 48. 
1556 Ibid., 100. 
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When necessary, the operator can also produce a purposefully monotonous enumeration, 
at the end of which a suggestion is placed, in order to create a contrast, to highlight the final clause. 
A frequent example of this technique consists in enumerating “ratifications” (lists of short and 
“direct descriptions” of the immediate environment or the subject’s behavior) to create assent, 
before introducing a suggestion at the end. For example:  
You’re sitting there   
You’re looking at me  
You’re breathing in and out 
Eyes blinking 
and you shift in your chair 
and you can begin to shift in a comfortable state of relaxation [final suggestion].1557   
 
This type of sensitivity to rhythm can be found in literary texts, including novels. In Anna 
Karenina, for example, one finds a passage that presents a similar, rhythmic use of enumeration 
(which I am purposefully transcribing with the same typographic disposition as the hypnotic 
inductions cited above): 
Further on it was all the same;  
the same jolting and knocking,  
the same snow on the window,  
the same quick transitions from steaming heat to cold and back to heat,  
the same lashing of the same faces in the semi-darkness,  
and the same voices,  
and Anna began to read and understand what she was reading [final “suggestion”].1558 
 
In the context of a hypnotic interaction, this passage would correspond to an inductive loop, where 
rhythm is used strategically—the lulling effect and repetition of the “ratifications” and of the term 
“same” leading to the culmination in a final suggestion, for the subject to “read and understand 
 
1557 Gilligan, Ibid., 90. The last clause is not a description, but a suggestion, which gives an order, disguised as a 
description. Placed at the end of the enumeration and “blended in” with the conjunction “and,” the suggestion is 
supposedly accepted more readily and made less visible.  
1558 Tolstoy, Anna Karenina, 100. Here, not only is the rhythm of the paragraph reminiscent of the pace that the 
operator might use, its very construction matches the basis structure of an inductive loop in which the operator 
enumerates a series of ratifications, that culminate in a suggestion which, at the end of the enumeration which 
multiplied instances of the subject’s assent (“yes there is jolting and knocking,” “yes there is snow out the window,” 
etc.), is more likely to go unnoticed and be accepted. Most strikingly, the introduction of the suggestion via the 
conjunction “and,” (serving to imply a causal connection while masking the fact that it is merely one of contiguity or 
juxtaposition), is one of the key elements of such inductive loops.   
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what they are reading.” Here also, an implicit command would be disguised as description. As this 
example shows, not only do hypnotic and literary discourse share similar formal properties, their 
literariness or hypnotic effect also depends, as we argued earlier in the chapter, on the context in 
which they are received. 
As I have argued here, hypnotic uses of language resemble literary ones with their 
sensitivity to the effects of pacing and rhythm on the awareness of the recipient. The felicity of 
hypnotic utterances depends on the recipient’s activity, but also on the operator’s awareness—and 
use—of “stylistic” elements that are often considered as being characteristic of poetic 
discourse.1559   
 
3.3.1.2.  Suggestive Language 
             
In modern indirect hypnosis, because “commands” are introduced covertly rather than 
explicitly or authoritatively, close attention is payed to the suggestive power of language, which, 
as we will see in what follows, refers in this context, both to the “metaphorical” and to the 
“manipulative” dimensions of language.  
Beyond its “poetic” dimension in the formalist sense, hypnotic language can also be said 
to resemble literary discourse in four distinct manners: in its strategic, narrative, metaphorical (or 
connotative) and ambiguous (or disorienting) uses of language.  
 
Strategic Communication 
Rather than transparent, modern hypnosis is a strategic, form of communication. It 
frequently uses the power of linguistic implication to guide the subject’s behavior in a desired 
direction, or simply as an inductive method. This requires paying attention to the implicit 
connotations of individual terms—such as when the operator might purposefully use the verb “try 
 
1559 The operator’s adaptation to the subject’s world view also involves paying detailed attention to lexical fields and 
choice of words. For instance, the operator selects his or her vocabulary to fit the preferred sensory modalities of the 
subject: “When the client specifies he doesn’t see how to overcome his difficulty” for example, Erickson would 
“package his verbal communication with visually oriented verbs and nouns like ‘clear,’ ‘picture,’ ‘focus’ or ‘bright’. 
If the client says there is no harmony in his marriage, E would utilize auditory packaging phrases such as ‘tune-in’, 
‘hear’, ‘listen’… or ‘amplify’. Kinesthetically based words include ‘touch, relax, comfort, sit, hold, grasp, feel, 
embrace, solid, and grip’. Most important …. is judicious packaging… for each client’s individual framework.” 
Stephen R. Lankton, “The Occurrence and Use of Trance Phenomena in Nonhypnotic Therapies.” In Ericksonian 
Approaches to Hypnosis, 135. 
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to” whenever he wishes the subject to fail at a specific task, because it implies the idea of “a block, 
a difficulty” rather than ease or success.  
On the level of the proposition, presuppositions by implication are one of the most 
frequently used hypnotic tools, whenever the operator wants to help a subject succeed at a given 
task.1560 In each case, the subject’s attention is diverted: it is invited to focus on less important 
elements while the main—suggested—element recedes into the background, and is more readily 
accepted. In this way, the subject can be held to a task by subtle directives and implications while 
maintaining “a very great subjective feeling of freedom of choice.”1561 
The most common form of presuppositions used by modern hypnotists are “binds” (which 
present a “free” choice between two or more comparable alternatives, but where all choices count 
as a “valid” reaction)1562 and “double-binds” (in which the operator makes a statement while 
simultaneously commenting on it on a higher, “meta-level” of communication).1563 Reminiscent 
of post-modern or eighteenth century metanarrative comments made by novelistic narrators, 
hypnotic double-binds aim to “confuse the subjects’ conscious mind and thus depotentiate their 
habitual sets, biases and learned limitations. Under these circumstances the field is cleared for the 
possibility of creative processes to express themselves.”1564 
 
1560 For example, the utterance “I don’t know which hand will lift first” implies that one of them will; the utterance 
“before you go into trance, you ought to be comfortable” implies that they will do so; when Erickson tells a volunteer 
who is walking onto a stage: “Don’t enter trance / until/ you sit all the way down/ in that chair/. There,” his utterance 
implies that if they sit in the chair, they accept the act of going into trance, etc. Erickson, Hypnotic Realities, 118. 
Other examples include “would you like to experience a light, medium or deep trance?”; “would you like to go into 
trance sitting up or lying down / quickly or slowly?”; “do you begin to experience numbness in the fingers or the back 
of the hand first?”; “What part of the body begins to feel most X (warm, cool, heavy, etc.). Ibid., 64. 
1561 Erickson, Hypnotic Realities, 11. 
1562 Indeed, “whichever choice leads behavior in a desired direction” (Rossi, 62); and “whatever they do tends to 
propel them further into the hypnotic situation of following suggestions.” Erickson, Hypnotic Realities, 77. 
1563 Rossi, Hypnotic Realities, 62. See Bakhtin: “We acutely sense two levels at each moment in the story; one, the 
level of the narrator, a belief system filled with his objects, meanings and emotional expressions, and the other, the 
level of the author, who speaks (albeit in a refracted way) by means of this story and through this story.” Mikhail 
Bakhtin, “Discourse in the Novel” (1931), in The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, trans. C. Emerson and M. 
Holquist (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981), 314. See also Gregory Currie, for whom the fictional author can 
engage simultaneously in acts of assertion and fiction making and who “may intend his audience to believe what he 
says and also intend that the audience (perhaps a different audience) will take the attitude of make-believe toward 
what he says.” Currie 35. In both literature and hypnosis, a single utterance can be intended to have simultaneous, yet 
distinct meanings and “addressees.” Furthermore, modern hypnosis uses “allusions, puns, metaphors, implications,” 
because they are usually not grasped immediately by consciousness: there is a momentary delay before one ‘gets’ a 
joke, and in part, what is funny about it.” Rossi, Hypnotic Realities, 228. It addresses itself to the unconscious mind, 
and is reminiscent of the parable or riddle in that their meaning, morality or resolution are often purposefully 
ambiguous or founded on paradoxes and apparent contradictions. 
1564 Erickson, Hypnotic Realities, 70. In “Conscious-Unconscious double binds” or “Double-dissociation double 
binds,” the action is performed by the unconscious while the conscious may mind remains inactive, unaware, or even 




As I will argue in more detail in Chapter 4, both hypnosis and literature also make heavy 
use of the narrative mode. A hypnotherapy session and novel can be thought to have in common a 
similar telos or necessity which drives them onwards, towards a resolution—often of an internal 
conflict.1565 In this sense, the hypnotic session may be conceived as following a narrative arc, 
similar to the structure of a novel.  
Furthermore, like most brief-therapies, modern hypnosis relies on the therapeutic value of 
“re-storying”—of retelling and redirecting one’s life narrative—and on the art of “reframing”—of 
illuminating a present situation under a different aspect, which usually allows its problematic 
dimension to dissolve.1566  
Hypnotherapy also frequently makes use of fictional narratives to get therapeutic messages 
across in a more fluid and indirect manner. The operator will dissimulate indirect suggestions in 
seemingly unrelated case histories (real or invented), stories and anecdotes.1567 Even when such 
narratives are “minimal,” they conserve their “literary” dimension, as is the case for natural 
 
but you do not need to awaken as a body (Pause)” or “You can awaken when your body awakes but without a 
recognition of your body” might be experiencing the impression of leaving body, the appearance or hallucination of 
bodily distortion, etc. In the following case: “You can write that material without knowing what it is/ then/ you can 
go back and discover you know what it is without knowing you’ve done it,” the response could be automatic writing, 
followed by amnesia upon reading, etc. Erickson, Hypnotic Realities, 48; 69; 71. Similarly, Erickson often “offers” 
suggestions in an open-ended manner that admits many possibilities of response as acceptable: “suggestions are 
offered in such a manner that any response the patient makes can be accepted as a valid hypnotic phenomenon.” Rossi 
in Hypnotic Realities, 48. In this way, it is extremely difficult for such suggestions to be rejected by the subject: they 
are “infallible” or the subject cannot fail at them, because of their openness. For example, to create hand catalepsy, 
various options will be evoked so as to broaden the possibilities of success for the subject “Your arm will feel entirely 
comfortable/ at ease/ or it may lose all feeling/ or it may develop a wooden feeling,/ a feeling of not being your arm/ 
I’d like to have you interested in discovering your way of handling that arm (pause).” Erickson, Hypnotic Realities, 
98. 
1565 See Aristotle. However, as notes in the improvisational music analogy, in hypnosis the path is not prewritten, and 
the resolution must come from the subject. Paradoxically, some operators use hypnotic scripts: formulaic mechanical 
applications of predetermined stories, for therapeutic use. This type of method brings hypnotherapy closer to the 
standardized method, which is less successful than an individualized, tailored, utilizational approach.  
1566 See for instance M. Erickson, Life Reframing in Hypnosis, ed. E. Rossi and M. O. Ryan. (New York: Irvington 
Publishers, 1992). See also: “The classic case is Tom Sawyer, forced to spend a tedious day whitewashing the 
fence…soon being paid by other children for the ‘opportunity’ to do his work for him.” Beahrs, “Understanding 
Erickson’s Approach,”72. See also Ryan, about computer simulations, which like hypnotic narratives “have nothing 
to do with deception; they are not supposed to re-present what is but explore what could be; and are usually produced 
for the sake of their heuristic value. … To simulate, in this case, is to test a model of the world.” Ryan, Narrative as 
Virtual Reality, 63. 
1567 Storytelling and anecdotes are also used as induction tools. For example, while his patient Dr. S is asked to focus 
on a spot, Erickson “talks about kindergarten and learning, imagery and comfort, the abilities of the unconscious and 
some alterations of the blink reflex,” constructing a conversational induction “so innocuous and indirect that it is often 
difficult to recognize that trance is being induced.” Rossi, Hypnotic Realities, 5.   
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narratives examined by William Labov.1568 Indeed, “all the problems of coherence, chronology, 
causality, foregrounding, plausibility, selection of detail, tense, point of view and emotional 
intensity exist for the natural narrator just as they do for the novelist.”1569  
 
Metaphorical, Connotative and Evocative Language 
However, the multi-level communication device which brings hypnotic discourse closest 
to poetic language is not its strategic or narrative uses of language (which are also present in non-
literary discourse), but rather, its metaphorical—and connotative—use.  
Indeed, while scientific discourse aspires to denotation, hypnotic and literary discourse 
both “thrive on the associations latent in words” and the connotative power of poetic language.1570 
Roustang thus argues that hypnotic metaphors and images have a “stronger” therapeutic impact 
than pure analytic interpretations: “Images which are infinitely richer than all interpretation. … 
The power of the imagination, of the single image, when it sums up the complexity of a relation 
to the world.”1571 
Even though in scientific texts, “context itself instructs readers not to attend” to the 
connotative dimension of language, “rhetoric and attitudinal coloring are inevitable conditions of 
all language… Language is a powerfully committing medium to work in. It does not allow us to 
 
1568 See also:  a minimal narrative is “a sequence of two clauses which are temporally ordered.” William Labov, 
Language in the Inner City (University Park: University of Pennsylvania Press 1972), 360. See also Pratt: “if it weren’t 
for the fact that his [Labov]’s data are not literature, Labov’s analysis could have provided valuable linguistic support 
for the Formalists’ idea about the aesthetic organization of narrative.” Pratt, 68. 
1569 Pratt, 66. Modern hypnotic discourse also has a quasi-intertextual or dialogic dimension, as it integrates foreign 
discourses (quotations, commentaries, parody, allusion, imitation, ironic transformation, de/recontextualizing of 
elements, puns, analogies, folk-language, etc.) into its narratives.   
1570 Furst, All is True, 149. 
1571 Roustang, Qu’est-ce que l’hypnose?, 52. As an example of the therapeutic potential of hypnosis to transform the 
subject’s relation to their past, Roustang describes a case history of a patient whose identity is constructed on passivity, 
victimhood, lack of responsibility and complaint: “Throughout his life, he expected to be pitied” (“Toute sa vie il 
attend d’être plaint”). Roustang used hypnotic regression to bring back the memory of the subject as little boy, standing 
at the foot of his mother’s casket, with all eyes on him. The child is held up so he can see, which he experiences as 
being "like a god shown to the crowd… he is but the result of those eyes staring at him” (“Il n’est plus que le résultat 
de ces yeux portés sur lui.” Under hypnosis, the patient then relives the scene, focusing this time on his mother, not 
the audience, and imagines himself addressing her: “I will not forget you but I will live my own life, with this suffering 
as the soil in which my life will grow.” As Roustang then notes: Here lies the decision, the remolding of one’s relation 
to the past, a reorientation in the world: an act which re-writes the story/history” (“Là est la décision, une refonte du 
rapport au passé, une réorientation dans le monde” : un acte qui réécrit l’histoire”). This re-imagination is of course 
not a modification of the memory itself, but the permission given by subject to himself to inaugurate the end of the 
mourning period. Ibid., 51. 
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‘say something’ without conveying an attitude to that something.” 1572 As Genette notes, “what the 
statement says is always in some way doubled, accompanied by the manner in which it is said, and 
the most transparent manner is still a manner.”1573  
Although in modern hypnotherapy, tremendous emphasis is placed on the value of 
therapeutic “metaphors,” the term is not used in the sense in which Jakobson banished realism 
from the realm of the metaphorical and the poetic. For instance, as Steven Heller notes, in the 
therapeutic context:  
All presenting problems and symptoms are really metaphors that contain a story about what the problem 
really is. It is, therefore, the responsibility of the therapist to create metaphors that contain a story that contains 
the (possible) solutions. The metaphor is the message. … Hypnosis is, in and of itself, a metaphor within a 
metaphor.1574   
 
In hypnotherapy, the term “metaphor” refers to an analogy—established in the operator’s 
speech or therapeutic strategy—between the client’s symptom or problem and an exterior element 
which illuminates it under a new aspect. In the therapeutic setting, metaphors are often embedded 
in “isomorphic” anecdotes, which present similar formal or structural elements with the identified 
“target context.” For example, a seemingly unrelated anecdote about farming will be used to 
address a developmental difficulty, and so on. 1575 Significantly, to be therapeutically effective, 
not only does this isomorphism not need to be obvious, it is preferable that the relations between 
the elements connected in the analogy go unnoticed: “when the nature of the isomorphism is not 
readily available to conscious awareness … arises the possibility of having a therapeutic impact 
without the client’s conscious understanding of the process.”1576 The primary function of hypnotic 
 
1572 Ibid., 151; Roger Fowler, Linguistics and the Novel (London: Methuen, 1977), 75 For Jakobson, “realist discourse, 
at least by implication, is relegated to a lesser status as not possessing the poetic quality of metaphor.” Ibid., 161.  
1573 “Le style… reste lié à ces effets de sens seconds que la linguistique nomme des connotations. Ce que dit l’énoncé 
est toujours en quelque sorte doublé, accompagné par ce que dit la manière, et la manière la plus transparente est 
encore une manière.” (“Style… remains linked to those secondary sense effects that linguists call connotations. What 
the statement says is always in some way doubled, accompanied by the manner in which it is said, and the most 
transparent manner is still a manner”) Genette, “La littérature et l’espace, ” in Figures II (Paris : Éditions du Seuil, 
1969), 47. The operator can be considered as applying Genette’s formulation literally, simultaneously addressing, via 
the connotative power of language, two distinct “levels” in the subject, and focusing mainly on the form, rather than 
merely the content, of his suggestions. 
1574 Steven Heller, Monsters and Magical Sticks, 51. 
1575 Erickson’s case histories provide numerous illustrations of this process, constructing anecdotes that often draw 
analogies between therapeutic elements (symptoms, problems and solutions), and elements taken from the natural 
realm (drought, death, plants, growth, walking, etc.) 
1576 Ibid., 116. 
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metaphors is thus to evoke and work-through problems indirectly, without mentioning them in an 
explicit manner.1577  
In “Ericksonian Anecdotal Therapy,” David Gordon thus defines a hypnotic metaphor as 
“a story or anecdote that is capable of accessing in its listener an intended content area, without 
the content being explicitly identified,” leading to a change of perspective which is “usually 
attributed to the inherent virtues of the analogy or resolution … in the metaphor.”1578 Hypnotic 
metaphors are “special opportunities to learn within the particular analogical environment created 
by the storyteller.”  In this sense, they are the tools of indirect and implicit communication par 
excellence.  
Because they are often purposely vague, general or ambiguous, they have the undeniable 
advantage of “provid[ing] the substance from which its listener is free to carve whatever 
understanding he or she finds consciously or unconsciously appropriate.”1579 In any case, hypnotic 
metaphors are based on the acknowledgment that we relate to the world in metaphorical ways, 
seeing beyond what we perceive, constantly injecting meaning into the elements around us, as in 
a literary text.1580 
In addition to therapeutic metaphors, hypnosis uses a variety of other indirect techniques, 
including “evocation,” which essentially corresponds to the literary maxim, “show don’t tell.” 
Based on the assumption that a detailed description of a phenomenon will create a related 
phenomenon or state in the subject—for example, describing heaviness will create a similar 
sensation in one of the subject’s limbs, describing instances of forgetting will encourage amnesia, 
and so on—this technique presupposes that an indirect evocation is less likely to fail than a direct 
suggestion, especially when facing a subject’s resistance.1581  
 
1577 The presupposition here is that excessively direct and frontal modes of communication creates resistance in the 
subject. 
1578 David Gordon, “Ericksonian Anecdotal Therapy,” in Ericksonian Approaches, 113. 
1579 Ibid., 114. 
1580 Gombrich notes that imagination and creation of metaphor is part of our “twin nature, poised between animality 
and rationality.” Gombrich, Art and Illusion, 103. Indeed: “To our emotion, a window can be an eye and a jug can 
have a mouth; it is our reason which insists on the difference between the narrower class of the real and the wider 
class of the metaphorical, the barrier between image and reality.” Ibid., 104. In her study of place in the realist novel, 
Furst has also noted that “metaphoricity is innate to the landscape of consciousness insofar as it presents a view of a 
place in its relation to the persona and/or the action.” Furst, All is True, 141. 
1581 To suggest amnesia, the operator might for example evoke the process of losing or forgetting: “it’s a very 
remarkable thing/ that you can lose an arm, a leg/ an entire moment./ You can forget where you are. (Pause).” Erickson, 
Hypnotic Realities, 42. To create time distortion, the operator can evoke the fluidity of subjective: “time can be of 
varying intensity/it can be condensed/it can be extended/ so you can review a lifetime history in a few seconds 
time./(Pause) Those few seconds can be expanded/ into/ years./ Also a few days can be condensed/ into a moment…” 
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Alan Leveton, for example, retells a case history which shows how the metaphorical 
evocation of an imaginary landscape can be put to both inductive and therapeutic use, and how 
embedded indirect suggestions in the story facilitate the process.1582 As Leveton explains, the 
technique of evocation was necessary in this case, as the patient was afraid of hypnosis per se, and 
resisted more direct methods of induction. By using the indirect yet inductive powers of evocative 
description, Leveton therefore created a hypnotic experience in a covert manner, without naming 
it as such: 
We would not “do hypnosis,” but she might remember some place where, when she was little and safe at 
home, she felt secure. … It was a pond near her house with reeds that sheltered ducks, with hidden flowers, 
soft sounds of wind and wavelets. She enjoyed describing her special pond … so bright was the sunlight 
reflected on the cusps of the little waves that they tired her eyes; so warm was the sun that she felt relaxed 
and drowsy; so pleasing was the memory that to see and to feel it more fully she might shut her eyes. Around 
the pond she noted her favorite trees, where she could seek shelter from the sun. Those trees had been there 
a long time and she found them the most attractive. They guarded her pond. Their roots penetrated deep into 
the nourishing soil; their leaves permitted the sun’s light to pass through in a muted way; their branches 
reached as far upwards into the air above as their roots penetrated deeply below. Her boyfriend could stay 
very alert and watch her closely, and soberly note how firmly safe she was by her trees, by her pond.1583 
 
In this example, the landscape serves as a metaphorical pretext for meaning to latch onto, and 
facilitates therapeutic change: it is a symbolic, mental landscape. 1584  
 
Erickson, Hypnotic Realities, 136. To create hypersthesia, evocation of a blind person’s acute sensory perception can 
be used: “A blind person/hears and feels/and smells someone else./He cannot see that person,/ but he can hear how 
tall a person it./ He can tell,/ talking with the person,/ Just by his speech to the person/…/because there is a different 
sound bounding off that person’s body back to his ears./ He can tell if a person is facing him or has his back to him./ 
We all have so much knowledge/ of which we are unaware/ (pause) Will you stop to think about it?/ We do not know 
(pause)/ which use/of your awareness/ of things/you will use.” Erickson, Ibid., 247. Rather than suggesting fatigue 
explicitly, Erickson used an arithmetic explanation as a stimulus for evoking an external reaction of being polite, 
which in turn evoked an internal response of boredom, which led her to feel fatigued.” Rossi, Hypnotic Realities, 267. 
When using direct suggestions on the other hand the operator takes more risks: “the therapist can only hope the subject 
will cooperate” with instructions that explicitly identify and state what the desired response should be and are thus at 
higher risk of failing. Rossi, Ibid., 267. Also, as Erickson has noted, “with direct suggestion we always have the 
problem of simulation. With indirect suggestion however there can be no question of voluntary compliance as the 
subject does not notice the suggestions: “if a response does take place, it is mediated by involuntary processes outside 
of a subject’s immediate range of awareness.” Erickson, Ibid, 26.  
1582 The case is that of a couple in which the woman has frequent seizures of an “unexplainable” nature, and whose 
partner thus has to care for attentively. The rest of the time, the latter is absent/drinking (the woman’s symptoms thus 
have strong secondary benefits). 
1583 Alan F. Leveton, “Family Therapy as Play. The Contribution of Milton Erickson,” in Zeig, (ed.), Ericksonian 
Approaches, 202. The therapeutic meaning of the metaphor is explicated in the text, but left unformulated in the 
session: “And what do you imagine was the most interesting quality of those trees? That they stood securely upright. 
They could do this because their roots were so strongly anchored and because of the wonderful, strong flexibility of 
their trunks. They were neither so limp that they couldn’t stand, nor so rigid that they might break in a strong wind. 
In the expectable winds by that pond they could make slight adjustments as they stood upright. They could sway, even 
sway noticeably, but not fall down. … After this session she could stand on her own two feet and no longer needed to 
be carried out of the office. She had markedly fewer seizures… She began a business which involved making storage 
racks out of a kind of wood she particularly liked.” Leveton, Ibid., 202-203. 
1584 Similar to the “isomorphic environments” described higher up by Gordon, (1978).  
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As Furst notes, novels also present “landscapes of consciousness” which are filtered 
through the minds of the characters, and where metaphoricities operate.1585 Furthermore, for Furst, 
“while purporting and pretending to be real,” in a novel, a place “only becomes so for readers by 
virtue of the symbolical, metaphorical force it assumes within the frame of the narration.”1586 As 
characteristic examples, Furst analyzes the house1587 and  the city,1588 both of which reveal the 
symbolic charge of spatial descriptions, even in texts which strive to achieve objective descriptions 
such as Zola’s “experimental,” naturalist novel.1589  
Similarly, hypnosis exploits the metaphorical charge of places in order to work through 
unconscious material and conflicts. The creation of mental landscapes, the manipulation of 
imaginary objects is a central—Roustang writes, almost “banal”—aspect of hypnotherapy.1590 For 
example, Roustang describes the case of a patient who constructs and spatially moves towards his 
own “house” but struggles to enter it. Only when he is able to enter the house does the therapeutic 
solution emerge:1591  
He sees a house at the bottom of the garden. I ask him to walk towards the house. He cannot, as it is 
surrounded with a magnetic field. Can he wait while he keeps looking at the house? The garden is not taken 
care of, the lawn is not mown. Then, after a long silence, he finds himself inside the house. It is small but 
very neat, it is made just for him. Nobody else may come inside thanks to the magnetic field. This house is 
 
1585 Furst, All is True, 119. Bruner defines “landscapes of consciousness” as “what those involved in the action know, 
think or feel, or do not know, think or feel.” Jerome Bruner, Actual Minds, Possible Worlds (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1986), 14. 
1586 Furst, Ibid.,142. 
1587 The symbolic dimension of the house in the Freudian topography goes without mentioning (“The ego is not master 
in its own house.” Freud, Standard Edition, XVII, 142). See also Jay Haley, who describes the mind as a “many 
chambered room with entrances and exits which often operate independently of each other.” Haley, “The Contribution 
to Therapy,” 25. For examples of literary domestic spaces which are related to the inner lives of realist characters, see: 
in Balzac’s Le Père Goriot the Vauquer boardinghouse, in Eliot’s Middlemarch Casaubon’s Lowick, in Mann’s 
Buddenbrooks the landscape room, as well as “a whole spate of Jamesian homes” [in Portrait of a Lady for example, 
the house “stands in for aspects of the characters which inhabit them”], Furst, 140. 
1588 Furst notes how in the later nineteenth-century, cities “become the metaphor for mental anguish as buildings 
translate into places of desire or dread.” Furst, 140. 
1589 In L’Assommoir for example, one can consider that the staircase and the dye in the water are charged with aesthetic 
and symbolic (thematic, metaphoric, connotative) power, as the various colors running in the water form a recurrent 
and “striking symbolical metaphor… to mark the stages of Gervaise’s rise and fall.” Furst, 169. 
1590 “Devenues banales dans la pratique des hypnothérapeutes.” (“Having even become banal in hypnotherapeutic 
practice today”) Roustang, 30, our translation. 
1591 The patient in question suffers from a “chronic inability to set boundaries, say no, not be ‘invaded’ and preserve 
his autonomy,” for whom “all romantic relationships follow the rhythm of an alternating absorption and being-
absorbed” (“toute relation amoureuse est rythmée selon l’alternance de l’absorber et de l’être-absorbé”). Roustang, 
29. In a classical induction, Roustang invites the patient to go down staircase, then leaves 5 to 10 minutes of silence, 
during which the patient remembers having dreamt of entering a subway station before emerging into a garden. 
Roustang’s suggestion then begins the spatial-symbolic deambulation: “I offer that he lets the dream pursue itself” [je 
qui propose de laisser se poursuivre le rêve”]. 
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his secret… One year later his relationships are healed. … When he feels bad, he returns to the house and 
finds his strength.1592  
 
As in fiction, descriptions of place in hypnosis present a “metaphoric account of an individual’s 
inner life or progress in the world.”1593 Both novelistic and therapeutic discourse are also charged 
with connotative and metaphorical potential, their discourse is thus not merely denotative or 
metonymic. 
 
3.3.1.3.  Ambiguous and Disorienting Communication 
 
Like literature, hypnosis also engages in subtle play and experimentation with language 
and its limits.1594 The saturating power of descriptive discourse is also used as an inductive tool in 
hypnosis. “Cognitive overload” is a common technique used by hypnotists, and is comparable to 
the precise descriptions—the Balzacian tartine—on which the realist illusion is based.1595 Indeed, 
as Furst writes, “the superabundance that stems from fullness of specification, in rhetorical terms, 
from amplificatio, is generally regarded as one of the salient features of realism.”1596 However, as 
Furst notes, “overdetermination can impede or suspend the process of reading if readers feel 
overwhelmed by such onslaught of information that they lose grasp of the whole as a result of the 
inflation of a particular segment.”1597 The hypnotist uses this moment—in which the multiplication 
of detail, rather than forming a realistic picture, turns into an overwhelming sensation—to his 
advantage:  by creating saturation on purpose, before inserting a suggestion into the attentional 
gap created by the hypertrophy of information. As we noted higher up, this way of facilitating the 
 
1592 Roustang, 30. Roustang goes on to explain: in the patient’s “real” dream, a cat was scratching him and a woman 
was piercing his nail (“piquait son ongle”) but in the hypnotic dream he found a solution and was able to enter the 
house (“le rêve diurnal a trouvé une solution”). One year later, he patient feels “freed from a constant oppression, 
capable of self-determination and thus of protecting himself” (“libéré d’une oppression constante, il se sent capable 
de se déterminer et donc de se protéger, quand il se sent mal, il revient dans sa maison et trouve sa force.” Ibid. 
1593 Furst, All is True, 141. 
1594 For example, Erickson defines the hypnotic therapeutic process as “expediting the currents of change already 
seething within the person and the family—but currents that need the ‘unexpected’, the ‘illogical’ and the ‘sudden’ 
move to lead them into tangible function.” Erickson, introduction to Change, 121. 
1595 See for example “l’hypertrophie du détail vrai (“the hypertrophy of the true detail”).” Zola, Letter to Henry Céard, 
22 March 1885, Correspondance, ed. H. H. Bakker (Montréal: Presses de l’Université de Montréal, 1978-1992), 5: 
249. 
1596 Furst, Ibid., 152. 
1597 Ibid. Indeed, “no other writer after Balzac imputed to readers the patient willingness to handle so massive a 
descriptive preamble” at the beginning of each novel. Ibid., 153. And the Nouveau Roman, “going too much against 
the grain of basic frames of representation…. Highlight[s] mediality as such and foreground[s] the conventionality of 
narrative,” thus creating distance and breaking illusion. Wolf, “Aesthetic Illusion(s)?,” 38.  
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acceptance of suggestions is characteristic of modern indirect hypnosis, that uses distraction and 
counteracts conscious thought by overloading the subject’s mind. This can either be carried out by 
prescribing various tasks (such as counting, listing, etc.), or with the excessive use of descriptive 
details, reminiscent of Nouveau Roman descriptions.   
Furthermore, this “overloading” dimension of evocation is also used for its therapeutic 
potential. Indeed, varying the degrees of intensity in focus of the awareness can be put in the 
service of change, by turning rationality against itself in order to dismantle or reveal the limits of 
conscious, analytic thought. For instance, Roustang describes a case in which Erickson uses 
saturation, where the patient’s focalization is pushed to its extreme, to create a form of hypnotic 
“hypersthesia”—or hyperawareness—which is used to remove unpleasant symptoms by placing 
exaggerated focus on them.1598  Roustang shows how in Erickson’s case, the solution involves the 
reduction ad absurdum of alert observation, and “pushing the work of attention until the 
destruction of its object,” like in the Nouveau Roman.1599 In this way, “the waking state, pushed 
to the limits of its possibilities, destroys itself.”1600 
In addition to “cognitive overload,” another frequently used example of the “density” of 
language pushed to its limits in indirect suggestions, is the use of hypnotic “confusion.” The latter 
comprises a wide scope of techniques,  ranging from “pattern interrupts” (sudden changes in pace 
and shifts in the object of attention), to the use of paradoxes and riddles (meaning-production 
techniques whose therapeutic value is close to the use of Koans in Zen Buddhism), of confounding 
statements by “apposition of opposites” (“you can forget to remember or remember to forget”1601), 
to nonverbal confusion (such as inviting a subject to sit, by directing them verbally toward one 
chair while gesturing nonverbally to another chair1602), etc.  
Just as hypnotic evocation can create the stability and safety of spatial situation, it can just 
as well use language to create spatial—or temporal—confusion and disorientation, which 
resembles Beckettian anti-narration:  
 
1598 For a patient suffering from a nausea-gag reflex: “I can ask the patient to really study this reflex. Where does it 
begin, where do you feel this sensation, concentrate on it” … “everytime you dissect something with detail you destroy 
it. You destroy its value.” Erickson, 1986, 65, quoted in Roustang, 68. Roustang compares this process to Buddhist 
Vipassana meditation exercises, which focus on unpleasant sensations until they vanish via the act of thorough 
examination and equanimous inspection.  
1599 Roustang, 68. 
1600 Ibid. (“Pousser le travail de l’attention jusqu’à la destruction de son objet. … La veille restreinte poussée jusqu’à 
l’extrême de ses possibilités se détruit elle-même”).  
1601 Erickson, Hypnotic Realities, 202. 
1602 Ibid., 146. 
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I did know that from where I was there then, I thought to myself, I don’t want to be here now; I want to be 
there now, and all I can remember is that to get there now, or at least soon from now from here, I take a 
combination of three right  turns and three left turns… but don’t know which is the right series of rights and 
lefts… but I do want to get there and I am here now, and so I said, all right, pay attention very closely 
[embedded suggestion in the imperative form], we’ve got to make it right or we’ll be left behind, And then I 
said all right, I’ll take a right here and then a left and now I’m left with two lefts and two rights… But I don’t 
think that is right, so I’ll take a right first, and then a left, and now I’m left with a right and... dead end. It’s 
the wrong way. So I go back to the starting point so we don’t get left behind... so I back track and now take 
three rights and three lefts again, except that each turn is now the opposite from the other direction… 
everything is reversed… Now which was then a right is now a left and that which was left then is now a right 
so for every right then it is right now to take a left and for every left then it is right now to take a right, and 
now we’re back at the beginning, ready to begin again, and what a nice thing to know that you can simply 
stop all activity and let your unconscious for the work for you.1603 
 
Unlike the Beckettian text however, which pushes language to its limit in order to underline the 
difficulty and hopelessness of representation and expression, the goal of confusion in modern 
hypnosis is to create receptivity in the subject, a “momentary gap in understanding that requires 
an explanatory suggestion.”1604 The receptivity is caused by the psychologically intolerable 
dimension of prolonged confusion and the need to reestablish meaning, stability, and structure, 
which are still assumed to be possibly retrieved. Modern hypnosis explains the success of older, 
authoritative models of hypnosis, by this very process:  
Under the shock and surprise of many of the older authoritarian approaches to hypnotic induction, it is 
obvious how the confusion-need-for–restructuring mechanism operated so automatically that it appeared as 
if the patient was hyper suggestible. This so-called hypersuggestibility, however, is actually the automatic 
acceptance of any acceptable restructuring that will end the intolerable confusion that has been effected by 
the hypnotic induction or any means of unstructuring the ego’s usual frames of reference.1605 
 
In this sense, all hypnotic inductions strive to produce a degree of destabilization, to “keep patients 
in flux, slightly off balance so they will continuously grasp on to whatever orientation [the 
operator] provides.”1606 Confusion thus is not a nihilistic technique, it implements the necessary 
destabilization from which something new and creative can emerge. 
On the opposite side of the spectrum, hypnosis uses not only saturation and confusion, but 
also openness, ambiguity, and even vagueness, in a strategic manner. Unlike ordinary discourse, 
which aims for the efficient communication of information, hypnotic language does not hesitate 
 
1603 Abbreviated from Gilligan, 100. The purpose of confusion is to facilitate the acceptance of a suggestion: once the 
subject seems sufficiently confused, the rhythm can be suddenly shifted and–as in this example–a suggestion inserted. 
The goal: to “confound the mind so it will be receptive to suggestion.” Erickson, Hypnotic Realities, 146. 
1604 Erickson, Ibid., 146. “They don’t know what to do. So then the therapist can tell them what to do. … If the 
surrounding reality becomes unclear, they want it cleared up by being told something.” Ibid., 107.  
1605 Ibid.,145. 
1606 Rossi, in Hypnotic Realities, 196. The power of modern hypnosis however is no longer conceived as a process of 
subjection, but of horizontal communication: “Erickson relies on upon the skillful utilization of … forms of 
communication, rather than hypersuggestibility per se, to evoke hypnotic behavior.” Ibid., 228. 
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to create absence of clarity, transparency or explicitness.1607 Indeed, while “in everyday 
communication, lack of specificity can create a discrepancy between intended communication and 
message received,” in hypnosis “vague phrasing can be helpful.”1608 Indeed, the “vague,” open 
and permissive suggestions found in Ericksonian models lay strong interpretative responsibility 
on the recipient, who must fill in the gaps for the suggestion to have meaning: “There is less and 
less importance to be attached to my voice and that you can experience progressively (pause) any 
kind of sensations you wish.”1609  
Instead of directly instructing the subject to visualize a specific landscape, for example, 
permissive hypnosis uses extremely open suggestions to preserve the imaginative freedom of the 
subject: 
Now the next thing for her to do/is actually to develop an hallucination/ of, let us say, a specific landscape. 
One that she has not seen previously. But a landscape she would like. (Pause). Now, who knows what she 
would put in a landscape? Birds, trees, bushes rocks.1610 
Or 
And now in a few moments when your unconscious is ready there may be a blankness or haziness in your 
visual field. (Pause) And how will that haziness develop? Will there be a fog or shadows? And when will the 
shadows begin to arrange themselves into definite forms? (Pause) Will your eyes be open or closed? (Pause) 
It will be interesting to find out whether it will be hazy or foggy or blurred. Or will things be unusually bright, 
sharp, and clear when you open your eyes? Will there be an alternation of the color background? Will some 




1607 The poietic, esthetic quality of vagueness has been noted, by Poe for example: “the indefinite is an element in the 
true poiesis … indefiniteness is an element of the true music… of its ethereal, its ideal, its intrinsic and essential 
character … its breath of fäery.” Poe, from Marguinalia, in Snyder, 43. As Gombrich has shown, in painting also 
ambiguity gives freedom to the imagination and interpretative faculties of the beholder. This emphasis on vagueness, 
silence or blankness can be seen for example in the idea of  “giving expression to the invisible” in Chinese art, in the 
notion of I tao pi pu tao [idea present, brush may be spared performance], with which “a few simple strokes” capture 
details that need not be represented, simply evoked. Gombrich, 170. Similarly, Da Vinci’s sfumato technique “cuts 
down the information on the canvas and thereby stimulates the mechanism of projection.” Gombrich, 221. 
1608 Stephen R. Lankton, “The Occurrence and Use of Trance Phenomena,” 137. Hypnotic language, even more if it 
is a prewritten script, resembles Iser’s description of the literary schemata: “a hollow form into which the reader is 
invited to pour his own store of knowledge.” Iser, The Act of Reading, 143. For Gombrich the “empty or ill-defined 
areas” of the esthetic experience are even helpful and allow the recipient to project mental representations in 
accordance with his respective repertoire of experience. In this way, “with this descriptive indeterminacy, they depart 
of real life, yet create “a rich projective space for imaginative readers.” Wolf, “Aesthetic Illusion(s)?,”45. Like the 
hypnotic subject who faces blanks, vagueness and silence yet cooperates during the experience as a whole, for Furst, 
the reader of novels “accepts” rather than fills in all the gaps, incompleteness and indeterminacies because “we have 
made a fundamental commitment to pretend to believe in the entire fiction.” Furst, All is True, 33.  
1609 Erickson, Hypnotic Realities, 30. 
1610 Ibid., 88. 
1611 Ibid., 79. 
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In these examples, permissive evocative suggestions admit “just about any possibility of a response 
in altered visual perception as a successful and interesting experience.”1612 Hypnotic discourse acts 
almost as a prompt, which leaves elements purposefully vague so as to stimulate the imaginative 
and creative faculties of the subject. 
Similarly, Iser describes the “blanks” as a “stimulating” function of the literary text, which 
functions like hypnotic discourse, using vagueness and silence on purpose:  
By impeding textual coherence, the blanks transform themselves into stimuli for acts of ideation. In this 
sense, they function as a self-regulating structure in communication; what they suspend turns into a propellant 
for the reader’s imagination, making him supply what has been withheld.1613  
 
Indeed, as we saw higher up, with excessive dense or detailed description, the operator risks losing 
the subject’s cooperation and attention. Unlike the older models, which gave out specific 
instructions to the subject, modern hypnosis uses open statements to counterbalance hyperspecific 
evocations and tasks.  Furst notes a similar process in the history of the realist novel, which shifts 
from hyperspecificity to openness, from “dense” descriptions in the Balzacian style to more 
“suggestive” ones, as in Henry James’ work.1614 As Furst notes, these suggestive descriptions are, 
like those of modern hypnosis, “tentative and open-ended” and imply “a different reader than those 
projected by density.”1615  
Based on “extreme flexibility” rather than rigid or systematic methodology, modern 
utilizational approaches to hypnosis resort to indirect—suggestive, fictional, evocative, ambiguous 
or playfully specific—rather than direct communication.1616 Like fictional texts, they acknowledge 
the value of “pointing out things with a parable or providing a somewhat confusing experience” 
 
1612 Ibid. 
1613 Iser, Ibid., 194. 
1614 After Balzac, “description is integrated into the action,” diminishing in quantity “as density yields to 
suggestiveness.” Furst, Ibid., 153. Upon closer inspection however, it is possible to argue that both authors use both 
modes, and rather than belonging to an author, a mode belongs to the subjectivity described in the test: “as the 
focalization becomes increasingly internalized in the course of the century, the protagonists can, solely according to 
their temperament, be made to draw on density or suggestiveness.” Ibid., 160. Similarly, the modern hypnotist adapts 
his mode of evocation (dense saturation or minimalist, open-ended evocation) to his or her subject (for example, with 
very analytic individuals, one will prefer using saturation, with very cooperative or creative minds, simple evocations 
will often bring rich results, etc.) 
1615 Furst, 155. Density is prompted by “the postulate of unknowing readers in need of initiation and instruction” 
whereas in suggestive descriptions, the supposition is of “knowing readers capable of making associations… without 
explanation.” Suggestive descriptions rest on the “assumption of readers’ familiarity” with places such as Paris, 
London, or “Canal Street” as in James’ Washington Square. A similar analogy can be drawn between the nineteenth 
century hypnotic subject and Balzacian reader, who is subjected to narrow guidance by the operator-narrator, and the 
Ericksonian subject-Jamesian reader, who is left the freedom of suggestiveness and ambiguity in the text. Furst, 155. 
1616 Zeig notes that Erickson considered theory as a “Procrustean bed that limits the practitioner’s flexibility.” Jeffrey 
Zeig, Ericksonian Approaches,145. 
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rather than addressing content in an explicit manner, or  “endlessly arguing.”1617 These aspects, 
combined with the poeticity or musicality of its language, brings hypnotic discourse close to 
literary discourse, and therefore, offers a much richer experience than Snyder’s “monotonous,” 
lulling of the senses and intellect.   
 
3.3.2.  An “Art of Distances”1618 
 
3.3.2.1.  Aesthetic Distance 
 
Poetic faith is famously defined as a willing and temporary suspension of disbelief.1619 As 
I have argued so far, despite its immersive power, the aesthetic illusion is characterized by an 
irreducible aesthetic distance, and is therefore not a delusion but an “experiential pseudo-
illusion.”1620 
Indeed, in his description of the aesthetic illusion, Wolf distinguishes an “analyzing ego” from an 
“experiencing” ego with which it coexists in most cases; insisting on the fact that aesthetic illusion 
is “a feeling … that prevails in spite of the fact, and our latent awareness of it, that this impression 
is triggered by a ‘mere’ artefact.”1621 A similar aesthetic distance also occurs in the hypnotic 
experience, which in this sense, functions as an aesthetic activity. In both hypnosis and aesthetic 
illusions, immersion is never total. Unlike delusion, the experience elicited by aesthetic illusions 
has a characteristic “as-if” quality: “the illusion-producing object creates a feeling of verisimilar 
lifelikeness, but not of life tout court.”1622  
 
1617 Van Dyck, “How to Use Ericksonian Approaches,” 38. 
1618 See Corina Stan, The Art of Distances: Ethical Thinking in Twentieth-Century Literature (Evanston, Illinois 
Northwestern University Press, 2018). 
1619 Coleridge, Biographia literaria, 169. 
1620 Wolf, “Aesthetic Illusion as an Effect of Fiction,” 328. 
1621 Wolf, Ibid., 325. “Total distance and total immersion do not yet, or no longer, qualify as aesthetic illusion” Ibid. 
329.  
1622 Emphasizing the distance implied in the aesthetic experience goes against the tendency of cognitive science 
inspired literary theory and cognitive narratology’s conception of the reader’s reactions to fictional characters as 
analogical to ordinary reactions to human beings, positing “a basic affinity between actual and fictional minds when 
it comes to information processing.” Uri Margolin, “Cognitive Science, the Thinking Mind and Literary Narrative,” 
in Narrative Theory and the Cognitive Sciences, ed. D Herman (Stanford, CA: Center for the Study of Language and 
Information, 2003), 281. As Ryan explains, “when [readers] experience emotions for the characters, they do not relate 
to these characters as literary creations nor as ‘semiotic constructs’, but as possible human beings.” Ryan, “Immersion 
vs. Interactivity,” 118. For her, in a novel, we experience–as in VR–“depth of the world,” which leads us to presuppose 
that in the fictional universe, “there is more than what we perceive of the world.” Similarly, on a “psychological” 
level, the reader of a realist or modernist novel makes inferences relating to the characters’ inner lives and 
“reconstructs” the content of their mind (whereas in postmodern texts, “when the reader feels there is nothing beyond 
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This is why aesthetic illusion is fundamentally a bipolar phenomenon: a “dominant 
experiential immersion” is always counterbalanced by a “latent,” culturally acquired “awareness 
of the fictionality of the perceived possible world (objects).”1623 Like in hypnosis, as Wolf shows, 
there are two layers in the experience of aesthetic illusion:  
In the background a latent, rational awareness from without, that the illusion-inducing artefact is a mere 
representation and in the foreground, a mainly intuitive mental simulation where this awareness is bracketed 
out in favor of an imagined experience of represented worlds, from within.1624 
 
Furthermore, in the illusory experience, immersion “can be suspended or undermined at any given 
moment, by the actualization of the latent consciousness of representationality.”1625  
Similarly, as Benson notes in his account of aesthetic absorption, even while I am intensely 
absorbed, there continues to be a “residual awareness” of myself as a spectator, listener or reader, 
“an awareness which is a central logical requirement for its being esthetic. Without this implicit 
awareness of myself as observing, however ‘residual,’ the distance necessary for aesthetic 
experience would not be possible.”1626  
From the perspective of the subject, the ambivalence of immersion consists in the 
perceiver’s “transportation to the fictional world as well as his or her awareness of fictionality.”1627 
Immersion and distance (like referentiality and textuality) are thus not mutually exclusive, and the 
novel, like hypnosis, can be both simultaneously “true” and illusory.  
This principle can apply to the reader’s relation to the fictional characters, who are semiotic 
constructs, and yet may be temporarily related to “as if” they were actual persons. Indeed, “the 
structure of consciousness can accommodate both an awareness of the characters’ status as 
 
language, inference procedures become largely pointless.” Ryan, Ibid., 118. For Lisa Zunshine, we infer the mental 
states of characters on the basis of the same theoretical knowledge that we apply to others’ behavior outside of 
fiction.1622 When encountering the fictional universe, representations are turned into meta-representations and acquire  
“source-tags,” which we attributed to them (for example, attributing a given discourse to the narrator or implied author 
). Once we have bracketed the text as a whole however, we don’t attribute tags to every utterance, to preserve cognitive 
economy. Indeed, we don’t need to remind ourselves of the fictionality of each proposition, we are able to “forget” 
our disbelief, since we acknowledged it in the beginning by attributing the source tag to the work as a whole. See 
Zunshine, 81. (On the opposite side of the literary theory spectrum,  opposing the idea of a continuity between real 
and fictional minds, one emphasizes the idea that characters are constructs, and that we cannot assume that readers 
approach them as they would people in ordinary intersubjective relations – see for example Brian McHale’s 2012 
reappraisal of D. Cohn’s Transparent Minds. For the question of the “paradox of fiction” and the problem of the 
reader’s affective reactions towards fictional characters, see Colin Radford “How can we be moved by the fate of 
Anna Karenina?” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 49 (1975): 67-93. 
1623 Wolf, “Aesthetic Illusion as an Effect of Fiction,” 328. 
1624 Wolf, “Aesthetic Illusion(s)?,” 33. 
1625 Ibid., 33. 
1626 Benson, The Absorbed Self, 97. 
1627 Koblížek, 2. 
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artefacts and a recognition of an analogy between their mental processes and those of real 
individuals.”1628 Unlike the duck-rabbit, which we can only be seen under a single aspect at a 
time,1629 the reader’s stance towards characters can involve a “twofoldness” shared by aesthetic 
and hypnotic illusions.1630  
For Murray Smith, twofoldness is part of our natural stance towards characters, especially 
in realist fiction: “there is no reason to drive a dualistic wedge between mimetic and synthetic [or 
configurational] attitudes, for these attitudes can—in most cases—coexist in our experience of 
characters. … Readers’ consciousness is not limited to a single aspect of the object being 
considered (character as person or character as artefact).”1631 Twofoldedness thus “dovetails with 
the idea that illusion is not delusion,” and that “we can talk about characters in mentalistic ways 
without mistaking them for real people.”1632 This acknowledgment would then destabilize binary 
oppositions such as absorption vs. theatricality or immersion vs. metafiction, which can perhaps 
be replaced with the “scalar” model, or spectrum, of aesthetic illusions.1633 
 
3.3.2.2.  Hypnotic Distance 
 
In hypnosis, distance is also an essential component of the “illusionary” experience. 
Indeed, modern theories of hypnosis have conceptualized the trance state as involving a certain 
degree of self-awareness, which does not endanger the immersive aspect of the experience.  
One main body of theories consist in the dissociationist and neo-dissociationist models 
which posit a split between multiple levels of awareness in the subject, that operate separately. In 
this context, one of them maintains awareness, with varying degrees of latency, throughout the 
 
1628 Marco Caracciolo, “Reading for the Mind; Aesthetic Illusion, Fictional Characters and the Role of Interpretation,” 
in Aesthetic Illusion in Literature and the Arts, 123. 
1629 See Gombrich: “all representation relies to some extent on “guided projection’” and “all images” contain an 
“inherent ambiguity” – an ambiguity which can “never be seen as such.” Gombrich, 203; 249. 
1630 Numerous theorists of aesthetic immersion have noted this double aspect. For Felski “even as we are bewitched, 
possessed, emotionally overwhelmed, we know ourselves to be immersed in an imaginary spectacle: we experience 
art in a state of double consciousness” ... we remain enchanted “without this knowledge diminishing or diluting the 
intensity of our involvement.” Felski, Uses, 74. For Furst, the recipient is actively cooperating “in pretense” and 
“readers can hold a dual standpoint: they exist both fictionally and literally that is they are absorbed in the realm of 
fiction as if it were real, yet they also remain aware of their actual position as readers of fiction.” Furst, All is True, 
42; 145. Iser also underlines the “dialectic of illusion making and breaking” which creates “a continuous oscillation 
between involvement and observation” constituting the experience of the text as event. Iser, The Act of Reading, 128.  
1631 Ryan, Narrative as Virtual Reality200. 
1632 Caracciolo, “Reading for the Mind,” 125. 
1633 Ryan, Ibid., 200. 
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hypnotic experience.1634 The most famous of these theories in modern hypnosis is that of the Ernest 
Hilgard’s “hidden observer,” coined in 1977, for whom “the observing and participating egos 
coexist, so that the subject is able to maintain a ‘continued limited awareness … that what is 
perceived as real is in some sense not real.”1635 Indeed, in  Divided Consciousness: Multiple 
Controls in Human Thought and Action,1636 Hilgard argues—like Janet—that the “unity of 
consciousness is illusory,”1637 and  that every individual is made up of and controlled by a 
multiplicity of “subsystems” which may be more or less dissociated, and are separated by an 
amnesic barrier.1638 Hilgard views hypnosis as a “readiness to fractionate the central executive and 
monitoring system,” which creates an internal dissociation from ordinary, planning and reality-
testing, cognitive routines: “The modification of controls can be described as dissociative if the 
usual controls are inoperative.”1639 For Hilgard, the more “dramatic” hypnotic phenomena (such 
as induced analgesia, deafness, or amnesia) can be understood as dissociative phenomena.  
As he argues, in the case of analgesia, a latent awareness of pain seems to remain operative 
in the subject: “the subject may verbally report no pain (or hearing, or memory) while at another 
level,” “the information may be shown, through such techniques as hypnotic interrogation or 
automatic writing, to have been registered and stored.”1640 This suggests the presence of a “hidden 
observer” that remains present, although the conscious subject remains unaware of it. This does 
not involve personalizing the “hidden observer,” as another consciousness—as did Janet, for 
 
1634 Hilgard argues that “amnesia and repression may also be articulated in dissociationist terms: information available 
in the system as a whole may be inaccessible, for whatever reason, to a particular subsystem, consciousness.” Matthew 
H. Erdelyi, “Review of E. Hilgard’s Divided Consciousness. Multiple Controls in Human Thought and Action.” 
Science 200, no. 4342 (May 12, 1978): 655. 
1635 Nell, 212. 
1636 Ernest Hilgard, Divided Consciousness. Multiple Controls in Human Thought and Action (New York: Wiley-
Interscience, 1977).  
1637 See also Jung’s Tavistock Lectures: “The so-called unity of consciousness is an illusion. …We like to think that 
we are one but we are not.” Jung, The Collected Works of C. G. Jung, vol 18 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1970-1979), 1935. 
1638 This doctrine indeed can be considered as a reformulation of Janet’s dissociationist conception, that “in essentials 
[it] is the old doctrine in new analogic garb, with information-processing metaphors (“systems,” “subsystems,” 
“controls,” “monitors") tending to supplant the older mentalist concepts (“complexes,” “egos," “ideas”)…The central 
experimental weakness of the studies reported on in this book is their direct reliance on verbal reports about the 
presence or absence of awareness, whether of pain, hearing, or memory, which raises questions about whether one is 
dealing with cognitive or reporting effects.” Erdelyi, 655. See also Sarbin, who in “Hypnosis as a conversation: 
Believed-in imaginings” states by having a dissociated element in hypnosis, the subject can respond to suggestions 
with a “believed-in imagination” while at the same time observing him or herself as experiencing the hypnotic reality 
in a more “objective” manner. Theodore Sarbin, “Hypnosis as Conversation. Believed-in Imaginings.” Contemporary 
Hypnosis 14, Issue 4 (1997), 203. 
1639 Hilgard, Divided consciousness, 227-228. 
1640 Erdelyi, 655. 
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instance. Indeed, in “Dissociation and Theories of Hypnosis,” (1992) Hilgard writes that “the 
‘hidden observer’ was intended merely as a convenient label for the information source capable of 
a high level of cognitive functioning, not consciously experienced by the hypnotized person.”1641  
Since then, theories of multiple hidden observers have also emerged, and as we saw in 
Chapter 1, the debate about whether hypnosis is a specific cognitive state or merely a case of 
psychological-social compliance (also known as the state vs. non-state debate) still divides 
experimental research today.1642 Socio-psychological theories of trance as compliance, voluntary 
role-playing, or “cooperation, also emphasize the “twofoldness” of the hypnotic experience, albeit 
without having to postulate a split, or dissociation, at the heart of the hypnotic experience.1643  
Either way, is generally admitted in both—cognitive and socio-psychological—camps that 
reality-testing is still present in hypnotic trance. In a 1975 study, Orne for example demonstrated 
that hypnotic hallucination can be experienced as being authentic, while the subject still takes in 
empirical elements from exterior reality. To illustrate this hypothesis, Orne showed that subjects 
who were instructed to simulate negatively hallucinating a person, bumped into that person, as 
they believed they ‘should’ in a hallucinated experience. On the other hand, non-simulating 
hypnotized subjects, who really ‘didn’t see’ the person, “respectfully an unobtrusively walk[ed] 
around the person while giving all other appearances of not seeing him.”1644 Therefore, hypnotic 
subjects remained aware of the reality around them, despite fully adhering to the illusory or 
“hallucinatory” experience. As Beahrs puts it, one can “hardly imagine a better demonstration of 
consciousness simultaneously occurring at more than one level.”1645  
 
1641 Hilgard, “Dissociation and Theories of Hypnosis,” (1992), 77; See E. Fromm and M. Nash, (eds.), Contemporary 
Hypnosis Research (Guilford Press, New York, 1992). 
1642 “A ‘third way' in hypnosis research construes hypnosis simultaneously as both a state of (sometimes) profound 
cognitive change, involving basic mechanisms of cognition and consciousness, and as a social interaction, in which 
hypnotist and subject come together for a specific purpose within a wider socio-cultural context” Kihlstrom, 2008. 
See also: “evidence that the rate of hidden observer response (like other hypnotic responses) varies with the wording 
of instructions does not contradict neodissociation theory; rather, it underscores the fact that hypnosis entails social 
interaction as well as alterations in conscious awareness.” Kihlstrom, “Dissociations and Dissociation Theory in 
Hypnosis: Comment on Kirsch and Lynn (1998).” In Psychological Bulletin, 1., 123 no. 2 (1998): 186.  
1643 Erickson, Hypnotic Realities, 269. 
1644 John O. Beahrs, “Understanding Erickson’s Approach,” in Zeig (ed.), Ericksonian Approaches to Hypnosis and 
Psychotherapy (New York: Brunner/Mazel, Inc., 1982), 67. 
1645 Ibid. See also Lynn and Rhue, in Theories of Hypnosis: Current models and perspectives (New York, Guilford 
Press, 1991), and Peter Sheehan and Kevin McConkey in Hypnosis and Experience: The Exploration of Phenomena 
and Process (Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Earlbaum Associates, 1982), who also argue that when guided by ethically 
responsible operators, subjects maintain ability and sufficient awareness to distinguish between reality and fantasy 
and thus cannot be hypnotized against their will or commit actions against their moral values in the state of hypnosis. 
Jacob Conn quotes Erickson to argue similarly–as did the physicians of the Salpêtrière–that hypnosis cannot be 
misused to induce the subject to commit actual wrongful acts: “the only serious risk encountered is incurred by the 
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It is often noted that illusion, like language, cannot be perceived from without.1646 This 
why models which posit multiple layers of experience are helpful to describe both hypnotic 
dissociation and aesthetic immersion, as in Ryan’s account:   
Illusion, like error, is a condition that can be diagnosed only in others, because its recognition requires an 
external perspective on a personal belief system. In an art experience, illusion is thus a judgment passed by 
a real-world self on the mental state of a fictional alter-ego—the appreciator’s reentered counterpart in the 
textual world. The same duplicity that diagnoses illusion allows oneself to be immersed and the other to 
appreciate the vehicle of the experience.1647 
 
The “as if” model—as in Walton’s concept of make-believe—enables this pivotal contradiction or 
split which allows an experience to be both illusory and true, simultaneously. Hypnosis, like 
novelistic fiction—especially realism—walks the tight rope which can conjointly maintain that 
“all is true” and its opposite. 
In older, traditional models, hypnotic experience had to be “detheatricalized” in order to 
succeed.1648 Like the realist author, the hypnotist tends to draw the recipient’s attention away from 
their—and thus their own—presence, as “the price of this consciousness is an ontological 
expulsion from the fictional world.”1649 As we saw, hypnotists avoid using the first person 
excessively to downplay the empirical presence of the operator—and thus the existence of the 
subject who reacts to the authority of the operator.1650  
 On the contrary, the narrators of pre-realistic and postmodern literature, by “emphasizing 
their authority,” are “ostentatious in reminding the reader of their manipulative powers over the 
story,” and therefore, appear to “break” the aesthetic illusion.  
However, once one acknowledges distance as an essential component of aesthetic, 
hypnotic-novelistic, illusion, one can admit a certain degree of explicit meta-discourse and self-
 
hypnotists, in the form of condemnation, rejection and exposure.” Jacob H. Conn, “The Myth of Coercion Under 
Hypnosis,” in Ericksonian Approaches, 366. 
1646  See Cavell, “an event in which we participate is not knowable apart from our knowledge of our participation in 
it.” Cavell, The World viewed, 128. See also: “Though we may be intellectually aware of the fact that any given 
experience must be an illusion, we cannot, strictly speaking, watch ourselves having a illusion.” Gombrich, 6. 
1647 Ryan, Narrative as Virtual Reality, 352. See also Wolf, for whom the principal preconception for aesthetic illusion 
is “the human ability to mentally dissociate oneself from the here-and-now and imagine being somewhere else or 
someone else, in some other time” and is “an anthropological constant.” Wolf, in The Aesthetic Illusion in Literature 
and the Arts, 35. 
1648 See: “Paradoxically, the painting has to ‘command’ the attention of the beholder,” but “it was only by negating 
the beholder’s presence that this could be achieved: only by establishing the fiction of his absence or nonexistence 
could his … enthrallment by the painting be secured.” Fried, Absorption and Theatricality, 103. 
1649 Ryan, “Immersion vs. Interactivity,” 126. Instead of formulating suggestions with the first person, as in the old 
model of the Abbé Faria—“Dormez, je le veux” (Sleep, I demand it)—the hypnotic speaker effaces himself behind 
his discourse, as does the Flaubertian imperceptible narrator.  
1650 Koten, in The Aesthetic Illusion in Literature and the Arts, 230. 
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awareness (and thus of acknowledgment of the presence of the “beholder”) as non-threatening to 
the immersive experience. Indeed, as it incorporated a certain degree of “meta-narrative” 
reflexivity into its practice during the twentieth-century, modern hypnosis underwent a shift 
similar to the evolution in the history of the novel, from the realist principle of Celare Artem to 
postmodern meta-narrative intrusiveness. Furthermore, just as realist fiction “use[d] contradiction 
as its pivot instead of denying and bypassing it,” hypnosis initially masked and acknowledged its 
illusory dimension, only to later on openly display it more fully, as did Modernist and postmodern 
literature.1651 
Indeed, while it was initially founded on the vertical rapport between a subject and an 
operator who “covers his own tracks,”—by concealing the artificiality of the practice and thus, his 
own lack of authority—hypnosis evolved into an interactive, aesthetic practice. In this modern 
form, its style no longer needs to cover its tracks or worry about “breaking” the trance of illusion. 
By acknowledging the activity of the subject, it no longer needs to protect the illusion of the 
“power” of the operator at all costs. The “death” of the hypnotic “author” allowed for the 
integration of a playful use of reflexivity and an open acknowledgment of the conventional nature 
of the illusion. Unlike the tricks of the magician, knowledge of how hypnosis works poses no threat 
to its efficacy.1652 Both literary absorption and modern hypnosis undergo the demystification 
without losing their enchanting and absorptive dimensions, provided that absorption is conceived 
as voluntary and active, as well an acknowledgment that the experience of mimesis relies on the 
acceptance of implied and temporarily suspended anti-mimesis. 
Not only are modern literature and hypnosis both aware of their absorptive power, they 
both play with the contrast between proximity and distance, using it to their advantage.  
A common myth about the trance state is indeed that of its fragility, based on the fear that 
should distraction or self-awareness appear on the part of the subject, the spell would be broken 
and the hallucinatory experience dissolve, like the fictional world disappears when one puts down 
a book. On the contrary, in modern hypnosis, a back and forth interplay between absorption and 
reflexivity is frequently used to strengthen the hypnotic induction, in a technique called 
 
1651 Furst, All is True, 3. 
1652 On the contrary, the notion of a “sophisticated” or “trained” subject implies that repetition and learning increase 
the intensity and depth of the experience: once a subject knows how to go into trance, the process tends to be greatly 
accelerated in further experiences. 
 351 
fractionation.1653 In this technique, the operator engages in playful alternations between intense 
immersion and reflexive distance, depending on the position or perspective that they wish the 
subject to adopt on their own situation.1654 In modern hypnosis, the trance state is no longer 
conceived as a fragile illusion that needs to be protected, or a trickery to be concealed. Rather, it 
is considered as a stable, yes fluctuating and variable state, which the subjects create themselves, 
from which one may drift in and out freely—and in which the back and forth between ‘in’ and 
‘out’ is purposefully used to deepen the experience. A similar process occurs in modernist and 
postmodern texts:  
Shuttled back and forth between ontological levels, the reader comes to appreciate the layered structure of 
fictional communication, a layered structure through which he is both (in make-believe) narratorial audience 
in the fictional world, and authorial audience in the real world. … We may call interactivity this switch in 
perspective from world-internal and immersive to world-external and reflexive. Under this interpretation, 
periodic de-immersion is essential to the ‘tilting game’ [initially Iser’s expression] of interactive reading.1655 
De-immersion, in that it creates interactivity (as it does in hypnosis) can thus be used to deepen an 
experience, rather than disrupt it or break its spell. It is also used by hypnotists to create curiosity 
and motivation in the subject, just as “self-reflexive and interactive reading can be used to enhance 
the reader’s awareness of her desire for immersion by temporarily holding her virtual body out of 
the textual world.”1656 
 
1653 In literature also, the “breaking of illusion” can be the “corollary” of the illusion itself. Wolf, “Aesthetic Illusion 
as an Effect of Fiction,”326. Even in realism, as Furst shows about the “diligent narrator in Eliot’s Middlemarch’s” 
(who directly addresses the reader in formulations such as “you see,” “If you want to know more,” “You may ask 
why,” and also gives out tasks such as “I will ask you to use your powers of comparison,” or produces exhortations to 
“remember” Eliot, Middlemarch, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1965), 448; 442; 462; 196; 335, etc.), instead of 
constituting an obstacle to immersion, interruptions by the narratorial voice can also serve as “a mediating link 
between text and audience, facilitating the pretense and encouraging slippages between reality and fictional world.” 
Furst, 67. See also Ryan’s descriptions, which can be considered as analogical to hypnosis which uses fractionation: 
“The texts that come the closest to combining both immersion and interactivity are those that orchestrate them in 
round-robin fashion through a game of in-and-out.” Ryan, “Immersion vs. Interactivity,” 132.  “The most efficient 
strategy for promoting an awareness of the mechanisms of fictionality is … to engage the reader in a game of in-and-
out: now the text captures the reader in the narrative suspense; now it bares the artificiality of the plots; now the text 
builds up the illusion of an extratextual referent; now it exposes the textual origin of this referent.” Ryan, Ibid., 126. 
See also Wolf: Similarly, “The rational distance implied in aesthetic illusion is not … totally opposed to immersion, 
but even supports it to some extent: for it is mainly responsible for the paradox that during the operation of aesthetic 
illusion even unpleasant emotions such as fear and horror can be experienced as pleasurable.” Wolf, Aesthetic Illusion 
as an Effect of Fiction,” 329. 
1654 The technique in its most rudimentary form consists in having the subject open and close their eyes multiple times, 
and pretending that opening the eyes leads to “coming out” of trance (when in fact open-eye trance is extremely 
common). The degree of distance and reflexivity incorporated into a hypnotic session will depend on the therapeutic 
goals and worldview of the subject. 
1655 Ryan, “Immersion vs. Interactivity,” 126. 
1656 Ryan, Narrative as Virtual Reality, 355. 
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The incorporation of distance into the concept of aesthetic illusion therefore allows us to 
define hypnosis not as pure absorption but once more, as a specific means of directing awareness. 
This direction—or re-centering—can be either away from the self (absorption) or towards the self 
(theatricality), and can be used for both therapeutic and inductive purposes. The hypnotist can 
therefore make use of meta-references to strengthen trance, just as the modernist or postmodern 
novelist can draw attention to textuality without destroying the immersivity of the reading 
experience—to be distinguished from immersion in the diegetic fictional “world.” Indeed, one can 
find oneself immersed in the act of reading a postmodern text which makes frequent use of meta-
textual devices, just as one can be absorbed in the “world” of a realist novel.1657 In either case, 
attention is focused on a specific object, whose ontological status is not necessarily central 
component of the readerly experience.    
 
3.3.2.3.  Continuity Between Real and Imaginary Levels 
 
Indeed, one can be immersed in a postmodern text which simultaneously comments on the 
ongoing process of immersion. Absorption in novelistic worlds thus goes beyond mere 
psychological identification with the characters or the realist illusion. Indeed, as Eve Sedgwick 
notes, identification occurs not with character but with style—with the writing, the words 
themselves. There is a “visceral near-identification … at the level of sentence structure, metrical 
pattern, rhyme.”1658 In some cases, “engagement with metafictional devices or linguistic patterning 
can be just as important to the ‘immersed’ reading experience as engagement with characters or 
plot.”1659  
A paradigmatic case of a meta-narrative yet immersive text is Julio Cortázar’s short story 
“Continuity of Parks,” which Wolf describes as “a metatextual allegory of the potentials of 
aesthetic illusionism and of its dangers.”1660 
Cortázar’s story opens with a short sentence (“He had begun to read the novel a few days 
before”), which both explicitly illustrates and actively performs the twofold nature mentioned 
 
1657 See: “The reader of fiction is always an actively meditating presence; the text's reality is established by his response 
and reconstituted by his active participation. The writer of narcissistic fiction merely makes the reader conscious of 
his experience.” Linda Hutcheon, Narcissistic Narrative. The Metafictional Paradox (Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfried 
Laurier University Press, 1980), 141. 
1658 Quoted in Felski, Uses, 63. 
1659 Troscianko, “How Should We Talk About Reading Experience?,” 252. 
1660 Julio Cortázar, “Continuity of Parks,” in Bestiary: Selected Stories, trans. A. Manguel et. al. (London: Harvill 
Press, 1998), 108-109; Wolf, “Aesthetic Illusion as an Effect of Fiction,” 344.  
 353 
higher up.1661 One the one hand, the metanarrative statement “he had begun to read” underlines 
the “real” act of reading in a self-reflexive underscoring of the fictional “frame,” which is crossed 
in any narrative opening or incipit. On the other hand, the pluperfect and temporal clause “a few 
days before” strengthen the gap or distinction between Cortázar’s short story and the novelistic 
genre in which the fictional character is absorbed. 
The opening of Cortázar’s short text contains several elements which we have noted so far, 
such as the active, voluntary (“allowed himself”) and gradual (“slowly growing”; “word by word”) 
dimensions of readerly immersion.1662 The lexical field of visual arts (“the drawing of characters”) 
is also employed to suggest the visual or pictorial dimension involved in the fleshing out, or 
rendering-visible, of the fictional characters in the mind’s eye. The comfort and isolation involved 
in the solitary act of reading (“sprawled in his favorite armchair, with his back to the door”) then 
leads to the deepening of absorption, and to the appearance of automatic behavior of the body: “he 
let his left hand caress once and again the green velvet upholstery,” and as well as the 
automatization of the process as a whole (“without effort his memory retained”).1663  
The specific act of crossing a threshold to enter the fictional world is then exaggerated and 
emphasized in its sudden dimension, likening the novelistic illusion to hypnotic hallucination: “the 
illusion took hold of him almost at once.” The passive dimension of the expression “taking hold” 
also evokes the notion of hypnotic “taking over,” as seen in Maupassant’s text or Poulet’s 
description of reading.  
A significant simultaneity then takes place: one the one hand, the pleasure of fictional 
transportation or recentering is evoked (“the almost perverse pleasure of disengaging himself line 
by line from all that surrounded him”—the term ‘perverse’ echoing back to the moralistic and 
medical traditions that condemn the escapist pleasures of reading fiction). On the other, the 
character’s awareness of his immediate surroundings and bodily sensations via proprioceptive and 
spatial localization does not disappear (“feeling at the same time that his head was relaxing 
comfortably against the green velvet of the armchair with its high back, that the cigarettes were 
 
1661 Cortázar, 108. 
1662 Ibid. 
1663  Ibid. The position of the body with the back to the door constitutes an ironic proleptic foreshadowing: the character 
turns his back to the door because he is pursuing immersion (“which would otherwise have bothered him as an 
irritating possibility for intrusions”), which ironically causes his downfall when the intruder does enter through the 
door.  
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still within reach of his hand, that beyond the great windows the afternoon air danced under the 
oak trees in the park”).1664  
The presence of a “hidden observer” of sorts is confirmed as the text ironically distances 
itself from the content of the fictional novel, which is described as “the sordid dilemma of the hero 
and heroine.”1665 Yet, at the same time, there is a quasi-hallucinatory dimension (“letting himself 
go toward where the images came together and took on color and movement”), activated especially 
in the strong spatiality (transportation to “where”), passivity (“letting himself”), visual (“images”; 
“color”) and kinetic dimensions (“movement”) of the text’s descriptions, which create a shift from 
immersion in a static landscape to immersion in a moving, quasi-virtual, reality.1666  
A sense of being present in, of inhabiting the fictional world, is strengthened by the 
description of the diegetic character as being located in the hypodiegetic scene: “he was witness 
to the final encounter in the mountain cabin.”1667 After being rapidly “escorted” through the main 
lines of the hypodiegetic story within Cortázar’s text, we then are suddenly and ironically brought 
out of its plot-level, back into the realm of our own “reading.”  
Therefore, we are made gradually aware of the fictionality and textuality of both texts, via 
the ironic “contamination” of the outer narratorial level by the vocabulary of the hypodiegetic 
novel: “A lustful, yearning dialogue raced down the pages like a rivulet of snakes.”1668 
Furthermore, the mention of the “pages” and the reference to novelistic necessity (“one felt it had 
all been decided from eternity”) broadens the ironic gap which underlines the fictionality and 
artificial dimension of the story. After the paragraph break, however, we are reimmersed into the 
world of the novel. Although this can only be known retrospectively, the pronoun “he”—which up 
until now designated the diegetic character-reader—now refers to the hypodiegetic hero of the 
fictional novel (“He went up the three porch steps and entered”).1669  
Here the story has operated a blurring or quasi inversion of the perspectives from which it 
is told, and of the internal and external diegetic levels. Indeed, the character-reader is now 







1669 Ibid., 109. 
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covered in green velvet, the head of the man in the chair reading a novel.”1670 The final murder 
thus creates a loop which allows the “fictional” diegetic world to—violently and destructively—
intrude and act upon the world of the “character-reader.”1671  
Our surprise as “real” readers, then, is a sign that the text has successfully made us aware 
of our own absorption, our immersive naivety—the very same which led the character-reader to 
his death. By underlining our own lack of awareness, it makes us aware of the power of narrative 
language, both of its dangers (through the evocation of violence and vulnerable, suggestible 
readers) and of its ability to instruct and draw attention to its own absorptive paradoxes.1672 This 
knowledge is experiential, in that it is necessary to have first been tricked to experience the surprise 
and subsequent reflection which it triggers. The experience is aesthetic, in that its medium is poetic 
and hypnotic, and uses evocation to both guides and trick us, manipulating us into becoming aware 
of our own responsibility and freedom during the whole process. Indeed, while reading, we 
voluntarily engaged in the experience of letting ourselves be tricked, having committed to do so 
when we accepted the readerly contract.  
The ending of Cortázar’s story thus relies on the lingering dimension of the aesthetic 
illusion, which is still operative while it has simultaneously been exposed as such. As Wolf notes, 
the final conclusion must be drawn by the recipient: 
as its terminal metalepsis, the paradoxical suggestion that the diegetic reader is killed by the hero of the 
hypodiegetic novel the reader is about to finish, is not actually narrated but exists only in the real recipient’s 
imagination after he has read the last words of the story.1673 
 
In Cortázar’s metafictional demonstration of the workings of readerly immersion, the result is 
ambivalent, “as it elicits such illusion within the fictional world and, to a certain extent, also in the 
real reader, but eventually lays it bare as a problematic, perhaps even dangerous effect.”1674 As 




1671 As Ryan puts it, in the grips of intense aesthetic illusion, the reader-character ends up “paying with his life the 
disappearance of the boundary between fiction and reality.” Ryan, “Immersion vs. Interactivity,” 120. 
1672 Such instruction is similar to that of hypnosis in that it relies on the pedagogical value inherent to the act of telling 
a story rather than different forms—that of the essay, or pedagogic manual, for example. 
1673 Wolf, “Aesthetic Illusion as an Effect of Fiction,” 327. 
1674 Ibid. 327. 
1675 See Iser: “As we are absorbed into an image we are no longer present in a reality … we are experiencing … an 
irrealization,” which when it is over “when we put the book down” makes us “experience a kind of awakening,” to a 
reality “from which we have been drawn away by the image building process. …The fact that we have been 
temporarily isolated from the real world means “that for a brief moment the real world appears observable.” Also, 
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        *** 
In this section, I analyzed the “inductive” dimension of hypnosis and literature, drawing 
out some of the “literary” aspects of hypnotic discourse. These include musicality and poeticity, 
suggestiveness and metaphoricity of discourse, as well as fictionality and the active cooperation 
of the subject. The “literary” tools of hypnosis (stories, symbols, metaphors, indirect and therefore 
suggestive formulations, play on rhythm, tone, etc.) are used by operators to create and amplify 
aesthetic immersion and absorption. However, as I argued, a residual distance or latent awareness 
always remains in the experience of immersive recentering, whether in novel reading or in 
hypnotic hallucination. Immersion and distance are not incompatible, but rather essential 
components of the aesthetic experience, and the back and forth between them is a key component 
of the esthetic competency of the subject. In The Woman Reader, Flint concludes her reading of 
Virginia Woolf’s The Voyage Out, with a comment that captures this idea: 
Acknowledgment of the degree to which an individual can get absorbed by fiction is coupled … with a 
recognition (which the reader is expected to share) that such habits of identification, of slipping into the skin 
and mind of a fictional character, can go hand in hand with self-awareness of the process which is taking 
place.1676  
 
In modern theories of hypnosis, not only is it admitted that the subject maintains self-
awareness and can exit the hypnotic “state” as easily as one puts down a book, self-reflexive 
devices are also used to create a back and forth between immersion and distance, to create a more 
compelling experience.  
In modernity, both literary absorption and hypnosis thus undergo a similar process of 
demystification without losing their enchanting immersive powers. In both hypnotic and novelistic 
discourse, sophisticated forms of attention and sensitivity to language and its aesthetic-
performative effects are mobilized, rather than the mere dulling of the subject’s intellect and 
deception on the part of the operator. Rather than a “cognitive mistake of some kind,” in both 
 
“image building eliminates the subject object division essential for all perception, so that when we ‘awaken’ to the 
real world, this division seems all the more accentuated. Suddenly we find ourselves detached from our world, to 
which we are inextricably tied, and able to perceive it as an object.” This detachment, even if momentary, then “may 
enables to apply the knowledge we have gained … so that we can view our own world as a thing ‘freshly understood.” 
Iser, 140. 
1676 Flint, The Woman Reader, 273. For Flint, “reading well” does not consist in becoming a “passive being, unthinking 
losing oneself in a story.” Ibid. On the contrary, “the ability to read literature carefully is equated… with the ability to 
read life. This attention which is demanded on the part of the reader … goes some way towards giving the lie to the 
dangerously uncritical mindlessness which so many critics chose to present as being induced by the opiate of sensation 
fiction.” Flint, 293. We would contend that a similar claim can be made about hypnotic experience.  
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hypnosis and literature, the aesthetic illusion creates “a strong affective impression of one’s direct 
participation,” which is a sign of aesthetic competency rather than cognitive delusion.1677  
As I hope to have shown, immersivity—rather than mimesis or referentiality—is thus the 
key component to the aesthetic illusion,  achieved by the poetic “trickery” that we outlined in this 
chapter.1678 Whereas “truthfulness is posited as the overarching convention of realism; it is not 
however, a literal truthfulness, in the sense of a faithful imitation of a prior reality, but rather, it 
produces “an ‘air of reality,’ the verbal and textual production of an impression of truth.”1679 
 In this sense, in both hypnosis and novel reading, “all is true within the frame of pretense 
evoked by narration.”1680 In felicitous hypnotic discourse, “all is true” within the frame of the 
subject’s experience. And yet, neither field can do without “an oblique avowal of its stylized 
nature.”1681  
    
*** 
 
“Enchantment,” as Felski writes, is traditionally “the antithesis and enemy of criticism.”1682 
In this chapter I hope to have shown that on the contrary, enchanted and immersive reading, like 
trance, rather than merely “dull consciousness,” can also “tighten it.”1683 Provided that it is 
followed by a return to reality, the enjoyment and experience of esthetic enchantment reinforces, 
rather than dissolves, our ability to distinguish reality and fantasy. Fantasy, in this sense, helps us 
navigate reality in more efficient ways.1684 In Chapter 4, I will draw out the value—both 
therapeutic and ethical—of immersive and fictional narratives.  
 
1677 Martin Pokorny, “Illusion, Distance and Appropriation,” in The Aesthetic Illusion, 153. 
1678 Indeed, science fiction of fantasy are also illusory.  
1679 Furst, All is True, 173. 
1680 Ibid. See also:  “the success of a work of art may be measured by the degree to which it produces” an illusion: 
“that illusion makes it appear to us for the first time that we have lived another life— that we have had a miraculous 
enlargement of experience.” Henry James, in Theory of Fiction, ed. James E. Miller, Jr. (Lincoln, University of 
Nebraska Press, 1972), 93. 
1681 Furst, Ibid., 173. 
1682 Felski, Uses, 56. To be absorbed or worse, enchanted is “to be rendered impervious to critical thought, to lose 
one’s head and one’s wits, to be seduced by what one sees rather than subjecting it to sober and level-headed scrutiny.” 
Felski, Ibid. 
1683 Nell, Lost in a Book, 9. 
1684 See Cavell: “It is a poor idea of fantasy which takes it to be a world apart from reality, a world clearly showing its 
unreality. Fantasy is precisely what reality can be confused with. It is through fantasy that our conviction of the worth 
of reality is established; to forgo our fantasies would be to forgo our touch with the world.” Cavell, The World Viewed, 
85. See also Ernest Hilgard (1956): the parent who tells a child tales of ghosts and castles and brings the child safely 
back to the ordinary (“from the animistic to the objective world”) is in fact creating a lifelong openness to fantasy and 
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Chapter 4. What Can Literature Do? The Therapeutic 
and Ethical Value of Narratives 
 
 
Just as novels have a different way of conveying “truths” than do philosophical texts, 
hypnosis has a different way of conveying therapeutic messages than more cognitively oriented 
forms of therapy. In this chapter, I will underline some of the ways in which novels and hypnosis 
share common ways of affecting their recipients and, in this sense, of “doing” something in the 
world. More specifically, I will argue that a common process of “unselfing” can be found in both 
hypnosis and novel reading, an aesthetic-ethical process which stems from specifically narrative 
ways of thinking and looking at the world, and which is both therapeutically and ethically valuable.  
While the previous chapter focused on the inductive power of narratives, here I turn to their 
transformative effects on the recipient. In this way, I move from how narratives draw us in, to what 
they draw out in us. Because it centers on the therapeutic and ethical value of stories, this chapter 
is inscribed in the tradition of the defense of mimesis and poetic discourse in the good life.1685 
Grounded in the framework of narrative ethics, it underlines the similarities between what literary 
and hypnotic modes of narration do in the world when they bring about beneficial transformations 
in the individual.1686 As I argue, this requires a non-dramatic conception of hypnotic storytelling, 
which is rarely found in the history of medicine and psychoanalysis. My contention here is that 
 
thereby strengthening the ability to distinguish reality from fantasy: “the path to the other world is well worn, the 
entrance and exit swift and safe.” For Hilgard this ability then leads to greater hypnotic susceptibility. Conversely, a 
confused notion of the status of fantasy (fairies are real, you’re just not noticing them) might lead to a life in which 
“the door to other worlds will be kept firmly closed.” In Nell, 55. So the development of reality testing implies creating 
a safe and well-trodden path from reality to fantasy and back again: flexibility.). The fears and anxieties that (still) 
surround hypnosis recall those that appeared with the rise of the novel. In both cases however, the power is not in the 
‘authority’ of a controlling or corruptive mind, but rather, in the subject’s ability to pay attention to its objects, to 
examine them deeply, which–rather than stultified blindness–is the essence of both hypnotic and novelistic awareness. 
1685 See Aristotle, Poetics, 1448 b5, and Paul Ricoeur, Soi-même comme un autre (Paris, Éditions du Seuil, 1990). 
This chapter proposes a conception of the good life in which the wellbeing of the self and of others are not only 
compatible but contribute equally to eudemonia. Framing therapy as an ethical attitude toward the self, it reinscribes 
therapeutic care into the long tradition of Souci de soi. See Michel Foucault, “La culture de soi” in Histoire de la 
sexualité, III, Le Souci de soi (Paris : Gallimard, 1984) and L’herméneutique du sujet. Cours au collège de France, 
1981-1982.  (Paris : Gallimard, 2001). 
1686 Here I broadly follow Booth’s definition of ethical criticism as “any effort to show how the virtues of narratives 
relate to the virtues of selves and societies, or how the ethos of any story affects or is affected by the ethos—the 
collection of virtues—of any given reader.” Wayne Booth, The Company We Keep (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1988), 11. 
 359 
hypnosis is at heart a narrative form of therapy, a claim which justifies my comparison between 
hypnotherapy and the novel, rather than theatrical or poetic form. As most modern hypnotherapy 
is solution-oriented, it is often less concerned with causal explanation of symptoms than with the 
exploration of alternative possibilities, which is to say, of other, imagined lives. Hence, what sets 
hypnosis apart from other therapeutic models is what brings it closer to the novelistic imagination. 
As both lead the reader-subject to imaginatively project their center of experience into that of other 
beings and situations,1687 they mobilize a mode of imagining that redirects the attention away from 
narrow, aspect-blind narratives, toward the possibility and reality of other lives.1688 Whereas most 
therapeutic approaches that focus on “re-authoring” or “restorying” the client’s narrative do so 
from a detached, exterior perspective, hypnotherapy, as we saw in Chapter 3, leads the subject to 
inhabit imaginary situations or lives from within—as if they were actual and in an immersive 
manner—much like the reader is led to shift between various situated and experiential points of 
view presented in the novel. Hypnotic-imaginative access to this first-person, phenomenological 
perspective—which preserves the possibility of another, more detached third-person point of 
view—is intimately linked to the ethical value of the novel.  
My argument here is that this double position, produced in both fiction and hypnotic 
dissociation, creates temporary acts of unselfing, of imaginative “becoming other,” which, thanks 
to the process of re-centering, help us become other in actuality. Drawing on ethical criticism and 
contemporary moral philosophy that emphasizes the primacy of moral vision and attention, I aim 
to show that the modes of attending and becoming-other that hypnotherapy shares with novelistic 
aesthetics contribute to its value, both therapeutic and ethical. 
A study of hypnotic storytelling stresses the importance of the inner life as well as the non-
rational, unconscious or affective aspects which determine and constitute it, and transpire in one’s 
outer actions. Indeed, unlike what is portrayed in the direct suggestions of authoritative 
hypnotherapies of the late nineteenth-century, hypnotic change occurs not merely at the level of 
behavior but first and foremost at that of worldview. Although these psychological aspects were 
discarded with the linguistic turn in literary criticism and moral philosophy of the twentieth 
century, they deserve to be reexamined as they enrich our conception both of narratives and their 
 
1687 See Benson’s concept of recentering, described in the general Introduction.   
1688 Which is to say, the lives of others (whether actual individuals or fictional characters), and “other” possible or 
alternative life paths, for the individual. 
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reception, bridging the gap between texts and the empirical individuals who read them. As Maria 
Antonaccio points out, “a return to moral psychology would allow ethicists to give more sustained 
theoretical attention to the crucial question of the formation of consciousness in increasingly 
complex cultural circumstances.”1689 For her, this is especially necessary “in an age which is 
witnessing the astounding proliferation of images by electronic and other media.”1690 As she 
argues, “what we need are new pictures of the soul, and new forms of critical analysis to evaluate 
the process whereby human beings create pictures of themselves and come to resemble the 
picture.”1691 As I will suggest in this chapter, the study of modern hypnosis informed by ethical 
literary criticism provides a “picture of the soul” which posits that change occurs at the level of 
internal representations, and consists in “becoming the picture” which we have fictionally and 
imaginatively formed of ourselves.  
Furthermore, unlike behavioral and cognitive therapeutic models, hypnosis relies strongly 
on eliciting interior responses in the client, which are both immersive and affective, to instigate 
change. Although this affective component of hypnotherapy is still often reduced to the abreactive 
release found in the cathartic model that originated with Freud and Breuer, in this chapter I will 
show that catharsis is but one of many ways in which hypnotherapy uses the emotional responses 
of the subject for therapeutic purposes. Whereas catharsis involves the dramatic acting out and 
abreaction of trauma, modern hypnotherapy also makes use of gentler, narratively oriented ways 
of providing emotional release and integration, which do not involve the reexperiencing, in statu 
nascendi, of a pathogenic memory. The affective responsiveness that occurs in this case, as I hope 
to show, is similar to that which can occur in reading fiction.  
Indeed, just as modern hypnotherapy presupposes that emotional responses are essential 
for the implementation of therapeutic change, in the conception of reading which I put forth here, 
the emotional responsiveness of the reader is an essential part of the understanding of the fictional 
work. As David Novitz has shown, only with immersive, imaginative, and affective involvement 
in the fictional world can one “notice and appraise vital aspects of the work” which would 
otherwise go unnoticed.1692 Such types of engagement are essential to comprehending the nature 
 
1689 Maria Antonaccio, “Picturing the Soul: Moral Psychology and the Recovery of the Emotions,” Ethical Theory and 
Moral Practice 4, no. 2, Cultivating Emotions (June 2001): 139. 
1690 Ibid., 139. 
1691 Ibid. 
1692 David Novitz, “The Beholder’s Share,” in Knowledge, Fiction and Imagination (Philadelphia: Temple University 
Press 1987), 80. 
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of fictionality itself, so that “any response to a fictional work that prevents emotional involvement 
must also preclude a full understanding.”1693 Hypnotic narratives require and cultivate an affective-
imaginative response without which transformative experience cannot take place. Indeed, like 
fiction, they affect the emotional and unconscious mechanisms that determine the individual’s 
conscious content.1694 In both cases, change does not stem exclusively from content-based or 
propositional insight, but requires the mobilization of non-rational faculties as well. 
Although hypnotic narratives show that stories impact the whole self, they do so from 
within a non-suspicious paradigm, considering the unconscious as an ally with whom it is possible 
to communicate through narrative material, without having to engage in forms of paranoid or 
symptomatic reading.1695 Just as the “meanings” or “lessons” of literature are rarely made explicit 
in the text, hypnosis, unlike cognitive and insight-based therapeutic models that mobilize the 
client’s conscious awareness and analytic capacities, remains efficacious even when focused solely 
on the “manifest content” brought to the session. It works directly on the level of primary process 
thinking, symbolic images, linguistic formulations, representations, etc., without having to 
uncover their latent significance, or “paraphrasable content.”1696 Furthermore, neither novelists 
nor hypnotic operators offer explicit solutions or guidelines—interpretations, maxims, rules—to 
be transposed at a practical level, which underlines the acknowledgment and value of ambiguity, 
present in these discourses, for the ethical life. In both novels and hypnotherapy, particular 
 
1693 Ibid., 87. 
1694 See for example Derek Attridge’s description of moral change that emerges from literary encounters as a 
“conversion event” further down. 
1695 “The spirit of the hermeneutics of suspicion has made us believe that to read critically is necessarily to debunk, 
deconstruct, down, not to praise and admire. … How can we read philosophically without reducing the text to a witting 
or unwitting illustration of a preexisting theory? ... A critic who proceeds in this manner may easily come to look 
guileless, as if she hadn't heard of the sophisticated concepts on display in the work of the masters of suspicious 
critique. To be willing to learn from the work requires a critic capable of a certain degree of humility.” Moi, “The 
Adventure of Reading,” 127; 132.  See also A. K. Sedgwick, “Paranoid Reading and Reparative Reading, or, You’re 
So Paranoid, You Probably Think This Essay Is About You” from Touching Feeling: Affect, Pedagogy, Performativity 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2003). 
1696 Similarly, paraphrases of fictional works will generally not do justice to the complexity of their multi-layered 
evocative meanings. The ability to engage with fantasy material is of course central to psychoanalysis. However, in 
hypnotherapy, insight need not be brought to the fore to enable new understandings. As Leon Chertock observes, it 
can even be conducted in complete silence, with almost no knowledge of the client’s story, using ideomotor 
phenomena to formally “symbolize” aspects of the problem while leaving their content unmentioned, or even letting 
the work develop internally and silently in the trance state, without the therapist intervening or accessing the content, 
which remains unnamed and unformulated. Chertock calls this process “hypnose sèche” (“dry hypnosis”). Léon 
Chertock, in Mémoires d’un hérétique (Paris: La Découverte, 1990), 227. Roustang notes how this “laisser-faire” and 
automatism force the therapist to face the superfluous dimension of her intervention and thus the affective, 
countertransferential consequences of her own limitations: “Only by returning to her own impotence will she be able 
to overcome her impatience and invent new outcomes.” Roustang, Qu’est-ce que l’hypnose? 144. 
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problems are represented and given concrete and aesthetic form, rather than solved. It is from the 
experience of interacting with the fictional world and the modes of looking which it encourages, 
that change can emerge. As moral philosophers such as Iris Murdoch and Martha Nussbaum 
suggest, the ethical or therapeutic message is to be located mostly in the capacities of attention that 
literary discourse evoke and elicit, in the values which they interrogate and mobilize, rather than 
in any content one might extract from them. In both novels and hypnosis, therapeutic and ethical 
messages, if they exist, are not explicitly formulated but rather, are expressed by fictional narrative 
in the same way that a person is expressive in their gestures, that is, in the very suggestive nature 
of their discourse and being.1697 
In this sense, we can envision a rehabilitation of the cognitive potential of the imagination, 
which is the language of the unconscious as conceived in modern hypnotherapy. In “Fiction and 
the Growth of Knowledge,” David Novitz reminds us of how empiricism, as a heritage of the 
Enlightenment, dismissed the imagination as a source of error: 
Perhaps the most obvious legacy of the Enlightenment is the widely held belief that empirical science alone 
can furnish us with useful knowledge about the world. Any claim to knowledge which is not based on, or 
amenable to, scientific enquiry is generally regarded as … a kind of quackery to be shunned by all who are 
not simple-minded or superstitious. … On this view… the fanciful imagination turns out to be no more than 
a source of error which, if relied on, will lead to the total destruction of human nature.1698 
 
On the contrary, immersive and projective imagining have a determining role in an ethics of 
restorying.1699 I propose, however, a non-sentimental, non-Romantic response to dismissals of the 
 
1697 James O. Young, argues that a literary text can provide knowledge by carrying out “illustrative demonstrations,” 
which, rather than give arguments, “place people in a position where they can recognize the truth of a proposition.” 
Young, “Literature, Representation and Knowledge,” in Contemporary Readings in the Philosophy of Literature. An 
Analytic Approach, ed. D. Davies and C. Matheson (Peterborough, ONT: Broadview Press, 2008), 367.  Here, Young 
adopts a Wittgensteinian position in which “adopting a position” is a form of aspect-seeing: “One can think of a 
perspective as an interpretation of some object or objects. An archaeologist, for example, may look at a piece of flint 
and see it as—interpret it as—a hand axe. The non-archaeologist may see the same artefact as a non-descript rock.” 
Thus, while they have no truth value in themselves, perspectives “are one step away from containing truths,” as they 
can “assist people in acquiring” either true or false beliefs. If novels or hypnotic narratives provide knowledge, it is 
by gesturing, by showing “not directly, but by means of representations” what adopting a given perspective might 
look like. For Young, even if “a suggestion or a gesture … does not prove anything by itself,” once we have 
“reinterpreted” our experience by “using the perspective of the novel,” its rightness can then “become apparent” or 
not. Young, Ibid., 368; 367; 372. 
1698 Novitz, “Fiction and the Growth of Knowledge,” in Contemporary Readings in the Philosophy of Literature 
(Peterborough, Ont.: Broadview Press, 2008), 343. Novitz goes on: “We are already acquainted with the romantic 
reaction to all of this, and we have seen how easily it tumbles into an untenable idealism.” Ibid. Our response will thus 
have to be non-Romantic.  
1699 Here, the expression “projective imagination” merely designates the process by which the subject imagines herself 
as projecting her “center of experience” into another’s perspective, rather than the Kleinian concept of “projective 
identification” described in “Notes on some schizoid mechanisms,” International Journal of Psycho-Analysis 27 
(1946): 97-110.  
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cognitive potential of the imaginary. I suggest that fictional narratives are “laboratories” where 
other modes of seeing the world can be explored, including those which do not fit one’s values or 
elicit empathetic responses in the subject. This capacity to inhabit other lives can be transferred 
into actuality but does not imply that the individual must adhere to the worldview which they 
temporarily inhabit. Imaginative becoming-other teaches us, not by inculcating specific 
messages—on the mode of direct suggestion, or of the didactic—but by revealing how being 
emerges from seeing, and from the internal acts of narration upon which seeing is constructed. 
 A comparative study of hypnotic and literary imagination shows that the narrative 
dimension of our inner lives illuminates the relations between interiority and outer action, stressing 
the importance of fictional and vicarious experience in the constitution and direction of attention 
in actual life. In other words, if hypnosis and the novel change the individual, it is because their 
form, not their content, teaches us new aesthetic-ethical modes of looking at and relating to the 
world. The novelistic genre is thus especially relevant in the examination of therapeutic-ethical 
concerns. In fact, its complex temporality is a better match for the longer process of therapeutic 
change than shorter genres, and illuminates the therapeutic potential of the double, internal-
external positioning occurring in hypnotic dissociation. It also allows a freedom of movement, not 
just in space but also in time, analogous to the process in which hypnotic subjects are invited to 
“regress” to a previous life event or imaginatively “project” into a future one.1700 Furthermore, the 
suggestive ambiguity of novelistic prose—as opposed to the essay form, for instance—matches 
the evocative and indirect communication of modern permissive hypnosis, described in Chapter 3. 
In both novels and hypnosis, any transformation which occurs is not imposed on the subject but 
allowed to emerge naturally, a process which rehabilitates automatism as a creative capacity. 
Before we begin our examination of the therapeutic value of narratives in hypnosis, one 
possible objection to the comparison between novels and therapeutic change deserves special 
mention.1701 In its contemporary, postmodern form—characterized by heavy disillusionment 
regarding the existence of a psychological self, a knowable reality, and the possibility of linguistic 
 
1700 And indeed, “the possibility of following a character over time makes narrative a natural and perhaps even 
necessary companion for moral thought.” Nora Hämäläinen, Literature and Moral Theory (New York: Bloomsbury 
Academic, an imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Inc., 2017), 34. 
1701 Other objections we can anticipate are the unsuitability of evocative, ambiguous content to convey clearly 
identifiable pedagogical messages, the extension of novelistic temporality as opposed to the circumscribed therapeutic 
encounter, the profoundly relational nature of psychotherapy as opposed to reading as a silent, private process, and 
the descriptive, even conservative, dimension of literary realism as opposed to self-transformation. 
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representation—the novel might indeed seem especially unsuited for illuminating the 
psychological self, let alone the therapeutic setting. In Doubling the Point, for example, J.M. 
Coetzee describes contemporary novelists as “children shut in the playroom, the room of textual 
play, looking out wistfully through the bars at the enticing world of the grownups, one that we 
have been instructed to think of as the mere phantasmal world of realism but that we stubbornly 
can’t help thinking of as the real.”1702 This aesthetic skepticism is echoed in contemporary 
psychotherapy, where the dissolution of psychological realism by the postmodern framework no 
longer permits positing the existence of an unquestionable “unitary, enduring and private” self at 
the core of individuality.1703 Although in the realism still characteristic of the “modernist” era, the 
self might be “hidden, disguised, or obscured … neglected and warped in the course of 
development,” it can nevertheless always be “reached and by patient work, restored.”1704  
Like the novel, psychotherapy in the twenty-first century can no longer ignore the 
linguistic, constructed, and thus narrative dimension of its object of study, as Alan Parry and 
Robert Doan argue in Story Re-visions. Narrative Therapy in the Postmodern World (1994).1705 
Indeed, in the post-positivistic eclecticism which characterizes psychotherapy today, most 
theoretical models have taken into consideration the importance of narrativity, as I show in 
Appendix B. This “narrative turn” in psychotherapy makes it impossible to return to the 
“modernist” paradigm to which Freud belonged according to Perry and Doan.1706 As I will argue, 
hypnotic narratives should be understood in light of this theoretical shift, as they are founded on 
the very acknowledgment and manipulation of autosuggestions, and thus narrativity, at the heart 
of individual identity. Whether the ability to narrate our lives is an innate tendency as it is for 
 
1702 Coetzee, in J. M. Coetzee and David Attwell, Doubling the Point: Essays and Interviews. (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1992), 63. 
1703 Haim Omer and Nahi Alon, Constructing Therapeutic Narratives (Northvale, N.J: Jason Aronson, 1997), 223. 
See also Appendix. 
1704 Omer and Alon, Constructing Therapeutic Narratives, 223. 
1705 Similarly, as Coetzee asks in The Good Story: “Are all autobiographies, all life-narratives, not fictions, at least in 
the sense that they are constructions (fictions from Latin fingere, to shape or mould or form)?” J. M. Coetzee, The 
Good Story, 3. See also: “what we call the truth is only a shifting self-reappraisal.” Coetzee, Doubling the Point, 392.   
1706 Parry and Doan define modernism in psychotherapy as “the last attempt to preserve the sacred and mythic 
narratives of the Western tradition,” its “epistemological hangover” being the assumption that “with understanding, 
with knowing, comes freedom.” Alan Parry and Robert Doan, Story Re-visions. Narrative Therapy in the Postmodern 
World (New York and London: The Guilford Press, 1994), 11; 23. For them, Freud is a modernist in that he still works 
with the notion of a “real” self and adheres “to the faith that if his patients probed deeply enough they would find the 
answers they were looking for in the unconscious,” which once restored to consciousness, would put an end to 
pathological “interferences and resulting distortions” and restore patients’ perceptions to “once again correspond to 
reality as it was” (8). In this sense, “to the extent that therapists of any school continue to operate within assumptions 
of single-selfhood and its essential knowability, they remain steadfastly within a modernist sensibility.” Ibid., 13. 
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Jerome Bruner,1707 or whether we are “spoken into existence” as Rom Harré contends,1708 the 
narrative mode of organization of human experience is at the heart of modern hypnotherapy’s 
conception of human consciousness. A study of hypnosis illuminated by literary theory shows that 
fictional narratives, whether novelistic or therapeutic, can teach us ways to attain self-
understanding and self-transformation, even in this context of deconstructed identities and of 
“scepticism about the cognitive power of literature.”1709  
While it mobilizes aspects of the narrative identity thesis1710 and responds to critics that 
reduce self-narration to “distorting the past” or “taking one further away from accurate self-
understanding,” this defense of the cognitive and ethical dimensions of fictional narration and our 
emotional responses to it does not amount to an ethics of sensibility or of wishful thinking.1711 
Rather, it uses the terms “ethics” and “cognition” in an extended sense. Indeed, it rehabilitates non-
rational means of knowledge acquisition, while widening the scope of the ethical beyond the 
narrow moralistic sense, situating the ethical in all aspects of everyday life, rather than limiting it 
to a circumscribed, separate domain of existence.1712 Furthermore, it eschews the types of readings 
 
1707 For Bruner, there exists in humans an “innate” or “primitive disposition” to organize experience narratively, which 
is then supplemented by the individual’s culture with its various traditions of telling and interpreting. Jerome Bruner, 
Acts of Meaning (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), 80. Bruner’s work has been described as a 
Kantian revolution in this respect: “Just as Kant attempted to show that the world was fixed and lawful, not by nature, 
but because our mental apparatus makes it so, Bruner argues that narratives are not merely implements by which we 
describe a pre-existing orderly reality, but the very tools by which reality is ordered. Therefore, it is not disparaging 
to say that the self is a tale.” Omer and Alon, 226. 
1708 For Rom Harré, language games and forms of life create our sense of self: “one who is always presented as a 
person, by taking over the conventions through which this social act is achieved, becomes organized as a self.” Harré, 
Personal Being, 106. As seen in Chapter 3, Benson explains that “the sequence of pronominal development suggests 
a progression from public social being to more private personal being (mine—me—I).” Benson, 133.  Significant for 
our purposes further on, for Charles Taylor the self is also instituted by our frameworks of value, by what we deem 
“good,” by the act of “taking a stand” and knowing “where I stand.” Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self. The Making 
of Modern Identity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), 27. 
1709 Alice Crary, “Coetzee’s Quest for Reality,” in Beyond the Ancient Quarrel (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2017), 127. With this expression, Crary is not thinking of poststructuralist or deconstructionist critiques of selfhood, 
but of twentieth-century Anglo-American analytic philosophy’s criticism of the truth value of literary texts, according 
to which “literature qua literature cannot immediately inform our understanding of the world,” that “it is ‘not “truth-
telling” in any straightforward sense’.” Ibid. See Peter Lamarque and Stein Haugom Olsen, Truth, Fiction, and 
Literature: A Philosophical Perspective (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 440.  
1710 See Paul Ricoeur, conclusion of Temps et Récit (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1983-1985): “Without the concept of 
narration, the problem of personal identity is condemned to an insoluble antinomy: either one posits a subject which 
is identical to itself in all the diversity of its states, or one contends, as did Hume and Nietzsche, that this identical 
subject is but a substantialist illusion.” Ricoeur, 355, our translation. See also Soi-Même Comme un Autre, 199-201.  
1711 Galen Strawson, “Against Narrativity.” Ratio 18, no. 4 (December 2004): 428; and: “About every story we can 
legitimately ask, qui bono?” Coetzee, The Good Story, 60. 
1712 Here, I follow Murdoch and Diamond’s idea that any delineation of the field of ethics, whether “implicit or 
explicit,” already reflects “substantial moral views,” including the “neutral” attempts and “linguistic” method of mid-
twentieth-century analytic philosophy. Cora Diamond, “Murdoch the Explorer,” Philosophical Topics, Vol. 38, No. 
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which reduce literary texts to mere illustrative examples, or impose theoretical-philosophical 
interpretive frameworks onto them, neglecting the specificity of their form. In this sense, defending 
the ethical value of literature is not a matter of producing moralistic interpretations or casuistry, 
but of drawing out the specific ways in which literature teaches us to look at the world.  
By drawing on these seemingly unrelated fields, this chapter thus makes apparent how 
post-Wittgensteinian moral particularists1713 and modern hypnotherapists in Ericksonian branches 
present similar, anti-theoretical challenges to the “mother” disciplines from which they emerged 
and whose conceptual framework they reject (namely contemporary moral and analytic philosophy 
on the one hand, and positivist, neurobiological, or even classic analytic models of the mind on 
the other).1714 Both reject systematizations, generalizations, and other “metaphysical” 
solidifications which obscure the particular and shifting complexity of reality. Instead, both 
redirect awareness to our preexisting evaluative frameworks and the ways in which these shield us 
from perceiving reality in all of its specificity. By insisting on the singularity of unique cases and 
on the importance of non-essentializing stances, both indicate, as Cora Diamond puts it, that 
“theory can't do the work for us.”1715  
From within this framework, I will show that the content and the direction of attention 
constitute the foundation of both hypnotherapeutic change and of the ethical life. In order to do so, 
 
1, Ethics (Spring 2010): 53. For Diamond, the question of the boundaries of the ethical field should not be settled once 
and for all: “the ‘domain of moral philosophy’ isn't something that can cease to be problematic.” Ibid., 52. 
1713 This branch of moral philosophy was pioneered by Peter Winch, then developed by Cora Diamond, Raimond 
Gaita, Martha Nussbaum, as well as Murdoch, although the latter is difficult to neatly categorize. Just like 
hypnotherapists consider that hypnotic processes and structures permeate the entirety of everyday life, the particularist 
post-Wittgensteinians agree on the impossibility of circumscribing the field of ethics and eschew systematic theorizing 
at the meta-ethical level. Hämäläinen, Literature and Moral Theory, 64. Thus, they mostly limit the role of the moral 
philosopher to that of investigating particular examples: “All we can do… is to look at particular examples and see 
what we do want to say about them; there are no general rules which can determine in advance what we must say 
about them.” Peter Winch, Ethics and Action (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, 1972), 182. Rorty and Diamond 
adopt more anti-theoretical stances, rejecting systematization and theoretical generalization in the domain of ethics 
altogether. However, as Nora Hämäläinen specifies, particularism does not necessarily exclude all forms of 
normativity, which can also “designate a level of philosophical evaluation/judgment still operative even at the level 
of the particular,” and “provide guidance by means of narratives and situation bound considerations in relation to 
particular cases.” Hämäläinen, 66. In this sense, it merely shows “the complexity of specific cases, the plurality in 
outcomes.” Ibid, 66. Among these thinkers who have argued for the integration of literature into the field of moral 
philosophy, I will pay attention especially to those who are sympathetic to the examination of the individual’s 
worldview and inner life as ethically relevant, thereby extending the domain of moral thought beyond the narrow 
boundaries of behavioral or deontological ethics. 
1714 As Nora Hämäläinen has noted, the “ethics-literature discussion” has led to a renegotiation of the boundaries of 
both literature and moral philosophy, instituting a renewed “openness to things beyond the main target of the 
discipline—in the case of literary theory toward the world outside the text and in the case of moral philosophy toward 
things that may not be expressive in terms of systematic moral theory.” Hämäläinen, 7.  
1715 Diamond, “Murdoch the Explorer,” 780. 
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I will use Iris Murdoch’s concept of moral attention—which she borrows from Simone Weil—to 
illuminate shared aspects of hypnotherapy, novelistic texts and moral philosophy. Indeed, hypnosis 
and the novel share a common process in which the attention is invited to turn away from the self 
and its neurotic or egoic narratives, and toward the lives—and stories—of others. For Murdoch, 
this process of “unselfing,” which is a central component of artistic reception, is essential to the 
good life. As I would like to show, it can be found both in hypnosis and novel reading, and is 
valuable not just ethically, but also therapeutically.  
In this chapter, after setting up a framework in which hypnosis can be reconceptualized as 
a form of narrative—rather than merely dramatic or cathartic—therapy, I will propose two ways 
in which this therapeutic “unselfing,” which is embedded in narrative modes of thinking and 
looking at the world, can be understood. First of all, it is the “unselfing” that occurs when hypnotic-
novelistic narration redirects the subject’s attention away from the self and its habitual narratives, 
toward alternative modes of apprehending reality. This first mode, I call “immersive restorying,” 
and explore in Section 4.2. The second form of “unselfing,” then, is one in which the attention, 
having been directed outwards—away from the self-centered, neurotic, narratives—can 
imaginatively enter other lives, by adopting a fictional yet experiential first-person point of view. 
This second form, discussed in Section 4.3, I call “projective imagining,” in the sense that the 
subject’s center of awareness is projected out and into another center, which is then inhabited or 
adopted—fictionally and temporally, on the mode of the “as if”—as one’s own. Unlike the defense 
mechanism of “projective identification” found in Kleinian branches of psychoanalysis, the 
process of “projective imagination” does not involve splitting off unwanted parts of the self, but 
rather, imaginatively transporting the locus of the “I” through serious games of make-believe such 
as those found in fictional and hypnotic narratives.1716 
In this way, I will underline the therapeutic value of narratives by drawing on arguments 
that are used to underscore their ethical value. Murdoch’s concept of moral attention will therefore 
 
1716 In the Kleinian concept of “projective identification,” unwanted parts of the self are split off and projected into 
the other. See Melanie Klein, “Notes on Some Schizoid Mechanisms,” International Journal of Psycho-Analysis 27 
(1946): 97-110. See also: “In projective identification parts of the self and internal objects are split off and projected 
into the external object, which then becomes possessed by, controlled and identified with the projected parts. 
Projective identification has manifold aims: it may be directed toward the ideal object to avoid separation, or it may 
be directed toward the bad object to gain control of the source of danger. Various parts of the self may be projected, 
with various aims: bad parts of the self may be projected in order to get rid of them as well as to attack and destroy 
the object, good parts may be projected to avoid separation or to keep them safe from bad things inside or to improve 
the external object through a kind of primitive projective reparation.” Hanna Segal, Introduction to the Work of 
Melanie Klein (New York: Basic Books, 1974), 27–28. 
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be central in this discussion, but will also be used in a more extensive, de-Christianized, sense. 
Indeed, here I also hope to emphasize the ways in which Murdoch is influenced by psychoanalysis, 
shifting critical attention away from the Platonism and mysticism often emphasized in her 
work.1717 By transposing her concepts of moral attention and unselfing to the therapeutic field, I 
will reveal the importance that Murdoch also grants to fantasy, narration, and unconscious or 
affective processes in the constitution of the individual’s ethical “texture of being,” which on the 
one hand can limit our ethical awareness, but on the other can be redirected in order to produce 
transformation. By reemphasizing the connection between “immorality” and failure in attention 
(rather than evil or innate deficiency), I hope to illuminate modern hypnotherapy’s potential of 
depathologization, which relies on the transformative potential of narrative and imagination. In 
both Murdoch and hypnosis, the redirection of the attention toward neglected possibilities, and 
away from illusory or harmful autosuggestions, constitutes the key to self-transformation, and the 
latent ethical value of fictional hypnotic-literary narratives. Despite their major differences, the 
narrative conception which I defend in this chapter shows that in both post-Wittgensteinian moral 
philosophy and hypnotherapy, self-transformation is not achieved by obeying different norms or 
general principles, but by refining capacities such as attention and perception. In this sense, 
absorption in the reality of other lives acts as an antidote to self-absorption. Both hypnotherapy 
and the novel (even in its postmodern, metanarrative forms), confront us with the transformative 
potential inherent in restorying, and with our own failures in moral attention. In this sense, we are 
placed in a position of responsibility to further cultivate attentiveness and openness toward our 
own potentially other lives, as well as those of others, and to a certain degree, to “commit” to the 
choices that stem from the understanding that ensues. 
In the first part of this chapter (in Section 4.1), I will argue that hypnosis is a narrative form 
of therapy, in order to justify the comparison between hypnotic and novelistic imagination. In 
Section 4.2, I then draw out the ethical potential of the mode of attending enabled by the creative 
re-vision of hypnotic and novelistic imagination, by using Martha Nussbaum’s defense of the 
 
1717 Reexamining the primacy of moral attention in Murdoch’s work shifts the focus back toward her moral 
psychology, rather than the Platonic, mystical and Christian aspects described for instance in: Elizabeth Burns, “Iris 
Murdoch and the Nature of Good,” Religious Studies 33, no. 3 (Sept. 1997): 303-313; Maria Antonaccio, “Imagining 
the Good: Iris Murdoch's Godless Theology,” The Annual of the Society of Christian Ethics 16 (1996): 223-242; Silvia 
Panizza, “A Secular mysticism?” in Filosofía, arte y mística (Salamanca: Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca, 2017); 
Nora Hämäläinen, “What is a Wittgensteinian Neo-Platonist? Iris Murdoch, Metaphysics and Metaphor,” 
Philosophical papers 42, no. 2 (July 2014): 191-225. 
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novel as moral philosophy and Iris Murdoch’s concept of moral attention. I sketch out an ethics of 
“unselfing” and “immersive restorying,” where fictional narratives enable a reorientation of the 
subject’s awareness, which leads to a corrective internal experience. Finally, in Section 4.3, I move 
from this internal transformation to the externally oriented, “projective imagination,” In this 
second-mode of unselfing or becoming other, the ability to immerse oneself in the lives of others 
is described as a central ethical capacity, of which novels and hypnosis provide significant models. 
Throughout the whole chapter, then, I argue that the link between ethics and hypnosis-therapeutics 
is therefore aesthetic in nature, and that the projective imagination is what opens up the individual 
to both the possibility, and reality, of other lives.  
 
4.1. Hypnosis as “Narrative Therapy”? 
 
In this section, my goal is to show that hypnosis can be conceived of as a narrative, rather 
than as a dramatic form of therapy. This will allow me to underline, in the two sections that follow, 
the therapeutic and ethical value of narrative ways of looking at the world, which are shared by 
hypnosis and novelistic prose. As I will argue here, once they are examined in light of the 
experience of novel reading, two of the main techniques used in hypnotherapy—hypnotic 
“regression” and “futurization”—can be conceived of as complex forms of storytelling, rather than 
mere abreaction or other dramatic-mimetic forms of acting-out. This requires that we take into 
consideration the distance and awareness at the heart of the experience, which we discussed in 
Chapter 3. In this way, the hypnotic subject’s ability to “narrate”—that is, to recreate and 
reinterpret—rather than blindly reproduce, her experience in the therapeutic context, will become 
more clearly apparent. 
 
4.1.1. Mimetic vs. Anti-mimetic Poles of the Hypnotic Experience  
 
Since the end of the twentieth century, psychotherapists have had to adapt to postmodern, 
antipositivist, and anti-psychiatric criticism, which brought psychopathological realism and the 
concept of mental illness into question.1718 These were replaced with a linguistic perspective that 
 
1718 For the history of the narrative turn in medicine, psychiatry, and psychotherapy, see appendix. For a description 
of the narrative turn in psychoanalysis, see chapter 1. 
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drew attention away from pathology and toward explaining symptoms as systems of 
communication and narration. In this process, the ideal of an objective science of the mind became 
destabilized from all sides, as if under attack.1719 In reaction against biological models, therapy 
exploded into a “multiple relativism” which culminated into the aporia of the famous Dodo Bird 
Verdict, according to which everybody wins.1720 Since then, multiple branches of psychotherapy 
have adopted the “narrative turn” described by Bradley Lewis in Narrative Psychiatry, which is 
helpful to reconcile and integrate various psychological models under a shared orientation, without 
falling into an “anything-goes relativism.”1721 After World War II, hypnotherapy similarly evolved 
to take into consideration this theoretical revolution,1722 and came to define itself as the art of 
manipulating language and communication, rather than subjects, mental faculties or parts of the 
psyche. Strikingly however, in the history of medicine and psychoanalysis, as in the hypnotic 
literature itself, the narrative dimension of hypnosis is still excessively underemphasized. Too 
often, hypnotherapy is described a cathartic, dramatic practice, in which repressed memories are 
uncovered, “acted out” and abreacted, as if hypnosis had not evolved since the method developed 
by Freud and Breuer. In this chapter, I will argue that, on the contrary, a proper understanding of 
therapeutic success in hypnotherapy requires a narrative conception of the subject’s activity. In 
this light, hypnosis no longer requires positing the historical truth of the material which it 
“uncovers” and can be considered as one of the narratively oriented therapies described by Bradley 
Lewis in Narrative Psychiatry, even though Lewis fails to mention it among the models he 
enumerates. Reconceptualizing hypnosis in light of literary theory will therefore reveal the 
centrality of fictionality and storytelling in its practice—not merely in its content, but also in its 
structure and form.  
 
1719 Omer and Alon underline the lexical field of colonization at the heart of this opposition between positivist and 
anti-positivist theories and practices: “Each barbarian tribe had no idea it was part of the ‘barbarian invasion’. Their 
cumulative effects, however, slowly began to make a difference. Anti-positivism became more organized… Many 
positivists became barbarized.” Omer and Alon, 191. 
1720 This principle indicates that when it comes to therapeutic success, the specific therapeutic method matters less 
than the common factors shared by all forms of therapy, regardless of the particular school of thought of the 
practitioner. For a more detailed explanation, see appendix.  
1721 Bradley Lewis, Narrative Psychiatry (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011), 32. 
1722 See especially the work of Gregory Bateson and the Palo Alto School, for example: Jay Haley, Strategies of 
Psychotherapy (Grune & Stratton 1963); Gregory Bateson, Mind and Nature: A Necessary Unity. (New York: Dutton, 
1979) and G. Bateson, Don D. Jackson, Jay Haley, and John Weakland, “Toward a Theory of Schizophrenia,” 
Behavioral Science 1, no. 4 (1956): 251-254. 
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The non-narrative, dramatic conception of hypnosis stems from what Ruth Leys and 
Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen name its mimetic dimension, which as I suggest, is overemphasized at the 
expense of its anti-mimetic pole.1723 As Leys describes it, hypnotic mimesis designates the 
tendency of the hypnotic subject to “imitate or repeat whatever they were told to say or do,” like 
an automaton.1724 Borch-Jacobsen stresses the importance of using the term mimesis rather than 
imitation, since the latter still presumes the existence of a “spectatorial” or “spectating” subject, 
who according to this conception, is “absent” during the hypnotic experience.1725 In the case of the 
hysteric patient, the activity of the subject is reduced to a mere “reproduction of traumatic scenes,” 
as in Charcot’s demonstrations described in Chapter 1.1726 This conception of hypnosis as pure 
mimesis best describes the state of the practice in the late 1880s. In Bernheim’s Suggestive 
Therapeutics, this is especially clear in descriptions of subjects who act out suggestions as if 
performing on stage:  
I say ‘You are a young girl.’ He drops his head in a modest way, opens a drawer, takes out a piece of cloth 
and pretends to sew… I say: ‘You are a general at the head of your army. He holds himself erect, and cries 
out ‘Forward!’ balancing his body as if he were on horseback. I say ‘You are a good and holy priest’. He puts 
on a pious expression, walks to and from reading his breviary, and makes the sign of the cross, as seriously 
as if it were all reality.1727  
 
Here, the laboratory has become a theater, the subject turned into a mere automaton and hypnosis 
into a practice resembling sadistic entertainment barely disguised as scientific experimentation. If 
anything is serious here, it is the ability of the vivid—realist, hypnotic—illusion to seemingly 
constitute an attack on the dignity of the subject, who according to this dramatic conception 
becomes dispossessed of his agency and autonomy.1728 This conception of hypnosis is 
strengthened by Bernheim’s abundant use of a theatrical vocabulary: the verbs “play” and 
 
1723 For example, Micale describes the “dramatic, convulsive, polysymptomatic forms” of hysteria in Charcot’s 
writings of the 1880 and the “gross and florid” motor and sensory conversions in Breuer and Freud’s Studies on 
Hysteria. Micale, “On the ‘Disappearance’ of Hysteria, A Study in the Clinical Deconstruction of a Diagnosis,” Isis 
84, no. 3 (September 1993): 498. 
1724 Leys, Trauma, 8. 
1725 Borch-Jacobsen, “Dispute,” in Chertock et. al., Hypnose en Psychanalyse (Paris: Dunod, 1987), 203-6; The 
Freudian Subject, 39. Nevertheless, as Leys has shown, in his ulterior writing, Borch-Jacobsen shifts from this mimetic 
conception to a “repudiation” of his previous understanding, in favor of an anti-mimetic emphasis on the autonomy 
of the subject. Leys, Trauma, 14. 
1726 As we shall see, this notion of mimesis “tended to call into question the veracity of the victim’s testimony… and 
hence to make traumatic neurosis and traumatic memory a matter of suggested fabrication or simulation.” Leys, 
Trauma, 10. 
1727 Richet, in Bernheim, Suggestive Therapeutics, 59. 
1728 This is the paradoxical seriousness (power) of hypnosis, which is in great part responsible for the lack of 
seriousness (legitimacy) often attributed to hypnosis as a practice, as in Thomas Mann’s description of stage hypnosis. 
See the general introduction. 
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“perform,” the adjective “dramatic,” and the terms “part” or “role” appear time and again in the 
descriptions of his case histories1729.  
Even in modern histories of hypnosis, the mimetic theory is hard to shake. Even in its 
permissive and indirect forms, hypnotherapy remains strongly tinted by the cathartic model and 
linked to the nineteenth-century conceptions of the conscious subject as, strictly speaking, absent. 
As Borch-Jacobsen puts it:  
The subject cannot see himself miming another at the moment he is miming, just as he cannot say that he is 
playacting precisely while he is acting. In order to do that—in order to see the invisible, or say the 
unsayable—he would have to reflect himself, absent himself from the plane on which he is speaking, take 
himself as reference point for his own discourse; in short, he would have to arrive at the vantage point of the 
lucid spectator.1730 
 
This conception of hypnotic “becoming-other” as an obliteration of the subject is in great part due 
to the fact that even today, hypnotherapy is often reduced to one of its many potential uses. Indeed, 
it is too often associated with its traditional function in trauma recovery work, where according to 
the dramatic conception, the patient, “incapable of consciously testifying to her traumatic 
experience,” is supposedly only able “to repeat it in the mode of a compulsive and repetitive acting 
out” during the trance state.1731 This “mimetic-suggestive” paradigm conceives of hypnotic 
regression as a process where the subject is “immerse[d] so profoundly” in reliving the past 
memory that “the kind of specular distance necessary for cognitive knowledge” of the event is 
“precluded.”1732 In this conception of trauma-work, hypnotic remembrance can never be a 
recollection or narration. It is a mere reproduction, a re-living of repressed material, which for 
Leys, explains why “the effort to cure patients by getting them, through the use of hypnotic 
catharsis or by other means, to recollect and narrate the dissociated traumatic origin was destined 
to fail.”1733 Available only in hypnotic trance but not in conscious awareness, the traumatic scene 
is never “present” to the subject as subject. In the shell-shocked soldiers and nineteenth-century 
case histories examined by Leys, “a scrutiny of the case histories of the traumatic neuroses suggests 
 
1729 Bernheim, Suggestive Therapeutics, 55-60. 
1730 Borch-Jacobsen, The Freudian Subject, 39. 
1731 Leys, Trauma, 2. For the patient suffering from PTSD, “the victim is unable to recollect and integrate the hurtful 
experience in normal consciousness; and instead, is haunted or possessed by intrusive traumatic memories. The 
experience of the trauma, fixed or frozen in time, refuses to be represented as past, but is perpetually reexperienced in 
a painful dissociated, traumatic present.” Ibid. This description could just as well apply to the Freudian conception of 
transference. In either case, repressed past material escapes the law of temporal change and pushes to become 
conscious again.  
1732 Ibid., 9 
1733 Ibid., emphasis added 
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that this [narration under hypnosis] is a demand that cannot readily be met.”1734 This is largely 
because in traditional models, the conception of the subject is still one in which “in deep hypnosis 
[he or she] is not a spectator of the (real or fantasized) emotional scene but is completely caught 
up in it.”1735 In this conception, the trance state involves “a profound absence from, or forgetfulness 
of, the self,” in which “the dissociated patient suffers his passion ‘beyond’ himself—beyond 
memory and self-representation—literally fainting away in the hypnotic enactment.” Leys, 
643.1736 In other terms, the subject is fundamentally absent, having become “altered” by hypnosis 
and thus “other to itself.”1737 
As I will argue further on, this conception greatly underestimates both the anti-mimetic 
aspect of hypnosis and the suggestive nature of the medical or experimental environments which 
lead patients to adopt such types of behavior. Borch-Jacobsen and Leys’ argument that “if speech 
or verbalization often accompanies those scenes, it does so not in the form of a discourse … but in 
the mode of an intensely animated miming of the traumatic ‘event’ that occurs in the absence of 
self-observation and self-representation” neglects the subject’s capacity to engage fully in “fiction” 
or make-believe. Additionally, its platonic undertones of criticism of mimesis echoes eighteenth-
century critics of the novel’s “dangerous powers.” Indeed, as shown in Chapter 3, the absorbed 
subject’s full immersion and engagement in hypnotic remembrance, even when it gives off an 
 
1734Leys, “Shell Shock, Janet, and the Question of Memory.” Critical Inquiry 20, no. 4, (Summer, 1994): 632. In Leys’ 
descriptions of the use of hypnosis in the treatment of the war neuroses with shell-shock soldiers for instance, it is 
impossible that “the patient's speech and behavior under hypnosis be interpreted “as a narrative in full consciousness 
of that lived experience as past.” On the contrary, hypnotic regression merely leads subjects to carry out a 
“‘reproduction’ of the traumatic scene in the mode of a ‘blind’ emotional acting in the present” (ibid.) This “emotional 
acting out of the hypnotic catharsis” cannot be converted “into re-presentation and self-narration.” Ibid. 
1735 Ibid., 632 
1736 In Leys’ example, (taken from Brown) indeed, “the shell-shocked soldier immediately begins to twist and turn on 
the couch and shouts terror-stricken voice. He talks as he talked at the time when the shock occurred to him. He really 
does live again through the experiences of that awful time. Sometimes he speaks as if in dialogue, punctuated with 
intervals of silence corresponding to the remarks of his [hallucinated] interlocutor, like a person speaking at the 
telephone. At other times he indulges in imprecations and soliloquy.... In every case he speaks and acts as if he were 
again under the influence of the terrifying emotions.” Leys, “Shell Shock,” 643. In these examples, “patients often 
became confused to the point of swooning when they were asked to narrate their experiences in the past tense. In some 
cases [the shell-shocked soldier] is able to reply to my questions and give an account of his experiences,” Brown 
relates. “In others he cannot do so, but continues to writhe and talk as if he were still in the throes of the actual 
experience” Brown, in Leys, in Critical Inquiry, 644. This shows the subject’s remarkably strong aesthetic capacity 
for make-believe. Furthermore, contrary to Leys’ examples, numerous modern empirical cases show examples of 
patients re-narrating calmly, without the dramatic acting out of nineteenth century and shell-shocked catharsis.  
1737 See also: “It is its own other, although it is never able to represent that other to itself” Roustang, foreword to 
Borch-Jacobsen’s The Freudian Subject (Stanford: University of California Press, 1988), viii. My central argument in 
this chapter is that becoming other does not necessarily imply losing oneself. Failure to understand this point is in fact 
the main cause of “resistance” in subjects who struggle to enter the hypnotic state. 
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impression of total absence, is not incompatible with a simultaneous awareness that often remains 
highly active. During hypnotic regression, attention has merely been redirected, it has not become 
inoperative. The intensity of the affect which can accompany hypnotic remembrance thus need not 
call into question the subject’s capacity to narrate. Rather, the behavior of the subject can be 
explained by a combination of cultural-historical expectations and authoritative (often 
unconscious) suggestions on the part of the clinicians of what the trance state should look like.1738 
In other words, the impression of non-narrativity given by the nineteenth-century and early 
twentieth-century case histories examined by Leys is the outcome of the clinician and subject’s 
unsuspected collaboration, of their shared desire to produce a successful therapeutic outcome, and 
therefore of their temporary, willful forgetting, of the subject’s “hidden observer.”1739 
A mimetic conception of trauma and hypnosis thus leads to a reductive description of 
hypnotic phenomena and subjectivity. Firstly, it omits the fact that traumatic abreaction is but one 
of many illustrations of the hypnotic ability to temporarily become-other, which must be 
reinscribed in a more general framework of hypnotic narrativity in order to be properly understood. 
Indeed, it omits the therapeutic potential of hypnotic dissociation, in which the subject is able to 
observe herself while carrying out fictional acts of make-believe, looking upon herself as one 
would a fictional character. Secondly, it misses the subtlety of hypnotic temporality, which, like 
the novel, allows for various movements of back and forth in time, as well as condensation, 
dilatation or distortions of the subjective experience of duration.1740 Finally, neglecting the 
narrative dimension of the hypnotic experience takes away the responsibility of the subject and the 
contingency at the heart of human experience. Reconceptualized as narrative, the therapeutic 
 
1738 For a description of the inevitably suggestive nature of both therapeutic and experimental contexts, see Chapter 1.  
1739 Indeed, in Spiegel’s example analyzed further down, a part of the subject’s awareness still understands the 
instructions regarding trance, i.e., the meta-instructions, despite the fact that he no longer “understands” on the internal 
level of “content.” Indeed, “despite this need to use an interpreter when interviewing him at ages younger than 13 
years, he could understand and respond without evidence of confusion to instruction related to his state of trance. For 
example, while being interviewed at the 10-year-old level, he was told, ‘When I touch your forehead, your eyes will 
close’ and ‘You are now going back into the years; you are now 6 years old—this is your sixth birthday’. His response 
was so clear that there was no doubt whatsoever that he understood exactly what was said. Again, at the 6-year-old 
level, when asked, ‘How old are you?’ he looked around with confusion and asked, ‘Vas?’. This case illustrates both 
the layering of memories that are later tapped by the trance regression and the dual focus that characterizes the trance. 
The subject relived the world as he had experienced it at age 12 years in German and at the same time understood 
trance instructions in English as a 25-year-old adult. This rather strange situation seemed to provoke little tension or 
puzzlement for the subject.” David Spiegel and Herbert Spiegel, Trance and Treatment, Clinical Uses of Hypnosis 
(Washington DC and London: American Psychiatric Publishing, 2004), 33, emphasis added. 
1740 See M. Erickson and Linn Cooper, Time Distortion in Hypnosis. An Experimental and clinical investigation (1959; 
Bancyfelin: Crown House Publishing, 2006).  
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potential of hypnotherapy reveals itself to reside less in affective abreaction than in the imaginative 
exploration of a range of fictional, alternative plotlines, which place the subject in a position of 
making a choice about the type of self-narration they wish to adopt. Rather than the mere acting 
out of an indefinitely reemerging past, hypnosis offers an imaginative yet realist antidote to the 
fatalism or deterministic outlooks that can lead to disillusioned apathy.  
Furthermore, because it reconciles narrativity with its emotional and unconscious efficacy, 
our narrative conception of hypnosis bypasses the central “conundrum” that reemerges throughout 
its history, integrating the mimesis-anti-mimesis opposition rather than oscillating between both 
poles.1741 The narrative outlook yields a balanced conception of hypnosis, distancing it from the 
“blindness” of the mimetic pole toward the autonomy and creative capacities of the subject. For 
this reason, the history of literary theory can help us to better understand the nature of hypnotic 
experience: theories of reading and reader-responses reveal that genuine emotional responsiveness 
to fictional works can be experienced without us having to decide on the truth value of the text or 
the narrated content. Hypnosis and literature thus mutually illuminate one another: both engage 
the whole subject, without this leading us to give too much weight to the problem of historical 
truth in the constitution of a worldview, of an individual’s value or belief system.1742 The 
seriousness of narrative—that is, the ability of fictional utterances to do things in the world—thus 
extends beyond the truth of its propositional knowledge. Rather, it lies in the transformative 
potential of the imaginative-aesthetic capacity to temporarily become-other and in the effects or 
responses that it elicits in the reader. As a form of make-believe in the sense of Kendall Walton, 
becoming-other has little to do with a total loss of self. On the contrary, it allows for a more 
informed return to the self, a notion which is at the center of hypnotherapy. As Erika Fromm notes 
in Hypnotherapy and Hypnoanalysis, “the inner world makes possible a two-step adaptation 
process: temporary withdrawal from the external world followed by a return to the external word 
with improved mastery.”1743 A comparative study of the transformative potential of hypnotic and 
 
1741 Leys, Trauma, 14. Leys has shown how the oscillation between mimesis and anti-mimesis “structures the history 
of trauma” and, as seen in our general introduction, is at the heart of the debates concerning the nature of the hypnotic 
state. Ibid. The narrative conception I am defending bypasses the need to choose between these opposed, mimetic and 
anti-mimetic, poles. 
1742 The narrative framework is also useful in trauma recovery as it avoids the binary alternative between either 
“cognitive recovery and integration” or “cathartic discharge or abreaction,” as it is presented by Leys, in Trauma, 12. 
1743 Fromm, Hypnotherapy and Hypnoanalysis (Hillsdale NJ; London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers, 
1986), 221. 
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novelistic narratives thus allows for a renewed description of how, as Arthur Frank puts it, stories 
are “made of air but leave their mark.”1744  
In what follows, I will begin by bringing out the narrative dimension of the hypnotic 
imagination, arguing hypnotherapy is best placed in the domain of narrative oriented therapies. 
Then, I will examine two specific hypnotic therapeutic narratives: regression and futurization. In 
doing so, my objective is to underline similarities that these techniques share with the projective 
imagination represented and cultivated in novelistic texts. My contention is that non-narrative 
conceptions of hypnosis, which take these techniques literally rather than as exercises in 
storytelling, blur the lines between historical and narrative truth, creating risks at both the 
therapeutic and the ethical levels. If properly understood as narrative techniques, regression and 
futurization reveal the transformative power of imaginative and affective engagement. Not only is 
this immersivity shared by hypnosis and literature, it distinguishes the former from cognitive 
therapies and the latter from the philosophical essay, journalistic piece or historical treatise. Thus, 
the bond between the therapeutic and ethical value of the narratives I examine here is their aesthetic 
dimension.  
 
4.1.1. 1.     The Hypnotic Subject of Enunciation: Narrative Discourse and Dissociation 
 
Representations of the fin-de-siècle hypnotic subject often involve images of the hysteric 
blindly acting out a traumatic memory which she cannot, strictly speaking, narrate. A closer 
examination of the history of hypnosis, however—especially outside the history of trauma—
reveals that narrativity—that is, the ability for the subject to narrate her experience and the degree 
of reflexive awareness necessary to do so—is present at the heart of hypnosis. Furthermore, I 
would argue that this was even the case in the 1880s, despite the historical and cultural differences 
between trance phenomena of the time, and those displayed in hypnotherapy offices today.  
In this sense, rather than an essential modality of hypnotic cure, the “hysterical” acting out 
which is so characteristic of nineteenth-century hypnosis can be considered as the product of the 
therapist’s expectations, and the cultural context in which the hypnotic experience unfolds. The 
 
1744 Arthur Frank, Letting Stories Breathe. A Socio-Narratology (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 
2010), 51. 
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“acted out” material could have very well been narrated, had narrating been the expectation at the 
time.  
Even in nineteenth-century conceptions of the hypnotic subject as automaton, the 
acknowledgment that the subject is not systematically or entirely absent from himself is still 
present. For example, in a male patient who relives an 1870 battle scene during hypnotic regression 
twenty years later, Bernheim notes the split in awareness between two temporally divided yet 
presently coexisting subjects of experience: “It is another self he sees and feels acting in this 
strange division of his personality. He speaks to me, answers me, knows that he has been put to 
sleep in the hospital and, at the same time, finds himself on the battle-field; the inconsistency does 
not strike him.”1745 Similarly, about a patient who imagines himself peacefully walking and 
conversing with his brother, a wood merchant at Bar-le-Duc, Bernheim notes: 
He… tells me everything he has seen on the walk… In spite of his dream, he retained the idea of reality. He 
knew that I was present and that he was asleep. At one and the same time, he was asleep in Nancy and awake 
in a wood-yard at Bar-le-Duc. The contradiction did not strike him.1746  
 
In these examples, rather than having become entirely other as they find themselves absorbed in 
the hypnotic scene, the subjects remain aware of the operator’s prompts and questions. Indeed, 
hypnotic dissociation allows them to experience hypnotic remembrance without the 
“contradictory” nature of the experience being problematic. The subject is both narrator and 
character, and retains awareness of present surroundings. Even at the end of the nineteenth century, 
Bernheim thus notes the “double personality” of certain somnambules,1747 revoking the purely 
mimetic thesis, and confirming that hypnotic regression is not incompatible with narration of 
experience.  
Later on, as the “pluralist revolution” of the twentieth century took place in psychotherapy, 
the once “solid” field became fragmented into a “multiple relativism” and hypnotherapy became 
one option among many in the wide array of therapeutic possibilities.1748  
 
4.1.1.2.    Structural Similarities Between Hypnotherapy and the Novel  
 
Restorying and Reframing: Telling a New Life Story 
 
1745 Bernheim, Suggestive Therapeutics, 66. 
1746 Ibid., 69, emphasis added. 
1747 Term in the original. 
1748 Omer and Alon, Constructing Therapeutic Narratives, 191. 
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Like psychoanalysis, modern hypnotherapy has been affected by the narrative turn which 
impacted other branches of therapeutics, medicine and psychiatry.1749 Including hypnosis among 
other narrative oriented psychotherapeutic models thus helps emphasize common ground between 
them, providing a shared meta-narrative framework for branches which span from mainstream 
cognitive-behaviorist models to humanistic and more alternative forms of therapy.1750 It 
contributes to psychotherapy integration and helps offer a solution to the Dodo Bird verdict by 
underlining common narrative concepts and structures at work in various, sometimes seemingly 
opposed, therapeutic branches.1751 Hypnosis is in fact especially suited to narratively oriented 
therapy since it defines human character as the sum of the individual’s autosuggestions, which 
translate into beliefs, exterior actions, and habitual patterns—the sum of which we call “identity.”  
In this sense, it conforms to Jerome Bruner’s view that “we organize our experience and 
our memory… mainly in the form of a narrative—stories, excuses, myths, reasons for doing and 
not doing, and so on.”1752 Furthermore, it adopts Daniel Dennett’s notion that selves are the product 
of narrative and that the urge to tell stories is biologically given in humans: “Like spider webs, our 
tales are spun by us; our human consciousness, and our narrative selfhood, is their product, not 
their source.”1753 Therapeutic intervention then involves the modification of the stories which 
constitute or lead to the individual’s symptom or problem. It is sensitive to the selective aspect of 
our narratives, and to the aspect-blindness to which they inevitably lead to in everyday life:  
Every story is a form of censorship in that it is based upon paying attention to certain events at the exclusion 
of others, as well as applying particular meanings to the events thus selected rather than other possible 
meanings.1754 
 
Furthermore, hypnotic restorying does not proceed by merely evoking or summarizing, describing, 
or analyzing problematic narratives, as other forms of narrative therapy do.1755 Rather, it produces 
 
1749 See Appendix A and B. 
1750 For Lewis, this common narrative orientation among various models helps bring psychotherapy back full circle, 
since “more than a hundred years after Freud introduced talking therapy, psychotherapy has returned to its early 
appreciation of the similarity between case histories and narrative stories.” Lewis, Narrative Psychiatry, 42. As 
mentioned higher up, although Lewis mentions “visualization exercises” as part of the “alternative” available models, 
he does not mention or describe hypnosis in his description of narrative psychotherapeutic models.  
1751 See appendix.  
1752 J. Bruner, “The Narrative Construction of Reality,” Critical Inquiry 18, no. 1 (1991): 4. 
1753 Daniel Dennett, “The Origin of Selves,” Cogito 3, no. 3 (1989):169. 
1754 Parry and Doan, Story Re-visions, 64. 
1755 In narrative therapy, “restorying” is often carried out in two phases: deconstruction—where the therapist looks for 
gaps and breaks in the client’s internalized story, questioning whether its values and preferences are “absolute or 
constructed.” Lewis, 50—and “reauthoring”—where client and therapist collaborate to present or expand future 
options, taking into consideration the “otherwise” of the client’s story and encouraging access to storylines which 
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an immersive and imaginative recreation of the problematic storyline, placing the subject in a 
position where they can imagine, create, and experience alternative plot-lines from within the 
fictional world, as a character, while simultaneously writing or narrating life (via re-reading it) 
from “without.” Exposure to, and imaginative elaboration of, these alternative storylines 
reintroduces the sense of agency and responsibility inherent to narrative conceptions of identity 
construction. Not only is hypnotic restorying a cognitive (rather than merely passive and 
automatic) process, it uses the structure of narrative fiction to produce therapeutic effects that are 
unattainable through purely intellectual or analytic procedures. Hypnotic restorying therefore 
differs from narrative medicine or narrative psychiatry—which listen to and compare narratives, 
but do not take the extra step of creating the combination of immersion and interactivity that elicits 
affective engagement before carrying out the modification of the patient’s story. Unlike what 
occurs in the conscious “reauthoring” used in models that don’t use the therapeutic potential of 
fictionality, in the immersive restorying of hypnosis, the individual is not merely a cut-off observer 
but also an active participant, whose entire being is engaged, with emotional, perceptual, and 
imaginative aspects of experience not only included but having crucial therapeutic value.  
 
Character in the Therapeutic Setting 
Hypnotherapy is also a narrative form of therapy in that it puts to use several key concepts 
in narrative studies, which structure the progression of a therapeutic session, or course of treatment. 
Indeed, taking a closer look at these concepts, we see that therapeutic change follows a structure 
reminiscent of that of a basic story. In Constructing Therapeutic Narratives (1997) for instance, 
Israeli therapists Haim Omer and Nahi Alon draw out the literary concepts which they use in their 
own pluralistic approach, that reconciles psychoanalysis and hypnotherapy. They propose a useful 
account of notions such as character, plot and perspective, which strengthens the analogy between 
literary and therapeutic narrative and change.  
For instance, as their description shows, in the context of hypnotherapy, the notion of 
character is not used to explain the nature of the psychological self, but can be employed in a 
manner that facilitates therapeutic change, by emphasizing the flexibility and narrative dimension 
 
have been “subjugated by the family’s and culture’s dominant discourse as to what constitutes the right way of doing 
things.” Parry and Doan, 17. See Appendix. 
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of identity. In the context of hypnotherapy, the subject directly experiences this malleability of 
character by experimenting with several imaginative variations, as we shall note further on. 
Whereas in the past a whole “gallery” of psychopathological types was available for the 
practitioner to draw from, these are no longer unquestionably available in the postmodern era.1756 
In this sense, the concept of character best enters the contemporary therapeutic setting via the 
concept of narrative identity. As Ricoeur writes, “fiction, in particular narrative fiction, is an 
irreducible dimension of self-understanding,” and “life can be understood only through the stories 
that we tell about it.”1757 Ricoeur’s notion of narrative identity is useful in that it proposes a 
nonessentialist, yet integrated conception of the self, which integrates change and mutability into 
the “cohesion of a life.”1758 It allows for continuity over time and “a relative stability of self, 
without implying a substantial … core to this stability.”1759 The notion of character thus suggests 
the possibility of change yet prevents the psychological dissolution or fragmentation which is often 
feared in hypnosis. It preserves temporal continuity and situation, while conserving a sense of 
potentiality for future developments. This is especially relevant for future-oriented forms of 
therapy like hypnosis, which emphasize possibilities of modification rather than the determined 
aspect of character. Indeed, as François Roustang notes: 
If one merely turns towards history and remembering, therapy can go back in time, but will not change 
anything in the patient’s existence. … Remembrance can lead us to this primal or primitive space, but it will 
never provide us with the impetus for change, just as the fascination for the archaic cannot free us from 
fatality.1760 
 
In modern hypnotherapy, character is no longer chained to the past, nor is it something to be acted 
out. On the contrary, even if its nature is narrative, it is to be modified from within, matching the 
psychological depth of novelistic characterization far more than the exterior, flat surface of the 
dramatis personae. By allowing the subject to imaginatively travel through time and space, 
 
1756 Omer and Alon, 33. See appendix. For Omer and Alon, this type of characterization “fails to pass the test of 
narrative empathy,” since it is superimposed from the outside onto the inside. Ibid. 
1757 Ricoeur, “Life in Quest of Narrative,” in D. Wood, ed., On Paul Ricoeur: Narrative and interpretation (London 
Routledge, 1991), 30.  
1758 Ricoeur, Temps et Récit, tome 3. (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1985), 356. As Ricoeur writes, “Unlike the abstract 
identity of the Same, narrative identity, which constitutes ipseity, can include change, mutability, into the cohesion of 
a life. The subject then appears as constituted both as reader and writer of his life, as Proust had it. As literary analysis 
of the autobiographical genre has shown, the story of a life is perpetually reshaped by all the true or fictional stories 
that the subject tells himself. This refiguration transforms life itself into a network of interwoven stories.” Ibid., 355-
56, our translation. (See also: “cette littérature est l'instrument irremplaçable d'exploration de la concordance 
discordante que constitue la cohésion d'une vie.” Ibid., 200). 
1759 Lewis, 48. 
1760 Roustang, Qu’est-ce que l’hypnose?, 131. As noted in Chapter 1, not all hypnotherapists adopt an anti-
psychoanalytic stance as Roustang does in this passage. 
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hypnotic restorying thus literalizes the notion that “we live immersed in narrative, recounting and 
reassessing the meaning of our past actions, anticipating the outcome of our future projects, 
situating ourselves at the intersection of several stories not yet completed.”1761 
A further aspect of Ricoeur’s conception that sheds light on the modern hypnotic subject 
is the notion that the stability of our narrative interpretations comes not from an individual essence 
but in part from the “weight” of the cultural stories with which we are surrounded.1762 Emphasizing 
the cultural aspect of narrative identity also preserves a sense of freedom for the subject, opening 
up the possibility—as in narrative therapy—of modifying the influencing factors. As Stuart Hall 
argues, as a “process of becoming rather than being,” culturally narrated identities are more 
impacted by “routes” rather than “roots”—by personal trajectory rather than fixed, naturalized or 
rigid senses of belonging.1763  
With this sensitivity to the impact of external narratives and suggestions in mind, in 
hypnotherapy, careful attention is thus given to the weight of the practitioner’s acts of 
“characterization.” Indeed, in the medical or therapeutic context, stories about illness are “much 
more than epiphenomena to the experience” but on the contrary can “determine the 
experience.”1764 In this sense, a psychopathological characterization, “far from helping the client, 
may actually become a crucial link in a pathologizing process.”1765 Rather than purely descriptive, 
diagnoses can become solidified into identities, acting as suggestions. They form an integral part 
of the etiological equation of the symptoms that doctors claim to merely observe. For example, as 
Ian Hacking notes in Reconstructing Individualism, PTSD is a way of “’making up’ a certain type 
of person that individuals can conceive themselves as being.”1766 Therapeutic models which are 
sensitive to this suggestive dimension must therefore strive to produce open narratives rather than 
solidify identity into “fixed types.”  
 
1761 Brook, Reading for the Plot, 3. 
1762 Lewis, 48. 
1763 Stuart Hall, “Who Needs Identity,” in Questions of Cultural Identity, ed. S. Hall and P. du Gay (London: Sage 
Publications), 1996, 4. “Not the so-called return to roots, but a coming-to-terms with our ‘routes’,” which allows for 
questioning their emergence and delineating future possible routes to be taken…Not ‘who we are’ or ‘where we came 
from,’ so much as what we might become, how we have been represented and how that bears on how we might 
represent ourselves.” Ibid. 
1764 Lewis, 26. 
1765 Omer and Alon, 33. 
1766 Leys, Trauma, 6, emphasis added. 
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Nevertheless, because some degree of characterization remains necessary, and 
inevitable,1767 what the therapeutic process involves is replacing limiting characterizations with 
more fulfilling ones: “we can oppose the client’s negative self-descriptions or our own tendency 
to pathologize only by developing an alternative, fully humanizing characterization … we would 
rather talk of heroic than neurotic characters.”1768  
This is what leads Omer and Alon to propose their concept of “narrative empathy,” which 
they define as the process of listening to and “re-writing” the patient’s narrative, a fundamentally 
ethical act.1769 More than merely lending a sympathetic ear, this consists of making sense of the 
internal logic of the patient’s problem or symptom, from within their own worldview, thereby 
“uncovering” the inner logic of their “seemingly irrational behavior.”1770 Significantly, this 
“empathy” is achieved through the process of narrating itself, from which understanding emerges. 
It lies in the elaboration of a new story that credits the client for “having developed a reasonable 
solution to the harsh conditions in which she found herself,” rather than producing a diagnosis or 
pathologization of the problem.1771 Therapy can thus be considered as a form of open 
characterization, constructed on a collaborative act of story-making where therapist and patient 
compete and collaborate to produce more complex and counterintuitive narratives than the opening 
problem-story, while respecting the latter as legitimate, rather than rejecting or condemning it.  
Hypnotherapy thus retains sensitivity to the effects of characterization, of the suggestive 
impact of the operator or therapist’s discourse on the patient.1772 As Borch-Jacobsen notes, patients 
“are not passive. … They react to the categories that describe them, either by rejecting them or by 
adopting new behaviors that in turn further confirm their categories, till … patients and doctors 
elaborate together a new psychopathological paradigm.”1773 A total absence of characterization on 
the other hand can be dangerous and lead to splitting and disintegration. Thus if the notion of 
 
1767 Indeed, “not to characterize would mean not to extrapolate from one act to the next and have [others] respond at 
any moment with any behavior whatsoever… the question is: what kind of characterization will it be?” Omer and 
Alon, 34.  
1768 Omer and Alon, 34. 
1769 Ibid., 6. 
1770 Ibid., 180. 
1771 Ibid. 
1772 Another way of framing this is to say that hypnotherapists themselves are careful to avoid letting their practice be 
drawn too far toward the mimetic pole.  
1773 Borch-Jacobsen, Making Minds and Madness. From Hysteria to Depression (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009), 6. In this work, Borch-Jacobsen traces the history of mental pathology from hysteria to depression, 
showing how the discourse of psychiatry “is not separated from the ‘object’ it deals with because it contributes to 
powerfully creating it.” Ibid., 5.  
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character exists in modern hypnotherapy, it is much less on the mode of the nineteenth-century 
theatrical roles, than as a flexible narrative which can be deconstructed, reinterpreted, and 
reshaped, and whose narrative dimension is a therapeutic asset rather than an obstacle on the path 
to therapeutic “truth.”1774 Hypnotherapy requires that the operator remain attentive to the patient’s 
preexisting “character style,” facilitating immersion and guiding the process of trying on various 
possible characters, instead of producing predetermining/ed, fixed or rigid, often pathologizing, 
acts of characterization. The process resembles the creation of fictional characters’ lives, which 
involves finding balance between completely inexistent and overdetermined characterization.1775 
For this reason, “a comparative logic” can be used in hypnotherapy, as in other narrative therapies, 
in order to show the client that “we can understand ourselves in the same way we understand 
characters.”1776 Rather than a mere descriptive category, character can thus serve as a therapeutic 
starting point waiting to be modified, its only essence being its narrative and dynamic qualities. 
 
Therapeutic Plots 
However, in the context of hypnotherapy and solution-oriented models, the notion of plot, 
which emphasizes events over character, action over being, is even more fitting than the notion of 
character to illustrate the process of therapeutic change.1777 Drawing attention away from identity, 
its emphasis on doing rather than being implicitly favors the notion of becoming over that of being 
determined by the past, which is especially relevant to the therapeutic elaboration of alternative 
storylines found in hypnotherapy. Like characterization, plot serves to create continuity in the 
patient’s experience and its narration, providing temporal coherence to what would otherwise 
 
1774 See Arabella Kurtz’ definition of narrative truth in therapy in The Good Story as analyzed further down. Erika 
Fromm’s hypnoanalysis can be considered as another example of the flexibility attributed to the “personality” in the 
context of hypnotherapy. In her work with borderline and psychotic patients, she uses object relations theory and 
hypnosis to create a “complete restructuring” of the personality by enabling introjection of the good object and creation 
of object constancy. See Erika Fromm, Psychoanalysis and Hypnosis, 40-54. 
1775 This notion is often implicit in therapeutic branches which emphasize de-pathologizing of the patient’s symptoms, 
as in Epston and White’s “externalization of the problem,” and the Ericksonian conception of the symptom as 
“solution.”  
1776 Lewis, 47. 
1777 As Aristotle pointed out and Denham restates, “a fictional narrative is not merely a list of particular considerations 
or an itemization of particular characters and events. It presents… configured patterns of these and the patterns are 
(typically) non-arbitrary ones.” Alison Denham, Metaphor and Moral Experience (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), 
351. 
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remain “confused, unformed, and mute.”1778 Indeed, as Paul Ricoeur famously established, 
emplotment creates narrative synthesis out of separate and heterogeneous elements which become 
organized into a temporal perception.1779 It allows for an “intelligible connection to be made 
between the elements of the story,” even when the relation between events is not strongly 
causal.1780 This is especially important in the treatment of traumatic experiences which are not 
only fragmented but also “shatter the frame of a person’s overall life-narrative.”1781 Emplotment 
thus sets the basis of meaningfulness for self-narratives, especially as “the acutest sense of 
traumatic disruption will be felt precisely at those points in the narrative where these … conditions 
of meaningfulness are invalidated.”1782 Framed thusly, the existence, structure and continuity of 
 
1778 Lewis, 46. Arthur Frank argues that the “primary or primal work” of stories is to serve as guidance systems which 
direct our attention within what William James called the “blooming, buzzing confusion” of the world (Frank, 54). 
See William James, The Principles of Psychology (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981), 462. 
1779 See Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 50-57; “Life in Quest of 
Narrative,” 21-31; “Narrative Identity” in From Text to Action: Essays in Hermeneutics, trans. D. Wood (Illinois: 
Northwestern University Press, 1991), 189. 
1780 Lewis, 45. See Virginia Woolf, who argues that the modern novel should include in both its material and form the 
immediacy of human perception: “The mind receives a myriad impressions—trivial, fantastic, evanescent or engraved 
with the sharpness of steel. From all sides they come, an incessant shower of innumerable atoms; and as they fall they 
shape themselves into Monday or Tuesday.” Woolf, “Modern Fiction,” in The Essays of Virginia Woolf, ed. A. 
McNeille, vol. 4. (London: The Hogarth Press, 1984), 160. The novel cannot do without including the “stuff” of life 
as it appears to consciousness, as well as the “dark places of psychology,” which are neglected in the rigid plots of 
“conventional” novelistic prose. However, this modernist aesthetic of consciousness still involves some degree of 
organization, as Woolf notes that “Life is not a series of gig lamps symmetrically arranged; it is a luminous halo, a 
semi-transparent envelope surrounding us from the beginning of consciousness to the end” Ibid., 162; 160. Here, the 
category of “plot” may indeed be used in an extensive sense, to describe the “halo” or “envelope” holding together 
modernist subjectivity and organizing experience, even if this organization is not causal or sequential. As Ricoeur 
points out, without plot, clock time—time understood as a series of nows—would be an abstraction and impossible to 
experience, since “the future is not yet, the past is no longer, and the present does not remain.” Ricoeur, Time and 
Narrative, vol. 1 (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1984), 7. See Lewis, 44-45. 
1781 Omer and Alon, 159. According to the cognitive view of PTSD, “it is not the event so much as the meaning that 
is ascribed to it and related statements about the self” that drive posttraumatic reactions. In Lynn et al. Essentials of 
Clinical Hypnosis (Washington DC: American Psychological Association, 2006), 169. In this way, “cognitive 
restructuring” can “assist the person in reconciling what occurred with his or her (pretrauma) belief system, especially 
in cases in which emotions like self-blame, guilt, and shame are part of the symptom picture.” Ibid, 170. 
1782 Omer and Alon, 159. Continuity is indeed a crucial component in the treatment of trauma, whose victims have 
been described as undergoing a “temporary disruption in the ability to make sense of events or breakdown of their 
meaning-making assumptions.” Wigren (1994) for example proposed that the traumatic effect of an experience is 
“directly linked to the victim’s inability to organize it by chains of meaning.” In this view, traumatic memories are 
not a story at all, but a collection of disconnected fragments of sensorial-physiological snapshots which are mentally 
disruptive precisely because they are formless” This view differs from the traditional Freud-Breuer cathartic method 
where the traumatic narrative is “repressed en bloc” and can be recovered as a whole. In Wigren’s interpretation, 
“there is no narrative to begin with. Trauma consists precisely in the breakdown of the story-making ability that makes 
experience assimilable… The role of treatment is to help the client instruct for the first time the story of the trauma.” 
For Omer and Alon, many clients suffering from trauma can be considered as having suffered “more of an inability to 
fit their traumatic stories into the flow of their narratives of self and world” than “from the chaotic fragmentation of 
the traumatic experience as such.” Wigren, Omer and Alon, 158-159.  
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the narrative seems more important than its content, a dimension which will reemerge further on 
in our mention of the latent ethical value of fictional narrative.  
Furthermore, the therapeutic process itself can thus be thought of as an emplotted narrative 
which, like fiction, contains beginnings, middles, and endings. As Almond and Almond point out, 
the opening of a novel and of therapeutic treatment also share strong similarities: they both begin 
with “a problem, a conflict, or an impasse” which must then be overcome and resolved.1783 In the 
same vein, Omer and Alon argue that both literature and therapy must “attract, grip, and satisfy” 
and “early dropout from therapy may be not unlike dropping a book after a few pages.”1784 In both 
cases, openings are crucial as they “foreshadow the shape of the treatment” which, “like an operatic 
overture,” allows for “a glimpse of the whole action.”1785 Subsequently, in “the middle parts” of 
the therapeutic process, plot and character development occur and “action, struggle, confusion, 
and flight” take place.1786 In postmodern, feminist, and family narrative therapy, a new plot is often 
developed by deconstructing and retelling the story from the vantage point of “the clue that didn’t 
fit,” which leads to a reversal of the initial problem-narrative.1787 Finally, just like novels have 
“happy or unhappy” endings in which “some sort of resolution or compromise occurs,” treatment 
“ends also, if not with total happiness, with resolution and compromise.”1788 In other words, a 
 
1783 Almond and Almond, 19. For example, for Almond and Almond, Elizabeth Bennet begins Pride and Prejudice 
“at age twenty, with a set of intrapsychic conflicts, associated beliefs, and feelings about herself and others”; or “plot 
movement in Jane Eyre is the fictional equivalent of therapeutic movement.” Ibid., 24; 60. 
1784 Omer and Alon, 76. As in a novel, once captured, “the client’s attention and involvement must be kept at a high 
pitch: the promise of the beginning must unfold into a rewarding action.” Ibid., 77. 
1785 Omer and Alon, 78. 
1786 Richard Almond and Barbara Almond, The Therapeutic Narrative. Fictional Relationships and the Process of 
Psychological Change (Westport and London: Praeger, 1996), 19. Whereas in psychoanalysis and hypnoanalysis this 
explicitly corresponds to the working through of the transference and resistance, in hypnotherapy used for symptom 
alleviation or supportive ego-strengthening hypnotherapy, it can correspond to moments of overcoming affective 
blockages, resistance to hypnotic induction, or systematic failure of suggested hypnotic phenomena. 
1787 Ibid., 88. For a description of Epston and White’s Narrative Therapy, see the appendix. Furthermore, As Almond 
and Almond show, upheavals and disruptions are necessary for change to occur in both novelistic and therapeutic 
settings: “The existence of a problem does not lead to change. Something must happen to throw the sufferer off 
balance. If his gold had not been stolen, Silas Marner would have been gazing at it still. If Darcy had not appeared at 
the Netherfield ball to insult Elizabeth, her sardonic wit might have allowed her to live a life of protected spinsterhood. 
In some way, a problematic behavior or defense must become less viable as a solution” for change to occur. Almond 
and Almond, 173. Similarly, narrative delays also occur in therapy, and in a fictional text they are thus both 
psychologically plausible and necessary to mirror on a structural level the movement of “actual” therapeutic working 
through. For example, “Jane Austen could have brought the lovers of Pride and Prejudice together after their meeting 
at Pemberley, but her heroine, too, had intrapsychic issues to resolve… A novel with a narrative that involves 
intrapsychic change needs to provide time and opportunity (in the form of plot complexities) for the difficulties of 
‘working through’. The reader accepts and appreciates these delays because they are psychologically plausible, even 
necessary.” Almond and Almond, 60. 
1788 Ibid., 19. 
 386 
matching of therapeutic and novelistic sequences of “initial engagement, followed by the 
emergence of difficulties that must be resolved” can productively be brought to the fore, regardless 
of the school of thought or therapeutic orientation of the practitioner.1789 This metanarrative 
approach participates in psychotherapy integration by emphasizing continuity rather than 
divergence between models. Evidently, the irreducible difference between the novel and the 
therapeutic process is in the distinction between the closed and open narratives. As Omer and Alon 
note, the “ideal ending” of a therapy cannot be imposed in a normative manner, since “the belief 
in one universal right ending is as groundless as the belief in one right therapy.”1790 Rather, the 
diversity of possible outcomes, styles, and cases necessarily prohibits positing a desired outcome 
for ending treatment. Instead of directing treatment toward an ideal ending, the concept of plot 
merely helps underline the ways in which, as for novels, “formlessness is a threat for any kind of 
therapy,” but unlike novels, therapy does not always constitute a totalized whole.1791 Rather than 
enclosing the client’s life, these narrative concepts help emplot it by redirecting it toward personal 
growth. As I will argue in what follows, because it concentrates on the patient’s inner life, this 
therapeutic redirection resembles novelistic character development rather than theatrical directing.  
 
1789 Ibid., Omer and Alon also propose a typology which, compares the various “stages” of therapeutic change with 
the Ancient Greeks’ three major modes of dramatic plot development: peripeteia, agon, and crisis. First of all, therapy 
is based on the process of reversal, whose powerful consequences can change both the course and meaning of the 
treatment, to the point where “we expect to witness peripeteia in the treatment itself.” In psychoanalysis, the sudden 
emergence of insight can also be considered a form of reversal, which leads the analysand to reinterpret, revise and 
re-color their whole previous experience in a new light. Secondly, therapy can involve a contest between “protagonist 
and antagonist, hero and villain, or thesis and antithesis,” a “combative attitude” can be placed at the heart of action. 
Epston and White’s “externalizing the problem” for instance is an explicit illustration of agon at the center of the 
therapeutic process, considering the problem as the treatment’s “villain,” against which the client’s forces are 
mobilized.” The Ericksonian utilizational method also fits this model, although instead of turning the problem into a 
villain, the operator depathologizes the symptom, reframing it as a provisional solution to an underlying, legitimate 
unconscious need. Finally, “crises are no less crucial for the psychotherapist than for the novelist or dramatist.” The 
Freudian model especially places crisis at the heart of the cure, turning it into a therapeutic asset. Rather than an 
obstacle to be overcome or a sign of failure, crisis can be read as an opportunity for change. This typology is not meant 
to impose predetermined structures onto the therapeutic process but to underline commonalities in various theoretical 
models and emphasize the possible analogy between literary and therapeutic narrative. For the therapist, they help 
understand the various phases through which “at the end of a successful treatment, the client is possessed not only of 
a better account of his life, but also of a new script of problematic situations and of a positive narrative about the 
therapy.” Ibid., 75-90. 
1790 Ibid., 106. For example, “Therapies that are conducted in a lighthearted mode cannot end like those in which a 
romantic or an epic tone prevail.” Ibid. See also Alon’s (1985) work on PTSD, where treatment reversed the expected 
order and placed the ending at the beginning: “clients expected the therapy to start with the trauma… many of them 
had already become so inured to this approach, that the mere mention of the trauma brought to their eyes an expression 
of endless fatigue. … Treatment should therefore reverse the expected order; rehabilitation should come first and 
elaboration of the trauma, last… Improvement became the condition for abreaction. The client had to be, functionally, 
no longer a post-traumatic in order to become eligible for it. In this manner, confrontation with the trauma was turned 
into the treatment’s rite of conclusion. The beginning became the end.” Omer and Alon, 106. 
1791 Ibid., 118. 
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4.1.2. Hypnotherapy as Immersive Narration 
 
Hypnotherapy can be considered a form of narratively oriented therapy because it makes 
ample use of stories, both fictional and nonfictional, it challenges the problematic narratives at the 
origin of the patient’s symptoms, and it is founded on the very acknowledgment and modification 
of these autosuggestions. But what sets it apart from other forms of “narrative therapy”? 
Unlike Epston and White’s narrative therapy, Lewis’ narrative psychiatry, or the narrative 
branches of psychoanalysis, the specificity of hypnotherapy lies in the induction of an immersive, 
modified state of consciousness, which creates the experience of narrative absorption and allows 
the patient to experience stories from the inside while remaining capable of reverting to the exterior 
perspective from which she can examine them from without, to reevaluate, reinterpret, and in this 
sense, “rework” them. Just as every reading produces a different text, every hypnotic session can 
produce a different version of one’s life story. Although the ability to “modify” the narrative plot 
might seem more akin to the work of the author than of the reader, the back and forth between 
internal and external points of view, and the impact of interpretation on the meaning of the text, 
are closely linked to the act of novel reading. “Re-storying” is first and foremost a process of re-
reading. 
The therapeutic benefits of hypnotherapy and its immersive narration are lacking in forms 
of therapy which operate exclusively from an external perspective—such as insight-based and 
cognitive models. Indeed, because they are based on interpretation and rational understanding, 
they do not rely on the value of immersivity or working directly with primary process thinking as 
hypnotherapists do. In hypnotherapy and novel reading on the other hand, the recipient reacts with 
their whole being, not merely their intellect. As I will show in this section, this immersion, and the 
emotional and unconscious responses which it elicits do not take away from the patient’s own self-
understanding, from their ability to narrate their experience or be “present” during the experience.  
In this section, I will argue that hypnotic regression and its mirror image, hypnotic “age 
progression” should not be reduced to mere dramatic enactments and should instead be 
reconceptualized as complex forms of storytelling.1792 In doing so, my goal is to propose a 
 
1792 Here I will therefore follow Michael Yapko’s contention that symptom relief is “the most superficial and less 
sophisticated” use of hypnosis in the clinical setting. Yapko, 119. 
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counterargument to the mimetic conception of hypnosis which skims over the internal creative 
activity of the subject underlying the production of the outwardly observable hypnotic phenomena. 
Both in hypnotic regression and futurization, situations are imaginatively constructed and 
experienced as if they were actual. Once we recognize hypnotic regression and futurization in their 
aesthetic complexity, it becomes clear that narration in modern hypnosis radically questions the 
modes of quasi- or failed enunciation traditionally attributed to the hypnotic subject.1793 Whereas 
overemphasis on the dramatic dimension portrays the subject as unreflectively absorbed in past or 
imaginary material (and thus being incapable of “reading” the events of her life), here the creative 
task of the subject lies in the balancing act of superimposing creative authorship and make-believe 
passivity, of both co-creating and giving oneself over to suggested, alternative possibilities of 
emplotment, and thus co-creatively elaborating them.1794  
Besides the mere reenactment of trauma, hypnotherapy offers a multiplicity of narrative 
possibilities, in which the operator’s suggestions act like basic scripts which the subject willfully 
and creatively develops, giving free reign to their imaginative composition, rather than obeying a 
set of commands or stage directions that are automatically enacted in the mechanical drama of 
psychological automatism. Acquiescing to the “realist illusion” of hypnosis leads one to 
unquestioningly consider regression and progression as an archaeological method of uncovering, 
or a deductive prediction of the subject’s future. On the contrary, both hypnotic techniques must 
be thought of as indirect means of telling the present story of the client by taking a detour through 
fictionality that involves “traveling” across temporal lines. Hypnotic regression or futurization in 
this sense consist, as does novel reading, in imagining oneself as another by imaginatively shifting 
one’s temporal “location.”1795 The dissociation produced in this process creates the same paradox 
found in novelistic fiction, in which—to use a Proustian image—the mind is both the explorer and 
 
1793 These mainly include blind abreaction in the hysterical patient or victim of PTSD (acting out without proper 
narrating), Multiple Personality Disorder (in which each split part fights for their own story), and automatic writing 
(in which we have a story with no author). 
1794 By picturing herself as experiencing various past or future events, the subject places herself in the position of a 
character, whose destiny seems to unfold automatically, and appears to act out (in strikingly realistic fashion) the 
operator’s suggestions, although the subject is the one carrying out the imaginative work.  
1795 The parallel between hypnotic and novelistic temporality reveals the therapeutic value of apprehending, as in 
Augustine’s description of threefold time, memory and expectations via the present, rather than naively assuming one 
can access an unmodified past (or yet inexistent future). 
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the explored territory.1796 When immersed in hypnotic narratives, subjectivity is simultaneously 
inside and outside, past/future and present, narrator/author and character, which as Yi-Ping Ong 
observes, are double placements with important ethical repercussions for the subject.1797 
Therefore, reemphasizing this narrative dimension reinstates the subject as subject of enunciation 
and reveals the therapeutic and ethical value of the similarities shared by the hypnotic and 
novelistic imagination. 
 
4.1.2.1 Hypnotic Regression: Looking Back on One’s Life 
 
The Archaeological View 
Regression is often conceived as belonging to the “virtuoso,” “advanced” hypnotic 
responses placed high on hypnotizability scales, supposedly requiring deep hypnotic trances in 
“skilled” subjects.1798 In debates about the nature of hypnotic trance, it is often used as an example 
to question the social-psychological and compliance-expectations based explanations of hypnotic 
phenomena described in Chapter 1. Indeed, numerous examples describe the vividness of the 
experience and the powerful affective reactions which accompany it, seemingly resuscitating 
“authentic” earlier developmental states that remain unavailable in ordinary waking 
consciousness.1799 Regression is often experienced “with all five senses functioning—seeing, 
hearing, etc.—and with abreaction and discharge of emotion.”1800 It is precisely this intensity 
which leads to the belief that “information can be obtained as to almost anything involved in the 
patient's difficulty or neurosis,” and that hypnosis is thus “infinitely more rapid than the usual 
method of free association.”1801 
 
1796 “What an abyss of uncertainty, whenever the find feels overtaken by itself; when it, the seeker, is at the same time 
the dark region through which it must go seeking.” Proust Remembrance of Things Past, vol 1, trans. C. K. S. 
Moncrieff, T. Kilmartin, and A. Mayor (New York: Random House, 1981), 49. 
1797 When assuming the position of a novelistic author in relation to oneself as character, “one’s attempts to inflect 
the whole of another person’s life with value—requires one to taste the ambiguity of a human life from within, while 
at the same time incorporating into this first-person point of view insights that could be glimpsed only in retrospect 
from a third-person perspective.” Ong, The Art of Being, 40. 
1798 Spanos, 41. 
1799 As Nash notes, when measures of subjective experience are taken during hypnotic regression, “subjects report that 
the experience of being a child is compellingly ‘real’. These reports far exceed those of unhypnotized control subjects 
and have nothing to do with whether the hypnotic performance was observably and genuinely childlike.” Nash, “What, 
if Anything, is Regressed About Hypnotic Age Regression? A Review of the Empirical Literature,” Psychological 
bulletin 102, no.1 (1987): 43. 
1800 L. Lecron, “A Study of Age regression Under Hypnosis,” Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis 2 (1954): 
77.  
1801 Lecron, Ibid., 77. 
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Herbert Spiegel describes a case that illustrates the influence of regression on a 25-year-
old man’s linguistic abilities during a demonstration. When regressed to various ages of his 
childhood, the subject “responded without difficulty, until he was signaled to place himself back 
to his twelfth birthday”:  
When asked for his name (as was done previously at older age levels), he responded with some confusion 
and tension but did not answer. When pressed for an answer, he looked about and inquiringly uttered a word 
that sounded like ‘Vas?’ It then became apparent that he did not understand English… At age 13 years, he 
had escaped from Vienna to the United States, and by the time he was 25 years old, his fluent English showed 
no trace of his native German tongue—a language that he had learned to despise to the extent that he had 
difficulty with both speaking and understanding it… From age 13 to 18 years, while under hypnotic 
regression, his spoken English revealed a gradually disappearing German accent.1802  
 
According to Spiegel’s analysis of this example, “the experiential intensity of the trance experience 
suggests an individual’s capacity to get in touch with early foundation experiences,” and his ability 
to “tap some earlier developmental experience.”1803 
The traditional conception of regression as “archaeological” is still frequent, even in the 
hypnotic literature of the twentieth and twenty-first century.1804 Following Freud and Breuer’s 
cathartic method and Janet’s distinction between traumatic and narrative memory,1805 it establishes 
the goal of hypnotherapy as the unveiling and integration, via narration, of repressed traumatic 
material. In the view of these practitioners, what began with Freud and Janet was “steadily refined 
through trial and error and anecdotal data,” indicating that the “potent clinical tool” of regression 
has “stood the test of time.”1806 This conception is found in modern trauma work such as that of 
Judith Herman, whose Trauma and Recovery is criticized in Leys’ Trauma, a Genealogy.1807 
 
1802 Spiegel and Spiegel, Trance and Treatment., 33-34. 
1803 Ibid., 34. 
1804 Nevertheless, this “credulous” view is much less adhered to inside than outside the field: “It is interesting … that 
theorizing which states a structural link between imagery and perception has actually had more support in the 
nonhypnosis than in the hypnosis literature.” Sheehan and Robertson, in G. Spanos et al, Hypnosis and Imagination 
(1996; London and New York: CRC Press, 2018), 2. See J. P. Sutcliffe, "’Credulous’ and ‘skeptical’ views of hypnotic 
phenomena: A review of certain evidence and methodology,” International Journal of Clinical and Experimental 
Hypnosis, 8 (1960): 73-101. 
1805 While the former merely and unconsciously repeats the past, the latter is able to narrate it as past. See Janet, 
L’Automatisme Psychologique, and Leys, Critical Inquiry, 647. 
1806 William Smith, “When All Else Fails: Hypnotic Exploration of Childhood Trauma,” Lynn et. al. (eds.), Casebook 
of Clinical Hypnosis (Washington DC: American Psychological Association, 1996), 129. 
1807 In Judith Herman’s description of traumatic recovery, “the survivor tells the story of the trauma…She tells it 
completely, in depth and in detail. This work of reconstruction actually transforms the traumatic memory, so that it 
can be integrated into the survivor's life story.” Judith L. Herman, Trauma and recovery (London: Pandora, 1992), 
75-77. However, as Leys argues, in Janet’s work with his patient Marie, it is the excision, the forgetting of the 
traumatic memory that cures her, not its retrieval via narration: “according to Janet's first account of the case and 
contrary to the ingrained beliefs of many of his commentators, Marie was cured not by the recovery of memory but 
by the excision of her imputed or reconstructed trauma (see L’Automatisme Psychologique, 7).” Leys, 650. As Leys 
notes, in 1894, Janet also criticized Breuer and Freud's account of the cathartic cure on the grounds that “what mattered 
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Similarly, Spiegel and Spiegel describe hypnotic regression as being “very useful in helping 
patients understand the origin of long forgotten bodily symptoms, such as conversion symptoms 
and somatic flashbacks.”1808 For them, it “help[s] patients recall dissociated memories” and helps 
“explain some present behaviors, such as a patient’s disproportionate reactions to seemingly 
benign stressors.”1809 In such accounts, the archaeological metaphor is even used explicitly: “Many 
such individuals seem to retain layers of memories analogous to the layers of a city uncovered by 
archaeologists. These primitive reflexes and childish emotional responses remain stored in the 
unconscious.”1810 In other words, regression makes an authentic return to earlier developmental 
stages in the subject possible. 1811  
The ethical and therapeutic dangers of such a conception have been underlined, which can 
lead to retraumatizing certain patients1812 who lack sufficient ego structure to undergo the painful 
affect unleashed by the “retrieval” of traumatic memories.1813 As Horevitz notes, “vulnerabilities 
to uncontrolled ego regression must be taken seriously and precariously organized patients treated 
supportively until they can undertake expressive work.”1814 
In response to these criticisms, the modern conception of hypnosis attempts to distinguish 
itself from previous nineteenth-century models by arguing that the retrieval of hypnotic memory 
need not be traumatic in itself.1815 In this view, “a number of hypnotic techniques can facilitate the 
 
in the treatment of the neuroses was not the ‘confession’ of the traumatic memory but its elimination.” in Leys, “Shell 
Shock,” 650. Nevertheless, this use of regression for “memory removal” is the equivalent of symptom removal for 
trauma but is far from exhausting the potential of hypnotic regression.  
1808 Spiegel and Spiegel, Trance and Treatment, 440. 
1809 Ibid., 440. 
1810 Ibid., 32. 
1811 See also: “When tested,” regressed patients “respond to vocabulary questions like 2-year-olds, deny knowledge 
of the current president, and giggle when tickled as though they were children. Some even become nonverbal when 
regressed to age 6 months and may, without specific instruction, develop the grasp and rooting reflexes that 
characterize the partially developed nervous system of an infant.” Ibid. 
1812 Risks commonly evoked include provoking psychotic episodes in predisposed patients or encouraging dissociation 
in patients diagnosed with Dissociated Identity Disorder (whose condition “involves underlying fragmentation of all 
the basic affective, cognitive, and behavioral structures whose integration is required for the development of self—, a 
naive and simplistic model of ‘archeological’ treatment (i.e., uncover the trauma, uncover the hidden dissociative 
states, and let love and trust heal the wounds) can pose more risks than benefits.” Richard Horevitz, “The Treatment 
of a Case of Dissociative Identity Disorder,” in Lynn et. al. (eds.), Casebook of Clinical Hypnosis (Washington DC: 
American Psychological Association, 1996), 198.  
1813 Indeed, “not every patient…is a good candidate” for regression, as “facing memories that were held out of 
consciousness for good reason can be upsetting and even disorganizing. Worsening of symptoms instead of 
improvement may follow, unless the patient’s personality resources are equal to the challenge.” Smith, “When All 
Else Fails,” 128. 
1814 Horevitz, Ibid., 128. 
1815 It is established nowadays that “patients need help achieving a controlled abreaction.” Spiegel and Spiegel, Trance 
and Treatment. 450. In early Freudian cases, and in the use of hypnosis in the treatment of wartime neurosis, intense, 
 392 
process of recovery of traumatic memories while still allowing patients to feel “in control.”1816 
Positive transference and good rapport can in this sense enable a controlled, “mastered” abreaction 
instead of a chaotic one.”1817 In this way, the transference and nature of hypnotic rapport can be 
used to therapeutic advantage: 
In hypnosis, painful emotion can be limited: slowed, muted, and stopped, when necessary. …What happened 
no longer seems unreal, nor poorly understood, and the person is no longer detached or absent as if it all 
happened to someone else … the therapist helps the person recall and now “own” his or her experience.1818 
 
In this conception, the therapist’s role is not just to uncover, but also to “help patients control and 
structure the retrieval and expression of painful memories and feelings associated with them.”1819 
Therefore, the main danger of the archaeological conception as it manifests itself in modern 
hypnotherapy is that of inducing false or pseudo-memories, due to the mimetic dimension of 
hypnosis. In his paper “Hypnotic exploration of childhood trauma,” William Smith observes that 
the very notion of trauma recovery is far from being controversy-free because “memory is so 
vulnerable to distortion, especially memory that has been elicited in a treatment context, that 
enormous harm can be done when such memories falsely identify an alleged perpetrator of 
abuse.”1820 This potential confusion of fantasy and memory stems from a double factor which 
 
dramatic experiences can be explained by preexisting expectations of both patients and doctors regarding the nature 
of hypnotic abreaction. Nowadays, a frequently used technique is for example that of the “split screen,” where the 
patient projects images of traumatic memories on the left side of the “screen” and “something he or she did to protect 
themselves or someone else (e.g., fight back, scream, protest, lie still)” on the right side. Lynn et al., 70. This type of 
distancing technique “facilitates the process of separating memories from physically painful sensations to minimize 
traumatic abreaction or retraumatization” and “allows for the manipulation of the affect that invariably is mobilized 
during the retrieval of traumatic memories.” Spiegel and Spiegel, 438. See also Erickson: “I like to initially regress 
my psychiatric patients to something pleasant, something agreeable. In the trance state I impress upon them that it is 
tremendously important to realize that there are some good things in their past, and those good things form the 
background by which to judge the severity of the present. And so I use the happy memories of their past to train them 
to recover fully and completely the various traumatic experiences.” Erickson, Experiencing Hypnosis, 12. 
1816 Indeed, “many patients fear that if they allow traumatic memories to surface they will, once again, lose control, 
symbolically reenacting the helplessness experienced during the traumatic episode.” Ibid.  
1817 Smith, “When All Else Fails,” 129. 
1818 Ibid., 125. 
1819 Spiegel and Spiegel, Trance and Treatment, 437. A number of hypnotic techniques can be used to facilitate this 
“controlled recovery,” such as relaxation techniques, projective techniques, and the “affect bridge” technique (in 
which a specific emotion triggered in the present serves as a “guide” toward an associated memory). 
1820 Smith, Ibid., 114. For Smith, it “has become controversial whether children subjected to traumatic experiences 
can become amnesic about the trauma and later recover the memories reasonably accurately through triggering life 
events, a therapy process, or hypnotically enhanced recall.” Ibid., 113. Empirical studies have also disproven the 
accuracy of certain memories retrieved through regression. For example, Nash, Drake, Wiley, Khalsa, and Lynn 
(1986) attempted to corroborate the memories of participants in an experiment which involved “age regressing 
hypnotized and role-playing (control) participants to age 3 to a scene in which they were in the soothing presence of 
their mothers” in Lynn et al., Essentials of Clinical Hypnosis (Washington DC: American Psychological Association, 
2006), 203. During this experiment, “participants reported the identity of their transitional objects (e.g., blankets and 
teddy bears). Third-party verification (parent report) of the accuracy of recall was obtained for 14 hypnotized 
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affects all hypnotic—and as I argue all therapeutic1821—situations: the suggestive nature of the 
therapist’s discourse on the one hand and the nature of memory itself on the other, which has “been 
shown to be a constructive process, in which memories and imaginings are mixed 
indistinguishably.”1822  
As Omer and Alon note,  memories of childhood are but complex translations into the adult 
mind of what we believe to have happened. This explains why, often, in regression:  
We witness ourselves in the third person in a scene we could never have experienced (redescription)… we 
cannot think of childhood events without overlaying them with adult meanings (reinterpretation)… Finally, 
the values are invariably changed (reassessment)… Memory is thus circular: the past is used to help 
understand the present and vice-versa, with both being changed in the process.1823 
 
Indeed, memory distortion can occur at any stage of its processing, “from acquisition, through 
retention, to retrieval,” in hypnotic and ordinary situations alike.1824 Memories are not simply 
retained and gradually lost but are “continuously modified by ongoing mental activity” as well as 
“permanently modified by new ones.”1825 In this sense, the original memory trace is irretrievable, 
having become “all but unrecoverable.”1826 Supporting this view, Leys has singled out the 
irretrievable aspect of original memories in the context of psychoanalysis and the retrieval of 
traumatic memories. As Leys shows, Freud was “the first to observe,” in his early work on hysteria, 
that patients “lacked conviction as to the reality of the reconstructed traumatic scenes.”1827 For 
example, he notes that his pressure technique “causes thoughts to emerge which the patient will 
never recognize as his own, which he never remembers, although he admits that the context calls 
 
participants and 10 control participants. Hypnotic participants were less able than control participants to identify the 
transitional objects actually used. Hypnotic participants’ hypnotic recollections matched their parents’ reports only 
21% of the time, whereas control participants’ reports were corroborated by their parents 70% of the time.” Ibid., 203, 
emphasis added. 
1821 Indeed, “false memories are certainly not limited to hypnosis and may be problematic in a variety of situational 
and therapeutic contexts.”  Ibid., 404. 
1822 Smith, “When All Else Fails,” 117. Smith underlines the distortion of memory often found in hypnotic regression, 
and its varying degrees: “It is not true that the ‘new’ [retrieved] memories must be authentic. They may be mostly 
true, mostly untrue, or entirely untrue. To make matters worse, memories emerging in hypnosis may feel compellingly 
real because of the vividness of imagery and emotion that some people achieve in hypnosis.” Ibid., 118. See also E. 
F. Loftus, Eyewitness Testimony (Cambridge: Harvard University press, 1979). 
1823 Omer and Alon, 216-7. See Schafer’s description of the hermeneutic circle involved in memory in Appendix A. 
Constrained by this hermeneutic circle, memory must involve reconstruction: “events cannot be recalled without being 
redescribed, reinterpreted and reassessed through a new context or leading narrative.” Ibid., 216. 
1824 Ibid., 211. For example, in a study, Allport and Postman (1947) showed that “when a number of people are asked 
to relay serially what they saw in a visual stimulus involving a black man wearing a suit talking with a policeman who 
holds a razor after a few relays, the razor passes from the hand of the policemen to that of the black man, the suit turns 
into jeans and the conversation becomes a threat on the part of the black man.” Ibid., 211. 
1825 Ibid., 211. 
1826 Ibid., 211- 212.  
1827 Leys, “Shell Shock,”644. 
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for them inexorably, and while he becomes convinced that it is precisely these ideas that are 
leading to the conclusion of the analysis and the removal of his symptoms.”1828 Whereas for Freud 
this was a reason to further pursue inquiry into the mechanics of resistance and thus “discover” 
psychoanalysis, modern hypnosis must embrace the impossibility of retrieving the “original” 
memories or material, traumatic or not. Indeed, as Leys explains, Freud’s observation constitutes 
a “stunning admission of the inherent irretrievability of the traumatic ‘event’.”1829  
Furthermore, the linguistic transposition involved in the mere act of reporting memories 
leads to even further distortion. As Omer and Alon note: 
Putting memories into words is no neutral act of translation: words seem to change the inner images, 
crystalizing them into a new form. With each new verbalization, people’s confidence in the veracity of 
retrieved memories grows. Each time a witness is asked to identify a suspect, her confidence grows, 
independent of the truth of the accusation.1830  
 
In addition to these various modes of distortion, empirical studies have called into question the 
phenomenon of hypnotic hypermnesia, disproving the alleged superiority of hypnotic memory 
over ordinary, waking memory.1831 For example, “when subjects are asked under hypnosis to recall 
verifiable items, such as the day of the week of past birthdays or the names of former teachers and 
schoolmates, they do no better than subjects not under hypnosis.”1832  
 
1828 Freud, “Studies on Hysteria,” in SE, 2:272. 
1829 Leys, 645. Leys cites a longer passage which further develops Freud’s difficulties: “The ideas which are derived 
from the greatest depth and which form the nucleus of the pathogenic organization are also those which are 
acknowledged as memories by the patient with greatest difficulty. Even when everything is finished and the patients 
have been over-borne by the force of logic and have been convinced by the therapeutic effect accompanying the 
emergence of precisely these ideas… they often add: ‘But I can't remember having thought it’. It is easy to come to 
terms with them by telling them that the thoughts were unconscious. But how is this state of affairs to be fitted into 
our own psychological views? Are we to disregard this withholding of recognition on the part of patients, when, now 
that the work is finished, there is no longer any motive for their doing so? Or are we to suppose that we are really 
dealing with thoughts which never came about, which merely had a possibility of existing, so that the treatment would 
lie in the accomplishment of a psychical act which did not take place at the time? It is clearly impossible to say 
anything about this—that is, about the state which the pathogenic material was in before the analysis—until we have 
arrived at a thorough clarification of our basic psychological views, especially on the nature of consciousness.” Freud, 
Ibid., 300. For Leys, this problem of the patient's “lack of confidence in the reality of the memory of the trauma,” the 
“victim's inability to remember, and hence testify with conviction to, the facticity of the reconstructed event” will 
“haunt not only psychoanalysis but the entire modern discourse of the trauma.” Leys, Ibid., 646. 
1830 Omer and Alon, 213. For an example of Piaget describing one of his own false memories, see Ibid, 213-214. 
1831 “Investigators who have carefully used conditions in which the experimenters do not know the hypotheses and 
proper motivational control groups have found no evidence for increased accuracy of recall… uniquely attributable to 
hypnotic-age-regression… most laboratory evidence to date seems to suggest that hypnosis does not yield meaningful 
increases in memory.” Nash, “What, if Anything,” 47. 
1832 Perry et al. 1991, in Omer and Alon, 222. Paradoxically, studies report that subjects who recall under hypnosis are 
more confident about their own accuracy, even when they are wrong (Dinges et al. 1987, Whitehouse et al. 1987). 
Ibid. 
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Finally, the suggestive dimension of hypnotic rapport or leading information unknowingly 
produced by observers in the experimental context easily produces memory distortion in subjects, 
who are “more amenable to influence by leading questions.”1833 For example, subjects watching a 
video of a minor traffic accident who are asked suggestive questions such as ‘how fast were the 
cars going when they smashed into each other?’ produce different descriptions of the event, 
reporting splintered glass when there was none, or if shown a video which contained splintered 
glass, took the latter for the original one.1834 In the therapeutic context, where the patient’s 
suggestibility is considerably increased, this preexisting ordinary process is amplified. Sarbin and 
Coe for instance have shown that when a client believes the hypnotist or therapist knows more 
than them, the situation becomes “highly conducive to believed imaginings.”1835 Conversely, the 
intensity of the subject’s behavior under hypnosis can lead the therapist to take a narrative (or 
dramatic) truth for a historical one, creating a cycle of mutual influence.1836 Therefore, the 
archaeological conception of regression, combined with the inherently suggestive nature of 
therapeutic rapport, risks eliciting memories that are “more fiction than fact,” which, when 
confused with historical truths, can become a problematic source of concern with harmful ethical 
implications. Paradoxically, the confusion of hypnotic material and historical truth is both one of 
the most powerful therapeutic “effects” of hypnosis and one of its greatest dangers. 
Residing neither in hypnotic excision nor in blind abreaction, the therapeutic value of 
regression in the case of trauma should thus be placed in its ability, via the deployment of the 
imagination, to help the patient “see the traumatic event from a new perspective, recognizing and 
accepting the helplessness imposed on them by the traumatic event, while at the same time 
crediting their efforts to protect themselves or somebody else.”1837 Far from mere wishful erasure 
or escapist reimagining of the past, this process constitutes an authentic form of “grief work” in 
which patients “acknowledge, bear, and put into perspective the loss of a sense of invulnerability, 
of health, or of loved ones.” The goal of modern hypnotherapy is no longer the erasure or removal 
 
1833 Omer and Alon, 221. Because “hypnosis involves direct and indirect suggestions, some of which may be leading 
in nature, and “increase[s] confidence of recalled events with little or no change in the level of accuracy,” therapists 
employing hypnosis must be “especially vigilant to the problem of false memory creation” American Medical 
Association 1985, in Lynn et al., 402.  
1834 Omer and Alon, 212. 
1835 Sarbin and Coe 1972, in Omer and Alon, 223. 
1836 See Borch-Jacobsen, The Freudian Subject. As Lynn et al. note, “clients’ memory reports during age regression, 
for example, can seem compelling because the reported images and emotions are vivid and intense. However, neither 
vividness nor emotionality can be taken as scientific evidence of historical veracity.” Lynn et al., 402.  
1837 Spiegel and Spiegel, 442 
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of memories but their restorying and integration: “We don’t erase the past, we change our 
interpretation of it,” or in other words, “in restructuring an old life experience we are developing 
new associative pathways, facilitating new responses to the old fear-provoking life situation. The 
old memories and pathways are still there. They will always be there.”1838 
 
Questioning the Classical View 
Narrative theory helps shed light on the nature of therapeutic efficacy. A narrative 
orientation shows that “uncovered” hypnotic material “carries conviction through its sensory and 
emotional richness” rather than its truth value.1839As long as regression is understood as an 
immersive game of make-believe, as a story representative of the present state and understanding 
of the client, ethical pitfalls can be avoided while maintaining therapeutic efficacy. Defending the 
value of regression even when the hopes of establishing with certainty the historical nature of its 
material are abandoned, reminds us of the seriousness, that is, the affective impact and 
transformative value, of fictional “untruths.”  
Replacing the dramatic with a narrative conception also allows us to extend the use of the 
technique well beyond the “unearthing” of traumatic memory. In fact, regression to “childhood 
states” was explored by hypnotists well before the invention of the diagnosis of PTSD in the 1980s 
by the American Psychological Association. In the late 1880s, Bernheim and Richet were already 
exploring its hallucinatory potential and effects on hypnotic behaviors: 
I say to him ‘You are six years old, you are a child. Go and play with the boys’. He gets up, jumps about, 
makes a gesture as if taking marbles out of his pocket…He keeps up his play indefinitely, with surprising 
activity, attention and precision of detail.1840 
 
 
1838 Rossi, in Erickson and Rossi, Hypnotherapy, An Exploratory Casebook (New York: Irvington Publishers, 1979), 
240, emphasis added. 
1839 Omer and Alon, 220. An element which strengthens this point is the spatial nature of the metaphors used to induce 
regression, which often involve imagining traveling through space. See, for example: “the therapist can ask the patient 
to walk down a staircase, with each step representing a year in the past, or ask the patient to observe scenes on a stage 
of the past. Patients can also be given simple suggestions to ‘go backward’ in time. Yapko, 1993, 296. See also Alden’s 
(1995) “variation of the bubble technique in which suggestions are given to ‘float back to an event and review it from 
the safety of the bubble,’” in Lynn et al., Essentials of Clinical Hypnosis, 63. 
1840 Richet 1883, in Bernheim, Suggestive Therapeutics 59, emphasis added. Even in Bernheim’s short example, 
therapeutic benefits are attributed directly to the “childlike” state created under hypnosis, in its ability to remove the 
psychogenic: “He plays tag, and leap-frog, making jump after jump over one or two imaginary playfellows, increasing 
the distance each time, and with an ease which in the waking condition, would not be possible, because of his malady.” 
Ibid., 59. 
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 As demonstrated in this example, hypnotic regression does not systematically involve abreaction 
or high levels of affective distress. Here, the association with “play” makes it more akin to the 
fictional games of make-believe described by Walton in Chapter 3. Furthermore, the “attention 
and precision of detail” which Richet notes is a strong indicator of the activity of the subject 
engaged in an imaginative exercise.  
In modern hypnosis, the therapeutic potential of this playful dimension is also preserved. 
In addition to “uncovering” repressed material, other functions of regression include revisiting 
consciously remembered memories, for ego strengthening purposes, or as an inductive 
technique.1841 Whether the memories in question are pleasant or unpleasant, establishing their 
“fictional”—or at the very least, unverifiable—dimension becomes a crucial ethical safety-net 
which prevents one from falling into the trap of the “realist illusion” of hypnosis. This narrative 
safeguard forces hypnosis to abandon its own “seduction theory” and to draw therapeutic benefits 
from the effects of stories rather than history, as one would in reading narrative literature, as 
opposed to theoretical essays.  
Empirical research has supported the “as if” dimension of regression, showing that “age-
regressed participants behave according to situational cues and their knowledge, beliefs, and 
assumptions about age-relevant behaviors.”1842 Even adherents of the archaeological model admit 
that subjects “use this technique as a form of ‘role-playing’ events, as if “they are happening all 
over again.”1843 Significantly, such studies show that subjects don’t manifest behavior and mental 
states typical of the age to which they are regressed. Rather, they produce adult interpretations of 
what that would be like. For example, in a 1959 study in which a group of adults was regressed to 
age 4, participants were placed in a sand box and handed a lollipop with the candy side facing 
toward them. The adults “invariably picked the lollipop by the candy side without bothering about 
 
1841 For instance, it can be used to “invite a patient to revisit a well-remembered past event with the goal of examining 
how she coped, in order to cope more effectively in response to future events.” Lynn et al., Essentials of Clinical 
Hypnosis, 74. It can also be used to “recall or revivify some meaningful episode from the past” in which “resources 
are identified and named, such as courage, creativity, or perseverance, and then… to integrate those resources … in 
such a way that those resources would lead to new helpful perspectives, reactions, and behaviors.” Yapko, 
Trancework, 416. In Joan Murray-Jobsis’ technique of “renurturing,” it is used to create an imaginary restitution for 
the patient’s “missing nurturing environmental history” during very early childhood, by allowing both patient and 
therapist to “play out in imagery the parent and child roles that can promote a renurturing healing process.” Joan 
Murray-Jobsis, “Hypnosis with a Borderline Patient,” in Lynn et. al. (eds.), Casebook of Clinical Hypnosis, 179. For 
Murray-Jobsis, this corrective technique can be used for patients with diagnoses of personality disorders, dissociative 
disorders, and psychotic disorders. Ibid. 
1842 Lynn et al., Essentials of Clinical Hypnosis, 74. 
1843 Spiegel and Spiegel, 440, emphasis added. 
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their dirty [sandy] hands.”1844 A recent replication of the study, however, used a control group 
composed of actual 4-year-olds, who all “picked up the lollipop by the stick.”1845 Paradoxically, 
hypnotic subjects become so absorbed in the experience of being a child that they lose critical 
judgment, which results in anachronisms that are obvious to unhypnotized individuals. While 
regressed to the age of 6 years, for instance, a hypnotized subject writes, “I am conducting a 
psychological experiment which will assess my psychological capacity” in childlike printing but 
with perfect spelling.1846  
Psychoanalytic theories of hypnosis also support the “fictional” status of regressed 
material. In “What, if Anything, is Regressed About Hypnotic Age Regression?” for example, 
Michael Nash argues that “there is no evidence for the idea that hypnosis enables subjects to 
accurately reexperience the events of childhood or to return to developmentally previous modes 
of functioning.”1847 For Nash, if there is anything regressed about hypnosis, it does not involve the 
literal return to a past developmental state, since the “hypnotically regressed subject’s response 
does not resemble that of children, and when it does, waking control subjects can do just as 
well.”1848 Rather, Nash argues that “some aspects of hypnotic response are similar to 
manifestations of primitive thinking in a nonhypnotized adult population.”1849 In other words, 
hypnotized subjects are not adults who “go back in time” but adults who “experience a shift 
towards more prelogical, primary process modes of thinking.”1850 Regression in this sense is 
topographic, not temporal. The psychoanalytic theory of hypnosis thus confirms that regression 
by no means involves traveling to the past or returning to a previous developmental stage but rather 
leads to adopting more creative modes of organizing ideational material.  
 
What Does Regression Really Do? The Therapeutics of “Lost Time.” 
 
1844 Reiff and Scherer 1959, in Omer and Alon, 222. 
1845 Omer and Alon, 222. 
1846 Orne 1951, in Nash, 43. 
1847 Nash, “What, if Anything,” 49. 
1848 Ibid., 49. In other words, “if regression is defined as the extent to which hypnotized subjects conform to childhood 
norms and control subjects do not, then the mental and physiological activity of hypnotically age-regressed subjects 
is not regressed; it appears to be essentially adult.” Regression merely involves “an increase in primary process 





The therapeutic value of regression—of imagining oneself as a younger version of oneself, 
as a child or in a past situation—reconceptualized as a form of serious pretense, can be summarized 
in a remark from Roustang: “The imagination would thus have the power to transform our history, 
that is, our past as it appears to us in the present.”1851 Paradoxically, this conception, in which the 
imaginary does bring about changes in actuality, both undermines and confirms the “truth” and 
efficacy of regression, which is directly linked to the aesthetic capacity to become absorbed in an 
aesthetic illusion and acts of make-believe.1852  
This imaginative exercise allows adults to access a position of unknowing and to 
temporarily experience what it feels like to become what one believes to be merely imitating. It 
creates a “refamiliarization” with the openness of childhood subjectivity. As Jennifer Gosetti-
Ferencei has shown, the “childhood mind” escapes the telos of adulthood and the rigidity of its 
conceptual distinctions.1853 This mode of being can be a rich source of therapeutic change, since it 
“reopen[s] this fluidity which, when recaptured in literature, provides glimpses into the 
constitution of quotidian life as well as its potential reconfiguration.”1854 Childlike imagination, 
conceived as openness to the ongoing possibility of the transformation of the self and thus of 
reality, is therapeutically valuable in that it remains faithful to “a constant and, from the mature 
point of view, radical openness.”1855 What the adult aims to recapture in the reveries of childhood 
is “also the sense of lost possibilities … the open thread of adventure which, when re-engaged, 
 
1851 (“L’imagination aurait donc le pouvoir de transformer notre histoire, c’est-à-dire notre passé tel qu’il nous apparaît 
dans le présent.”) Roustang, Qu’est-ce que l’hypnose?, 130. As Roustang adds, memory converts itself into 
imagination, which enables change and can only in this sense be considered as a form of “rewriting” the past: “Just as 
the epigenetic can modify the genetic, memory reconverts into imagination, and will give the latter greater force to 
modify our history.” Ibid., 132. 
1852 In hypnosis, these effects first and foremost manifest themselves in the reality of the body (with ideomotor 
phenomena) and in cognitive phenomena such as hallucinations, which are experienced as the direct effects of the 
operator’s language.  
1853 See Freud, for the link between creative writing, fantasy and childhood: “When the child has grown up and has 
ceased to play, and after he has been labouring for decades to envisage the realities of life with proper seriousness, he 
may one day find himself in a mental situation which once more undoes the contrast between play and reality….the 
growing child, when he stops playing, gives up nothing but the link with real objects; instead of playing, he now 
phantasies. He builds castles in the air and creates what are called daydream,” and “a piece of creative writing, like 
a day-dream, is a continuation of, and a substitute for, what was once the play of childhood.” Freud, “Creative Writers 
and Day-Dreaming,” (1908), in SE, 9:144-45; 152. 
1854 Jennifer Gosetti-Ferencei, The Ecstatic Quotidian: Phenomenological Sightings in Modern Art and Literature 
(University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 2007), 43. 
1855 Gosetti-Ferencei, Ibid., 54. Indeed, “the order of everyday life, and its vulnerability to transformation” are not 
opposed forces in the child experience (ibid, emphasis added). 
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goes even farther than memories of our own childhood.”1856 Similarly, as Gaston Bachelard writes 
in a description of reverie that applies well to regression, “a potential childhood is within us. When 
we go looking for it in our reveries, we relive it even more in its possibilities than in its reality.”1857 
Far from the infantile aggression described in Kleinian or Freudian analysis, here regression to 
childhood is an enrichment, rather than impoverishment, of our capacities: 
When adults observe children at play, accompany children caringly through the world, or engage in the 
literary imagination of childhood, they experience at best not a regression into childishness … but rather 
glimpses of an alternative to present reality, reminders of the capacity to form new ideas and be open to new 
ways of interpreting things.1858  
 
In this sense, childhood, as opposed to “childishness,” is the state of freedom from the “fixed 
conceptuality and habit” of ordinary consciousness, as well as a “persistent source, when revivified 
in adulthood, for the revitalization of quotidian life.”1859 
However, in order to specify the description of this transformative potential of an 
imaginative return to childhood, the aesthetic complexity of hypnotic regression, which is elided 
by the dramatic conception, must be examined more closely. Indeed, the comparison between 
hypnotic and novelistic temporality reveals that literature allows for similar “access-ways” to the 
past as hypnosis, supporting the narrative aspect of the technique. 
Hypnotic regression can be carried out in two “modes,” which can alternate or coexist. In 
the first mode, it is produced in the “past tense,” in what is called dissociated regression (or 
hypnotic revivification). Here, experience is witnessed from “without,” as the subject pictures 
herself as if she were an onlooker, while remaining aware of her present situation both in space 
and time.1860 Dissociated regression allows the subject to experience a double perspective on her 
 
1856 Ibid., 54, emphasis added. Although it “cannot be immediately accessed”—even if regression can recreate the 
experience of such an access—Gosetti links the childhood consciousness with the aesthetic and with transformation 
in itself, describing it as “one model for what has been called here the ‘ecstatic quotidian’.” Ibid, 43. In her citation of 
a passage describing Walter Benjamin’s childhood, in which chasing butterflies involves “becoming one” with the 
object of perception, the immersion and merging of the boundary between self and other strongly resembles the 
aesthetic absorption described by Benson: “the more I nestled, in all fibers of my being, against the animal, the more 
butterfly-like I became inside … and in the end, it was as if capture was the price through which alone I could regain 
my human existence.” Benjamin, in Gosetti, 47. See also Erickson’s numerous analogies with the process of learning 
acquired in childhood (walking, speech, writing, etc.). 
1857 Bachelard, The Poetics of Reverie, trans. Russel (Boston: Beacon 1960), 86. (“Une enfance potentielle est en nous. 
Quand nous allons la retrouver en nos rêveries, plus encore que dans sa réalité, nous la revivons en ses possibilités.” 
Bachelard, Ibid., 86; 101 in Gosetti. 
1858 Gosetti-Ferencei, The Ecstatic Quotidian, 57, emphasis added. 
1859 Ibid., 59-60. 
1860 A whole spectrum of degrees of proximity and distance can be utilized, depending on the case: “Suggestions can 
be given for patients to (a) have their inner self watch events from a distance or from a different perspective or mental 
point of view)…; (b) interrupt the mental tape, make it run backward from different points, then fast forward and give 
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life events: from without, it resembles the narrator’s perspective, which is able to survey and 
navigate temporally and spatially at will, entering and exiting various episodes of the diegetic 
world. In the second mode, regression is carried out in “the present tense,” in what is called 
associated regression, where the subject has the impression of reliving past events from a first-
person perspective, as if it were occurring in the present.  
Similarly, the genre of the novel allows for the selection or combination of these two 
“poles,” either inserting a large temporal “gap” between the subject of narration and the subject of 
experience in past tense third-person narration, or narrating events in the first person, present tense, 
thereby coming very close to associated hypnotic regression.1861 Furthermore, just as a literary text 
has a narratorial presence, no matter how imperceptible, a subject in associated regression retains 
awareness of the present, even if it remains preconscious or in the background, like Hilgard’s 
hidden observer.  
This awareness is acknowledged even in hypnotic theories that reduce the subject to a mere 
automaton. For example, Bernheim observes about a subject who reexperiences—and acts out—
the battle of Gravelotte in the 1870s that he was both “here and there,” experiencing past events 
and obeying present instructions, understanding and responding to present cues. The subject was 
even able to navigate between various roles or positions in time, demonstrating complex aesthetic 
awareness:  
In living this part of his life over again, S---- doubles his personality so to speak. He puts questions, and gives 
answers, all at the same time; he speaks for himself and for the others. … He dreams the drama that has been 
suggested to him, regarding himself as with his comrades in his former existence, repeating aloud what they 
say to him, what he answers, and gesticulating, as if he were at once the spectator and actor.1862  
 
 
the scene a different ending; (c) watch events first from the viewpoint of a dispassionate observer, before entering the 
scene; (d) make the scene become brighter, dimmer, or out of focus; (e) change the characteristics of key persons (e.g., 
become smaller or larger—feet can grow to ridiculous proportions like a clown's) so that their threatening aspects are 
neutralized; (f) stop and start the tape repeatedly; (g) restructure the memory until different feelings develop or actively 
cultivate different feelings (e.g., anger vs. fear) while watching the tape; (h) shuttle back and forth between the 
traumatic incident and a memory of an incident in which the patient felt in control, safe, and secure; and (i) contain 
disturbing memories between sessions in a file drawer, locked vault, or in a special holding room.” Lynn et. al, 
Essentials of Clinical Hypnosis, 168.  
1861 As Dorrit Cohn points out, some novels use “dissonant narration” where an ironic gap separates them (Cohn, 150). 
Cohn’s notion of “consonant narration” would be (as in Knut Hamsun’s Hunger) adapted to associated regression. 
Cohn, Transparent Minds, 161. 
1862 Cohn, Ibid., 65. While imagining himself in Dijon on garrison duty, at the coffee-house with his comrades, 
Bernheim asks “Where are you, S?’ / ‘I am at Dijon’. / ‘Who am I’? ‘You are Dr. Bernheim. But I cannot be at Dijon, 
for you are at St. Charles Hospital at Nancy. That cannot be! Here are my comrades. No, I do not know you.” 
Bernheim, Suggestive Therapeutics, 65. Here the subject uses trance logic to make sense of the double, incompatible, 
realities, thereby clearly demonstrating his awareness of both levels.  
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This is clearly a reenactment involving narration, a play which is put on in make-believe rather 
than a blind repetition that occurs mechanically and automatically.  
Whereas associated regression leans more strongly toward dramatic acting out and 
cathartic abreaction, dissociated regression bares more resemblance with novelistic subjectivity, 
and pulls regression back toward the anti-mimetic pole. Indeed, in dissociated regression, the 
subject looks upon his “self” as a narrator would upon a character caught in the “necessity” of a 
narrative arc or plot line. Whereas the “past” character’s perspective is limited both in space and 
in time, the “present” perspective is more informed and can look back with “cognitive privilege” 
over the subject of experience. This process is an important characteristic of literary traditions of 
self-narration, as in Rousseauian confession and, of course, Proustian remembrance.  
The best example of a spontaneous Proustian “regression” or emergence of an involuntary 
memory is not the episode of the madeleine but that of the uneven paved stones (“les pavés mal 
équarris”) in the courtyard of the hôtel de Guermantes: 
I had entered the courtyard of the Guermantes' mansion and in my absent minded state I had failed to see a 
car which was coming towards me; the chauffeur gave a shout and I just had time to step out of the way, but 
as I moved sharply backwards I tripped against the uneven paving-stones in front of the coach-house. And at 
the moment when, recovering my balance, I put my foot on a stone which was slightly lower than its 
neighbour, all my discouragement vanished and in its place was that same happiness which at carious epoch 
of my life had been given to me by the sight of trees which I had thought that I recognized in the course of a 
drive near Balbec, by the sight of the twin steeples of Martinville, by the flavour of a madeleine dipped in 
tea, and by those other sensations which I have spoken of and of which the last works of Vinteuil had seem 
to me to combine the quintessential character.1863 
 
The joy is the same as in the episode of the madeleine, except that the “difference, purely material; 
lay in the images evoked.”1864 As the images of Venice begin to spontaneously arise on the mode 
of alterity and exteriority,1865 attempts to use conscious volition to remember fail, in a mnesic 
emptiness that the text dramatizes with the temporal pause containing the effort to try and 
remember:  
As afraid to move as I had been on the earlier occasion when I had continued to savor the taste of the 
madeleine while I tried to draw into my consciousness whatever it was that it recalled to me—I continued, 
ignoring the evident amusement of the great crowd of chauffeurs to stagger as I had staggered a few seconds 
 
1863 Proust, Time Regained, 898-99. (See : “Au moment où … je posai mon pied sur un pavé qui était un peu moins 
élevé … tout mon découragement s’évanouit devant la même félicité qu’à diverses époques de ma vie m’avaient 
donnée la vue d’arbres que j’avais cru reconnaître dans une promenade en voiture autour de Balbec, la vue des clochers 
de Martinville, la saveur d’une madeleine trempée dans une infusion, tant d’autres sensations dont j’ai parlé et que les 
dernières œuvres de Vinteuil m’avaient paru synthétiser.” Le Temps Retrouvé, in À la Recherche du Temps Perdu 
(Paris: Garnier Classiques, 2017), 153-155). 
1864 Proust, Ibid., 899.  
1865 “A profound azure intoxicated my eyes impressions of coolness, of dazzling light, swirled round me.” Ibid. 
Similarly, Combray emerges from a cup. 
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ago, with one foot on the higher paving-stone and the other on the lower. Every time I repeated this physical 
moment, I achieved nothing; but if I succeeded, forgetting the Guermantes party, in recapturing what I had 
felt when I first placed my feet on the ground in this way, again the dazzling and indistinct vision fluttered 
near me, as if to say: “Seize me as I pass if you can, and try to solve the riddle of happiness which I set 
you.”1866 
 
When the images finally appear, the comic effect ceases and conscious volition can let automatism 
take over, allowing the images to unfold spontaneously:  
And almost at once I recognized the vision: it was Venice, of which my efforts to describe it and the supposed 
snapshots taken by memory had never told me anything, but which the sensation which I had once 
experienced as I stood upon two uneven stones in the baptistery of St Marks had, recurring a moment ago, 
restored to me complete with all the other sensations linked on that day to that particular sensation, all of 
which had been waiting in their place—from which with imperious suddenness a chance happening had 
caused them to emerge—in the series of forgotten days. In the same way the taste of the little madeleine had 
recalled Combray to me.1867 
 
Once inside the Guermantes’ mansion, the mechanism of association between both “images 
d’azur” is set in motion, and with the emergence of the spontaneous memory of the beach at 
Balbec, the vividness of the impressions and sensations lead to the temporal confusion between 
past and present, as in hypnotic regression:  
A new azure vision passed before my eyes; but an azure that this time was pure and saline and swelled into 
blue and bosomy undulations, and so strong was this impression that the moment to which I was transported 
seemed to me to be the present moment: more bemused than on the day… I thought that the servant had just 
opened the window on to the beach and that all things invited me to go down and stroll along the promenade 
while the tide was high.1868 
 
Here the confusion (“hébété”) is exactly that of an associated regression, in which temporal lines 
are momentarily blurred, as in a phenomenon of déja-vu.1869 The chance encounter of the physical 
sensations trigger the association between memory-past sensation, and present situation: with both 
touch (“The napkin which I had used to wipe my mouth had precisely the same degree of stiffness 
and starchiness as the towel with which I had found it so awkward to dry my face … at 
Balbec”),1870 and vision of color (it “concealed within its smooth surfaces and its folds—the 
 
1866 Proust, 899.  
1867 Ibid., 899-900.  
1868 Ibid., 900. See also: “I seemed to be in the railway carriage again … until I had time to remember where I was.” 
Ibid., 900-901. 
1869 See also the hallucinatory dimension of the Proustian description: “And if the present scene had not been 
victorious, I believe that I should have lost consciousness; for so complete are these resurrections of the past during 
the second that they last, that they not only oblige our eyes to cease to see the room which is near them in order to 
look instead at the railway bordered with trees or the rising tide, they even force our nostrils to breathe the air of places 
which are in fact a great distance away, and out will to choose between the various projects which those distant places 
suggest to us, they force our whole self to believe that it is surrounded by these places or at least to waver doubtfully 
between the, and the place we now are, in a dazed uncertainty such as we feel sometimes when an indescribably 
beautiful vision presents itself to us at the moment of our falling asleep.” Ibid., 908. 
1870 Ibid., 901 
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plumage of an ocean green and blue like the tail of a peacock”).1871 In this unfolding, it is a whole 
section of the past that produces or “upholds” (“soulevait”) these colors,1872 which Marcel was 
unable to enjoy in Balbec, but once remembered, lead to the present affective reaction, here the 
joyful feeling: “which now, freed from what is necessarily imperfect in external perception, pure 
and disembodied, caused me to swell with happiness.”1873 In the case of these three examples of 
Venice with the paved stones, Balbec and the napkin and Combray with the Madeleine, the 
sensation which triggers the emergence of the past memory seems like an unexpected, almost 
arbitrary cause, and thus destines all conscious attempts at voluntarily remembering to failure: “the 
sensation of the uneven paving-stones, the stiffness of the napkin, the taste the madeleine had 
reawakened in me had no connection with what I frequently tried to recall myself of Venice, 
Balbec, Combray with the help on an undifferentiated memory.”1874  
The spontaneous and involuntary dimension of regression substantiates the claim that 
Proustian memory is more hypnotic than Freudian, unlike what is suggested by J.Y. Tadié in Le 
Lac Inconnu.1875 Indeed. both types of memory can be seen as founded on a certain degree of 
“psychological automatism,” rather than repression. It is not surprising that regression, like 
Proustian involuntary memory, can occur spontaneously, unsought, with the mere induction of 
trance. As Erickson observes, regression is indeed “often present as an epiphenomenon of the early 
stage of trance development. ... In this first stage of learning to experience an altered state, many 
uncontrolled things happen, including spontaneous age regression.”1876 In this case, as in Proust, 
an external trigger creates a sensation, the element to which the memory “latches on” to emerge in 
the present. Proust emphasizes the “extreme difference” between the “real” and “false” impression 
one has of an object: while the latter is the product of voluntary searching, the former emerges 
spontaneously.1877 
 
1871 Ibid. (“et maintenant…elle déployait, réparti dans ses plis et dans ses cassures, le plumage d’un océan vert et bleu 
comme la queue d’un paon,” TR, 155). 
1872 “what I found myself enjoying was not merely these colours but a whole instant of my life on whose summit they 
rested.” Ibid., 901. 
1873 Ibid.  
1874 Ibid., 902  
1875 Jean-Yves Tadié, Le Lac Inconnu: Entre Proust et Freud (Paris: Gallimard, 2012).  
1876 Erickson, Hypnotherapy, An Exploratory Casebook, 18. 
1877 “l’extrême différence qu’il y a entre l’impression vraie que nous avons eue d’une chose et l’impression factice 
que nous nous en donnons quand volontairement nous essayons de nous la représenter.” TR, 155 (“The vast distance 
between a real impression which we have had of a thing and the artificial impression of it which we form for ourselves 
when we attempt by an act of will to imagine it.” Ibid., 902).  
 405 
Hypnotic trance thus serves the same function as Proustian chance (the “hasard” which 
prefigures the surrealist rencontre), as well as the famously hypnagogic opening of the Recherche: 
it facilitates the emergence of the past without constituting a voluntary search.1878 Involuntary 
memory and regression involve similar forms of letting go, a laisser faire which is the sine qua 
non of the spontaneous emergence of “lost” material. 
As François Roustang notes, non-intervention is the vital condition for the general success 
of both hypnotic inductions and the therapeutic work. Without it, the subject remains stuck in the 
sterility of voluntary inquiry, which as Proust has shown us, dooms us to failure.1879 The following 
example drawn from one of Erickson’s case histories clearly illustrates this strong difference 
between voluntary and involuntary remembrance, between both modes of apprehending 
unconscious material:  
When one woman was asked about her earliest memory, for example, she first responded with one that was 
long familiar to her. When she was encouraged to explore further, she paused for a few moments, manifesting 
that inner focus we call the common everyday trance, and then quietly remarked how she seemed to be 
looking up at a bright light, with nothing else in focus. A moment later her left leg began levitating, while 
the rest of her body remained immobile but noticeably relaxed. She then reported that she felt a scream 
building up in her throat. With that she suddenly shook her head, shuffled her body, and obviously reoriented 
to the awake state. In her inner search for an earlier memory she had spontaneously fallen into a trance and 
momentarily experienced a genuine age regression to infancy, when her visual field and her body were 
apparently not entirely under voluntary control, and she felt herself about to cry as an infant might. That 
frightened her, so she spontaneously reoriented to the awake state.1880 
 
This example shows the strong difference between voluntary searching and the spontaneous 
emergence of unconscious material. For Roustang, the non-intervention seen in the latter is the 
condition of all hypnotic phenomena, not just those in which the subject has the impression of 
encountering past material. Hypnosis achieves a paradoxical voluntary passivity, where, as in 
Chinese calligraphy, action stems from inaction:  
Non-action is the moment which opens up toward action, it is its immediate preparation. … If non-action 
occurs, action will emerge from it, not by magic but as a certain consequence. At the heart of non-action, one 
 
1878 Even in the madeleine episode, rather than a simple binary between voluntary and involuntary remembrance, a 
form of intermediate inquiry occurs, which can be described as a special kind of attention which situates itself in 
between both extremes.  
1879 In the opening lines of the preface to Contre Sainte-Beuve, Proust already wrote: “Everyday, I give less value to 
the intelligence. Everyday, I realize that it is outside of it that the writer is able to grasp something of our impressions, 
something of himself, the only material of art. What the intelligence gives us and calls the past, is not of the past” 
(“Chaque jour j'attache moins de prix à l'intelligence. Chaque jour je me rends compte que c'est en dehors d'elle que 
l'écrivain peut ressaisir quelque chose de nos impressions, c'est-à-dire atteindre quelque chose de lui-même et la seule 
matière de l'art. Ce que l'intelligence nous rend sous le nom de passé n'est pas de lui”). See Marcel Proust, Against 
Sainte-Beuve and Other Essays (New York and London: Penguin Books, 1988).  
1880 Rossi, in Hypnotherapy, An Exploratory Casebook, 55. 
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merely has to wait. The laws of calligraphy (which apply to all action) consist in creating emptiness, and 
letting movement occur. … Emptiness, in this sense, is the principle from which emerges action.1881  
 
Nevertheless, despite their spontaneous manifestation, in both Proustian involuntary memory and 
hypnotic regression, there is a paradoxical distance-simultaneity between past and present selves, 
or Marcel and the narrator. Proustian remembrance and hypnotic regression are equally narrative. 
As Gosetti-Ferencei notes, “it must not be assumed then that there is a single core of childhood 
experience which Proust’s narrator is able to recover.”1882 Indeed, Proust’s “revivifications of 
child-consciousness” are systematically interwoven with “post-childhood capacities for reflection, 
linguistic expression, and aesthetic form.”1883 As André Breton puts it in the first Surrealist 
Manifesto, “the desire for analysis overshadows sentiment.”1884 
As in dissociated regression, “in the act of remembering, we sit astride time, living both in 
the present and in the past.”1885 However, since “each recollection involves a reconstitution and a 
reinterpretation,” in Proust’s Recherche the context of remembrance adds inevitably to what is 
remembered.1886 Hypnotic regression literalizes this novelistic process by using dissociation to 
create a juxtaposition of both temporal positions of the narrating and experiencing “I.” For 
example, this can be noted in a description produced by one of Erika Fromm’s patients:  
Such vivid memories … I haven’t thought of these things in years. I remembered as a child going down the 
wooden steps to the beach, to avoid the poison ivy, running on the sand, picking seashells smeared with clay 
… then jumping in the water. I could see the wave ripples in the sand … clumps of water grass and brownish-
speckled fish. I had such a good feeling. … Then I was sitting with the family under a maple tree, eating 
something and looking down at the grownups sitting on Grandpa’s homemade log furniture, eating cookies, 
drinking tea, and talking a kind of Russian Yiddish with a little German and English thrown in.1887  
 
 
1881 Roustang, Qu’est-ce que, 159. (“le non-agir est le moment de l’ouverture vers l’agir, il en est la préparation 
immédiate. … Si le non-agir est réalisé, l’agir va en sortir non comme par enchantement mais comme conséquence 
certaine. Au sein du non-agir, il suffit d’attendre. ‘Les lois de la calligraphie (Valables pour toute action) consistent à 
faire le vide et laisser bouger. … Le vide, en ce sens, est donc situé au principe de l’action”). Here is a much more 
accurate and subtle description of hypnotic automatism than the pathologizing one inherited from Janet. For Roustang, 
this laisser faire must also be embodied by the therapist and is a condition for the emergence of therapeutic change: 
“Change in the patient is conditional upon the non-involvement of the therapist in the change. It is not the latter’s 
action that does the work, it is the patient’s own capacity, which he lets emerge. Once the therapist has tried everything 
and failed, once he has given up, the patient’s freedom is born; he no longer suffocates under the solicitude and good 
intentions that were being used as an illusory crutch.” Ibid., 159; 144.   
1882 Gosetti, 84. 
1883 Ibid., 83. 
1884 “Le désir d'analyse l'emporte sur les sentiments.” Breton, 315. 
1885 Omer and Alon, 125. 
1886 Ibid. 
1887 in Brown and Fromm, Hypnotherapy and Hypnoanalysis, 14. 
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Like an absent or imperceptible narrator, the remembering “I” lets the images unfold 
spontaneously and “automatically,” but remains distinct from the experiencing “I,” even in cases 
where they seem to overlap and become difficult to separate, as in the clause “I had such a good 
feeling.” Indeed, “awareness of the fictionality” of regression remains, even in associated 
regression. For example, Erickson’s Patient “Jill” is able to comment on this temporal 
juxtaposition during the trance state:  
J: I do too. It is not the me now, it is probably the childhood thing. As a child I was always put down. That's 
it! That's where it comes from. It's as though the tears I feel coming now are not me here now crying. It is 
the child-feeling from long, long ago. It is an old, old feeling that is coming out now.1888 
 
Even here, when the subject’s center of experience is in the past and leads her to express herself 
in the present tense, temporal complexity is preserved. In the transcription of a patient with a fear 
of flying, one notes a similar awareness of the gap which separates past and present perspectives 
and manifests itself in a series of meta-narrative interrogations:  
It is a cloudy day and I am in a car with my parents and my sister. I don't know where my brother is. I'm 
wearing, I can't think of what I am wearing. I'm wearing a cotton pinafore like dress, but I don't understand 
why I am wearing that dress when it is so cloudy outside. We were going to my grandmother's and my 
grandfather's and it is, how did I know it was Sunday? It's Sunday, how could I tell? … It is Sunday afternoon. 
We are going over to my grandmother's and grandfather's and my grandmother has promised me chicken 
noodle soup for lunch. And we are in a blue car. I wonder if my parents had a blue car? They must have. This 
is like a newsreel in my mind. Events are happening in my mind… We are driving down the road, and it's 
the Sacramento River Bridge. My mother is unhappy about something, and she asked me to sit back in the 
seat. I don't know why, maybe Diane and I were playing. I'm sitting back in the seat and I'm looking out 
straight ahead.1889  
 
In his description of this case history, Erickson makes an important commentary: “That this is 
something more than a simple recall of a lost memory is indicated by the fact that she reports it as 
a newsreel in my mind, wherein it seemed to come to her autonomously as an unconscious process 
unfolding itself spontaneously, rather than a labored effort of the conscious mind to 
remember.”1890 As in Proustian remembrance, the difference between voluntary and 
“spontaneous” memory is at the heart of the hypnotic, regressive experience.  
The constitutive anti-mimetic awareness that remains active in the subject is what leads 
hypnotists to purposefully create shifts between temporal positions in order to strengthen the 
“realist illusion” of regression and manipulate the subject’s “focal point,” alternating between past 
and present tense. As Erickson notes about one of his patients, “at a critical point I shift tense from 
 
1888 in Erickson and Rossi, Hypnotherapy, An Exploratory Casebook,  267. 
1889 Ibid., 238. 
1890 Ibid., 240. 
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the past (When was that? Where were you?) to the present (Who is in the room?). This shift in 
tense is an important approach to facilitating an actual age regression ... her responses after that 
shift tend to imply she is reexperiencing the past.”1891 
Therefore, hypnotic regression can and should be thought of as the patient’s immersive re-
telling and re-reading of her story, no matter how intense the apparent “confusion” (Proust’s 
hébétement) or “illusory” dimension of the experience.1892 As in other narrative therapies, in 
hypnotic regression the client becomes the “active describer” rather than the “passive victim” of 
her experience. In permissive models of hypnosis, the therapist does not adopt the role of author 
but at best, co-narrates by participating in form-giving and emplotment: “Without making leading 
statements that could shape or distort the memory, the therapist can help in ordering the elements 
of what happened.”1893 In hypnotic regression, “time travel” illuminates not the past itself, but its 
present re-reading, under a different light. Strictly speaking, the client need not believe in the 
actuality of the “uncovered” material for the experience to have therapeutic value.1894 As with 
fiction, working through symbolic, evocative, or narrative material—of which we bracket the 
question of historicity or truth value—can be just as powerful as believing in its historical nature, 
especially when affective responsiveness is involved. Like Charles in Walton’s example,1895 
genuine (sometimes unbearable) affect can remain within the bounds of the contractual framework, 
 
1891 Ibid.,120. 
1892 Taking this “hébétement” for bêtise (stupidity) thus manifests the very credulity which one believes to be exempt 
from, and underestimates the aesthetic complexity of hypnotic phenomena, as well as the aesthetic capacities of the 
hypnotic subject. 
1893 Ibid. In Smith’s description of a successful use of hypnotic regression for example, it becomes clear that 
“recognizing the significant connection between traumatic events in her childhood… and both the early and adult 
traumas and the contemporary triggering events, made Cindy’s symptom picture comprehensible… She now has a 
coherent narrative of her life, recognizes the links between her past and her present.” Smith, Clinical Hypnosis, 125. 
This conception of the hypnotist shows that positive transference and suggestibility can be thus used therapeutically: 
“Worry about therapists’ ability to exploit their patients’ heightened suggestibility and to influence them in a 
manipulative way is ill-founded in a respectful intervention where reassurances and explanations are provided that are 
perfectly consistent with the patient’s conscious wishes and treatment goals.” Ibid. 
1894 Spiegel further indicates that “One controlled study of 112 subjects with PTSD demonstrated that psychotherapy 
with hypnosis was superior to a nontreatment control condition, was equivalent to both psychodynamic therapy and 
systematic desensitization, and was especially effective in reducing intrusion symptoms”; that “The literature, limited 
as it is, provides evidence that hypnosis is a promising treatment for traumatic stress-related syndromes.” For Spiegel, 
“the shift in concentration elicited in hypnosis, so useful in defending against the immediate impact of trauma while 
it is occurring and so problematic in the aftermath of trauma in that it may hamper or delay working through traumatic 
memories, can be quite useful in mobilizing and putting into perspective traumatic memories and reducing the 
symptoms of … PTSD.” In Spiegel and Spiegel, 443. 
1895 See Chapter 3. 
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which establishes the “fictional” nature of the experience. In this sense, Nell’s remark about the 
novel can be applied to hypnotic regression and hallucination: 
It is undeniable that we can be moved to bodily feeling and sensation by what we know to be fictionally the 
case. … The occurrence of feelings and sensations of this sort clearly does not depend on a belief that the 
situation witnessed or described is actual.1896  
 
In the context of hypnotic regression, even if the memory is historically accurate, its meaning is 
relevant only in that it is recreated and reexperienced in the present. Affective discharge or 
abreaction are thus the starting point, rather than the end goal, of the therapeutic process. 
As Joan Murray-Jobsis specifies about her “renurturing” technique, in hypnotic regression, 
“both the patient and therapist know that the real-life experiences of the patient were most likely 
different from the imaginary renurturing. They know that they are creating new experiences in 
imagery that will not change the past but may help make the present and future better.”1897 In 
trauma recovery and “corrective” emotional experience alike, the existence of the form-giving 
narrative framework itself therefore seems more valuable than its content or truth value. 
As an immersive, co-created story, hypnotic regression thus offers the “aesthetic illusion” 
of accessing the past in order to produce a new perspective on one’s life and experience. Whether 
associated or dissociated, it inserts greater distance between the self and the problem, enabling an 
overview of the situation from the perspective of a cognitively or emotionally more informed 
viewpoint. As an exercise in make-believe, regression allows one to imagine possible 
communications between temporal “realities” and creates the setting for skills or insights to be 
metaphorically transferred between them. Decidedly undecidable with regards to the question of 
the pathogenesis of childhood trauma in adult psychopathology—mainly due to the vulnerability 
of memory to distortion and the suggestive nature of the therapeutic-hypnotic relation—hypnotic 
regression tells the story of an impossibility, a simultaneous, dual position which occurs nowhere 
 
1896 Nell, Lost in a Book, 285. The suspension of judgment regarding the truth value of traumatic memories does not 
hinder the healing process. Indeed, “in the absence of external verification, there is no way to know whether [a 
patient’s] memories are authentic or not … ‘Seeming’ real is not confirmation. The patient’s remarkable improvement 
is also not actually a validation of the memories. It may be that memories that are entirely fictitious could still provide 
a plausible and satisfying rationale for [the patient’s] symptoms and thereby serve as therapeutic leverage for 
recovery.” Smith, Clinical Hypnosis, 124. This idea calls into question the cognitive theory according to which our 
emotional responses are founded on belief: “that if I do not take myself to be threatened or in danger, then I am not 
afraid (for myself); similarly, pitying another involves believing him or her to be in one way or another a victim of 
misfortune. And beliefs of this sort would appear to depend on a belief in the existence of the objects in question.” 
Nell, Ibid., 279. Provocatively, Neill even argues that “what I feel for or about a fictional character may in fact be 
more intense than my feelings for or about the starving Ethiopians.” Ibid., 285. 
1897 Murray-Jobsis, in Casebook, 178. 
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else but in fiction. Penetrating the past from a present viewpoint, while still providing access to 
the interiority of the “characters,” regression does not change or rewrite past events, nor does it 
remove, or “excise” traumatic memories by inducing post-hypnotic amnesia in a passive subject, 
unlike what Leys notes about Janet’s work. Rather than acting out “hystories” on the one hand and 
conforming to overused tropes of wishful modification of the past on the other, hypnotic regression 
thus offers an opportunity for the subject to create new ways of looking, by closely “re-reading” 
the narrative material of their life. Considering therapeutic change as a form of re-reading 
preserves the responsibility of the subject, while taking into consideration its situation—social, 
political and material—in the world. Far from promoting a status quo or fatalist resignation, it acts 
as a precondition for change by creating openness to its very possibility. Indeed, before it can 
occur, transformation requires a worldview in which change is possible.1898As Roustang notes, the 
suggestibility and “passivity” involved are precisely what allows for the “malleability” needed for 
change to occur: “without suggestibility, all relations remain closed to the emergence of 
possibility.”1899 Thus, the act of reading one’s life—both past and potential future—allows for 
reconsiderations and reexaminations whose therapeutic value and foundations lie in capacities 
strongly akin to aesthetic—and thus ethical—perception. 
 
4.1.2.2.  Hypnotic Futurization: Fictionally Experiencing Possible Lives 
 
As we have seen, in regression, the reinterpretation of the past is carried out not merely 
conceptually but with an accompanying emotional and imaginative experience. Insight is obtained 
through imagination rather than analytic thinking. 
However, not only does hypnosis make the past coherent, it also allows one to 
imaginatively elaborate new futures, the former being necessary for the latter to occur. As 
Roustang notes: 
When memory transfers its content into the imagination, the latter has the power to produce new 
combinations. Thus, in another sense, the past is indefinitely transformative, so that our history constantly 
 
1898 Here the parallel with reading can be pursued, in the movement with which the past constantly returns to itself and 
makes room for the present: “The literary text relegates our own prevailing views into the past by itself becoming a 
present experience, for what is now happening or may happen was not possible so long as our characteristic views 
formed our present.” Iser, The Act of Reading, 131. 
1899 Roustang, 77. “Cette soumission et la passivité impliquent la malléabilité. Or c’est là un trait positif qui 
conditionne le changement. Son contraire est la rigidité, qui s’en tient à ce qui est connu, établie, vérifié et qui se 
refuse à recevoir la nouveauté. Sans la suggestibilité, toute relation est fermée à l’émergence du possible.” Roustang, 
Qu’est-ce que, 77. 
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renews itself and can even be actively and radically renewed provided we let the power of the imagination 
act.1900 
 
In hypnotherapy, once the patient’s attention is no longer fixated on the past, it can be reoriented 
toward imagining alternative future possibilities. However, as J. M. Coetzee’s fictional character 
Elizabeth Costello notes, “compared with our fiction of the past,” our fiction of the future can 
ordinarily be “a sketchy, bloodless affair, as visions of heaven tend to be.”1901 With the hypnotic 
imagination, not only does the “bloodless” indeterminacy of the future become concretized into 
the vividness of the possible experienced as actual, it reconnects the subject with a sense of 
possibility inherent at the heart of the present situation.  
Indeed, hypnosis literalizes the imaginative process already acknowledged in fiction, 
where imaginative exploration is both the product of a reading of the past, and of the fictional 
elaboration of possible futures, opening up the present to a renewed sense of possibility:  
Like history, the novel is thus an exercise in making the past coherent. Like history, it explores the respective 
contributions of character and circumstance to forming the present. By doing so, the novel suggests how we 
may explore the power of the present to produce the future.1902  
 
In hypnotic futurization, a technique also called “age progression,” this process is concretized, as 
potential plotlines and character traits are tried on creatively in the trance state.1903 As in regression, 
they are pictured and experienced from within as if they were actual, albeit in a future-oriented 
manner.1904 However, unlike what is posited in cognitive solution-oriented therapies, in 
hypnotherapy, mere conceptual description or evocation of desired futures or possibilities is 
considered insufficient. As Roustang puts it, “where courage, willpower, and good resolutions 
 
1900 Roustang, Ibid., 130. (“Lorsque la mémoire transfère son contenu dans l’imagination, le pouvoir de celle-ci peut 
produire de nouvelles combinaisons. Donc en un autre sens, le passé est indéfiniment transformable, si bien que notre 
histoire se renouvelle en permanence et qu’elle peut même être renouvelée activement et radicalement si nous laissons 
agir le pouvoir de l’imagination”). 
1901 Coetzee, Elizabeth Costello 38. 
1902 Ibid., 39. 
1903 In the literature, various other expressions are used, such as “time projection, mental rehearsal, process imagery, 
goal imagery, success imagery and end result imagery.” Michael Yapko, Hypnosis and Treating Depression. 
Applications in Clinical Practice (New York and London: Routledge, 2006), 101. These models are all compatible 
with Alfred Adler’s future-oriented approach, according to which human beings are essentially goal oriented and thus 
generally see themselves as moving forward toward the “future.” 
1904 “This future-oriented approach stands in contrast to more common uses of hypnosis for age regression to past 
traumatic events, where the client can feel overwhelmed and become destabilized, especially in the early stages of 
therapy.” Yapko, Depression, 271. Past oriented models like analysis can be detrimental to some cases according to 
Yapko: “In Michael’s case, the shift from a past orientation of an unchangeable history to a future orientation featuring 
some of the best experiences life can offer was vital to his recovery from depression.” Ibid., 111. 
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remained helpless, imagining the desired events opened the door to their actualization.”1905 In 
hypnotic futurization, the induction of a trance state is used to create imaginative immersion in the 
narrated future, which can feel as vivid as regression. Indeed, “When we consider the research that 
documents how utterly real and convincing a confabulated (or therapist-suggested, but inaccurate) 
age regression may feel to a subject, why shouldn’t age progressions have the potential to feel just 
as actual and real?”1906 Unlike regression, however, the aim is not abreactive but rather that of 
using fictional experience with the purpose of discovering, redefining, or developing, via the 
imaginative immersion in alternative future storylines, the patient’s existing capacities, values, 
goals, and aspirations.1907 In this sense, hypnotic futurization can be considered as the mirror image 
of regression, that is, as an imaginative preparation for human action that offers a creative response 
to psychological determinism. Rather than understood as mere wishful thinking, it should be 
reconceptualized, like regression, as an exercise in sympathetic imagination applied to a 
temporally displaced or relocated self.1908 In this sense, comparing hypnotic futurization to the 
novelistic imagination helps underline the contingency and malleability of reality signaled in 
fictional narratives.  
Hypnotic futurization is the concretized elaboration of the process characteristic of 
ordinary imagination, where vicarious experience and the rehearsal of future scenarios serve as 
preparation for action. A description by David Novitz gives a detailed account of this process, 
which he uses to point toward the value of fictional narratives in the practical domain. Adapting 
an example drawn from Hilary Putnam, Novitz notes the similarities between the “learning” that 
emerges in reading fiction and imaginatively “visualizing” a course of action:  
Suppose that I want to retrieve a ball which has lodged itself in the upper branches of a walnut tree. I gaze 
upward trying to fathom which branches will best provide a foothold and which a secure grip. Clearly, if I 
can imaginatively re-create the situation—that is, if I can “see” myself in my mind’s eye moving from this 
branch to that, holding here and stepping there, and if I can imagine what it feels like to stand on a high, 
swaying branch while reaching for a ball, I will not only have some idea of, but will have developed what is 
in effect a complex hypothesis about, what it is like to be in such a situation. To the extent that I assent to 
this hypothesis, I may be said to have acquired certain empathic beliefs about what it is like to retrieve a ball 
from the upmost branches of a tree. Not only do these beliefs allow me to construe my predicament in a 
certain way, but they also allow me to develop plans of action appropriate to it. I will now attend to what I 
believe are the likely difficulties in the situation, the possible risks, and I will try to conceive of ways of 
 
1905 Roustang, 131. (“Là où le courage, la volonté, les bonnes résolutions étaient demeurés impuissants, l’imagination 
des événements souhaités ouvrait la voie de leur réalisation.”)  
1906 D. Corydon Hammond, 1990, 515, quoted in Yapko, Depression, 101. 
1907 In this way, it helps bridge the gap between the imaginary/fictional/virtual, and the present/real/actual/possible.  
1908 Bernheim even implicitly supports this process, by speaking of the “transfer” of a patient’s personality “into 
another,” which implies an imaginative relocation that can be described as the psychological equivalent of the 
possession examined in Chapter 2. See Bernheim, Suggestive Therapeutics, 59. 
 413 
avoiding them. … Readers who engage in this imaginative activity acquire what might be termed a set of 
practical hypotheses: that is to say, they have at their disposal a range of possible ways of responding to, or 
negotiating, a certain sort of problem.1909  
 
Here, visual imagery provides more than a mere conceptual picture or “idea” of what the situation 
will be like. It creates a “complex hypothesis” which can be used in practice and originates in the 
exercise of the sympathetic—or as Novitz writes, “empathic”—imagination.  
In the field of narrative psychiatry, Bradley Lewis’ technique of “imagining future 
histories,” stresses the benefits of this kind of imaginative projection, as opposed to the mere 
exercise of the rational will or conscious decision making:1910  
A future history is a speculative history, a kind of fantasy projection, in which the clinician and client begin 
the process of imagining possible resolutions to the client’s troubles. The work of developing future histories 
calls on both the clinician’s and the client’s most creative capacities because a future history involves a leap 
into the unknown, the possible rather than the actual. … It is important to recognize that developing future 
histories is imaginative work rather than work of the will. … Only after this imaginative work has been 
completed can alternative choices be made.1911  
 
Nevertheless, hypnotic futurization differs from these methods of conscious visualization or 
narrative therapy, which are conducted in the waking state. Generally occurring after the formal 
induction of a modified state of consciousness, it involves an immersive and affective dimension 
that distinguishes it from surface-level exercises in visualization.1912 
Elaborated in the 1950s, Erickson’s “pseudo-orientation in time” technique was the first of 
this kind and served as the original basis for ulterior models of hypnotic futurization. In Erickson’s 
method, after the induction, the patient is made to “travel forward into the future to a time and 
space” in which the resolution of the current problem has already been achieved. The patient is 
then instructed to “accept the future time as the present,” while the therapist inquires what they 
have learned and done in the interim that helped solve the problem.1913 The patient thus 
imaginatively inhabits a desired future situation, before “returning” to the present in order to 
 
1909 Novitz, 349-350. See Hilary Putnam, “Literature, Science and Reflection,” in Meaning and the Moral Sciences 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), 83-94. 
1910 “Clinicians who add a consideration of future history to their previous consideration of present history and past 
history more easily recognize the storied dimension of clinical work.” This involves reading works of fiction, which 
is the “first step of imagining new possibilities.” Also, in narrative psychiatry, “it is… important to recognize that the 
new possibilities of narrative work are not developed out of nothing. They are developed in the crucible of cultural 
frames that are available to the client and the therapist.” Lewis, 85; 81. 
1911 Lewis, 81. 
1912 As a form of concrete imagining, hypnosis shows that mere ideas are insufficient to create change. Instead, it adds 
affect, physical sensation, hallucinated sounds or images to make the experience lifelike rather than merely conceptual 
and abstract. 
1913 Erickson, 1954, in The Collected Papers, vol. 1., 261. Although this is not systematic, Erickson tended to induce 
amnesia and use the obtained information as a therapeutic strategy. 
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provide necessary insight or useful “skills” to their “present” self, which during the experience is 
perceived as “past” and thus less informed. More recently, Michael Yapko describes using a 
similar technique with patients suffering from clinical depression:1914 
A discussion is held with the patient about developing a desired future image in which the patient would be 
comfortable, better, healthier, happier, or somehow greatly improved. Once this desired state is identified, 
the patient is guided into hypnosis, and then age progression is facilitated by suggestions for ‘time travel’ 
into a specific time in the future. The future reality is hypnotically enhanced by suggestions focused on visual, 
auditory, tactile, olfactory, and gustatory senses that add both experiential power and realism to the 
experience. In addition, the patient’s ongoing experiences are enhanced by ego strengthening … Patients are 
told that these positive images, sensations, and feelings are a special gift that they can take with them on their 
trip ‘back from the future’ into the present. … The patient is asked to bring the written assignment to the 
following session and to read it aloud. The symptoms of futurelessness, helplessness, and hopelessness are 
usually significantly reduced, replaced by a sense of new hope, strength, inner resourcefulness, self-mastery, 
and belief in the possibility of making a recovery.1915  
 
Clearly, the objective here is neither to make predictions about the future nor to “wish” the 
problematic situation or symptom away. Rather, the aim is to inject a sense of possibility into the 
present state of the subject, whose ability to carry out therapeutic work becomes strengthened. 
Like metaphors, which “invite us to look at things in a new way without first imparting factual 
beliefs about those things,” visualization and imaginative inhabiting of future possibilities in the 
context of hypnotherapy allows the patient to re-evaluate their present state.1916  
As was the case with hypnotic regression, conceiving futurization as mere erasure of the 
problem is thus highly reductive. For example, in patients suffering from PTSD, instead of being 
used to imagine a future in which the traumatic memory is “forgotten,” futurization opens up the 
possibility of a life in which the condition has been worked through:  
Age progression can be achieved in most patients by giving suggestions for walking along a road to recovery 
to a time in which the memory has been processed and is no longer distressing. We instruct patients to notice 
all of the small changes in thoughts, feelings, and actions that occur along the road, and to specify how they 
were able to achieve these changes.1917 
 
By directly mobilizing the creative capacities of the subject to imagine possible alternatives or 
developments, hypnosis sheds light on the potentiality, freedom, and contingency at the heart of 
 
1914 Which he calls “Back from the Future.” Yapko, Depression, 102. 
1915 Ibid., 102. Yapko specifies: “When the patient comes out of hypnosis, a brief discussion is conducted about the 
patient’s experience. This is followed by a homework assignment in which the patient is asked to write about the 
experience and describe what it was like to take such a ‘voyage’ into the future. This written assignment may be 
requested while the patient is still in hypnosis.” Ibid. 
1916 Novitz, “Fiction and the Growth of Knowledge,” 353. Yi-Ping Ong’s analysis of Kierkegaard’s notion of 
imagination shows that the latter is intimately bound up with the ability of the self to represent its possibilities, hopes, 
and fears. In this sense, a self that is devoid of imagination has “lost the capacity to be a self.” Kierkegaard’s notion 
of “infinitizing reflection” involves “the representation of the self to itself according to which it is able to go beyond 
what it merely is … and project itself into the real, of what it might be or not be.” Ong, 119. 
1917 in Lynn et al, Essentials of Clinical Hypnosis, 169. 
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human reality. Like the existential novel, it inquires “what it means to understand one’s own life 
as a work in progress” and points toward the freedom at the heart of existence, even if 
temporarily.1918 Furthermore, in hypnotic age progression, the patient must let their imagined self 
become “autonomous” and take on a life of its own, as would a character in a novel. Just as the 
novelistic character must appear as free for the novel to succeed, hypnotic futurization must 
produce a similar “aesthetic effect of lived freedom.”1919 In age progression, even after the “future 
goal” is fictionally established, the subject must operate within a mode where the narrative is not 
yet written, is not predetermined, and can be acted upon as it remains unknown, yet to be 
created.1920 By allowing the future self to “emerge,” the subject resembles the reader who lets the 
story unfold, rather than the author or omniscient narrator who accesses the minds of those in the 
past.1921 Both hypnotic imagination and novel reading thus depend on the limitation of the subject’s 
perspective, from which the future remains pregnant with possibility.1922  
Emphasizing the contingency of events, futurization also offers a creative response, an 
alternative to deterministic, past-oriented therapeutic models.1923 It reinjects a sense of the virtual, 
the possible, of contingency, into reality. As Arthur Frank writes, the function of stories is partly 
to signal this “fragility of events,” to “arouse people’s imaginations concerning how their lives 
might have been different, and the possibilities that still lie open to them.”1924 Hypnotic narratives 
tap into a similar sense of contingency and fragility and use it as a significant therapeutic strategy. 
In his analysis of this strategy, Roustang has shown that the condition of therapeutic change 
based on hypnotic-imaginative immersion is unknowing, for both subject and operator. Indeed, 
letting go of preexisting—evaluative or fatalistic—frameworks is necessary for a re-setting and an 
 
1918 Ong, 195. See Sartre: “man is not the sum of what he has, but the totality of what he does not yet have, of what he 
might have.” Sartre, conclusion of his easy 1939 on Faulkner, in Ong, 71.  
1919 Ibid., 67. 
1920 As Sartre notes in his description of novel reading: “if I suspect that the hero’s future actions are determined… 
my own time ebbs back into me; there remains only myself… confronted by a static book” and later the character is 
“inside me; he is alive” (Sartre, “Francois Mauriac and Freedom,” in Ong, 66. 
1921 In realism, this perspective from which the future seems unwritten is necessary for the novelistic illusion to operate. 
1922 For the success of both therapeutic change and the aesthetic illusion of the novel, reader and subject alike “must 
be convinced of the illusion of an open future in the novel in a way that recalls the indeterminacy possibility, and 
freedom of her own existence,” even if its “truth” can never be verified. Ong, 67.  
1923 For example, see Appendix A, for Roy Schafer’s critique of the two “deterministic” Freudian stories of the “beast” 
and the “machine.” For Schafer, these narrative structures are designed to “totalize” and incorporate any 
inconsistencies in the analysand’s experience that might seem not to fit into the analytic model: “Those actions that 
appear to be free and responsible must be worked into the deterministic narrative of the beast, the machine, or the 
incoherent mingling of the two. Freedom is a myth of conscious thought.” Roy Schafer, “Narration in the 
Psychoanalytic Dialogue,” Critical Inquiry 7, 1 (1980): 33. 
1924 Frank, Letting Stories Breathe., 49-50. 
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opening up to these virtual possibilities for the subject’s future life. In this context, writes 
Roustang, the imagination is the central faculty, as it becomes the “context of all possible particular 
contexts,” the locus where all virtual possibilities gather, and out of which they can be deployed 
or explored.1925 Like Proustian involuntary memory and hypnotic regression, the process requires 
a letting go, out of which future possibilities spontaneously emerge before one can rationally or 
consciously choose to implement them in actuality. This necessitates a temporary forgetting or 
suspension of the known, in order to re-learn, by reimagining alternative modes of doing and being: 
“the skills we have previously learned must be forgotten, so that we can imagine better 
alternatives.”1926 This unlearning is itself the outcome of a learning process, which hypnotic 
induction both symbolizes and teaches. As Roustang notes: “giving consistency to this non-action, 
this non-intentionality, depends on a form of work, patience, learning, on a strategy or trick, in 
short, on a technique.”1927 In other words, both in hypnotic regression and progression, trance 
constitutes a letting go and an opening up, which allows for the emergence of alternative futures 
in the imagination, by make-believing them to be experienced in actuality.  
Through this hypnotic unlearning, preparation for change in the actual world can take 
place. As Roustang notes, therapeutic success is impossible without these imaginative acts of 
make-believe:  
The subject suggests to himself something that does not exist yet, or that exists only in the imagination, which 
is the only faculty that can project itself into the future. Without this projection which prefigures change, the 
latter would never come into being.1928  
 
The therapeutic value of futurization simultaneously emerges from, and brings to the foreground, 
the actual effects of storytelling, and the role of vicarious or rehearsed experience in the 
constitution of actuality.1929 As Ricoeur puts it, “the power of allowing oneself to be struck by new 
possibilities precedes the power of making up one’s mind and choosing.”1930 Similarly, Fromm 
supports the therapeutic value of “reality testing in fantasy,” which leads to the development of 
“coping mechanisms previously not available” to the subject.1931 In experiencing the intensity of 
 
1925 Roustang, 129. 
1926 Ibid., 179.  
1927 Ibid., 178. 
1928 Ibid., 129.  
1929 Social evolutionary explanations of fictional narration often insist on the fact that rehearsing future possible 
scenarios is the primary evolutionary function of storytelling in general. 
1930 Ricoeur, From Text to Action: Essays in Hermeneutics, II. (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1991), 
101. 
1931 Fromm, 1986, 221. 
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hypnotic imagery, the patient “gains mastery” over a given situation, which “enables him then to 
approach the realistic situation … with much more confidence,” as he “transfers the sense of 
success from the imagined to the real situation.”1932 As we will see in the next sections, this is a 
process shared by both the novelistic and hypnotic imagination. Just as for Novitz, readers “can 
only acquire cognitive skills from fiction by tentatively projecting the factual beliefs gleaned from 
the work on to the world about them,” in hypnosis, fictional rehearsal paves the way for effective 
action, which “once adopted and entrenched, can correctly be described as acquired skills.”1933  
Our analysis of hypnotic futurization and regression shows that the “projective” power of 
the hypnotic imagination is not merely evocative but also transformative. As does literature, 
hypnotic imagination “helps human beings to reveal the world, or to come to understand it in light 
of possibilities.”1934 It also “shape[s] the reality before us by regarding it and changing it in new 
ways, integrating possibilities with what is given.”1935 Irreducible to escapist fantasy, literary and 
hypnotic imagination thus share the power to “defy actuality” and reveal “properties that cannot 
be immediately observed” in ordinary life.1936 Crucially, this is also an embodied process, which 
explains the frequent use of ideomotor phenomena in the hypnotic experience: “We can imagine 
change, because we have made it happen with our bodies, and we can intentionally effect change 
in the world because we can imagine things otherwise than they are.”1937  
In this context, Gosetti’s description of “art as an authentic choice” can just as well be 
applied to hypnosis, which “must not lead to the denial of reality or an escape from it,” but is “an 
expression of its ecstatic latencies.”1938 The ethical potential of immersive imagining then appears 
more clearly. As an aesthetic mode of relating to reality, hypnosis, like art, contributes:  
not only to freedom but to the ethical responsibility freedom entails. ... Imagination allows us to consider 
different potential modes of response, rather than merely to react immediately, unreflectively, to pressures of 
a given situation. In so doing, imagination may provide us the liberty to shape our interactions, to change 
 
1932 Ibid., 221. 
1933 Novitz, 353. 
1934 Jennifer Gosetti-Ferencei, The Life of Imagination: Revealing and Making the World (New York, NY: Columbia 
University Press, 2018), 2. 
1935 Ibid., 2. By imagining, we are not simply recombining, we can also “project ourselves into another situation to 
see, or think about, the world from another perspective.” Ibid., 4.  
1936 Ibid., 147. 
1937 Gosetti-Ferencei, 166-7. Our analysis of hypnotic futurization and regression shows that “narratives” mobilize the 
whole being: we do not read with just our intellect. Transposed into the domain of literary theory, this means that 
either we must accept the affective, bodily, and imaginative components of reading, or we must include these 
“nonrational” responses into the realm of the cognitive.  
1938 Gosetti-Ferencei, The Ecstatic Quotidian, 24. In this sense, it also fits into “a wider cognitive ecology, enabled in 
its deviations from habitual thinking by cognitive play.” Gosetti-Ferencei, The Life of the Imagination, 23. 
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ourselves or the surrounding world—not with some wave of a magic wand but in and through the 
circumstances at hand.1939 
 
Not only does this aesthetic-ethical dimension constitute the foundation of the therapeutic value 
of hypnotic imagination, it remains entirely covered up in non-narrative conceptions of hypnotic 
regression and futurization, which are inherently narrative—diegetic, rather than mimetic or 
cathartic—activities.  
Like the Sartrean imagination,1940 the hypnotic imagination is thus “two-sided,” it is 
“turned toward reality insofar as it turns away from it.”1941 Indeed, if it were unable to “flee” from 
reality, imagination would remain “fatally glued to it” and stripped of its power to reconfigure our 
relation to it.1942 Because it cultivates and enables attention to all possibilities, imagination can be 
considered as the most “realistic” of faculties. As Roustang argues:  
It is even the only one to be realistic, since it offers an infinitely richer universe than that presented when I 
observe this arm, this hand… It is what resists preformed reality, and this explain why it is able to transform 
it.1943 
 
Indeed, for him, only the imagination is able to “contain, without imposing constraints on it, the 
limitless variety of things and beings, and their correspondence, making it possible for them to 
constitute a world.”1944 This imaginative world-formation at the heart of hypnotic narration reveals 
the double impact of narrative in our lives. While regression points to its inevitable dimension 
(access to the past is always mediated by narration), futurization reveals its transformative 
potential (fictional narration prepares for the actual). In both cases, creating new ways of looking 
at the world is what leads to new ways of being in the world. This transformative potential is 
overlooked in archaeological and non-narrative conceptions of hypnotherapy. On the contrary, as 
I have suggested, hypnotic narrativity is interpretive in nature. This brings the practice closer to 
 
1939 Gosetti-Ferencei, The Life of the Imagination 79. 
1940 “à double face…tournée vers le réel en tant que détournée de lui” (Roustang, 129). See for example: “For 
consciousness to be able to imagine, it must be able to escape from the world by its very nature, it must be able to 
stand back from the world by its own efforts. In a word, it must be free.” Jean-Paul Sartre, The Imaginary: A 
Phenomenological Psychology of Imagination, trans. J. Webber (1940; New York: Routledge, 2004), 183. 
1941 Roustang, 129. 
1942 Ibid. (“Si l’imagination n’était pas capable de fuir la réalité, elle y serait fatalement engluée; elle n’aurait donc 
aucun pouvoir pour configurer notre monde comme une totalité, et bien encore moins pour configure notre rapport à 
ce monde”). 
1943 Roustang, 129-130. (“L’imagination est réaliste, elle est même la seule à être réaliste, puisqu’elle propose un 
univers infiniment plus riche que celui présenté par l’attention à ce bras, cette main… Elle est ce qui résiste à la réalité 
préformée et c’est pour cela qu’elle est capable de la transformer”).  
1944 Roustang, 135. (“Seule l’imagination …est capable de supporter, sans vouloir la contraindre, la variété sans limites 
des choses et des êtres, et leur correspondance, de rendre possible qu’ils constituent un monde”) 
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forms of reading than impositions of “rewriting” one’s life on the one hand, or “reenacting” it on 
the other. 
 
      *** 
 
In the second part of this chapter, I will transpose the question of narrative “efficacy” from 
the psychological to the ethical level, bringing therapeutics and ethics together in the common 
aspiration toward the good life, where sympathy for the self and for others can coexist without 
contradiction. Emphasizing the intersection between therapeutic and ethical change, I will stress 
that psychotherapy centers around questions of “how one ought to lead his or her life,” or of “what 
values should permeate my relationships with others.”1945 Indeed, “when people begin 
psychotherapy they enter a critical moment of choice and self-determination, during which, even 
if implicitly, “politics and ethics are at the heart of their decision making.”1946 Just as narrative 
oriented therapies describe moral norms and principles as collective acts of storytelling,1947 moral 
philosophers show that our stories are ethical positionings, regardless of their explicit content. 
Furthermore, as my analysis of the hypnotic imagination shows, both in ethical and therapeutic 
change consciousness must recognize possible tensions or disjunctions “between its own mode of 
reflection and a reality that lies beyond or outside it (or between its own … vocabulary and a reality 
that cannot be entirely grasped by that vocabulary).”1948 As I will show, the production of new 
modes of seeing as, whether literary or therapeutic, is inherently an ethical activity. This 
contention, often found in contemporary moral philosophy, emphasizes the evaluative dimension 
 
1945 George Howard, A Tale of Two Stories: Excursions into a Narrative Approach to Psychology. Notre Dame, IN: 
Academic Publications, 1989, 77. Howard pursues, in defense of the humanities: “for glimmering of answers to such 
questions, one would be ill-advised to query science,” since “knowledge is insufficient to give purpose to one’s life. 
Purpose and meaning exit when one sees himself or herself as an actor in some larger story—be it a cultural tale, a 
religious narrative, a family saga, a political movement, and so forth.” Ibid, 77. Similarly, as narrative therapists have 
often pointed out, “when people author their own stories, they clearly express their own moral perspective” and 
“assume responsibility for their own moral actions.” Parry and Doan, Story Re-visions, 46.  
1946 Lewis, 53. In this sense, the narratives we choose to adopt in the therapeutic context have inescapable ethical 
consequences: “the question to ask is not simply, which story is true? But, instead, what are the consequences of each 
story? And what kind of life will follow from inhabiting these stories?” Lewis, 14. 
1947 See for example Michael White: “there is a dominant story about what it means to be a person of moral worth in 
our culture. This is a story that emphasizes self-possession, self-containment, self-actualization, and so on… This 
individuality is a way of being that is actually a culturally preferred way of being, and what is ‘right’ is culturally 
specific. What is right requires certain operations on our lives, much of which are gender and class-specific” M. White, 
Re-authoring Lives: Interviews and Essays (Adelaide, South Australia: Dulwich Center Publications, 1995), 16. 
1948 Antonaccio, “Moral Change and the Magnetism of the Good.” The Annual of the Society of Christian Ethics 20 
(2000): 151. 
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of all description, where “aesthetic perception, seeing-as, and other forms of ‘concrete’ imagining 
manifest the productive ways in which… the world is not merely neutrally grasped as data but 
saturated with thought and value.”1949 Fictional narratives, whether hypnotic, therapeutic, or 
novelistic, are ethical activities that express value-laden worldviews. The ethical value of these 
narratives lies, not in the transmission of pedagogical or normative content, but in their shared 
ability to creatively re-direct the recipient’s attention.  
 
4.2. The Ethics of Immersive Restorying 
 
As Iris Murdoch writes, one way of achieving moral transformation is first “to imagine 
how things might be different.”1950 Now that we have established narrativity at the heart of 
hypnotherapeutic change, in this section, we will compare hypnosis and novels by conceiving them 
as means to create narrative “unselfing” and “restorying” for the recipient. To do so, I will 
underline the ethical possibilities that open up, for both hypnosis and literary criticism, once the 
focus is placed on the specifically immersive quality of hypnotic and novelistic storytelling. 
The entire edifice of hypnosis is constructed on the determining role of the inner life and 
the narratives which compose it. Hypnosis can be considered as a form of “unselfing” in that it 
acknowledges the determining effects of both the direction and objects of the attention, 
manipulating them in order to bring about transformation in the subject. In the therapeutic context, 
this consists either in modifying existing limiting beliefs and autosuggestions or immersively 
imagining alternative scenarios and plotlines to be explored: in creating a process of immersive 
“restorying” for the subject. Both processes involve reorienting awareness away from its habitual 
neurotic contents and patterns of thought, toward more complex forms of narration, using the 
power of the imagination rather than conceptual analysis. The restorying involved in therapeutic 
change is that which, by cultivating perception, emotion, and attention to particulars, modifies 
preexisting, limited and limiting internal representations. Unlike the various forms of “reframing” 
and “reauthoring” used in other narrative or cognitive therapies, its immersive dimension is what 
 
1949 Gosetti-Ferencei, The Life of the Imagination, 116. 
1950 Murdoch, Metaphysics, 330-331. In Murdoch’s view, moral change implies opening up to a reality that lies outside 
our limited perspective, which is also the process involved in hypnotic reimagining, as I have underlined in this section. 
Similarly, Omer and Alon note that “the best moments in therapy are those in which we and our clients discover the 
limitations and biases of our own provisional descriptions.” Omer and Alon, Constructing, 183.  
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maintains its kinship with literary absorption, and is similar to the way in which a novel differs 
from a philosophical treatise.  
For the subject, hypnotic restorying involves forms of becoming-absorbed in something 
else, something new—a story in which the self, its problem or symptoms, no longer constitute the 
center. The insistence on the importance of immersion shows that it is fictionality which is at the 
heart of the transformative power of both hypnosis and novels, mobilizing similar faculties in the 
subject. As Kendall Walton notes: 
It is chiefly by fictionally facing certain situations… and having or expressing certain feelings, that a dreamer, 
fantasizer, or game player comes to terms with his actual feelings—that he discovers them, learns to accept 
them, purges himself of them, or whatever exactly it is that he does. If I am right about this, people can be 
expected to derive similar benefits from novels, plays, and films only if it is fictional that they themselves 
exist and participate… in the events portrayed in the works.1951  
 
Thus, participation and engagement, both in and with the fictional world—the immersion and 
interactivity which Ryan mentions—are necessary for obtaining transformation by imaginative 
world-making.  
In this section, I will examine the form of attentiveness that is involved in this hypnotic-
literary restorying.1952 I will argue that both in hypnosis and the novel, the attentiveness cultivated 
by narrative exploration allows the reader-subject to inwardly open up to the reality of other lives, 
which in turn modifies one’s ability to relate and attend to the external world of observable action. 
In this sense, this immersive “restorying” is a form of becoming-other.1953 Iris Murdoch’s concept 
of moral attention will be especially useful here, as it helps situate the node of the ethical life in 
the subject’s way of looking at the world and “inner life,” just as hypnotherapy situates the 
emergence of therapeutic change in worldview rather than behavior. My reading of Murdoch’s 
concept reveals the importance of the middle ground, formed by internal representations, between 
unconscious mental processes on the one hand and exterior actions on the other. Indeed, for 
Murdoch as for the hypnotherapist, “freedom is not strictly the exercise of the will, but rather the 
 
1951 Kendall Walton, “Fearing fictions,” in Contemporary Readings in the Philosophy of Literature, 274. In fact, 
Walton extends this potential to the acts of make-believe in the therapeutic context, such as role-playing used in Gestalt 
therapy: “I find encouragement for these speculations in the deliberate use of roleplaying in educational simulation 
games, and as a therapeutic technique in certain kinds of psychotherapy.” Ibid. 
1952 Here I use ethical criticism and theory not to impose a conservative or moralizing framework onto literary texts 
but to underline the centrality of narration, vision, and attention in the constitution of experience, as well as its 
determining role in all forms of self-transformation, whether ethical or therapeutic. 
1953 Against purely rationalist and cognitivist models, as well as deontological or normative ethics and purely linguistic 
approaches, this cross-comparison between hypnotherapy and ethical criticism will help underline the determining 
role of the inner-life, of psychological and affective components in constituting the events of our outer, ordinary and 
ethical, lives. 
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experience of accurate vision,” because “by the time the moment of choice has arrived the quality 
of attention has probably determined the nature of the act.”1954 In this framework, ethical criticism 
can then join hypnotherapy in developing a conception of the good life which takes into 
consideration the relations between different parts of the self—conscious and unconscious, 
intentional and automatic, affective and intellectual—which intervene in observable behavior, the 
latter merely constituting the surface of the individual’s moral life. In the ethical life, as in 
therapeutic change, the source of transformation lies not in behavior but upstream, in the quality 
of the subject’s awareness, in the direction and objects of the attention.1955 This view allows us to 
construct an ethics which takes into consideration the teachings of psychoanalysis, without 
condemning individual freedom altogether. In my reading, Murdoch’s mobilization of the 
Freudian unconscious does not entail that psychical determinism is ineluctable, but rather, points 
toward the potential transformations that become available once the constraints imposed on us by 
our past have been acknowledged, as does hypnotherapy. Like hypnotherapy, Murdoch’s moral 
psychology is not based on general abstract rules, maxims, or imperatives, but balances the 
determining constraints of the unconscious with the central role of a “loving gaze” that is 
irreducible to libidinal drives and allows for self-transformation.1956 From there, a range of 
transformative possibilities are opened up at the heart of human attention, while avoiding the 
pitfalls of wishful thinking on the one hand and fatalism on the other.1957  
As we shall see, reemphasizing the importance of the concept of attention in Murdoch’s 
thought shows aspects of her moral philosophy that distinguish it from the Christian morality or 
the Neo-Platonic defense of the Good that have been highlighted in her work.1958 What I would 
like to call attention to in her work is moral psychology that takes into account the particularity of 
reality, underlines the inevitable delusion of our internal narratives, and the possibility of their 
 
1954 Murdoch, “Sovereignty,” in Conradi, ed. Existentialists and Mystics, 355.  
1955 For Murdoch, the right attention to, or perception of, reality has a greater chance of leading to “appropriate action.” 
Diamond, “Murdoch the Explorer,” 73. 
1956 See for instance: “We need a moral philosophy which can speak significantly of Freud and Marx… We need a 
moral philosophy in which the concept of love, so rarely mentioned now, can once again be made central.” Murdoch 
1969, in Existentialists and Mystics, 339. 
1957 Murdoch’s conception of moral transformation thus helps revise a conception of hypnosis as mere positive or 
magical thinking. On the contrary, “therapy begins… with giving up magical thinking, with the relinquishment of this 
longing for cure or the waving of a magic wand.” Kurtz, The Good Story, 61. 
1958 See for instance Maria Antonaccio. “Imagining the Good: Iris Murdoch's Godless Theology” in The Annual of the 
Society of Christian Ethics, 1996, Vol. 16 (1996), 223-242 ; Elizabeth Burns, “Iris Murdoch and the Nature of Good” 
in Religious Studies, Sep., 1997, Vol. 33, No. 3 (Sep., 1997): 303-313; see also Silvia Panizza, “A Secular mysticism?” 
in Filosofía, arte y mística, Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca, 2017. 
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modification through aesthetic processes. Furthermore, despite what her use of expressions such 
as “loving gaze” might seem to imply, Murdoch offers a distinctly non-Romantic, non-sentimental 
argument about the potential “unselfing” enabled by the modification of moral perception and the 
redirecting of attention. Despite her critique of existentialist philosophy, her work on the ethical 
value of literature suggests that self-transformation is possible through the cultivation of an 
increase in awareness, which occurs at the level of the individual’s worldview, and suggests that 
being emerges from seeing. My emphasis on these particular aspects of Murdoch’s thought will 
underline the forms of awareness and attending shared by novelistic and hypnotic narratives, which 
enhance the possibilities for change in everyday life. Insofar as it represents, in concrete form, the 
ethical differences between an interiority composed of limited, self-serving, or anxious fantasies, 
and one constructed on more complex forms of imagining and understanding of particular 
situations or persons, the novel’s ethical force resembles hypnotic “unselfing”—the decentering 
and reorientation of the attention, the restorying via immersion, which we argued is at the heart of 
hypnotic phenomena.  
In delineating this ethics of immersive or absorptive restorying, I hope to clearly 
distinguish it, as I did with hypnotic regression, from the mere delusional “erasure” or “rewriting” 
of the events of one’s past. In doing so, I propose a response to ethical doubts raised about the 
consequences of defending the freedom to reauthor one’s life, such as those raised by J. M. Coetzee 
in The Good Story:  
I find the nostrum that each of us has a life-story, and we should exert ourselves to become the author of that 
life-story, rather than allowing others to tell it to or for us, to be morally dubious… I am alarmed by the 
prospect of a world in which people’s notion of liberty includes the liberty to reconstruct their personal 
histories endlessly without fear of sanction (fear of the reality principle).1959 
 
On the contrary, like the psychoanalyst Arabella Kurtz contends about narrative truth in 
psychoanalysis in her exchange with J. M. Coetzee in The Good Story, by using authors such as 
Murdoch, I hope to show that the value of hypnosis and reading novels lies is their contribution 
toward “working through mask-narratives to find a truer one.”1960 Their common transformative 
value is based on fiction’s ability to “delude” us into adopting stories that dispel, rather than 
solidify, self-delusion. There are two ways in which the novel cultivates ethical forms of attending, 
which I will explore in turn. The first is in engaging our emotional responsiveness, which is an 
 
1959 Coetzee, The Good Story, 41. 
1960 Kurtz, The Good Story, 5. 
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inevitably ethical process. The second is cultivating our moral perception or attention, as Murdoch 
contends. Both of these are not only at the heart of moral transformation, they are also central 
capacities of the “hypnotic” subject.  
 
4.2.1. The Ethical Value of Emotions 
 
At the end of the twentieth century, Anglo-American moral philosophy saw a broad revival 
of the view that emotions are a central part of morality, reestablishing them as a “constitutive part 
of how we see the world, how it appears to us, and thus as an indispensable part of our cognitive 
makeup.”1961 In this context, philosophers like Martha Nussbaum strive to reintegrate affect as a 
potential guide and cognitive aid both in novel reading and moral deliberation.1962 As Nussbaum 
writes in Love’s Knowledge, the very act of deciphering novelistic prose, de facto, mobilizes our 
moral attentiveness, which comprises emotional responses that are absent from the reading of 
purely theoretical, philosophical reasoning: “To work through these sentences… is to become 
involved in an activity of exploration and unravelling that uses abilities, especially abilities of 
emotion and imagination, rarely tapped by philosophical texts.”1963  
For many critics, this implies that “readers who are incapable of certain affective responses 
will not receive cognitive benefits from certain works” and will miss out on the complete ethical 
understanding of both the fictional text and its inhabitants.1964 Such approaches to reading, which 
highlight both the cognitive and ethical value of emotions, entail re-committing, to a certain 
degree, the “affective fallacy” theorized by W. K. Wimsatt and Monroe Beardsley in the 1950s.1965 
However, as Jane Thrailkill argues, “attentiveness to the experience of a literary work need not 
eradicate meaning (or its concomitant, civilized society) if we come to accept that feeling is not 
 
1961 Hämäläinen, 34, emphasis added. Against modern moral philosophy’s focus on the Kantian rational will and 
disregard for the moral role of inclinations, virtue ethics defended the individual’s moral responses as “a central part 
of his moral make-up,” which, if lacking, can become “a central moral fault.” Ibid.  
1962 For Nussbaum, the novel “calls upon and also develops our ability to confront mystery with the cognitive 
engagement of both thought and feeling.” Nussbaum Love’s Knowledge, 143, emphasis added. For Iris Murdoch also, 
experiences involving moral change “involve not only thought but affect… In recognizing the values and disvalues of 
things, one becomes subject, however inchoately to the motivational force that these properties exert.” Alison Denham, 
Envisioning the Good: Iris Murdoch's Moral Psychology.” Modern Fiction Studies 47, no. 3 (Fall 2001): 620. 
1963 Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge, 143. 
1964 James O. Young, “Literature, Representation and Knowledge,” in Contemporary Readings in the Philosophy of 
Literature (Peterborough, ONT: Broadview Press, 2008),373. 
1965 See W. K. Wimsatt and Monroe C. Beardsley, “The Affective Fallacy” in The Verbal Icon: Studies in the Meaning 
of Poetry (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1954). 
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opposed to interpretation but part of it.”1966 Transposed to the ethics of novel reading, this implies 
that “a reader of Anna Karenina who fails to be moved by Anna’s fate might be thought to have 
missed something as crucial to the appreciation of the work.”1967 In this view, “if the reader truly 
understands what Anna Karenina thinks, it is in part because he has been brought to appreciate 
how she feels. The two achievements are not independent of each other.”1968 As underlined in the 
experience of hypnosis, to appreciate how a character feels requires eliciting the appropriate 
feeling-response in the subject. In this chapter, I will work with the assumption that an emotional 
responsiveness and engagement of this sort is necessary to properly understand a fictional work, a 
requirement shared by novelistic and hypnotic narratives alike.1969 Emotional responses are the 
opposite of the exterior, distant, bystander view which prevents full participation in the fictional 
universe or game of make-believe. Because they “create expectations” and “direct the player’s 
attention to some of the game’s most important features” they are necessary to its proper 
comprehension.1970 Failure to engage emotionally and imaginatively with the work demonstrates 
“failure to understand the game of make-believe altogether.”1971 
As we saw in Chapter 3, the cognitive function of emotions as providing guidance in our 
actual, ethical lives, does not imply that they must be founded on beliefs about the existence of the 
objects to which they apply in actuality.1972 Hypnotherapy and literature alike provide examples 
of the presence and power of affect which do not require belief in the existence of the objects that 
trigger it.1973 Indeed, in both cases, the recipient can experience genuine affective reactions—such 
as fear, sadness, even sexual arousal—without being “deceived” and naively assuming that the 
work’s propositional content is a direct description of the actual world.1974 In this sense, Kendall 
 
1966 Thrailkill, Affecting Fictions. Mind, Body and Emotion in American Literary Realism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2007), 4, emphasis added. 
1967 Davies and Mathesen, Contemporary Readings in the Philosophy of Literature (Peterborough, ONT: Broadview 
Press, 2008), 253. 
1968 Denham, Metaphor and Moral Experience (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), 344. 
1969 This is because emotional engagement is necessary to “notice and appraise vital aspects” of the fictional work. 
Novitz, “The Beholder’s Share,” 80. Indeed, in any game of make-believe, some features are only noticed because of 
“expectations bred from emotional involvement” in the game. Novitz, “The Beholder’s Share,” 81.  
1970 Novitz “The Beholder’s Share,” 77. 
1971 Ibid., 81. 
1972 The strongest cognitivist positions would hold that “the belief is both necessary and sufficient for the emotion,” 
such that “the emotion is itself identical with the full acceptance of, or recognition of, a belief,” as does Aristotle. 
Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge, 292. 
1973 In Chapter 3, we examined the question of the “reality” of emotions whose object are fictional. What emerged 
from our inquiry, which is informed by the experience of hypnotic hallucination, is that one need not hold a belief 
about the existence of an object in order to experience genuine emotional reaction and responses to it. 
1974 Novitz, “The Beholder’s Share,” 84. 
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Walton’s “quasi-emotions” should be thought of as having the same impact on the beholder as 
“real” ones. Charles knows that the fictional slime does not exist, yet feels the physiological 
manifestations of fear, even though he takes no empirical action such as running or calling the 
police. Even if, like Walton, “we reject the idea that our affective responses to fictions are genuine 
emotions,” these responses have the same experiential impact, “the same affective qualities” as 
genuine emotions.1975  
Fictionality is therefore not an obstacle to the emotional responsiveness which is a central 
component of the cultivation of our moral capacities.1976 On the contrary, in literature, the 
necessity, and ethical relevance of affective responsiveness can be brought to the forefront on two 
levels: in the moral-affective lives of the diegetic characters and in our moral-affective responses 
to them.  
As Alison Denham indicates, one central “ancestor” of the conception which defends the 
moral value of literature based on its affective power is Tolstoy, who in What is Art? develops a 
non-cognitivist conception of art, famously centered on morality.1977 In Tolstoy’s essay, art is  
famously defined as “that human activity which consists in one man’s consciously conveying to 
others, by certain external signs, the feelings he has experienced, and in others being infected by 
those feelings and also experiencing them.”1978 Furthermore, the subject-matter of art should be to 
replace “lower feelings, less kind and less needed for the good of humanity, by kinder feelings, 
more needed for that good.”1979 As Denham points out, the main interest of Tolstoy’s essay is less 
its morally prescriptive conclusion than his “implicit premise concerning the character of ethical 
 
1975 Davies and Mathesen, 256. In other words, although we cannot be afraid “of” what we know to be fictional 
characters, as Victor Nell puts it, we can be afraid “for and with” them, experiencing genuine affective reactions. Nell, 
Lost in a Book, 284. Significantly for our purposes further on, “both fear for and fear with others, unlike fear for 
oneself, are sorts of response that we often experience as a result of imaginatively adopting another’s perspective on 
things” Ibid. 
1976 This conception provides an antidote to the accusations of simulation that often accompany the mimetic dimension 
of the hypnotic experience and conceive of the subject as “merely acting.” See Leys, Trauma, 13. 
1977 Denham, Metaphor and Moral Experience, 19. 
1978 Tolstoy, What is Art? 1897. Trans. R. Pevear and L. Volokhonsky (London: Penguin Book, 1995), 90. This “non-
rational, immediate infection of feeling” occurs “not by representing or describing the emotions,” but by way of 
“unmediated transmission.” Denham, 18.  The parallel with hypnotic contagion is further suggested in the idea that 
artistic absorption annihilates the boundary between self and other, both in the artist-beholder relation and among the 
public receiving the work: “The effect of the true work of art is to abolish in the consciousness of the perceiver the 
distinction between himself and the artist, and not only between himself and the artist, but also between himself and 
all who perceive the same work of art.” Tolstoy, 210. Similarly: “Every work of art results in the one who receives it 
entering into a certain kind of communion with the one who produced or is producing the art, and with all those who, 
simultaneously with him, before him, or after him, have received or will receive the same artistic impression” Ibid, 
87. 
1979 Tolstoy, What is Art?  214. 
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perceptions.”1980 Indeed, in Tolstoy’s account, “any activities which strongly influence our 
sentiments (for instance, artistic…) must be recognized as having significance for ethical 
perception as well.”1981 In this sense, “the representation of values is not a wholly cognitive 
matter… one’s grasp of them at least sometimes occurs by way of affect and emotion.”1982 
Tolstoy’s “sentimentalist epistemology of value” thus reveals how ethical beliefs are constituted 
in part by affective experience, and emotions act as “a principal—and wholly respectable—source 
of moral insight.”1983  
From here, one might be tempted to deduce that at the heart of the ethical value of literature, 
as in our ethical lives, emotions not only precede rational deliberation but overshadow rational 
choices altogether. 
In the context of contemporary ethical literary criticism, such views of the primacy of affect 
over rational deliberation are often found in the reading of J.M. Coetzee’s novels, which we will 
examine more in detail further on. In “A Yes without a No,” for example, Derek Attridge claims 
that Coetzee’s texts are founded on a clearly “non-rational” ethical stance, in which “the 
precedence of the ethical demand as an experience over any rational calculation is clear.”1984 As 
evidence for his claim, Attridge cites and a passage from a roundtable published in The Death of 
the Animal, where Coetzee affirmed:  
There are people (among whom I number myself) who believe that our ethical impulses are prerational (I 
would be tempted to go along with Wordsworth and say that …our moral being is more deeply founded 
within us than rationality itself), and that all that a rational ethics can achieve is to articulate and give form 
to ethical impulses.1985  
 
In other words, any philosophical justification for ethical responses is seen as “merely post hoc, a 
product of our shared veneration of rationality.”1986 For Attridge it is not reason but affect which 
leads to moral change, both in fictional characters and readers: novels “give us not information, 
moral exempla, or philosophical truths, but experiences, and experiences which, by taking us into 
 
1980 Denham, Metaphor, 22. 
1981 Ibid., 21. 
1982 Ibid., 22. 
1983 Ibid., 23. To Denham’s reading, we would add that Tolstoy allows for the inclusion of hypnosis, via its infectious 
foundation, into the domain of the artistic. 
1984 Attridge, “‘A Yes without a No’. Philosophical Reason and the Ethics of Conversion in Coetzee’s Fiction.” In P. 
Hayes and J. Wilm (eds.), Beyond the Ancient Quarrel (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 94. See also Derek 
Attridge, The Singularity of Literature, London: Routledge, 2004 and The Work of Literature, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2015. 
1985 Coetzee, in P. Cavalieri, The Death of the Animal A Dialogue (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 121. 
1986 Attridge, 92. 
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new territory of meaning and feeling, are capable of changing us, however minimally or 
transiently.”1987 According to Attridge, it is thus the event—rather than the content—of reading 
novels that opens up the way to moral growth.1988 This is what enables Attridge to call the 
psychological event at the root of ethical change a “conversion experience,” an expression with 
evident spiritual undertones that captures the suddenness with which affective upheaval can 
modify a worldview, one that exceeds and escapes rational descriptions and justifications.1989 
As an example of such an experience occurring in the diegetic world of fictional characters, 
Attridge cites Coetzee’s short story “The Old Woman and the Cats,” when an older Elizabeth 
Costello remarks:  
That was when I made my decision. It came in a flash. It did not require any calculation, any weighing up of 
pluses against minuses. I decided that in the matter of the cats I would turn my back on my own tribe—the 
tribe of the hunters—and side with the tribe of the hunted. No matter what the cost.1990  
 
Significantly, when Costello’s son John engages in rational forms of argumentation—pointing out, 
for example, that cats are also hunters—Costello responds that such ‘moral problems’ are 
irrelevant to the motivation behind her ethical act: “I abhor the mind-set that sees life as a 
succession of problems presented to the intellect to be solved. A cat isn’t a set of questions. The 
cat in the culvert made an appeal to me, and I responded. I responded without question, without 
referring to a moral calculus.”1991 At the end of the story, Costello concludes with a strong 
reemphasis on the difference between an ethical action guided by rational deliberation—a 
“calculation”—and a “conversion experience”:  
I know exactly how that process of deliberation and decision feels and tastes, exactly how little it weighs in 
the hand. The other way I speak of is not a matter of choice. It is an assent. It is a giving-over. It is a Yes 
without a No.1992  
 
1987 Ibid., 101. 
1988 In this sense, for Attridge as for Cora Diamond, we must take Elizabeth Costello seriously when she recommends 
that her audience “read poems … (and perhaps be changed by their reading)” (ibid). Indeed, if The Lives of Animals 
or Elizabeth Costello altered the behavior of any of its readers as a literary work, for Attridge “it is not because of the 
arguments Costello presents but the reader’s experience of her presentation of them, which includes an affective 
engagement with the character created within the fiction.” Attridge, 101.  
1989 Attridge, 101. Indeed, in The Death of the Animal, Coetzee uses the expression himself: “We (participants in this 
dialogue) are where we are today not because once upon a time we read a book that convinced us that there was a flaw 
in the thinking underlying the way that we, collectively, treat nonhuman animals, but because in each of us there took 
place something like a conversion experience, which, being educated people who place a premium on rationality, we 
then proceeded to seek backing for in the writings of thinkers and philosophers.” Coetzee, in Cavalieri, The Death of 
the Animal,121. According to Attridge, Coetzee’s emphasis here is thus on the “total irrelevance of the faculty of 
reason to the ethical domain,” and on the power that the literary text can have in both representing and creating such 
conversion experiences. Attridge, 92. 
1990 Coetzee, “The Old Woman and the Cats,” in Attridge, 94. 
1991 Ibid., in Attridge, 94. 
1992 Ibid., in Attridge, 95. 
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In his reading, Attridge thus argues that the conversion experience is the model of all ethical 
actions, and therefore takes Costello’s “abhorrence” toward considering life as a set of 
intellectually solvable problems to be Coetzee’s as well as his characters.1993 And herein lies the 
ethical force—and for Attridge, the superiority over theoretical argument—of literature: 1994 in its 
ability to “stage actions that remain unjustifiable in rational terms, but that have an impact upon 
both character and reader, with the force of their rightness.”1995 In these readings, Coetzee is 
thought to situate morality “outside the domain of rationality altogether.”1996  
These anti-theoretical or anti-rationalist readings of literature help propose an interpretive 
method which takes the modes of attending encouraged by fictionality seriously, and points toward 
the importance of including attentiveness and affect into the reading experience, both of literary 
texts, and of other lives in actuality. They can be put in parallel to Roustang’s account of the 
 
1993 Another example can be from at the end of Coetzee’s novel Disgrace, when David Lurie struggles to provide a 
rational explanation for his unwillingness to let the corpses of the dogs be beaten with shovels: “Why has he taken on 
this job? To lighten the burden on Bev Shaw? For that it would be enough to drop off the bags at the dump and drive 
away. For the sake of the dogs? But the dogs are dead, and what do dogs know of honour and dishonour anyway? For 
himself, then. For his idea of the world, a world in which men do not use shovels to beat corpses into a more convenient 
shape for processing.” Coetzee, Disgrace, 146. What Attridge concludes from these examples is that “there is no 
explanation of Lurie and Costello’s behavior.” Attridge, 104, emphasis added. Regarding the behaviors of Costello or 
Lurie, Attridge claims that “the explanations work in the same way as the novels in which they occur,” giving verbal 
form to “impulses that are inherently non-rational,” and through this form, conveying “the force and rightness of those 
impulses.” Attridge, 104. Another example he cites is when David Lurie drives back from the clinic where he and Bev 
Shaw put down the dogs, and “has to stop at the roadside to recover himself.” Coetzee, in Attridge, 98. For Attridge, 
Lurie’s tears and shaking hands “here bespeak an overwhelming event that is surely related to the ‘conversion 
experience’… and is not a matter of any kind of extended rationality.” Attridge, 98. In a similar spirit, in “Coetzee’s 
Critique of Reason,” Martin Woessner notes that Coetzee’s ethical stance “cannot be schematized, quantified, or 
taught, only dramatized via the unique form of the novel.” Woessner, “Coetzee’s Critique of Reason,” in J. M. Coetzee 
and Ethics, ed. A.  Leist and P. Singer (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 226. 
1994 Attridge links Diamond’s anti-theoretical position with Coetzee’s stance. For Diamond, literature counts as an 
“independent vehicle of thought, putting forward a point of view, an insight, which is persistently out of reach” from 
the perspective of the more traditionally “philosophical realm of claims, arguments and theories.” Hämäläinen, 
Literature and Moral Theory, 73. 
1995 Attridge, 104. Attridge distinguishes “two ways the conversion experience may happen: (a) in the presence of the 
animal or (b) in the reading of literature. And “it is, after all, in a work of literature, a short story, that Coetzee finds a 
powerful way of conveying the importance of these issues.” Ibid., 96.  
1996 Attridge, 108. As we shall see further on, this reading is not evident for all critics. For Alice Crary for example, 
Coetzee merely rejects a narrow conception of rationality, working within a more extended one. As Attridge notes 
himself, for Crary, the moral importance of the novel lies in “the lesson it offers its readers through its narrative and 
characters, teaching us how we might enrich our vision of the world,” whereas for Attridge, it is in the “experience 
the reader lives through” in the way in which “the novel challenges the very basis of our moral norms.” According to 
Attridge, Diamond’s position in “Anything but Argument” is even “very much in line with Costello’s (and… 
Coetzee’s) position,” as well as his own anti-theoretical stance. Attridge, 97-98.  
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“unknowing” as a condition for the success of the hypnotic experience, which we discussed in the 
previous section.1997  
In her essay “The Difficulty of Reality and the Difficulty of Philosophy” for example, Cora 
Diamond criticizes readings that reduce a novelistic text to a mere vehicle for argument. “Pulling 
out ideas” from the text “as if they had been simply clothed in fictional form,” these readings fail 
to fully grasp the ethical value of literature, as they confuse the discourse of the main character 
with the general “meaning” of the work, or take the fictional text as an authorial participation in a 
theoretical debate about the “issues” which it raises.1998 On the contrary, as Diamond argues, 
focusing on Coetzee’s novel Elizabeth Costello, “Costello’s responses to arguments can be read 
as ‘replies’ in the philosophical sense, only by ignoring important features of the story.”1999 For 
her, if one wants to properly understand the difficulties of the questions at hand in the text, (such 
as the tragic suffering of vulnerable human and nonhuman animal bodies), one should attend to 
Costello’s experience itself, to “the rawness of her exposé” rather than its philosophically 
extractable content.2000 And this is precisely what Diamond does in her own reading. Indeed, she 
“forces the reader to attend to the silence of Coetzee in the text,” and “imagine the (fictional) 
person, Elizabeth, who fails to fully participate in argument.”2001 As in hypnotherapy, the 
fundamental aspect to be grasped here is not what Costello could or does argue, but rather “what 
it means, what it can be, to see things her way.”2002 What Diamond highlights is how Coetzee’s 
text takes us to “places where most philosophers seem unable to follow” its ability to put us in 
touch with a human predicament that makes argumentation “quite insufficient, or even impossible, 
or meaningless.”2003 In her reading, Diamond thus makes apparent the ways in which literary form 
gives us a chance to revise our understanding of what is at stake, even in the most difficult or 
disturbing instances, as does the hypnotic encounter. In this account, the role of emotions is not 
merely to provide fuel for belief, but is central to understanding itself: “The horror and 
 
1997  “The only remaining available path is that of unlearning.” Roustang, 127. 
1998 Diamond, 53. The error committed by these commentators is thus in part caused by a failure in attention: they 
have “not quite perceived that Costello does not fully engage in argument,” that “she cannot do that.” Hämäläinen, 
Literature and Moral Theory 72. They do not listen when Costello “says that she doesn’t want to be taken to be joining 
in the tradition of argumentation.” Diamond, “The Difficulty of Reality,” 52.  
1999 Diamond, Ibid., 53. 
2000 Hämäläinen, Literature and Moral Theory, 72. 
2001 Ibid., 183. 
2002 Ibid., 73. 
2003 Ibid., 72. 
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incomprehension of Costello are not emotional adjuncts to opinion but something more 
fundamental.”2004  
Diamond’s reading of Coetzee’s text is important to our understanding of hypnotic and 
novelistic ethics, because it rejects “deflecting” the subject away from the “difficulty” of reality in 
the face of which “to attempt to think… is to feel our thinking come unhinged.” 2005 This is the 
same process used in the therapeutic context, where whenever the subject is tempted to turn away 
from difficult affect by turning it into a problem to be dealt with intellectually, the therapist 
reorients the attention toward the emotionally charged “difficulty,” so that the latter can be 
experienced and worked through rather than avoided.2006 Thus, a similar courage can be noted in 
the literary and hypnotic attitudes of rejecting deflection and allowing affective intensity into what 
is taken to constitute a full understanding of reality. In this sense, as Nora Hämäläinen argues, in 
Costello’s, Coetzee’s, and Diamond’s efforts, we find “a paradigm of a sort of attention,” of 
“looking—as philosophers and human beings—beyond argument,” which they share with 
hypnotherapy.2007 In this mode of reading, attention becomes fully ethical, in the same way as the 
hypnotherapist lets go of the need to extract rational content from the therapeutic interaction at all 
costs.2008 Emotions, in this view, are neither byproducts nor complete replacements of rational 
deliberation—they are merely central to a full understanding of existence and therefore do provide 
forms of knowledge, albeit non-propositional, which remain unattainable by argumentation.  
In this sense, the common trait between the emotional life of the ethical and hypnotic 
subject lies not in being blinded and blown about by one’s affective reactions, but rather, in their 
shared ability to integrate emotional responsiveness into the reading, or understanding of human 
existence, their common acknowledgment of the impossibility of detached contemplation. Rather 
than a merely anti-rationalist conception of moral decisions like that of Attridge, one that makes 
room for the cognitive role of emotions in their ability to guide our moral choices and self-narration 
 
2004 Ibid., 73. 
2005 Diamond, 58. A term which she takes from Stanley Cavell, and designates the tendency to turn away from reality 
by turning its horror—or beauty—into a problem or issue to be grappled with intellectually: The philosopher “deflects” 
from reality as he “thinks and rethinks” the issue “in the language of philosophical skepticism.” Ibid., 57. 
2006 In this sense, “Instead of telling patients not to ruminate over the details of a traumatic experience, the 
therapist does the opposite. He or she instructs the patient how to think about the experience.” Spiegel and Spiegel, 
Trance and Treatment, 433. 
2007 Hämäläinen, 73. 
2008 Rather than look for arguments (whether in fiction or in the therapeutic context) or providing us with a “pre-given 
position,” such an attitude reveals to us that “our preconceptions of what the question is about may need to be 
reorganized” Hämäläinen, 72.  
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in our everyday lives is preferable.2009 Thus, just as the “talented” hypnotic cannot be reduced to 
a purely irrational, affective automaton, deprived of all cognitive functioning, hypnosis and 
novelistic prose come together in the shared affective responsiveness of the recipient, without this 
completely overshadowing the cognitive, anti-mimetic aspects of their respective subjectivities. 
Emotional responses are not a sign of irrationality, but of increased understanding. 
Nussbaum’s Aristotelian position, therefore helps to delineate the way in which affect can 
participate in the ethical life: “emotions are not just the fuel that powers the psychological 
mechanism of a reasoning creature, they are parts, highly complex and messy parts, of this 
creature’s reasoning itself.”2010 They are “appraisals or value judgments” in their own right, and 
emotional “upheavals” are able to create cognitive change, which is to say, upheavals of 
thought.2011 For Iris Murdoch, the emotions are significant for ethics because they display the 
value-laden character of human consciousness.2012 Indeed, they are “neither mere projections of 
our subjective states onto a valueless world; nor are they simply passive receptors of objective 
values we find outside ourselves. Rather, the emotions reflexively mediate our relation to objective 
value” and can be called cognitive “because they tell us something.”2013  
 
2009 The tension or alternative between non-cognitivist and cognitivist accounts of the role of emotions in ethical life 
thus runs parallel to discussions where the therapeutic efficacy of hypnosis is “pulled” either toward its cognitive, or 
its non-cognitive aspects. In the context of the ethical relevance of the novel, it is best exemplified in the tensions 
between readings of critics who agree on the moral dimension of literature, yet propose differing accounts of the force 
of affect in the constitution of moral judgments and the development of moral insight. See for example Derek Attridge 
and Alice Crary’s different readings of the ethical value of Coetzee’s novels in “Coetzee’s Quest for Reality” and “‘A 
Yes without a No’ Philosophical Reason and the Ethics of Conversion in Coetzee’s Fiction.” Whereas Attridge rejects 
rational deliberation as a representative of Coetzee’s ethics, Crary underlines the necessity of emotional 
responsiveness for full moral understanding, while still claiming that Coetzee does include rationality, albeit in a 
“wider” conception, that he embraces “sensitivities that are not matters of reason in the narrower sense.” Attridge, 82. 
In both cases, literature, like hypnosis, brings the moral importance of emotions into view by showing us how they 
make a moral difference in characters’ lives, implicitly requiring of critics that they position themselves on how much 
importance they are willing to grant emotions in the constitution of moral deliberation.  
2010 Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 
3, emphasis added. 
2011 Nussbaum, Upheavals, 4. For Nussbaum, Proust holds such a commitment to the cognitive role of emotions. See 
Nussbaum’s analysis of the Baron Charlus’ radical change as he falls in love with Charles Morel: “his world changes 
and this is … a cognitive change.” Nussbaum, Upheavals, 458-459. As Nora Hämäläinen points out, in Nussbaum’s 
later writing, emotion also forms the link between the individual and collective levels, once we accept that thinking 
can be guided by emotional reactions. The use of narratives in Nussbaum’s political writing aims at moving us to 
consent, with the explicit principle in mind that feeling differently will make us think differently, and further, that 
finding the appropriate emotional response will make us think better.” Hämäläinen, 144. 
2012 As we shall see further on, however, for Murdoch, “in order to earn their cognitive status, the emotions must be 
tested in relation to a critical principle in order to guard against the egoistic tendencies of consciousness to build up 
images of reality to serve its own purposes.” Ibid. 
2013 Antonaccio “Picturing the Soul,” 129, 135. 
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Nussbaum and Murdoch’s philosophical positions about the cognitive dimension of 
emotions are valuable to our argument, not because of what they say about the existence of actual 
objects—the idea that “acceptance of a certain belief or beliefs [is] at least a necessary condition 
for emotion”—but because of their role in guiding our moral evaluations.2014 In other words, the 
cognitive dimension of affect is relevant as it applies to our whole evaluative moral landscape, 
including non-actual, imaginary, or fantasy material. In this sense, as with reading fiction, the 
question of belief about the actual existence of the object can remain “suspended,” while emotions 
are still able to guide our understanding of what is important to us. Emotions serve as a cognitive 
guidance system which helps us to make choices and are powerful enough to stir us out of previous 
narrative frameworks without their upheavals taking away the subject’s autonomy or awareness 
altogether.2015 
In relation to both fictional and actual worlds, emotional and imaginative engagement also 
instructs by drawing attention to previously unnoticed aspects of a given situation. This is the case 
in both the ethical life and the act of novel reading, where full understanding will be conditional 
on reacting in specific ways which go beyond that of mere rational comprehension. Just like a 
hypnotic or therapeutic image or suggestion will only be successful if the subject engages and 
reacts to it appropriately, understanding the ethical implications of a literary situation requires, 
from the reader, an ability to feel and respond similarly in the ways in which the text invites them 
to. Alison Denham argues that this is precisely the effect and function of metaphor in the novel, 
which, in order to be understood, requires an appropriate affective and imaginative reaction on the 
part of the recipient, which often requires a subjective experiential perspective.2016 If the metaphor 
 
2014 Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge, 41. 
2015 In Diamond’s description, cited above, to appreciate the difficulty of reality is “to feel oneself being shouldered 
out of how one thinks,” to be “throw[n],” “astonish[ed]” by the “incomprehensibility” of reality, which “unseats our 
reason.” Diamond, 58; 60; 62; 74. This kind of therapeutic shock also provides its own form of knowledge and is able 
to lead to rapid self-transformation, especially when ordinary concepts are suddenly no longer operative, and change 
becomes effected as soon as its necessity is acknowledged.  
2016 As an example, Denham cites an image from Anna Karenina, where Anna and Vronsky are compared to a sailor 
who realizes he has drifted off his course but is powerless to stop his progress, which serves to describe the characters’ 
moral and affective reaction to the consequences of their actions on Anna’s son, Seryozha. For Denham, “if the reader 
agrees with the idea that this is how they must actually feel, then “he will endorse the description as true.” Denham, 
Metaphor and Moral Experience, 338-339. Another example is that of the comparison between Swann’s jealousy and 
the image of the stalagmite growing in his heart in Proust’s Recherche, which, to be understood need to first be 
imaginatively felt: “the alert reader will… imagine an episode of jealousy in which these features actually are 
prominent,” and “once he has formed an imaginative conception of a kind of jealousy such as would actually elicit 
some of the responses one might have to a stalagmite piercing and growing in one’s heart,” he is “then in a position 
to play our certain of the comparisons in thought—but not before.” Denham, 310. 
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is successful, the act of grasping the image will lead affect and cognition to coexist in the 
production of a new moral understanding. The elicited feeling will have a cognitive component, 
revealing how a simile or metaphor can teach us something about a moral situation by proposing 
a way of looking linked to the feeling. As Denham explains, “it is not a mere feeling but a thought… 
by way of which … the [individual in question] reconcile[s] their circumstances.”2017 In this sense, 
figurative discourse is “a means by which subjects can be brought to notice moral aspects which 
they might not otherwise discern and to comprehend moral perspectives to which they might 
otherwise be blind.”2018 The reader is only able to “properly” understand this figurative description 
only insofar as: 
He has come to respond to its topic in the manner which it suggests: his grasp of its truth-conditions, while a 
cognitive achievement, is in a part a consequence of a shift in his… affective orientation… What he has come 
to see could only be seen by one who’s subjective perspective features those responses.2019  
 
Denham’s account of grasping a literary image can serve as a model for what it means to grasp the 
hypnotic suggestion, and the nature of the fictional work. In reading novels, in hypnotherapy 
sessions, and in the ethical life alike, to properly understand is to see and thus to have responded 
affectively in the way in which the image or metaphor prompt us to.  
In the context of reading literature, emotional reactions are in the service of an increase in 
understanding of character and reader, which can coexist with affect without being overblown by 
it.2020 As Alice Crary argues, as these new aspects are illuminated, a new moral understanding is 
capable of “uprooting” the previous ones, which “take part in it from old ideas, habits, and social 
 
2017 Ibid., 338. 
2018 Ibid., 339. 
2019 Ibid. 
2020 Many novels “invite us to regard human cognitive development as essentially involving the growth of affect” and 
also permit an “expansion of mind.” Crary, “Coetzee’s Quest for Reality,” 125. Taking the example of Disgrace, Alice 
Crary argues that: “David Lurie only starts to approach a slightly better comprehension of his social world when events 
in his life put pressure on some of his most deep-seated attitudes, producing the kind of emotional change that he 
himself had been inclined to resist. Lurie then begins, very imperfectly, to register the fact of his own bodily exposure, 
and to recognize the importance of similarities between his life and the lives of other human beings, as well as of 
animals. At the same time, he starts to register that his past emotional fixity was a mark of intellectual limitation. He 
now haltingly exhibits the tractability of feeling to allow himself to be pulled beyond the sphere of thought he 
previously inhabited, and he tacitly acknowledges challenges of thought that he had earlier been unable to recognize 
or meet. In addition to thus making a thematic issue of this conception of our intellectual and moral condition, Disgrace 
exemplifies it in formal terms.” Crary, Ibid., 131, emphasis added. This is done in great part with its present-tense, 
third-person account. The text invites readers to “share in [Lurie’s] impressions as he goes through his various (largely 
self-inflicted) tribulations, finds himself overwhelmed by his own physical frailty, and ultimately registers morally 
salient resemblances between human life and the lives of animals that he had previously denied. This narrative strategy 
positions us imaginatively to experience a self-transformation that … open[s] to a new vision of the world.” Ibid., 130. 
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ties.”2021 In this process, affect serves as a guide—not a replacement—for intellect, and helps 
constitute a new moral vision. It is such a conception of literature and hypnosis’ ability to redirect 
awareness—rather than mere use of pure affect or naïve positive thinking—that should be linked 
to their ethical and therapeutic ability to bring about self-transformation.  
Stressing the cognitive value of emotions is important to distinguish hypnosis from 
therapeutic models which focus exclusively on restructuring thoughts and behaviors. It helps 
reframe the way in which affect intervenes in the therapeutic context, not as mere abreactive 
discharge but as a mode of shedding light on the subject’s value system and thus a central locus 
and catalyst of potential transformation. The hypnotic subject’s emotional reactions accompany 
and guide her hermeneutic and cognitive acts and participate to the refined form of attention from 
which change can emerge.  
 
4.2.2. Moral Attention and Novelistic “Unselfing.” 
 
As we have seen, affect is not only crucial to produce adequate understanding of situations 
and individuals in our ethical lives, it is also integral to an adequate response to fictional texts. 
Nevertheless, overemphasizing the affective dimension risks overshadowing the attentiveness 
which it helps guide and inform. This is why we must now turn toward the specific kind of moral 
attention or perception that is found in both therapeutic and novelistic modes of narration and ways 
of looking at the world.  
Moral attention enters the contemporary discussion about literature’s relevance to ethics 
on three main levels. First of all, it is at work in the lives of fictional characters, in “how they 
perceive their situations, lives, fellows.”2022 Second, it intervenes in the act of reading and the 
reader’s moral response to the text and characters, in the various acts of “assessing their lives and 
their needs and responding appropriately.”2023 Reading in this sense both “displays and practices 
moral perception.”2024 Finally, moral attention permeates the author’s creative work itself, which 
as Nussbaum argues in her reading of Henry James, can be considered as a “moral” task in and of 
 
2021 Crary, Ibid., 131. 
2022 Hämäläinen, 28. 
2023 Ibid., 28. 
2024 Ibid. 
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itself.2025 These three different levels can be transposed to the therapeutic setting, which presents 
the same type of ethical relevance as do literary texts. Indeed, first of all, the hypnotic fictional 
world can become populated with characters—or parts of the psyche to which concrete or symbolic 
form is given—who engage in similar ethical activity as that of novelistic characters. Secondly, 
just as the reader’s attention to the novelistic world and its “inhabitants” becomes an ethical act, 
the subject’s careful and responsive attentiveness to the hypnotic world and its inhabitants is the 
sine qua non to bring about therapeutic change.2026 Finally, the exterior, meta-position of the 
attentive therapist, as well as his or her “creative” contribution, is just as moral as the author’s 
position according to Nussbaum. In this section, I will examine moral perception under three of its 
main aspects (which play out on these three different levels, in both novelistic-ethical and 
hypnotic-therapeutic subjectivity): the attention to particulars, the primacy of vision over choice 
or behavior, and the ability to cast a “loving gaze” upon reality, rather than turn or “deflect” 
attention away from the difficulties of reality. 
 
4.2.2.1. Attention to Particulars  
 
Martha Nussbaum famously writes that “to confine ourselves to the universal is a recipe 
for obtuseness.”2027 Paying close attention to the specificity of particular cases rather than 
committing theoretical generalizations is one of the central aspects of modern, Ericksonian, 
hypnotherapy, which, as we showed in Chapter 3, requires some degree of improvisation on the 
part of the operator.2028 In the context of the ethics-literature discussion of the twentieth century, 
especially for the moral particularists who aim to correct the systematizing tendencies of 
 
2025 Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge, 148. See for instance: the novel counts as “a paradigm of moral activity,” “the 
novel is itself a moral achievement, and the well-lived life is a work of literary art.” Nussbaum, “Finely Aware and 
Richly Responsible,” 377.  
2026 For Novitz, “attentive readers who understand the text of a fictional work will derivatively imagine this world” 
and likely “be moved by what they imagine.” Novitz, “Fiction and the Growth of Knowledge,” 344.  
2027 Nussbaum, “Finely Aware,” 387. 
2028 As Martha Nussbaum has shown, this ability to improvise is a central ethical capacity for moral particularist views 
but is not incompatible with structure and responsibility. On the contrary: “the actress who improvises well is not free 
to do anything at all. She must at every moment— far more than one who goes by an external script—be responsively 
alive and committed to the other actors, to the evolving narrative, to the laws and constraints of the genre and its 
history.” Using the examples of the actress and jazz musician, Nussbaum emphasizes the constraints to which they 
are bound: “These two cases indicate to us that a perceiver who improvises is doubly responsible: responsible to the 
history of commitment and to the ongoing structures that go to constitute her context; and especially responsible to 
these, in that her commitments are internalized, assimilated, perceived, rather than read off from an external script or 
score.” Ibid., 385. 
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theoretical and normative—utilitarian or deontological—ethics, attention to particulars is often 
presented as a valuable feature of novelistic description, which serves as a model for ethical 
attention. For thinkers like Nussbaum, this particularism stems back to the Aristotelian notion that 
general rules are insufficient for guiding moral choices.2029 Indeed:  
Aristotle’s defense of the priority of ‘perception’ together with his insistence that practical wisdom cannot 
be a systematic science concerned throughout with universal and general principles, is evidently a defense of 
the priority of concrete situational judgments of a more informal and intuitive kind to any such systems.2030  
 
As a place where we can “turn the particularities of human life into common objects of attention,” 
novelistic texts can in this sense be opposed to a moral philosophy or theory based on general 
principles. Unlike the former, the latter risks omitting important or new features of a given 
situation, their “context-embeddedness,” as well as the ethical relevance of “particular persons and 
relationships” involved in them.2031 This, as Alison Denham notes, is what makes literary 
description and its “fine-grained modes of representation” necessary to our moral lives.2032 Indeed, 
for Denham, “our moral concepts are undetermined: to know the paradigm cases to which they 
apply is to know very little about the diversity of circumstances satisfying them in day-to-day 
life.”2033 Although she does not call into question the use of rational philosophical discourse (which 
is distinct from literary form and serves different functions), Iris Murdoch also notes that the realm 
of ethics requires that we pay attention to particular cases, in all of their details:  
Should a retarded child be kept at home or sent to an institution? Should an elderly relation who is a trouble-
maker be cared for or asked to go away? Should an unhappy marriage be continued for the sake of the 




2029 Aristotelian particularism defends the incommensurability of all goods, the notion that “discernment rests with 
perception” and “a picture of choice as a quality-based selection among goods that are plural and heterogeneous, each 
being chosen for its own distinctive value.” Nussbaum, Love’s knowledge, 57. See also Nussbaum’s criticism of R. 
M. Hare’s Moral Thinking, in the Archangel represents the position of the utilitarian philosopher while the “prole” is 
stuck in ordinary daily intuition, seeing moral dilemmas as real and indissoluble. Nussbaum writes: “I believe, with 
Aristotle, that the Archangel’s superior clarity and simplicity does not make things better; that rising above a human 
problem does not solve it. I believe that we want more proles and fewer Archangels, not only in daily choice, but as 
leaders and models.” Nussbaum, Ibid., 66. 
2030 Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge, 66. 
2031 Ibid., 38, and Hämäläinen, 30-31. 
2032 Denham, Metaphor, 337. 
2033 Ibid., 337. For Denham, “scrutiny of the relevant phenomena, alertness to specifics, sensitivity to subtle 
differences—these are characteristics of proper attention that must underpin reliable judgment.” Denham, 
“Envisioning the Good,” 621. For her, although “our literal lexicon of moral terms may serve well enough for highly 
approximate, ‘summary’ judgments,” we require “more fine-grained modes of representation if we are to distinguish 
between the many different aspects of value attaching to particular cases.” Ibid. 
2034 Murdoch, “Sovereignty,” 375. 
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Providing answers to these questions with generalized principles or rules will often prove to be 
misleading and ineffective.2035 One might even say that a whole novel could be constructed on—
or required to respond to—each of them, given the mode of attending that they call for. Thus, if as 
Murdoch claims, “we ‘become better people’ by attending to particulars” and by “doing our best 
to understand the phenomena before us,” then indeed, “it is not easy to think of an art form that 
can better emulate this phenomenology than the form of the novel.”2036 Similarly, for Nussbaum, 
just as we cannot paraphrase a novelistic scene without losing its moral quality, we cannot allow 
ourselves to neglect details of an actual situation without demonstrating “a lack in our 
understanding of it.”2037 For Nussbaum as for Murdoch, “obtuseness and refusal of vision are our 
besetting vices,” and responsible lucidity “can be wrested from that darkness only by painful, 
vigilant effort, the intense scrutiny of particulars.”2038 As is the case in the therapeutic setting, in 
ethical life also, “our highest and hardest task is to make ourselves people ‘on whom nothing is 
lost’.”2039 
Furthermore, attention to moral particulars involves rehabilitating the value of concrete 
perception. In Nussbaum’s Aristotelian account, the Platonist opposition between blindness and 
vision which organizes the relations between rationality and concrete perception is inverted. Here, 
because of the concreteness of all situations, which “do not present themselves with duty labels on 
them,” perception become necessary to moral duty, without which it would remain “blind and 
therefore powerless.”2040  
In the context of novelistic, as well as therapeutic discourse, this process often requires an 
ability to find the right description and encourages us to practice refining our own vocabularies, 
which reveals the quality of our attention. In this sense, description is a moral exercise in itself.2041 
 
2035 As Murdoch writes, “false conceptions are often generalised, stereotyped and unconnected,” whereas “true 
conceptions combine just modes of judgment and an ability to connect with an increased perception of detail, as in 
the case of the mother who has to consider each one of family carefully as she decides whether or not to throw auntie 
out.” Ibid., 379. 
2036 Denham, “Envisioning the Good,” 622. 
2037 Nussbaum, “Finely Aware,” 378. 
2038 Ibid., 377. 
2039 Ibid. 
2040 Ibid., 386. 
2041 For Murdoch, the fact-value distinction is a fallacy, as all description is evaluative. Similarly, as Cora Diamond 
notes, “the conceptual activities of the mind and the spirit in which we see the world make us who we are, morally 
speaking; two people may not, in the relevant sense, inhabit the same world” (Diamond, 73). See also Bernard 
Williams’ distinction between thin and thick moral concepts, which also calls into question the fact-value distinction 
Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (London: Fontana Paperbacks, 1985), 129. For Williams, thin moral 
concepts cannot account for the full moral significance of a situation: “a great deal of the moral job is, in this view, 
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As Nussbaum notes, “picturings, describings, feelings, communications—actions in their own-
right—have a moral value that is not reducible to that of the overt acts they engender.”2042 
This sensitivity to the understanding demonstrated and implied in every descriptive act is 
at the heart of the suggestive dimension of the therapists’ acts of characterization described in the 
previous section. This is especially important in the numerous cases where patients’ accounts of 
their lives and descriptions of situations, both during and after hypnotic experience, tend to use 
primary process thinking and imagery.2043 On the levels of both novelistic prose and therapeutic 
understanding, the type of awareness involved in one that allows to see a complex, concrete reality 
in a “highly lucid and richly responsive way… taking in what is there, with imagination and 
feeling.”2044 It is this process, which Nussbaum calls “moral” perception, that reveals the ethics at 
the heart of novelistic description, but also of the therapeutic encounter. 2045  
 
done by substantial descriptions of people and events. It provides a qualitatively distinct way of formulating and 
expressing evaluative thought.” Hämäläinen, 104. In this way, “the moral signification of a novel as a whole can be 
understood through an analogy with the way thick moral concepts work, exhibiting a similar intimate union of the 
normative and the descriptive.” Ibid., 105.  
2042 Nussbaum, “Finely Aware,” 383. In Nussbaum’s famous reading of James’ The Golden Bowl, Adam Verver’s act 
of perceiving his daughter “in a certain way”—as a “sea creature”—co 
nstitutes his moral “action” as well as that of James’ text.  As a picture, Nussbaum argues, the image of the sea creature 
is significant “not only in its causal relation to [Adam’s] subsequent speeches and acts, but as a moral achievement in 
its own right.” It is not “a mere precondition for action” but in this case, is an act of “sacrifice and renunciation.” For 
Nussbaum, the “full specificity” of the image is in this sense absolutely necessary, since rephrasing or paraphrasing 
James’ passage would change the moral quality of character, narrator and readers’ understandings alike. Indeed: “If 
we had read, ‘He thought of her as an autonomous being,’ or ‘He acknowledged his daughter’s mature sexuality,’ or 
even 'He thought of his daughter as a sea creature dipping in the sea,’ we would miss the sense of lucidity, expressive 
feeling, and generous lyricism that so move us here. It is relevant that his image was not a flat thing but a fine work 
of art; that it had all the detail, tone, and color that James captures in these words. It could not be captured in any 
paraphrase that was not itself a work of art.” Nussbaum, Ibid., 381. 
2043 This can be seen for example in this case study drawn from Erickson and Rossi: “when I started swimming back, 
I came into a net of dolls and old toys, childhood things. And my immediate thing was to swim through it. But I knew 
I could not do it because my fist got stuck in the net. So I put my fist out and I could still swim and I felt my legs being 
very strong kicking the water. And I gently moved the net of childhood things over and pushed it out to sea, so it was 
free again, and I swam some more. Whatever obstacles there were, different things from my family, etc., I just swam 
gently through them after that.” in Erickson and Rossi, Hypnotherapy, An Exploratory Casebook, 270. As suggested 
in Nussbaum’s example, here if the therapist had attempted to reformulate the patient’s description by extracting its 
paraphrasable content (if we had read, “She overcame the obstacles caused by her family difficulties,” or worse, if 
they told the patient “You overcame the obstacles…” rather than remaining at the level of the specific image), the 
relevant features of the image, which may also count as a “fine work of art,” would be missed. In the therapeutic 
context, much of the valuable affective responsiveness would be lost. For instance, in this example from Erickson and 
Rossi, the “gentleness” inherent in both the patient’s swimming and her general attitude toward the events of her life 
would be completely lost and the specificity of the way in which she “frees” herself entirely overshadowed. In this 
example, as in Nussbaum’s reading of James, attention to particulars and to particular descriptions (including their 
stylistic features) reveals the irreducibility of knowledge to “simply intellectually grasped propositions,” to general, 
or even, “particular” facts. Nussbaum, Ibid., 381. 
2044 Nussbaum, Ibid., 382. 
2045 Of course, in both ethics and therapeutics, attending to particulars does not necessarily mean rejecting theory or 
guiding principles altogether. Rather, Nussbaum proposes the compromise of a dialogue between “the fine-tuned 
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4.2.2.2. The Transformative Potential of Re-Vision 
 
For Iris Murdoch, moral vision is not only necessary to grasp the particularity of situations, 
so that we don’t leave duty “without a context,” but is also a prerequisite to right action2046: “true 
vision occasions right conduct.”2047 An ethics based on attention to particulars thus centers itself 
on what precedes exterior behavior and observable action, focusing instead on the determining 
impact of moral interiority.2048 In her famous example of the mother and daughter in law, for 
instance, “M comes to see D quite differently but her conduct is altogether unchanged. Here—
with M—attentiveness is a thoroughly hidden virtue.”2049 This insistence on attentiveness is 
consistent with hypnotherapy’s premise that therapeutic change occurs at the level of worldview 
rather than primarily involving decisions of the rational, conscious will. Thus, both ethical and 
therapeutic transformation involve changes in the subject’s mode of looking at, and inhabiting, the 
world as a whole. Indeed, as Murdoch writes, “I can only choose within the world I can see, in the 
 
perception of particulars” and a rule-governed “concern for general obligations,” since each, taken by itself, is 
insufficient for moral accuracy.  In other words, the moral value of rules can only be shown “inside a story that situates 
[them] in their appropriate place vis-à-vis perceptions.” Nussbaum’s compromise thus makes space for philosophy, 
but as an “ally of the literary text,” which will have to adapt to the latter rather than merely using it as its material. 
“The critical and distinction-making skills usually associated (not inaccurately) with philosophy do have a substantial 
role to play here—if they are willing to assume a posture of sufficient humility. As Aristotle tells us, a philosophical 
account that gives such importance to concrete particulars must be humble about itself, claiming only to offer an 
‘outline’ or a ‘sketch' that directs us to salient features of our moral life… And even to be the ally of literature—not 
to negate the very view of the moral life for which it is arguing—the philosopher’s prose may have to diverge from 
some traditional philosophical styles, toward greater suggestiveness.” Nussbaum, Ibid., 388; 390; 391. 
2046 Murdoch, “Sovereignty,” in Existentialists and Mystics, 375.  Just as hypnotic “hallucinations” are imaginative 
rather than purely “visual,” the term “vision” for Murdoch refers to one’s ability to imaginatively pay attention and 
thus understand, reality as it is, rather than as we want it to be. As Maria Antonaccio explains, imagination is the 
“primary metaphor” Murdoch uses for moral cognition, which she also describes as an aspect of vision, opposing both 
terms to the “distorted, egoistic form of human image-making,” which she calls fantasy, as we shall see further on. 
Antonaccio, “Moral Change,” 151. 
2047 Murdoch, in Existentialists and Mystics, 355. 
2048 Indeed, Murdoch’s insistence on vision shows acquiring a new moral attitude does not need to be perceivable in 
terms of exterior, observable action or behavior in order to count as moral. For Murdoch, “moral vision 
(insight/meditation) and action/performance can be distinguished,” and the latter often takes the role of “the test of 
the vision,” which in this sense is preexisting. Murdoch, “Vision and Choice in Morality,” 42. 
2049 Daniel Brudney, “Marlow’s Morality.” Philosophy and Literature 27, no. 2 (October 2003): 326, emphasis added. 
Indeed, Murdoch invites us to imagine that D has died and the families moved apart, so that the change no longer has 
any observable consequences “in the world.” See also Diamond’s claim that “Murdoch herself, though, suggested that 
we think of the case as one in which there is no outward behavior at all toward the daughter-in-law after the change; 
we should suppose that the couple has emigrated or that the daughter-in-law has died.” Diamond, “Murdoch the 
Explorer,” 82.  
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moral sense of ‘see’, which implies that clear vision is a result of moral imagination and moral 
effort.”2050 
In Murdoch’s thought, moral vision first and foremost involves the attentive “imagination” 
overcoming illusion and “fantasy,” through the progressive destruction of the individual’s illusory, 
self-absorbed, and self-interested narratives and images.2051 Imagination is thus the faculty with 
which we come to be able to see what is before us, rather than remaining trapped in our limited 
perception of reality.2052 For Murdoch, it implies defeating the constructions of the “fat relentless 
ego” which prevents us from perceiving reality as it is and portrays it as we would like it to be.2053 
Indeed, as Murdoch famously writes: 
By opening our eyes we do not necessarily see what confronts us. We are anxiety-ridden animals. Our minds 
are continually active, fabricating an anxious, usually self-preoccupied, often falsifying veil which partially 
conceals the world.2054 
 
The faculty that allows one to break through this veil of delusions is attention. As is well known, 
Murdoch takes her conception of the moral attention from Simone Weil, but places it within her 
own metaphysics:2055  
While Weil gives a metaphysical account of the tendency towards self-centredness, Murdoch translates those 
ideas into modern psychological terminology, with a nod to Freud: for her it is the ego which is responsible 
for all our errors, because the ego is constantly involved in the attempt to protect and gratify itself, which 
 
2050 Murdoch, “Sovereignty,” in Existentialists, 332. As Diamond notes, the notion of vision is crucial in Murdoch's 
repudiation of the idea of a separation between the theoretical realm and the practical, since “what moral life demands 
is not primarily ‘getting choices right’, but ‘achieving in a piece-meal way a clarity of vision’.” Diamond, “Murdoch 
the Explorer,” 73.  
2051 The significance of the imagination in her theory of moral change is “at the heart of consciousness an ability to 
conceive a reality that cannot be collapsed into psychic fantasy.” Antonaccio, “Moral Change and the Magnetism of 
the Good,” 153. 
2052 Thus, fantasy mechanically “makes and uses pictures in ways which help to maintain the self in a kind of insulation 
from reality,” as opposed to imaginative efforts which “freely and creatively explor[e] the world.” Diamond, 
“Murdoch,” 68. 
2053 Murdoch, Sovereignty, in Existentialists, 344. 
2054 Ibid., 368-69. 
2055 Panizza, “A Secular Mysticism?” 349. Simone Weil’s description of attention is reminiscent of the attitude of the 
hypnotic subject. For Weil, attention is not an effort, but rather a state of self-surrender, of maximum receptivity and 
self-negation, a “passive activity,” a silencing and emptying of the self and a renouncing of the will, a receptivity 
without seeking, a making oneself available which goes against the human tendency to “grasp, possess, interpret.” 
Ibid., 350. As Weil describes it, “Attention consists of suspending our thought, leaving it detached, empty and ready 
to be penetrated by the object. it means holding in our minds, within reach of this thought, but on a lower level and 
not in contact with it, the diverse knowledge we have acquired which we are forced to make use of. Our thought should 
be in relation to all particular and already formulated thoughts as a man on a mountain who, as he looks forward, sees 
also below him, without actually looking at them, a great many forests and plains. Above all our thought should be 
empty, waiting, not seeking anything, but ready to receive in its naked truth the object which is to penetrate it.” Weil, 
Waiting on God (Glasgow: Collins 1978), 72.  
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often results in the distortion of reality, by seeing things as one wishes them to be, or as one fears them to 
be.2056  
 
Murdoch thus formulates a moral question in psychological terms, noting that what she takes as 
“true and important in Freudian theory” is the “thoroughly pessimistic view of human nature” 
according to which Freud: 
… sees the psyche as an egocentric system of quasi-mechanical energy, largely determined by its own 
individual history, whose natural attachments are sexual, ambiguous, and hard for the subject to understand 
or control. Introspection reveals only the deep tissue of ambivalent motive, and fantasy is a stronger force 
than reason. Objectivity and unselfishness are not natural to human beings.2057 
 
In this view, the obstacles that keep us separate from reality are not merely cognitive, but those 
emerging from our unconscious life, including “selfishness, pride, lies and comforting fantasies,” 
which are none other than “false, soothing, convenient and comfortable pictures of the world.”2058 
Murdoch cites Freudian neurosis as an example of the delusion to which she is referring with the 
term “fantasy”: “Freud’s condition of neurosis represents this refusal of reality in favour of magical 
self-deception. The neurotic ‘mistakes an ideal connection for a real one’ and ‘over-estimates the 
psychic process as opposed to reality’.”2059  
Furthermore, because for Murdoch “at crucial moments of choice, most of the business of 
choosing is already over,” psychoanalysis paints a more substantial picture of the self than the 
philosophers that she refers to as the existentialists:2060  
The self of psychoanalysis is certainly substantial enough. The existentialist picture of choice, whether it be 
surrealist or rational, seems unrealistic, over-optimistic, romantic, because it ignores what appears at least to 
be a sort of continuous background with a life of its own; and it is surely in the tissue of that life that the 
secrets of good and evil are to be found. Here neither the inspiring ideas of freedom, sincerity and fiats of 
will, nor the plain wholesome concept of a rational discernment of duty, seem complex enough to do justice 
to what we really are. What we really are seems much more like an obscure system of energy out of which 
choices and visible acts of will emerge at intervals in ways which are often unclear and often dependent on 
the condition of the system in between the moments of choice.2061 
 
 
2056 Panizza, “A Secular Mysticism?” 356. 
2057 Murdoch, “On ‘God’ and ‘Good’,” 343. See also: “One of the main problems of moral philosophy might be 
formulated thus: are there any techniques for the purification and reorientation of an energy which is naturally selfish, 
in such a way that when moments of choice arrive we shall be sure of acting rightly?” and “It is important to look at 
Freud and his successors… because the ignoring of psychology may be a source of confusion.” Ibid., 345; 343.   
2058 Ibid., 171-172. “Bad therapy,” like bad art, would simply serve to appease the client in his or her self-indulgent or 
self-deprecating narrative instead of challenging these narratives in the name of more ‘imaginative’ ones.  
2059 Murdoch, “The Fire and the Sun: Why Plato Banished the Artists,” 419. 
2060 Murdoch “Sovereignty, 332. It is important to note that Murdoch’s use of the term “existentialism” here mostly 
targets “Neo-Kantian existentialism,” not existentialism in general. Murdoch, “On ‘God’ and ‘Good’,” 346. 
2061 Murdoch, “On ‘God’ and ‘Good’,” 345. The central question for her thus is: “Must we be condemned always to 
oscillate between the illusion of complete determinism and the equal, opposed illusion of total free will, like so many 
twentieth-century thinkers and, indeed, fictional heroes?” in Conradi, Existentialists and Mystics, 27.  
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 Although this passage leaves out important aspects of existentialist thought that do not “ignore” 
this “tissue” of life—such as Sartre and Beauvoir’s notion of “situation” for example— the central 
point for our purposes here is that it reveals how our freedom, our ability to choose, is heavily 
constrained by processes which in great part escape our ordinary awareness. For Murdoch, our 
capacity to choose is dependent upon what we see, and for her, we are “compelled almost 
automatically by what [we] can see.”2062 Despite this, Murdoch maintains the possibility of 
change, taking into account the teachings of psychoanalysis without taking away the subject’s 
agency altogether.2063 This is where the transformative potential of vision and attention comes into 
play, indicating both the limits of our ability to choose and the possibility of self-transformation, 
in the same way that hypnotherapy acknowledges the weight of unconscious processes and the 
limits of conscious, rational volition, while still maintaining the possibility of therapeutic 
change.2064 In moral life as in hypnosis, change occurs neither by repression nor by conscious 
decisions and resolutions, but rather, by refocusing the attention towards new objects, narratives, 
or aspects of reality.  
In the therapeutic context, this ability of the imagination to dispel fantasy has been 
underlined by Arabella Kurtz, who in The Good Story responds to the arguments raised by Coetzee 
about the ethical dangers of “rewriting” one’s life. Kurtz’ view is similar to Murdoch’s in that, for 
her, narrative truth in therapy dissolves illusion rather than strengthening it, by helping the patient 
fully inhabit their perspective, instead of trying to avoid it.2065 However, in the therapeutic context, 
attaining a more “realist” vision first involves re-inscribing vision in its perspectival, situated 
dimension.2066 Self-understanding is thus “to some extent contingent on relinquishing the 
 
2062 Murdoch 1970, 332, italics in the original. 
2063 “Some philosophers (e.g. Sartre) regard traditional psychoanalytical theory as a form of determinism and are 
prepared to deny it at all levels… But determinism as a total philosophical theory is not the enemy.” Murdoch, “On 
‘God’ and ‘Good’,” 343. 
2064 See for instance: “Weil said that morality was a matter of attention, not of will.” Murdoch, “Against Dryness,” in 
Conradi, 299. See also: “Where strong emotions of sexual love, or of hatred, resentment, or jealousy are concerned, 
‘pure will’ can usually achieve little. … What is needed is a reorientation which will provide an energy of a different 
kind, from a different source. Notice the metaphors of orientation and of looking. … Deliberately falling out of love 
is not a jump of the will, it is the acquiring of new objects of attention and thus of new energies as a result of refocusing. 
… explicit efforts of will are only a part of the whole situation.” Murdoch, “on ‘God’ and ‘Good’,” 346.  
 
2065 For her, “The invitation to inhabit one’s perspective—to understand and own it for all its difficulty and its 
complexity in as mindful a way as possible—seems to me central to the practice of twenty-first-century postmodern 
psychoanalysis.” Kurtz, in The Good Story, 17. 
2066 For Kurtz, truth in therapy is subjective, which does not take away from its truthfulness: “we can do a great deal 
with these stories, particularly if we take the view that there are truths, of the subjective and intersubjective kind, to 
be revealed in the manner of telling.” Thus, “poetic truth, subjective truth, artistic truth, or relational truth” in therapy 
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aspiration to perfect vision.”2067 Nevertheless, despite this apparent difference between Kurtz and 
Murdoch’s ideas, they both help illuminate the fantasy-dispelling potential or restorying. Indeed, 
for Kurtz, understanding the narrative truth at the heart of therapy involves first and foremost 
letting go of the desire to reach objective, omniscient truth, which is the precondition to acquiring 
a more “realistic” vision of reality. Therapy is thus able to dispel rather than create more illusions. 
For her, it is a combination of active listening and of selective comments on the aspects of a life-
story which “do not seem to hold” and “hint at the possibility that a more convincing underlying 
story may emerge.”2068As in Murdoch’s moral psychology, in order to dispel it, therapy first 
involves acknowledging “the hold magical thinking has on all of us” in unconscious fantasy.2069 
By working-through illusory and neurotic fantasy, it then gradually and imaginatively produces a 
different story, creating the inner becoming-other at the heart of our ethics of immersive restorying. 
In this process, the therapist’s goal is “to understand the internal world of the patient, taking away 
the need for distortion through an understanding of that need.”2070 Significantly, whereas 
psychoanalysis dispels fantasy with the help of interpretation and insight, both fiction and hypnosis 
use the “trickery” of the aesthetic illusion, freeing the subject from self-deception by using the 
very material produced by the imagination. In this way, as in Murdoch’s moral philosophy, we use 
the imagination “not to escape the world but to join it.”2071 Therefore, transformation in the 
hypnotic therapeutic setting fits Iris Murdoch’s conception of art as a “conjuring trick” about 
which she concedes: “There is certainly a conjuring trick. But our discovery of the trick need not 
discredit the trickster.”2072 Indeed, art and hypnosis, through serious play or trickery, are able to 
imaginatively reveal, rather than disguise, reality. This is done by dispelling, rather than 
strengthening, delusion or “fantasy” in Murdoch’s sense. A similar “seriousness” thus lies at the 
 
are also forms of truth. Analytic insight can then be defined as “emotional truth… internal truth,” a truth which is 
“always dynamic, provisional and intersubjective.” For her, truth in therapy is dynamic, because “it derives from the 
perspective of a living being whose external and internal characteristics change, even in small ways, over time.” Kurtz, 
Ibid., 63, emphasis added; 11; 10. 
2067 Kurtz, 185. 
2068 Ibid., 11. Although Kurtz’ arguments apply to the analytic setting, they are valid in the hypnotherapeutic context 
as well.  
2069 Ibid., 62. Whereas in psychoanalysis a lot of this work centers around creating, then working through the 
transference neurosis in hypnotherapy, it includes working directly with primary process thinking, and using this 
“fantasy” material directly, without having to interpret it to conscious awareness. 
2070 Ibid., 11. 
2071 Murdoch, in Conradi, 375, 90. 
2072 Ibid., 248. 
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heart of ethical and therapeutic change as it is found in the playfulness of hypnosis and art.2073 As 
Murdoch herself notes, “Of course art is playful, but its play is serious… Freud says that the 
opposite of play is not work but reality. This may be true of fantasy play but not of the playfulness 
of good art which delightedly seeks and reveals the real.”2074  
Like successful therapeutic change, moral change for Murdoch is this “mental activity 
whereby consciousness alters its natural energies through a principle which critically redirects 
those energies away from psychic illusion and towards the real.”2075 For her, what enables the 
individual to choose correctly (or to change) is “an exercise of justice and realism and really 
looking” which shows how in ethics and therapeutics, vision comes before choice or action.2076 It 
is in this sense that Murdoch’s ethics of vision allows her to describe morality “a form of 
realism.”2077 
 
4.2.2.3. The Loving Gaze in a Disenchanted World 
 
This reorientation of the moral or “realistic” attention requires what Murdoch calls a “just 
and loving gaze,” a notion which designates “the characteristic and proper mark of the active moral 
agent.”2078 Rather than being indifferent or impersonal, this “realism” designates the “knowledge 
 
2073 In this sense, Murdoch’s definition of art as dispelling fantasy is thus a response to what she takes to be Freud’s 
criticism of art: “Freud says that ‘before the problem of the creative artist psychoanalysis must lay down its arms’. 
However, Freud does not lay down his arms. He tells us that art is essentially the fantasy life of the artist stimulating 
the fantasy life of the artist’s client. The work of art lies in between, acting as a sort of concealed bribe. The formal 
and ‘innocent’ aesthetic charm of the artwork leads the client, as it has already led the artist, on towards an end pleasure 
of quite another sort, a sexual satisfaction in a licensed play of fantasy, which provides the work with a spurious air 
of completion. Art then consoles, but does so by secret and unacknowledged means; the unity and the dignity of the 
work of art are in a sense sham. Freud is actually too loyal and traditional a European to make his attack upon art in 
any savage style. He interlards his criticism with compliments, though the criticism is none the less devastating.” 
Murdoch, in Conradi, 246. Similarly, Murdoch groups together Freud and Plato’s criticism of art as equally blind to 
its moral relevance: “Plato and Freud mistrust art for the same reason, because it caricatures their own therapeutic 
activity and could interfere with it. Art is pleasure-seeking self-satisfied pseudo-analysis and pseudo-enlightenment.” 
Murdoch, “The Fire and the Sun,” 422. 
2074 Murdoch, “The Fire and the Sun,” 457. Thus, Murdoch’s moral psychology helps defend hypnotic daydreaming 
and the novel as directing us toward reality, rather than deflecting us away from them. 
2075 Antonaccio, “Moral Change and the Magnetism of the Good,” 139. “Reality, in this case, is defined not as a state 
of affairs independent of consciousness, but as a state of perfected knowledge or perception which is reached.” Ibid. 
2076 Murdoch, in Conradi, 375. 
2077 Ibid., 349. 
2078 Ibid., 330 See also Daniel Brudney: “attentiveness to the other is the virtue corresponding to the vice of narcissism 
… to attend to the other person’s reality is to attend to her, and… seeing… that she is ‘real’… To attend to the other 
is to make oneself concerned with the other and this eases easily into concerning oneself for the other.” Brudney, 325-
6. See also Simone Weil: “To know that this man who is hungry and thirsty really exists as much as I do—that is 
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available through loving attention.”2079 Furthermore, this “love” differs from the Freudian drives 
just as much as it does from mere Christian brotherly love or Romantic sensibility. Murdoch’s 
description of moral attention constitutes much less an appeal to warm affective dispositions than 
to the effort it takes to see the world beyond the fantasies produced by the ego. Realism as loving 
gaze here points to the existence, reality, and value of others and what exists outside the self.2080 
This disciplined effort to turn toward the reality of other lives, to “centers” beyond the self, 
Murdoch calls “unselfing,” a reorientation of the attention which functions in similar ways to 
Benson’s description of aesthetic-absorptive recentering. Murdoch’s use of the concept of moral 
attention and loving gaze can thus be used in support of the non-sentimental nature of an ethics of 
immersive restorying.2081  
Murdoch’s concept follows Simone Weil’s, for whom “at its highest point, love is nothing 
but intense, pure, disinterested, gratuitous, generous attention.”2082 Rather than focusing on the 
mystical connotations of Weil’s conception of love and attention, Murdoch’s secular re-adaptation 
of it can be understood in the terms used by George Steiner in the Foreword to Existentialists and 
Mystics: “Love is the perception of individuals. Love is the extremely difficult realisation that 
something other than oneself is real. Love, and so art and morals, is the discovery of reality.”2083 
Whereas the “true” vision of reality is understood by Weil as following God’s will, it is described 
by Murdoch as “responding to the moral demand of particular situations and individuals.”2084 As 
Murdoch notes herself in “On God and Good,” this reorientation away from limited self-centered 
narratives, toward the reality of others—for Murdoch, toward a Good which transcends the 
individual—need not necessarily imply any form of mysticism: 
Human beings are naturally ‘attached’ and when an attachment seems painful or bad it is most readily 
displaced by another attachment, which an attempt at attention can encourage. There is nothing odd or 
 
enough, the rest follows of itself.” Weil, “Attention and Will,” in Simone Weil: An Anthology, ed. Siân Miles (New 
York: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1986), 214. 
2079 Diamond, “Murdoch,” 73. 
2080 For Murdoch, reality is a “fundamentally moral notion” in which “the realistic is also generous and just and good” 
Murdoch, Sovereignty, repr. (London: Routledge, 2001), 57-58. 
2081 Bridging the gap between the aesthetic and the psychological, Murdoch’s unselfing designates the effort to 
“refocus psychic energy on new objects of attention” and is able to shatter the “false values which the emotions build 
up around the objects of its own self-protective fantasy.” Antonaccio 2001, 138). 
2082 Weil, “Human Personality,” in Selected Essays 1934-1943, trans. R. Rees. (London and New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1962), 28. Here, I will adhere to readings according to which Murdoch’s adaptation of Weil’s 
concept of attention as love to a secular context shows that if there is any mysticism involved, it “is best understood 
as an ethical attitude.” Panizza, 349. 
2083 George Steiner, in Existentialists and Mystics, 18. 
2084 Panizza, 358. 
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mystical about this, nor about the fact that our ability to act well ‘when the time comes’ depends partly, 
perhaps largely, upon the quality of our habitual objects of attention.2085 
 
Thus, it is the moral psychology of attention, rather than its metaphysical or mystical 
underpinnings, what has special relevance for our purposes in Murdoch’s conception of loving 
attention.2086 Self-transcendence can be thought of as self-transformation, which shines a secular 
light on the notion of attention, not as “a mystical apprehension of the absolute,” but as “self-
transcendent, because it requires bracketing the ego.”2087  
One of Murdoch’s most striking passages illustrates the idea that the loving gaze, of 
unselfing, just like hypnotic trance, need not be mystical, and rather, sheds light on the penetration 
of the ethical into the ordinary. Indeed, absorption in the “right” object, such as in the 
contemplation of nature, can act as a potential antidote to self-absorption: 
I am looking out of my window in an anxious and resentful state of mind, oblivious of my surroundings, 
brooding perhaps on some damage done to my prestige. Then suddenly I observe a hovering kestrel. In a 
moment everything is altered. The brooding self with its hurt vanity has disappeared. There is nothing now 
but kestrel. And when I return to thinking of the other matter it seems less important.2088  
 
Immersion in nature, outside of the self, is an ethical act in itself, with transformative potential. 
This passage recalls a case history in which Erickson, rather than basing a hypnotic encounter with 
a suicidal woman on an explicit therapeutic intervention, embarks on a lengthy description of the 
various species of natural creatures and living beings—“the flowers, fruit, seedlings, shape of 
every leaf on every plant… the countless generations … the migration of birds, which mankind 
does not understand, but fascinates us nonetheless”—inscribing the therapeutic intervention into 
the unselfing potential of aesthetic or curious attentiveness to life outside the self.2089 In both 
therapeutics and ethics, this aesthetic-hypnotic absorption or unselfing shows that the realist value 
of restorying lies not in content but in the act of returning attention to the “reality” hitherto ignored 
in the narrow, “deluded” view. 
Murdoch writes that “if quality of consciousness matters, then anything which alters 
consciousness in the direction of unselfishness, objectivity and realism is to be connected with 
 
2085 Murdoch, “On ‘God’ and ‘Good’,” 347. 
2086 Indeed, “there is a psychological power which derives from the mere idea of a transcendent object.” Ibid., 350. 
As Murdoch herself notes, her framework is secular: “What is this attention like, and can those who are not religious 
believers still conceive of profiting by such an activity?” in Conradi, 346. 
2087 Panizza, 358. 
2088 Murdoch, “Sovereignty,” 369. One can note here the immediacy and rapidity of the process, which recalls 
Attridge’s description of the conversion event in Coetzee. In any case, redirecting the attention has ethical and 
therapeutic power.  
2089 in Roustang, 140. 
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virtue.”2090 For her, one of the main vehicles of “realist” and “moral” unselfing is art, which in this 
sense, offers the immersive restorying experience par excellence. Indeed, for Murdoch, good art 
is an essential tool for moral understanding, as it can produce “accurate, selfless and unsentimental 
pictures of life.”2091 Unlike “mediocre art”—where perhaps “even more clearly… than in mediocre 
conduct” we find “the intrusion of fantasy, the assertion of self, the dimming of any reflection of 
the real world”—and like (good) therapy, (good) art allows for this process of unselfing.2092 As 
Murdoch writes, “art transcends selfish and obsessive limitations of personality and can enlarge 
the sensibility of its consumer. It is a kind of goodness by proxy. Most of all it exhibits compassion. 
The realism of a great artist is not a photographic realism, it is essentially both pity and justice.”2093 
Artistic form is thus a model of moral attentiveness:  
Good art reveals what we are usually too selfish and too timid to recognise, the minute and absolutely random 
detail of the world, and reveals it together with a sense of unity and form. This form often seems to us 
mysterious because it resists the easy patterns of the fantasy, whereas there is nothing mysterious about the 
forms of bad art... Good art shows us how difficult it is to be objective by showing us how differently the 
world looks to an objective vision. We are presented with a truthful image of the human condition in a form 
which can be steadily contemplated; and indeed this is the only context in which many of us are capable of 
contemplating it at all.2094  
 
As Cora Diamond explains, when Murdoch mentions the impersonality of art, as in Flaubert’s 
aesthetics, this does not imply that it is “neutral.”2095 Indeed, this impersonality is “distinguished 
from the kind of impersonality characteristic of science. … To speak of great art as impersonal is 
not meant to imply that great artists do not have highly recognizable individual styles … The point 
of calling such an achievement impersonal is that our usual failure to see reality as it is, is a matter 
 
2090 Murdoch, “Sovereignty,” 368-69. 
2091 Hämäläinen, 172. This explains Murdoch’s preference of realism over twentieth century novels, in its ability to 
picture the reality (and social) existence of other individuals. However, reality for Murdoch is not the totality of 
empirical facts but as noted higher up, it is the evaluative realm of a “life-world,” perceptible once we rid ourselves 
of the obstacles that conceal it. 
2092 Murdoch, Ibid., 349. As Murdoch notes, “It is difficult for any artist not to falsify, the discipline of art must include 
the persistent recognition and rejection of easy natural falsification… This is perhaps the most difficult thing of all, 
requiring that courage which the good artist must possess… A study of good literature, or of any good art, enlarges 
and refines our understanding of truth, our methods of verification.” Murdoch, Metaphysics, 86. 
2093 Murdoch, “Sovereignty,” 371. 
2094 Ibid., “The enjoyment of art is a training in the love of virtue. The pointlessness of art is not the pointlessness of 
a game; it is the pointlessness of human life itself, and form in art is properly the simulation of the self contained 
aimlessness of the universe.” Ibid.  
2095 As Antonaccio puts it, “perfected or ‘realistic' vision… is not impersonal like the eye of a camera; it is human 
vision that has been purified of selfish fantasy.” Antonaccio, 156. In this sense, the artistic and realist dimension of 
the therapeutic narrative lies in the process of learning how to cast a loving yet disinterested and non-neurotic gaze 
upon the self. 
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of us—ourselves, our system of desires and fantasies—getting in the way.”2096 In “good art” as in 
therapy, “consciousness is transformed through the work of imagination as it confronts what is 
other than itself.”2097 Moral imagination, in this sense is not about “inventing and expressing a 
better self and a better world” but, as in therapy, about a “restorying” consisting in “transcending 
the self” and opening it up to “obstacle-free perception.”2098 Murdoch’s insistence on vision thus 
relocates the moral task from describing “free isolated individuals-actors”—as in behaviorism or 
existentialism2099—to “approximating an accurate vision of reality,” which includes that of 
others.2100 An ethics of vision therefore helps understand how ethics in the novel are expressed 
first and foremost in the selections of attention—whether through the perspective of a character, 
narrator, or implied author.2101 On the therapeutic level it is mirrored by the notion that self-
transformation occurs before it manifests itself in habit, behavior, or action. Given Murdoch’s 
conception, hypnosis in the therapeutic context can thus be considered as a form of awareness 
which casts an artistic, loving gaze on the reality of one’s life.2102 
 
      *** 
 
 
2096 Diamond, “Murdoch,” 66. As Denham explains, engaging with a work of art involves “attun[ing] ourselves to 
concerns and conditions that are enjoyed and suffered by humankind quite generally; we are compelled to contemplate 
realities that surround us every day, but to which our selfish concerns so often blind us. In doing this, moreover, we 
come to care about interests beyond our own: we learn to feel with and for others—and so satisfy, however 
episodically, a wholly traditional requirement of morality.” Denham, “Envisioning the Good,” 625). 
2097 Antonaccio, “Moral Change,” 153. 
2098 Hämäläinen, 29. 
2099 “Murdoch’s talk of attending to another person, Stanley Cavell’s insistence on acknowledgment, Cora Diamond’s 
concern with the importance of being human all point to the thought that moral conduct is about more than action.” 
Brudney 2003, 323. See Simone Weil, “Attention and Will,” in Simone Weil: An Anthology, ed. Siân Miles (New 
York: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1986). 
2100 156. The imagination is a “moral discipline of the mind,” an ability to “picture what is quite other [than oneself]” 
and thus to “make real to oneself, the existence and being of other people” (Murdoch, Metaphysics, 321-322). 
2101 This process occurs in Murdoch’s novel The Sea, the Sea, where the main character Charles Arrowby shifts from 
believing in his self-serving illusions masked as love, to a more authentic and selfless love for his long lost love 
Hartley, moving from envy and resentment to a greater degree of acknowledging the reality and freedom of others, as 
his interrogations reveal: “Why did she go? Because I was in love and she was not; because she simply did not like 
me enough, because I was too selfish, too dominating, as she put it, ‘so sort of bossy’. I had deluded myself throughout 
by the idea of reviving a secret love which did not exist at all” (Murdoch, The Sea, The Sea, 498 check quote words 
Denham 616). As Denham notes, “there is redemption of a kind in [the novel’s] denouement, for Arrowby is at last 
brought to see, or at least to glimpse, some of the realities to which his life-long fantasies had blinded him,” which in 
turn trickles down into modifying his behavior toward Hartley (Denham, 616). 
2102 Significantly, Murdoch often refers to this ideal as the “magnetic” force of the good, a metaphor serving to 
symbolize “the way in which human beings can be drawn outside of themselves to new objects of attention, new 
sources of moral and psychic energy, and a transformed perception of the real.” Antonaccio, “Moral change,” 156. 
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As Maria Antonaccio has noted, the linguistic turn brought with it a certain “loss of the 
psychic” in contemporary moral philosophy.2103 This is problematic, since without “a significant 
notion of consciousness, the idea of moral change becomes marginal to ethics.”2104 The fact that 
Murdoch rehabilitates interiority by mobilizing the concepts of moral vision and attention is 
therefore important for conceptualizing both the ethical life and therapeutic models which focus 
on the inner life, with its images, representations, narratives, and the values which all of these 
manifest—hypnotherapy being a case in point. Indeed, unlike philosophies which reject the notion 
of a private language or inner world, for Murdoch “‘mental events exist, in the sense that there are 
images, speeches uttered to oneself, and perhaps more obscure occurrences which ask for 
metaphorical descriptions.”2105 In other words, the inner life comprises all of our picturing and 
narrative activities, whether overtly displayed or inwardly elaborated.2106 This inner life, Murdoch 
argues, constitutes the “texture” of someone’s being, the “nature” of their personal vision,”2107 and 
is composed of one’s “meditation upon and conception of his own life, with its selective and 
dramatic emphases and implications of direction.”2108 The material of ethics is thus constituted of 
the individual’s “total vision of life,” which from the point of view of the hypnotherapist, reveals 
itself in “their mode of speech or silence, their choice of words … their conception of their own 
lives … their reactions and conversation.”2109 It is in this sense that, as we have previously noted, 
morality “pervades” thought, and thus “all consciousness has a moral character.”2110 In this way, 
Murdoch’s ethics reintroduce a conception of human beings as “real, substantial individuals with 
a stream of consciousness where perception and evaluation are constantly intermingled and often 
inseparable,” akin to that with which modern hypnotherapists work with.2111 
Furthermore, as in hypnotherapy (where the limits of one’s world are those of one’s world 
view), for Murdoch, differences in individuals’ texture of being indicate, strictly speaking, 
 
2103 Ibid., 145. 
2104 Ibid., 150. 
2105 Murdoch, “Vision and Choice,” in Conradi, 103. As Murdoch puts it, “there is an inner life… in the sense of 
personal attitudes and visions which do not obviously take the form of choice-guiding arguments.” Ibid., 105. 
2106 “Either overt (conversation, story-telling) or if introspectable are identifiable and in principle exposable (private 
images, inner monologue).” Ibid., 105. 
2107 The “complex attitudes to life which are continuously displayed and elaborated in overt and inward speech but are 
not separable temporally into situations.” Ibid., 106. 
2108 Ibid., 109. 
2109 Ibid., 105. 
2110 Diamond, “Murdoch the Explorer,” 52. 
2111 Hämäläinen, 156. 
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individuals who inhabit different worlds. Indeed, in Murdoch’s moral psychology, a divergence in 
moral views does not involve individuals who merely apply differing “moral concepts” to a shared, 
value-neutral world, but persons who inhabit different universes. For her, moral differences are 
differences “of story or metaphor or … moral vocabulary betokening different ranges and 
ramifications of moral concept.”2112 A difference in moral concept implies a “total difference of 
Gestalt” so that when moral divergence occurs, “we differ not only because we select different 
objects out of the same world but because we see different worlds.”2113  
Applied to the world of the novel, this change of Gestalt implies that a character’s moral 
growth either involves a change in their perspective (and thus, strictly speaking, the creation of a 
new character), or the stepping back from their narrow perspective into a more informed 
viewpoint—whether theirs or that of a narrator.2114 The process is similar to hypnotic regression 
and futurization where, as I have indicated, the subject is invited to observe their reality from a 
spatial or temporal distance, from the perspective of the “other,” already-changed, self—that is, 
from the paradoxical perspective of the nonexistence of their current perspective.2115 In hypnosis 
as in Murdoch’s moral psychology, changing one’s world view involves stepping outside of it. As 
long as one stays within the limits of one’s world, change remains impossible. Leaving our world 
opens up the possibility of creative elaboration, at the price of the death of the previous “self” or 
worldview. In this sense, Murdoch’s ethics of vision—where we “grow by looking”—helps 
 
2112 Murdoch, “Vision and Choice,” 107. 
2113 Ibid., 106, emphasis added. Similarly, Alison Denham describes moral properties as being perspectival: analogous 
to musical or pictorial aspects, they are “configurational” or “organizational properties,” they act like patterns or forms 
which “emerge within the sensible world” and organize our experience. Thus, when in Murdoch’s example M sees D 
differently, “this is a matter of seeing one pattern rather than another, of configuring her observations in accordance 
with different categories.” As “aspectual properties” moral properties are detected rather than invented, but are only 
directly evident to those who “possess the requisite experiential sensitivity” to perceive them. Whether or not one 
detects them depends on one's experiential capacities and point of view: “Just as one's ability to hear a certain melody 
or to see a certain image depends on both one's position and constitution, so too does capacity for moral 
understanding.” As in Murdoch, “we detect them… by looking and attending, rather than willing and choosing.” 
Denham, “Envisioning the Good,” 614-615. 
2114 Of course, many novelistic characters—and actual individuals—are unable to operate this change, and reveal the 
limitations of their inner, moral world in the ways that it limits and distorts the perception of the “outer,” fictional 
world.  
2115 Here the novel and its character space help us better understand the therapeutic value of hypnotic dissociation. As 
Auerbach notes in Mimesis about Emma Bovary’s perspective, “though the life which illuminates the picture proceeds 
from her, she is yet herself part of the picture” (Auerbach, 484-485, in Ong, 190). In this sense, as Yi-Ping Ong 
explains, “the world-disclosing perspective essentially illuminates itself as the limits of its world.” Indeed, “it is almost 
as if we are made to know Emma’s world-disclosing perspective from the point of view of the possibility of its 
nonexistence—that is to say, as if the possibility of this mode of knowledge is conditional on a kind of not-being-in-
the-world.” Ong, 190, emphasis added. 
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underline the similar processes involved in moral and therapeutic change. Not only do they reveal 
how ethics cannot be divorced from a perceiving subject and their particular worldview, they use 
this fact to create “a change in moral landscape.”2116 An ethics centered on vision therefore helps 
underline the internal dimension of the “immersive restorying” enabled by novelistic and hypnotic, 
narratives, which both imaginatively open up the subject’s world-disclosing perspective to 
transformation, and thus open up its existence to “the point of view of the possibility of its 
nonexistence.”2117 
 
4.3. The Ethics of Projective Imagining 
 
In the previous section, I discussed “immersive restorying,” the first form of “unselfing” 
or “becoming-other,” shared by the narrative ways of looking at the world found in hypnosis and 
novels. In the final section of this chapter, I will turn to the “projective imagination,” the other 
form of fictionally induced, temporary becoming-other shared by hypnotic and novelistic 
subjectivity. Rather than a blindly automatic process—as the affective mimesis of the hysterical 
patient was once conceived—it is an inherently imaginative capacity, which forms the common 
ground between hypnosis, literature, and ethics. Extending the limits of subjective experience to 
other “centers of experience”—human and nonhuman alike—it does so from within, by mobilizing 
creative capacities which are specifically tied to the experience of immersion in fictional 
narrative.2118  
As we saw in Part 1, once they are replaced in a narrative conception of hypnosis, 
regression and futurization can be considered as instances of projective imagining, rather than 
dramatic reenactment. Whereas the “immersive restorying” described in Section 4.2 concerned an 
internal reorientation of the attention, here the projective imagination involves an outwardly 
directed process of re-centering, which “transports” the subject’s center of experience out, into the 
 
2116 Antonaccio, 155. 
2117 Ong, 190. 
2118 Once again, here the term “projective” is used not in the psychoanalytic sense of a defense mechanism of the ego, 
but in Benson’s sense of the individual imaginatively “projecting” one’s center of experience outward, which leads to 
aesthetic absorption in the given object of attention. It is an ethical capacity in that it takes an extra step, from 
acknowledging the other, to imaginatively becoming-other. See Nagel: “To understand that there are other people in 
the world, one must be able to conceive of experiences of which one is not the subject: experiences that are not present 
to ourself,” which necessarily involves having “a general conception of subjects of experience and to place oneself 
under it as an instance.” Nagel, The View From Nowhere (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 20. 
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situated perspective of others, that can then be imaginatively inhabited. In this sense, it is the 
psychological and ethical, inverted mirror image of the invasive “possession” explored in Chapter 
2.2119  
The projective imagination moves one step further than the acknowledgment of the 
“reality” of other lives and the loving gaze. As an ethical-aesthetic capacity, it leads the subject-
reader to relocate “herself” and experience the world from the situated perspective of the other, 
which includes an embodied dimension that mere cognition is unable to fully grasp.2120 Beyond 
mere feeling for, or feeling with, it involves feeling as if one has already become other. Just as the 
literary narrative allows one to appreciate and adopt a different “field of vision… as one’s own, if 
only episodically,” the task of the hypnotherapy session is not merely to determine how life could 
be different, but to actually provide an experience of it from the point of view of what it would be, 
if it had already changed.2121  
This ability to fictionally penetrate into what remains inaccessible in ordinary life is crucial 
to the understanding of fictional works and is present in novelistic and hypnotic imagination 
alike.2122 What both hypnosis and novels “give us,” to use Felski’s formulation, “is not just 
anthropology, but phenomenology.”2123 Their epistemological mode is one of “seeing as” rather 
than “seeing that.”2124 Furthermore, both the hypnotic and novelistic imagination allow for infinite 
variations of shifting and inhabiting situated perspectives or centers of consciousness. In both 
cases, a proper understanding of others’ inner lives must reach “beyond attributions of belief and 
desire” and delve into the “fine grain of phenomenologically characterized experiences,” into their 
“affective states, sense-experience, quality (and not just content) of their ambitions and fears.”2125 
This ability comes into play on two levels, that of relating to the fictional-hypnotic world, and of 
relating from within that world. Indeed, not only must the therapist and author be able to attend to 
this fine grain (which, as described by Nussbaum, constitute the “moral” dimension of the creative 
act), so must the client and reader for therapeutic or novelistic-aesthetic success to occur. Just as 
 
2119 Indeed, while possession involves my being invaded and “penetrated” by another, projective imagination involves 
me penetrating into the perspective and “being” of another. 
2120 It does not merely involve picturing what it would be like to become x, but consists in imaginatively experiencing 
oneself as x, and feeling, rather than merely conceiving, what it is like to inhabit the world from within x’s viewpoint. 
2121 Denham, Metaphor and Moral Experience, 354. 
2122 As Nell puts it, a reader “who doesn’t see the world of Tom Sawyer through Tom’s eyes will have understood the 
novel only in a very thin sense of ‘understand,’ if at all.” Nell, Lost in a Book, 282. 
2123 Felski, Uses, 91. 
2124 Ibid., 93. 
2125 Denham, Metaphor, 352. 
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the therapist-hypnotist must know how to read the other by “penetrating” into his or her reality, so 
must the subject-reader who temporarily inhabits fictional lives, which are first experienced as 
existing independently and then open up into being “habitable.”2126  
As Alison Denham has noted, the projective imagination’s ability to illuminate hitherto 
unnoticed aspects of reality is directly linked to the ethical domain and thus the moral value of 
both novelistic and hypnotic imagination:  
What Einfühlung achieves is a shift in the perspective from which some state of the world (typically … of 
another) is experienced; and … can bring to one’s attention certain facts which would otherwise pass 
unnoticed, for there are certain facts (in particular facts about sensory, affective, and other motivational 
states) which are fully represented only from the first-person perspective. The psychopath … lacks this 
natural capacity and so lacks the true beliefs—beliefs about the perspectival representations of others—which 
it alone can yield.2127  
 
As Denham specifies, this implies that we locate the imagined experience as “present to some 
specific conscious subject,” whose situated perspective will “obviously alter both the content and 
the phenomenology” of our imaginative episode.2128 As a worldview is fundamentally value-laden 
and cannot be divorced from its perceiving inhabitant, only by being able to “think, feel, speak and 
reason as from points of view which are not our own” can we hope to properly understand these 
evaluative aspects which the world possesses for those who occupy those points of view.2129  
To a certain degree, the ethical value of the projective imagination depends on the ability 
to cultivate empathy, the “sympathetic imagination” as theorized in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries.2130 However, because the projective-hypnotic imagination also allows us to inhabit the 
 
2126 See also: “To think in this way we use not a faculty of external representation, but a general idea of subjective 
points of view, of which we imagine a particular instance and a particular form.” Nagel, Ibid, 20-21. 
2127 Denham, Ibid., 157. His defect is not “one of reason and cognition: it is a defunct of imagination and response.” 
Ibid., 159.  
2128 Ibid., 207. 
2129 Ibid., 336. Although this ability “does not suffice to tell us how to judge or what to do, morally speaking,” it “is 
at least necessary if our thought and action are to be well informed.” Ibid. 
2130 See for instance: “When we sympathize with the passions and sentiments of others, these movements appear at 
first in our mind as mere ideas” which are “converted into the very impressions they represent” so that “the passions 
arise in conformity to the images we form of them.” Sympathy is thus “the conversion of an idea into an impression 
by the force of imagination.” David Hume, Treatise on Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (1739, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1973), 319-20; 427. See also: “Whatever is the passion which arises from any object in the person 
principally concerned, an analogous emotion springs up, at the thought of his situation, in the breast of every attentive 
spectator.” Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759; Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 
1976), 10. For Smith, “by the imagination we place ourselves in his situation, we conceive ourselves enduring all the 
same torments, we enter as it were into his body, and become in some measure the same person with him, and thence 
form some idea of his sensations, and even feel something which, though weaker in degree, is not altogether unlike 
them.” Smith, 9. See also Rousseau’s theory of pity as natural law and foundation of morality: “La pitié est un 
sentiment naturel, qui modérant dans chaque individu l'activité de l'amour de soi-même, concourt à la conservation 
mutuelle de toute l’espèce” [“pity is a natural feeling, which, moderating amour de soi in each individual, participates 
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lives of “absolute others” for whom the subject has no sympathetic feelings—such as inanimate 
objects, corpses, individuals whose existence violate our own moral values, enemies, Denham’s 
psychopath, and so on—it cannot be reduced to a simple merging of sentiment.2131 Because the 
aesthetic absorption at the heart of the projective imagination can blur the boundaries between self 
and all kinds of others, it is irreducible to, and does not necessitate, an empathetic response with 
the other in question.2132 Examining its moral value beyond sensibility or compassion thus offers 
a non-Romantic treatment of an ethics of becoming-other. It emphasizes the imagination’s ability 
to put us face to face with the ethical responsibility of acknowledging the limits of our own narrow 
perspectives, and of inhabiting others’ narratives even when their content is difficult to adopt, their 
perspective painful or unpleasant to inhabit (as in the case of hypnotic regression, or of the therapist 
whose client’s worldview they feel morally opposed to). In this sense, the ethical and therapeutic 
value of literary-hypnotic narration lies not in agreeing with the other life, but in the act, the 
capacity to transport oneself into it, even in the absence of sympathy.  
As we will see further on, even though the nineteenth-century ethics of sympathy were 
overshadowed by the emergence of modernist and postmodernist aesthetics, the novelistic genre, 
even today, can still be considered as being preoccupied with the question of the value and dangers, 
the possibility and limitations, of the process of imaginatively becoming-other and thus, of its own 
ethical relevance.2133 J.M. Coetzee’s novel Elizabeth Costello, is a telling example of how the 
contemporary novel can navigate such difficulties. As I will suggest, Coetzee’s text allows one to 
note the workings of the projective imagination in an anti-mimetic, contemporary context, and 
avoids reducing it to mere empathy or sentimentalism. In this sense, in both his novel and his 
 
in the conservation of the whole species”] Discours sur l’origine et les fondements de l’inégalité parmi les hommes, 
in Collection Complète des oeuvres, (Genève, 1780-1789, vol. 1, our translation). 
2131 The object “may be another person or an animal, but may also be a fictional character made of words, or even… 
inanimate things such as landscapes, artworks, or geological features” Keen, Empathy and the Novel, 28.  
2132 Furthermore, empathetic “feeling for” has been criticized for being naïve on the one hand, and potentially 
hypocritical and ethnocentric on the other. To avoid such pitfalls, the projective imagination must be conceived not 
as feeling for another whom we believe to have understood, but rather, as a Murdochian effort of the moral imagination 
to transcend our own narrow limitations through serious games of make-believe. In this way, vicarious imaginative 
experience, rather than abstract thought or argument, is what helps expand our ethical understanding, our conceptual 
map and moral vocabulary, by asking us to feel, rather than merely think, our way into the embodied lives of others.  
2133 The reception of Coetzee’s novel reveals the risks inherent to any claim defending the ethical value of literature, 
which must avoid imposing didactic and moralist interpretations on the one hand, and a sentimentalist ethics of 
sympathy on the other. It must also avoid the critical pitfall of reducing literature to a collection of examples for the 
moral philosopher to use in the context of philosophical argumentation—as seen in readings which attribute the 
discourse of fictional characters to their author and reduce the ambiguity of novelistic prose to an “extracted” content 
which neglects the specificity of the text’s form.  
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discussion with Arabella Kurtz, Coetzee offers a far more nuanced version of the sympathetic 
imagination than a Neo-Romantic interpretation of his work might suggest.  
Significantly, readings that reduce the novelistic text to an apology of sympathy are 
reminiscent of the misreadings of hypnosis, whose material is confused with historical truth: in 
both cases, a “credulous” representation of hypnotic-novelistic becoming-other is produced, 
aesthetic distance and meta-narration are ignored, pedagogic or propositional knowledge or is 
hastily “extracted” from the text at the expense of omitting the fictional work’s inherent, 
imaginative, and nuanced ambiguity.2134 The example of Coetzee’s novel will thus serve to 
underline how the study of hypnosis changes our understanding the ethically relevant aspects of 
novel reading. In both hypnosis and the novel, another worldview is explored in a serious manner 
without its content having to be taken “seriously” by the recipient (that is, without it being endorsed 
outside of the fictional experience). The ethical dimension of projective “becoming other” in both 
fields does not lie in the content, but in the act and movement of imaginative transport that occurs 
in the engagement with fictional narratives.  
In what follows, I will thus begin by laying out the main characteristics of the empathetic, 
or sympathetic imagination, in order to then distinguish them from those of the projective 
imagination. By looking more closely at an example of the contemporary novel, I hope to clarify 
the differences between the two, and in doing so, to rehabilitate the ethical value of hypnotic 
narration, which lies in the features that it shares with the novelistic imagination.  
 
4.3.1. The Empathetic-Sympathetic Imagination 
 
To a certain extent, it might seem that an ethics of the projective imagination strives to 
revive the eighteenth and nineteenth century conceptions of sympathy and proposes a Romantic 
defense of the novel as a means to develop the sympathetic imagination.  
As Alison Denham notes, “just as we are indebted to Hume [and Smith] for linking moral 
judgments to a specific operation of the subjective imagination, so we are indebted to the 
Romantics for drawing attention to the close connection between that operation and literary 
 
2134 On the contrary, instead of considering the novel as “an engagement with a character in the role of persuader,” 
one should situate its ethical contribution at the level of the text as a whole, not in the isolated claims one finds voiced 
by the characters in the text. Ward E. Jones, “Elizabeth Costello and the Biography of the Moral Philosopher,” The 
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 69, no. 2 (Spring 2011): 209. 
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language.”2135 Indeed, Percy Shelley in his Defense of Poetry (1821) famously emphasizes the 
moral dimension of sympathy, arguing that with the aid of poetic discourse, the good man “must 
imagine intensively and comprehensively; he must put himself in the place of another and of many 
others; the pains and pleasures of his species must become his own.”2136 The nineteenth-century 
novel then took up the idea of sympathetic role taking and gave it “a robust legacy,” as the 
enthusiasm spread to the Victorians, creating “high hopes” for the moral consequences of novel 
reading.2137 However, as seen in Chapter 2, critics also feared that the novel’s ability to create 
sympathy for fictional characters would turn readers away from virtuous action in the actual 
world.2138 In this way, the problem of failed sympathy arises, creating worries that novels of 
sensibility might prevent the development of benevolence. For example, “imagining a sweet-tea 
drinker who reads a novel unconscious that her sugar consumption supports slavery, Coleridge 
deplores the fine lady who ‘sips a beverage sweetened with human blood, even while she is 
weeping over the refined sorrows of Werther or Clementina’.”2139 Nevertheless, for its 
appreciators, the novel of sensibility remained capable of “sowing the seeds of virtue in the hearts 
of responsive readers.”2140 In fact, during the early nineteenth-century, literary representations of 
sympathetic encounters became “so influential in the culture at large that the evidence of textual 
and real world sympathy become difficult to disentangle.”2141 George Eliot’s reworking and 
application of the Romantics’ notion of poetic sympathy to narrative fiction further participated in 
drawing out the central role of the imagination in the process. In a letter to Charles Bray, Eliot 
defines the goal of literature as the extension of the reader’s feelings: “the only effect I ardently 
long to produce by my writings, is that those who read them should be better able to imagine and 
 
2135 Denham, Metaphor, 231. 
2136 Shelley, A Defence of Poetry. 1821, in Shelley’s Poetry and Prose, ed. D. H. Reiman (New York: Norton, 1977), 
487-88. See also Coleridge’s 1796 definition of “active benevolence” as “natural Sympathy made permanent by an 
acquired Conviction that the Interests of each and all are one and the same.” Coleridge, The Watchman, in Collected 
Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, ed. L. 
Patton (London: Routledge; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), 132. 
2137 Keen, Empathy, 48. 
2138 In 1795 for example, an anonymous commentator complained in The Sylph: “I have actually seen mothers, in 
miserable garrets, crying for the imaginary distress of a heroine, while their children were crying for bread” in John 
T. Taylor, Early Opposition to the English Novel: The Popular Reaction from 1760 to 1830 (New York: King’s Crown 
Press, 1943), 53. In this context, the novel arouses suspicion due to its effect on “suggestible” readers, “so effectively 
does it provoke emotional responses in women, servants, and the poor.” Keen, Empathy, 41. 
2139 Keen, Ibid., 50. 
2140 Ibid. 
2141 Ibid., 51. This creates a paradoxical petitio principii—still operative today according to Keen, since researchers 
like Hoffmann use novels as empirical proof for their theses—whereby “training in sensibility offered by fiction often 
becomes evidence of its own efficacy.” Ibid. 
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to feel the pains and joys of those who differ from themselves in everything but the broad fact of 
being struggling erring human creatures.”2142 As Eliot writes in “From the Natural History of 
German Life,” the literary imagination is more efficacious than general approaches when it comes 
to eliciting moral sentiment:  
The greatest benefit we owe to the artist, whether painter, poet, or novelist, is the extension of our sympathies. 
Appeals founded on generalizations and statistics require a sympathy ready-made, a moral sentiment already 
in activity; but a picture of human life such as a great artist can give, surprises even the trivial and the selfish 
into that attention to what is apart from themselves, which may be called the raw material of moral sentiment. 
… Art is … a mode of amplifying experience and extending our contact with our fellow-men beyond the 
bounds of our personal lot… The thing for mankind to know is, not what are the motives and influences 
which the moralist thinks ought to act on the labourer or the artisan, but what are the motives and influences 
which do act on him. We want to be taught to feel, not for the heroic artisan or the sentimental peasant, but 
for the peasant in all his coarse apathy, and the artisan in all his suspicious selfishness.2143  
 
Here, literary discourse can “surprise” us into paying “attention” and redirect our awareness away 
from the self, reaching out toward the reality of other lives. Finally, the fin-de-siècle saw the 
appearance of the term “empathy” as it is used nowadays. As Keen explains, “the key term in the 
transformation of novel reading from a morally suspect waste of time to an activity of cultivating 
the role-taking imagination, empathy, appeared in English as a translation of Einfühlung in the 
early twentieth century.”2144 Indeed, in 1909, E.B. Titchener translated as “empathy” the German 
term Einfühlung, used by Theodor Lipps, which designated the process of “feeling one’s way into” 
an art object or other person.2145 As described in Chapter 3, with the turn of the century and the 
advent of modernist aesthetics, formal experimentation took center stage and relegated sentiment 
to the background, discarding realistic absorption or novelistic sympathy as “naive”—even 
conservative—notions, which belong to the past.2146 By the mid-twentieth century, empathetic 
 
2142 Eliot, to Charles Bray, 5 July 1859, in The George Eliot Letters, ed. G. S. Haight (New Haven and London: 
Yale University Press, 1954–78), 3: 111.  
2143 Eliot, “The Natural History of German Life,” in Essays of George Eliot, ed. T. Pinney (New York: Columbia 
University Press; London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), 270-272. 
2144 Keen, 39. 
2145 See Theodor Lipps, Äesthetik: Psycholgie des Schönen und der Kunst (Hamburg and Leipzig: Voss, 1903, 1906) 
and E. B. Titchener, Experimental Psychology of the Thought Processes (London: Macmillan, 1909). Significantly, 
Titchener’s elaboration of the concept in Beginner’s Psychology mentions the act of reading: “We have a natural 
tendency to feel ourselves into what we perceive or imagine. As we read about the forest, we may, as it were, become 
the explorer; we feel for ourselves the gloom, the silence, the humidity, the oppression, the sense of lurking danger; 
everything is strange, but it is to us that strange experience has come.” Titchener, 198. 
2146 See for example Brecht’s anti-empathetic aesthetics, which recall with disgust “fascism’s grotesque emphasizing 
of the emotions.” Brecht, “Short Description of a New Technique of Acting,” in J. Willett, ed., Brecht on Theatre: 
The Development of an Aesthetic (New York: Hill and Wang, 1964), 145; and deplore the infectious “automatic 
transfer of the emotions to the spectator.” Brecht, “Alienation Effects in Chinese Acting,” in Brecht on Theatre, 94. 
For Brecht, emotions have “quite a definite class basis, the form they take at any time is historical, restricted and 
limited in specific ways” and are “in no sense universally human and tieless.” Brecht, “New Technique,” 145.  
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responsiveness and the realist novel as a genre became tainted with “a sense of social as well as 
moral superiority, and the suspicion that it exists only to shore up middle-class identity.”2147 As 
Keen puts it, with an implicit reference to Victor Nell’s book: 
Experimental techniques disrupted the surface of discourse so that it could not be read by  getting ‘lost in a 
book’, with the reader submerged in an unchallenging absorbing, reading trance. Inducing readers to work 
as strenuously thinking collaborators meant depriving them of the emotional effects they had come to rely 
upon getting from literature.2148  
 
Nevertheless, ethical criticism, as well as cognitive psychology today, still defend the value of 
novel reading in creating empathetic responses and actions in the reader. For example, John Carey 
links the aesthetic pleasure of reading to its ethical value, writing that “the imaginative power 
reading uniquely demands is clearly linked, psychologically, with … the ability to empathize with 
other people. Without reading, these faculties may atrophy.”2149 However, it is difficult to 
unproblematically defend this claim in light of the ethical and political limitations inherent to the 
concept of empathy on the one hand and the findings of empirical studies of the impact of novel 
reading on the other. 
In her valuable study Empathy and the Novel (2007), Suzanne Keen has explored the 
relevance and limits of such claims, by examining literary criticism in light of empirical studies 
about the impact of the imagination and novel reading on empathy, arguing that the empathy 
produced by novel reading does not necessarily lead to ethical transformation or moral action on 
the part of the reader.2150  
 
2147 Keen, 47. See for example the virulent critiques of literary empathy in Marcus Wood’s rereading of late-
eighteenth-century literature of abolition, which sees the representations of suffering slaves as “pornographic, 
appealing to the sadomasochistic appetites of persons of sensibility.” Keen, Ibid. Wood writes: “the dirtiest thing the 
Western imagination ever did, and it does compulsively still, is to believe in the aesthetically healing powers of 
empathetic fiction.” Marcus Wood, Slavery, Empathy and Pornography (Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2002), 36, quoted in Keen, Ibid. 
2148 Keen, 56. 
2149 John Carey, Pure Pleasure: A Guide to the 20th Century’s Most Enjoyable Books (London: Faber, 2000), xi. See 
also: “Our capacity to enter imaginatively into the lives of others is a process of irreversible growth. It provides us 
with knowledge we can never resign and must act upon… What we in turn recognise as readers is the need—if we are 
to read with any sense at all—to feel ourselves into the moral imagination of the characters. We may shift back and 
forth, from inside to outside. . . but we cannot begin to understand the experience the novel presents without some 
participation in the moral realities within which its characters live.” Martin Price, Forms of Life: Character and Moral 
Imagination in the Novel (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1983), 23. 
2150 For example: “Marjorie Taylor has demonstrated that a group of fiction writers score higher on empathy tests than 
the general population. … The activity of fiction writing may cultivate novelists’ role-taking skills and train them in 
habits of empathy.” in Keen, xiii. Also: at the Wellcome Department of Neuroimaging at the University of London, 
Tania Singer published a study in Science which used FMRI data to study empathetic responses to witnessing and 
imagining a loved one’s pain: “When watching a loved one in the same room receiving a sharp shock, subjects showed 
active response in the affective parts of the brain’s pain matrix… but not in the somatosensory cortices of the brain. 
The affective brain areas responded to both real and imagined pain. A person not actually experiencing pain but 
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Firstly, one must distinguish, as Keen does, between an automatic, “quick-match 
categorical empathy”—which “looks weaker and more vulnerable to bias through ethnocentrism 
or exclusionary thinking”—and situational empathy, which involves empathizing with an 
individual’s circumstances, rather than identity. For instance, Martin Hoffman describes the 
former type by noting a fundamental hardwiring, shared by humans and other animals, which links 
imitation and empathetic responsiveness.2151 This innate quality appears to be “biased” toward in-
group—familiar or similar—individuals, and to decrease whenever it applies to those who seem 
“strange, dissimilar or outside the tribe.”2152 In this sense, identity and empathy are governed by 
“collective self-definition of an in-group and opposition to an out-group.”2153 On the other hand, 
Patrick Colm Hogan’s cognitive view and description of “situational empathy” refers to a process 
which, because it mobilizes personal memory and role taking rather than mere identification with 
sameness, can lead to an “ethics of compassion.”2154 In the context of novel reading, because it 
responds to aspects of plot rather than identity, “huge character-reader differences” do not interfere 
with situational empathy.2155 From this perspective, character identification is not necessary to 
produce empathetic responsiveness: “liking or approving of the characters may not be a 
requirement” for situational empathy.2156 Thus, if novel reading does lead to increasing empathy 
toward others, Keen argues, it is first and foremost by cultivating situational—rather than biased, 
“in group”—empathy in the reader. 
For thinkers like Nussbaum, there is an unquestioned link between affective reaction, 
empathetic responsiveness, and moral understanding of a given life or situation. As Nussbaum 
writes: 
If you really vividly experience a concrete human life, imagine what it's like to live that life, and at the same 
time permit yourself the full range of emotional responses to that concrete life, you will (if you have at all a 
 
observing a loved one being shocked showed brain activation of matching emotional areas, not the sensory areas.” 
Singer et. al., “Empathy for Pain Involves the Affective but Not Sensory Components of Pain.” Science 303 (20 
February 2004): 1157. 
2151 For him, “mimicry is probably a hard-wired neurologically based empathy arousing mechanism whose two steps, 
imitation and feedback, are directed by commands from the central nervous system.” Martin Hoffman, Empathy and 
Moral Development: Implications for Caring and Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 44. 
2152 Ibid., 20. 
2153 Patrick C. Hogan, The Mind and Its Stories: Narrative Universals and Human Emotion (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), 141. Nevertheless, our empathetic responses can be stimulated as a result of conditioning: 
repeated exposure could build a sense of familiarity that can then overcome the bias against feeling for those who are 
dissimilar, inculcating empathic responses to others’ suffering.  
2154 Ibid., 142. Situational empathy… depends upon a reader’s having a memory of a comparable experience, which 
is never guaranteed.” Keen, Empathy and the Novel, 96.  
2155 Keen, Ibid., xii, 95-96. 
2156 Ibid., 79. 
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good moral start) be unable to do certain things to that person. Vividness leads to tenderness, imagination to 
compassion.2157 
 
Similarly, Richard Rorty describes Dickens’ novels as “a more powerful impetus to social reform 
than the collected works of all the British social theorists of his day.”2158 In both cases, the 
novelistic and moral imagination seem able to lead to actual, observable effects in the world, with 
tangible ethical and political consequences. However, in Keen’s view, once the field of literary 
studies opens up to taking into consideration experimental evidence and empirical findings, the 
“contemporary truism” according to which novel reading cultivates the kind of empathy that would 
“produce good citizens for the world” is far from certain.2159 
Indeed, according to Keen, temporary sympathizing with another’s situation in no way 
guarantees that “being moved” by their narrative will lead one to act morally toward them. Keen’s 
work argues that empirical studies in psychology and reader responses do not reveal any 
conclusive evidence that would allow us to bridge the gap between empathy for fictional 
characters, and moral behavior in the actual world.2160 Although she affirms the “robustness” of 
the narrative empathy which emerges from reading and writing fiction, she strongly hesitates to 
“tether” readers’ empathy to certain outcomes of altruistic action,” remaining “skeptical” about 
the consequences of novel reading beyond “immediate feeling responses.”2161 To substantiate her 
doubts, she cites the example of Dutch scholar Jèmeljan Hakemulder who, inspired by Nussbaum’s 
argument, adopted an empirical approach and conducted his own studies on the effects of literary 
reading.2162 Although two of his studies demonstrated that character identification enhances 
comprehension of others’ feelings, they revealed “no changes in altruistic behavior as a result of 
encountering narratives.”2163 For Hakemulder, reading narratives may thus “enhance awareness of 
others’ emotions and motives” but “does not seem to stimulate self-denying behavior.”2164 
 
2157 Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge, 21. 
2158 Rorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 147. 
2159 Keen, xv. Nussbaum’s “overt” optimism has also been criticized by numerous critics from within the field. See 
Joshua Landy (2008), Candace Vogler (2007), and Richard Posner (1997), listed in Hämäläinen, 136. 
2160 D. J. Kruger, for instance, has shown that the expectancy of reciprocation has “eight times more impact on helping 
intentions than empathy.” Kruger, “Evolution and Altruism: Combining Psychological Mediators with Naturally 
Selected Tendencies,” Evolution and Human Behavior 24 (2003): 122, quoted in Keen.  
2161 Keen, ix. 
2162 See Jèmeljan Hakemulder, The Moral Laboratory, Experiments Examining the Effects of Reading Literature on 
Social Perception and Moral Self-concept (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2000).  
2163 Hakemulder, The Moral Laboratory, 57. 
2164 Ibid., 32-33, 36. 
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Hakemulder’s empirical approach therefore “checks his enthusiasm for Nussbaum’s project” and 
calls for an effort to “falsify theories of literature that promise positive outcomes.”2165  
Finally, for Keen, contemporary criticism often demonstrates confusion about the cause of 
the increase in empathy noted in novel readers. For her, imaginative sympathy is not attributable 
to the novel, but emerges in “readers themselves,” who “possess the power they so often attribute 
to novels.”2166 It is therefore the explanation of the moral value of novels, rather than the 
experience of reading—Nussbaum might say, the theory which we add to the reading experience—
that draws out their ethical value and the ways in which it might apply in the real world. Therefore, 
“we ought to take care not to confound the effects of teaching with the effects of reading … 
Readers … bring empathy to the novel.”2167 
A second, crucial objection, denounces empathy for being ethically, socially, and 
politically dubious, an emotion that can easily be transformed into failed, or false empathy. 
Whereas failed empathy refers to the absence of any politically or socially useful action, false 
empathy designates the “self-congratulatory delusion of those who incorrectly believe they have 
caught the feelings of suffering others from a different culture, gender, race or class.”2168 In both 
of these senses, whether the focus is on its “inefficacy” or its “inaccuracy,” empathy can be 
considered as ineffective at best and harmful at worst, as an obstacle to moral action or an apathy 
which merely reproduces hierarchy and power-relations.2169 Indeed, overemphasizing literary 
empathy can serve to mask a series of injustices under the cover of well-intentioned 
sentimentalism: “Some philosophers and experts in cultural studies regard the putative ethical 
consequences of empathy and reading emotionally evocative literature as impediments to justice,” 
because they easily lead to “the empathetic individual’s erasure of suffering others in a self-
regarding emotional response that affronts others’ separate personhood.”2170 Described by some 
as a waste of sentiment and encouragement of withdrawal,2171 in some extreme cases—which a 
Freudian or Hobbesian reading might unveil—it has also been denounced as a form of “antipathy 
 
2165 Ibid., 167, in Keen, 92. 
2166 Keen, 168. 
2167 Ibid.,   
2168 Ibid., 159. 
2169 Ibid. 
2170 Ibid., xxiv. 
2171 See Raymond Williams’s argument according to which reading about fictional characters in “pitiable” situations 
actually leads to apathy. R. Williams, Culture and Society, 1780–1950 (1958; New York: Columbia University Press, 
1983), 109. 
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disguised as compassion” which does violence to its object through aggressive identification or 
projection.2172 The most vehement critics have compared empathy to a form of pornographic or 
onanistic indulgence of sensation, acquired at the expense of the suffering of others.2173 Here, 
ethnocentrism and empathetic responses are closely linked. Empathy becomes “yet another 
example of the Western imagination’s imposition of its own values on cultures and peoples the it 
scarcely knows, but presumes to ‘feel with’, in a cultural imperialism of the emotions.”2174 Indeed, 
using empathy to underline supposed commonalities between different, complex realities “exposes 
the empathizer to risks of oversimplification, misunderstanding, and inadvertent harm.”2175 
Because it depends upon generalizations about universal human traits,2176 empathy can be accused 
of carrying out “too little cross-cultural comparison” and of offending a fundamental notion of 
difference, preventing its subject of “speak[ing] for herself.”2177 A significant example can be 
found in Achebe’s words:  
I should like to see the word universal banned altogether from discussions of African literature until such a 
time as people cease to use it as a synonym for the narrow, self-serving parochialism of Europe, until their 
horizon extends to include all the world.2178  
 
This is why “recognizing and responding to cultural differences” is—or should become—a priority 
over any “easy assumption of understanding” based on human universals.2179 
Similar criticism of the failure and falsity of empathetic responses can be found in Richard 
Delgado’s in In the Coming Race War?, where characters discover that true empathy is “in shorter 
and shorter supply” and can be easily corrupted into a hypocritical caricature of itself.2180 Whites 
in particular are prone to “false empathy, a sentimental, breast-being kind,” which they “enjoy” 
while “pretend[ing] to understand and sympathize with a black.”2181 In this sense, “the most 
unsympathetic thing you can do is think you have empathized with those of a radically different 
background. You can easily end up hurting them.”2182 Whether conscious or unconscious, this 
 
2172 Keen, 159. 
2173 See Wood, Slavery, 36. 
2174 Keen, 147. 
2175 Ibid., 159. 
2176 “Universalism” is defined in Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin’s postcolonial studies handbook as 
“a hegemonic view of existence by which the experiences, values and expectations of a dominant culture are held to 
be true for all humanity.” Key Concepts, 235, in Keen, 161.  
2177 Keen, 162. 
2178 Chinua Achebe, Morning Yet on Creation Day (London: Heinemann, 1975), 9. 
2179 Keen, 160. 
2180 Delgado, The Coming Race War? 8. 
2181 Ibid., 13. 
2182 Ibid. 
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false empathy is most “common among white liberals, and is the mirror opposite of false 
consciousness.”2183 As Keen points out, Delgado eschews empathy altogether: “persons of 
radically different backgrounds and race cannot be made vicariously to identify with us to any 
significant extent.”2184 Sentiment, in this context, is not only impotent at the practical level, it 
becomes a hypocritical justification for inaction: “empathy, in this light, becomes a delusion of the 
affluent West.”2185 
For these reasons, an ethics of the projective imagination cannot rely on empathy alone. 
As I will show in the next section, this fact, which the contemporary novel has had to face in the 
twentieth and twenty first centuries, is dramatized in J. M. Coetzee’s Elizabeth Costello, where the 
notion of “thinking oneself into other beings” is both central to the text and consistently 
undermined, so as to produce a non-sentimental form of “becoming-other” that can only be 
expressed in the ambiguity of poetic or novelistic discourse.  
 
4.3.2. Temporary Becoming-Other: The Projective Imagination 
 
To distinguish the projective imagination from empathy, an example is called for. As a text 
which constantly reminds us of the difficulty of affirming a moral claim in theoretical language, 
J.M. Coetzee’s Elizabeth Costello demonstrates the ethical value and limits of the projective 
imagination, in a novelistic form which encompasses two moral and factual impossibilities: that 
of settling for a fixed, solidified—and thus reductive—theoretical position, and that of remaining 
silent. In response to the question of ‘what can literature do’, Coetzee’s novel thus seems to 
alternate between affirmation and skeptical undermining, ironic commentary and contradictory 
textual performance, which renders the task of extracting a paraphrasable claim from the text as a 
whole impossible. This in and out movement matches the mimetic-anti-mimetic alternation at the 
heart of the hypnotic experience, which, like the novel, can neither settle nor escape the ethical 
implications inherent in “penetrating” the lives of others. In Elizabeth Costello, these concerns are 
present both at the level of the characters’ discourse and in the performance of the text itself, whose 
frequent meta-narrative intrusions serve as an ironic commentary on the untenability of realism 
 
2183 Ibid., 12.  
2184 Ibid., 31. Delgado’s text suggests whites should instead work to “reject racial privilege, act in solidarity with 
minorities and work to subvert the system from within.” Keen, 157.  
2185 Keen, xxiv. 
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today and the limits of novelistic discourse and representation. Nevertheless, instances and 
mentions of the “projective imagination” are numerous in the novel, which, like hypnosis, presents 
us with the difficulty of reality and of other lives, which forces us to face both our own moral 
responsibility and limitations. Coetzee’s novel is useful to our purposes as it manifests the same 
distance which lies at the heart of the hypnotic projective imagination: rather than empathetic 
fusion or complete identification with the object, it allows for a mobile back and forth motion 
between inside and out, which combines the same mimetic and anti-mimetic dimensions as 
hypnotic immersion.  
 
4.3.2.1. Poetic Discourse as Vehicle for Projective Imagining 
 
On the one hand, in The Good Story, Coetzee describes “sympathetic identification” 
without doubting its moral value:  
I see sympathy as an inborn faculty in human beings which may or may not grow, may or may not atrophy, 
may or may not be fostered; I also see it as capable of extending itself beyond fellow human beings to other 
forms of life. Sympathetic identifications allow us to enter other lives and to live them from the inside.2186  
 
Coetzee’s description is relevant as it underlines the close proximity between projective 
imagination and fiction: “our sympathetic identifications have a fiction-like status … our 
sympathetic intuitions can be relied on only to yield fictional truths.”2187 Like Murdoch, he stresses 
the moral effort required to exert this “essentially spiritual” capacity and effectively reach a sense 
of what it is like to become other, rather than merely imagine it from an exterior perspective: “by 
a strenuous effort of sympathetic projection one can reach a flickering intuition of what it is like 
for a bat to be a bat.”2188 Centered on this very question, his novel Elizabeth Costello is often taken 
 
2186 in The Good Story, 52. 
2187 Ibid., 134. For Nagel, the subjective character of experience remains inscrutable because “every subjective 
phenomenon is essentially connected with a single point of view, and it seems inevitable that an objective, physical 
theory will abandon that point of view.” T. Nagel, Mortal Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 
167. In other words, “the experience of what it’s like for the experiencing organism is accessible from only one point 
of view, that of the organism itself.” Benson, 84. In the absence of an “objective phenomenology,” the best option is 
therefore the imagination: “we must take up the point of view of the experiential subject by acts of perceptual or 
sympathetic or symbolic imagination.” Nagel, 176n. As Coetzee explains, “in Nagel’s terms, the only true, real 
knowledge one can have of what it is like to be anyone or anything in the world is a form of knowledge of what it is 
like to be oneself. Other such knowledge may be true, but its truth is the truth of fictions.” Coetzee, Ibid, 136.  
2188 Coetzee, Ibid.,136. The fictional speech of Elizabeth Costello resembles Coetzee’s conversation with Kurtz in 
frequent passages: “Nagel’s… denial that we can know what it is to be anything but one of ourselves seems to me 
tragically restrictive, restrictive and restricted.” Coetzee, Elizabeth Costello, 76. 
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to be an illustration or demonstration not only of the possibility but also of the ethical necessity of 
the projective imagination.  
Indeed, both in the text and in its reception, Elizabeth Costello’s career as a writer is 
reduced on multiple occasions to an exercise in imaginative sympathy. According to Costello’s 
own public discourse: 
There is no limit to the extent to which we can think ourselves into the being of another. There are no bounds 
to the sympathetic imagination. If you want proof, consider the following. Some years ago I wrote a book 
called The House on Eccles Street. To write that book I had to think my way into the existence of Marion 
Bloom. … If I can think my way into the existence of a being who has never existed, then I can think my 
way into the existence of a bat or a chimpanzee or an oyster, any being with whom I share the substrate of 
life.2189 
 
However, this is not to say that Costello’s claim should be attributed to Coetzee, and lead to any 
deductions regarding the author’s own ability to think himself into a female character. Rather, the 
dimension of meta-narrative, ironic distance, should be kept in mind in a text that systematically 
comments upon the difficulty involved in the process of imaginatively becoming-other.2190 
Therefore, Coetzee’s text pushes the question of the limits of the projective imagination, rather 
than unquestioningly positing its moral value. 
One of the main relevant features of the text is the way in which it sketches out the 
possibility of extending imaginative becoming-other to the nonhuman realm. In this way, it 
confirms that the projective imagination need not be contingent on “in-group” mentality but can 
extend the limits of the “thinkable” to previously unexplored areas. It also sheds light on the nature 
of the therapeutic change produced by the hypnotic imagination, where the self learns how to 
change by imagining itself as other. Furthermore, the questions explored in “The Poets and the 
 
2189 Coetzee, Elizabeth Costello, 80. During her radio interview, her career is also summarized as a process of writing 
from the perspective of the other: “—Do you find it easy, writing from the position of a man?…—No. If it were easy 
it wouldn’t be worth doing. It is the otherness that is the challenge. Making up someone other than yourself. Making 
up a world for him to move in.” Costello’s son John also frequently and vehemently insists on this aspect being central 
to his mother’s career: “‘My mother has been a man’, he persists. ‘She has also been a dog. She can think her way 
into other people, into other existences. I have read her; I know. It is within her powers. Isn’t that what is most 
important about fiction: that it takes us out of ourselves, into other lives?’” Ibid., 12; 22-23.  
2190 For example, this concern appears in the mention of James Joyce’s “failure” in fully understanding Molly Bloom’s 
perspective due to the limits of the male perspective: “Molly didn’t have to be limited in the way Joyce had made her 
to be, that she could equally well be an intelligent woman with an interest in music and a circle of friends of her own 
and a daughter with whom she shared confidences—it was a revelation, as I say. And I began to wonder about other 
women whom we think of as having been given a voice by male writers, in the name of their liberation, yet in the end 
only to further and to serve a male philosophy.” Conversely, it also appears with the mention of the “romantic 
stereotyping” of male figures in the Victorian novel: “Of course, fair’s fair, men will have to set about reclaiming the 
Heathcliffs and Rochesters from romantic stereotyping too, to say nothing of poor old dusty Casaubon.” Ibid., 14. In 
readings where the latter comment can be taken as an ironic undermining of the former, the text seems to manifest 
harsh ironic distance rather than warm sympathetic feelings toward its characters and itself. 
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Animals,” where poetic discourse is deemed the only form of discourse able to convey, or body-
forth, the embodied experience of being an animal, underline the similarities shared by poetic and 
hypnotic language, as well as the capacities of their recipients. Indeed, becoming-animal is a 
frequent imaginative experience occurring in the hypnotic context, whether suggested or 
spontaneous, and demonstrates similar abilities as those which Costello praises in the poets.2191 As 
one of Erika Fromm ’s patients describes, for instance: 
 
I decided to fly and centered on becoming a condor. My nose became my beak; I preened feathers and 
quivered my arms as wings. Soon I was sailing above some mountains, tense-winged, and flapping once in a 
while.2192 
 
Here, as in Costello’s description of Ted Hughes’ poems about the Jaguar, the projective 
imagination involves “becoming” rather than “being like,” penetrating into the kinetic experience 
and mode of being of the embodied other:  
His [the jaguar’s] consciousness is kinetic rather than abstract… Hughes is feeling his way towards a different 
kind of being-in-the-world, one which is not entirely foreign to us.…The poems ask us to imagine our way 
into that way of moving, to inhabit that body. By bodying forth the jaguar, Hughes shows us that we too can 
embody animals.2193 
 
The non-conceptual, non-propositional knowledge which emerges from both hypnotic and literary 
imagination is our sheer animal vulnerability, the commonality that lies beyond our seemingly 
irreducible separateness: “Being fully a bat is like being fully human, which is also to be full of 
being. … To be full of being is to live as a body-soul. … An animal—and we are all animals—is 
an embodied soul.”2194 As Diamond argues, not only is philosophical argument unfit to express or 
convey such knowledge, it also risks “diminish[ing] and distort[ing]” it.2195 On the other hand, 
hypnosis and literature carry out their exploration on an entirely different level. As Rita Felski 
 
2191 In the experimental explorations of the nineteenth century, the process was already used to explore the 
hallucinatory impact of suggestion, although the latter was acted out rather than narrated. In Suggestive Therapeutics, 
for example, Bernheim describes one demonstration in which the subject becomes animal to the point of behaving 
like one, temporarily losing the exterior signs of “human” dignity: “I can transfer him into an animal, by saying: ‘You 
are a dog’. He gets down on all fours, barks, pretends to bite, and does not change his position, until I restore his own 
personality.” Bernheim, Suggestive Therapeutics, 60. This acting out however is merely the external manifestation—
reported by the operator and not the subject—of the internal, narrative, imaginative, and evocative process necessary 
for any genuine make-believe to occur. Examples draw from hypnoanalysis and permissive hypnosis, which give 
voice to the patient’s internal experience in the case histories, are thus more useful for our purposes than those which 
merely report the patient’s externally observable utterances and behavior. 
2192 in Brown and Fromm, Hypnotherapy and Hypnoanalysis, 14. 
2193 Coetzee, Elizabeth Costello, 96-97. 
2194 Ibid., 78. 
2195 Diamond, “The Difficulty of Reality and the Difficulty of Philosophy,” Partial Answers: Journal of Literature 
and the History of Ideas 1, no. 2 (June 2003): 57. Significantly, John’s wife Norma, as a philosopher, considers 
Costello’s views as “jejune and sentimental.” Coetzee, Elizabeth Costello, 48.  
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describes it, the recognition which can occur in novel reading operates on a level of immediacy 
reminiscent of hypnotic phenomena and rapport:  
Suddenly and without warning, a flash of connection leaps across the gap between text and reader; an affinity 
or an attunement is brought to light…In either case, I feel myself addressed, summoned, called to account: I 
cannot help seeing traces of myself in the pages I am reading. Indisputably, something has changed; my 
perspective has shifted; I see something that I did not see before. … In a mobile interplay of exteriority and 
interiority, something that exists outside of me inspires a revised or altered sense of who I am.2196  
 
In Coetzee’s text, Costello even underlines the proximity between the experience of reading poetry 
and the “possession” often associated with hypnotic phenomena in popular culture, as described 
in Chapter 2: “When we read the jaguar poem … we are for a brief while the jaguar. He ripples 
within us, he takes over our body, he is us. … It is much like the mixture of shamanism and spirit 
possession and archetype psychology that [Hughes] himself espouses.”2197 However, as the text 
shows farther on, just like Murdoch’s concept of moral attention, such mystical conceptions of the 
projective imagination need not be mobilized. 
For example, when Costello describes the perspective of Sultan, the ape who undergoes 
Wolfgang Köhler’s experiments, it is also from within.2198 According to her, whereas the well-
intentioned scientist can at best empathize “from the outside,” the poet can understand, and have 
a feel for, Sultan’s perspective and transmit it to the reader via poetic language: “This is as far as 
Köhler… is able to go; this is where a poet might have commenced, with a feel for the ape’s 
experience.”2199 However, the way in which Coetzee’s text gives us a feel for Sultan’s experience 
is neither by merely describing his bodily sensations, nor by suggesting complete—mystical, 
Romantic—fusion, but by giving a voice and attributing complex thoughts to his internal 
perspective, thereby underlining our shared vulnerability by “humanizing the animal” rather than 
“animalizing the human.” Sultan’s case is in this sense the mirror opposite of the jaguar example, 
where the poet “shows us how to bring the living body into being within ourselves.”2200 
 
2196 Felski, Uses, 23-25. 
2197 Coetzee, Ibid., 97. 
2198 Of course, it is significant that Costello presents herself on stage as a wounded animal similar to Kafka’s Red 
Peter, and Sultan as his “ancestor.”  
2199 Coetzee, Ibid., 74-75. 
2200 Ibid., 97. “‘Sultan knows: Now one is supposed to think... But what must one think? One thinks: Why is he starving 
me? One thinks: What have I done? Why has he stopped liking me? One thinks: Why does he not want these crates 
anymore? But none of these is the right thought. Even a more complicated thought – for instance: What is wrong with 
him, what misconception does he have of me, that leads him to believe it is easier for me to reach a banana hanging 
from a wire than to pick up a banana from the floor? – is wrong.” Ibid., 72. And: “Although his entire history… leads 
him to ask questions about the justice of the universe and the place of this penal colony in it, a carefully plotted 
psychological regimen conducts him away from ethics and metaphysics towards the humbler reaches of practical 
reason.” Ibid., 58. Here, the use of the pronoun “one,” which humanizes Sultan, is worth singling out, as Costello 
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Nevertheless, in both cases, the projective imagination involves the subtle process of inhabiting a 
worldview from the inside, with its specific quality and texture of being, without imposing 
preexisting knowledge onto it. In this way, the text reveals the subtle mobility of the projective 
imagination, which, as it navigates between seemingly opposed perspectives, can penetrate them 
from within and imaginatively highlight relevant aspects of their complex realities.  
Although it is often reduced to the “issue” or question of animal rights, the novel’s 
exploration of the limits of the projective imagination extend far beyond the animal’s perspective, 
toward absolute otherness, and objects with which it is difficult for the subject to establish 
commonality or sympathetic feelings. Whereas the hypnotic imagination allows access to such 
imaginings, mere empathy does not. Indeed, in the rest of the text, the imaginative “thought 
experiment” is pushed further and further, toward inhabiting more uncomfortable, quasi-
unimaginable perspectives.2201 The most striking of these is Costello’s description of her non-
abstract knowledge of what it is like to be a corpse:  
“For instants at a time,” his mother is saying, “I know what it is like to be a corpse. The knowledge repels 
me. It fills me with terror; I shy away from it, refuse to entertain it. All of us have such moments, particularly 
as we grow older. The knowledge we have is not abstract. … For a moment we are that knowledge. We live 
the impossible: we live beyond our death, look back on it, yet look back as only a dead self can.”2202 
 
It is precisely this “living the impossible” that the hypnotic imagination allows, with the “looking 
back” enabled by hypnotic dissociation. 
Similarly, in “The Humanities in Africa” Costello imagines and describes what it is like to 
sympathetically understand and attend to the suffering and erotic desire of Mr. Phillips—her 
mother’s ex-lover—whose aging body is slowly dying of cancer. In this “Lesson,” Costello’s 
response consists in visiting the old man and engaging in sexual acts although she feels neither 
warmth nor erotic desire toward him. Her action is described as stemming from an 
 
often uses it to refer to herself. Here it seems to suggest both the presence of a first-person pronoun type thinking, 
with an added capacity for generalization and abstraction, moving the “I” toward the indefinite “one.” At the same 
time, it mirrors the exterior perspective which the human scientists have on Sultan, who is but a representative of a 
genus or species, one among many other possible interchangeable members of a type, not an individual worthy of the 
care and respect that are reserved for human individuals.  
2201 As Costello notes, this question is ethically important as it sheds light on our own limitations: “Are there other 
modes of being besides what we call the human into which we can enter; and if there are not, what does that say about 
us and our limitations?” Ibid., 188. 
2202 Ibid., 77. In this sense, the passage describing the embodied experience of the frogs dying in the summer then 
returning to life with the first rains echoes Costello’s knowledge described here, by “combining’ it with the animal 
perspective. Ibid., 219-220. See also visualization exercises in Theravada Buddhism where the advanced practitioner 
pictures themselves as a rotting corpse from within, and practices of “past life regression” in New Age branches of 
hypnotherapy, both of which support the parallel between the novelistic and hypnotic-absorbed imagination in their 
common ability to “live the impossible.”   
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acknowledgment of the pain, fear and vulnerability of the old man’s dying body, into which as a 
younger ageing body, she is able to breathe a flicker of life, thanks to the force of erotic desire. In 
Coetzee’s text, however, the description is strikingly cold, devoid of empathetic warmth or 
sentiment, based on the recognition of a mutual condition, but stripped of sentimentalism: “just … 
an old bag of bones waiting to be carted away.”2203 At the other end of the spectrum, in “Eros,” 
Costello directs the projective imagination in the opposite direction, musing about what it is like 
to become a god and engage in sexual intercourse with one. In these passages, the imagination is 
able to “humanize” the gods by attributing to them anthropomorphized traits and human erotic 
desire from within.2204 Conversely, it simultaneously extends the human perspective toward 
becoming-them via embodied imagining: “Can we be one with a god profoundly enough to 
apprehend, to get a sense of, a god’s being?”2205 In this sense, both poles are directed toward each 
other by being extended, that is, explored from within this flexibility of the hypnotic-novelistic, 
projective, imagination. All of these examples involve stretching the limits of the imagination and 
relinquishing theoretical understanding in order to acknowledge a common, vulnerable or desiring 
embodiedness, shared by all mortal beings. In Coetzee’s text, on two simultaneous—diegetic and 
extradiegetic—levels, “sympathy” therefore applies less to the content than to the worldview that 
is expressed and to the being—the body-soul or wounded animal—who expresses it. As an 
aesthetic capacity, it has a profoundly ethical dimension, and its mobilization, both in hypnosis 
and in literature, is simultaneously an invitation to examine our own limitations, our openness or 
closedness to other, vulnerable lives.2206  
 
2203 Ibid., 151. “No mistaking the signs. Not a spry old fellow any longer, just an old fellow, an old bag of bones 
waiting to be carted away. Flat on his back with his arms spread out, his hands slack, hands that have in the space of 
a month become so blue and knobbly that you wonder they were ever fit to hold a brush. Not sleeping, just lying, 
waiting. Listening too, no doubt, to the sounds inside, the sounds of the pain. (Let us not forget that, Blanche, she 
thinks to herself: let us not forget the pain. The terrors of death not enough: on top of them the pain, crescendo. As a 
way of putting to a close our visit to this world, what could be more ingeniously, more devilishly cruel?).” Ibid., 151-
152. 
2204 Ibid., 190. “What she knows for certain about the gods is that they peek at us all the time, peek even between our 
legs, full of curiosity, full of envy; sometimes does that curiosity really run? Aside from our erotic gifts, are they 
curious about us, their anthropological specimens, to the degree that we in turn are curious about chimps, or about 
birds, or about flies?” Ibid., 190. (For the examples of Psyche, Mary, and Anchises, see 185-187). Here of course, the 
text invites us to think ourselves into the being of animals via the gaze of the gods, to whom we appear as such. The 
process is strikingly similar to the “mental progression” techniques used in hypnosis: imagining one’s present day self 
through the gaze of a “higher” (or future) perspective.  
2205 Ibid., 188. 
2206 Costello’s multiple exhortations and injunctions toward her interlocutors simultaneously reverberate onto the 
“attentive” reader: “just as Elizabeth Costello encourages her audience members to ‘think their way into the being’ of 
animals, Coetzee encourages us to imagine Costello’s own disturbing view of the world, and thereby to understand 
her pain.” Ward E. Jones,  “Elizabeth Costello and the Biography of the Moral Philosopher,” 215. 
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In this sense, just as moral differences for Murdoch are differences in Gestalt, the use of 
the projective imagination in Coetzee reveals that moral failure can be considered as failure in 
attention and imagination, both in characters and in the reader, and that general principles are 
insufficient to guide us, both at the therapeutic and the ethical level. Indeed, in both cases, “a 
person with narrow imaginative capacities is pictured as morally limited, capable only of acting 
according to rules and according to the limited perceptions which are possible due to the limits of 
the creative imagination.”2207 The most striking manifestation of this idea is Costello’s 
controversial and disturbing analogy between mass animal slaughter for meat consumption and 
the horror of the Holocaust, which she explains by the same failure in moral attention.2208 With 
such passages, the text shocks the reader into examining their own responsibility in exercising this 
faculty:  
There are people who have the capacity to imagine themselves as someone else, there are people who have 
no such capacity (when the lack is extreme, we call them psychopaths), and there are people who have the 
capacity but choose not to exercise it … in a huge communal effort, we close our hearts… We can do 
anything, it seems, and come away clean.2209 
 
While it cannot guarantee the exercise of attention (just like the therapeutic session cannot 
guarantee the success of the outcome), the ethical relevance of the literary text lies in its ability to 
show, rather than produce arguments about, the difference between a worldview that uses the 
projective imagination, and one that cannot or does not. Richard Rorty’s reading of Nabokov’s 
Lolita points to a similar contention, by interpreting Humbert Humbert and his moral blindness as 
a kind of “moral disorder or disability, which a certain kind of reader may recognize in 
himself.”2210 In this way, novelistic literature demonstrates how the inclusion of explicitly moral 
content into its body is irrelevant to its moral value. Rather, the ethical relevance of both hypnotic 
and novelistic narration lies in their ability to present us with fictional lives or worlds, which, when 
 
2207 Hämäläinen, 29. 
2208 “The particular horror of the camps, the horror that convinces us that what went on there was a crime against 
humanity, is not that despite a humanity shared with their victims, the killers treated them like lice. That is too abstract. 
The horror is that the killers refused to think themselves into the place of their victims, as did everyone else. They 
said, ‘It is they in those cattle cars rattling past’. They did not say, ‘How would it be if it were I in that cattle car?’ 
They did not say, ‘It is I who am in that cattle car’. They said, ‘It must be the dead who are being burned today, making 
the air stink and falling in ash on my cabbages’” Coetzee, 79. 
2209 Coetzee, Elizabeth Costello, 79-80. 
2210 Hämäläinen, 125. As Rorty argues, “the moral is not to keep one’s hands off of little girls but to notice what one 
is doing, and in particular to notice what people are saying. For it… very often does turn out, that people are trying to 
tell you that they are suffering.” Rorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity, 164. Humbert Humbert’s moral type in this 
sense is “not that of the child molester but that of the morally blind person.” Hämäläinen, 125. 
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we face them, also force us to face our own responsibility and limitations. Both invite the reader-
subject to examine the texture of their own, internal ethical world.  
 
4.3.2.2. Novelistic Ambiguity as an Ethical Gesture  
 
As Patrick Hayes and Jan Wilm note in the introduction of Beyond the Ancient Quarrel:  
Nussbaum has sought to demonstrate how useful literature can be as a supplement to moral philosophy, most 
especially through its capacity to put moral abstractions in touch with the particularity of experience. In “The 
Novel Today” Coetzee took up a position that can only be described as an extreme rejection of this long 
tradition.2211 
 
Indeed, in “the Novel Today” Coetzee strongly rejects what he calls the ‘novel of 
supplementarity’—where literature is in service to philosophy—describing it as “not merely a 
domestication but an infantilization of literature … as a child’s schoolwork is checked by a 
schoolmistress.”2212 However, like Nabokov’s, Coetzee’s novels often do more than what the 
author claims in his interviews or essays, by complicating both naive and skeptical positions 
regarding their ethical value.2213 This ability stems from the very “intelligence” with which they 
resist “the blunt alternatives” defined above.2214 
Indeed, while it is often considered as a defense of the sympathetic imagination, Coetzee’s 
novel complicates its ethical stance by inserting frequent contradictions between what it does and 
what it says. For instance, when Costello herself is pressed to produce a clear argument about the 
efficacy of poetic discourse in creating empathetic responses and actual change in the world, her 
interrogators are often met with skeptical, ambiguous responses:  
Do you really believe, Mother, that poetry classes are going to close down the slaughterhouses?’ —“No.” —
“Then why do it? … isn’t poetry just another kind of clever talk…? Wasn’t your point about talk that it 
changes nothing?2215  
 
2211 Hayes and Wilm, Beyond the Ancient Quarrel, 10, emphasis added. 
2212 Coetzee, in Hayes and Wilm, 10. The “novel of rivalry” on the other hand—in which literature is in service to 
itself—is autonomous, “operates in terms of its own procedures and issues in its own conclusions,” and “evolves its 
own paradigms and myths, in the process… perhaps even going so far as to show up the mythic status of history—in 
other words, demythologizing history’.” Ibid., 10. Coetzee even proposes the analogy of the cockroach to describe 
literature: “a scavenger, a creature that keeps to itself and does not do another’s business (unlike, say, a dog, which 
can be loyal and obedient if it is properly domesticated),” thereby indicating the “low” and insular quality of the novel, 
suggesting that we stay wary of interpreting as illustrating philosophical arguments or actual historical situations. Ibid. 
2213 In this sense, “what makes Coetzee such an interesting writer to think about in relation to the ‘ancient quarrel’ is 
the extent to which his fiction registers and explores this conflict between ‘supplementarity’ and ‘rivalry’,” rather than 
adopting a fixed, unilateral position. Hayes and Wilm, 10. 
2214 Hayes and Wilm, 10; 
2215 Coetzee, Elizabeth Costello, 103. See also: “Her first inclination would be to say no. Her books certainly evince 
no faith in art. … Her books teach nothing, preach nothing.” Conforming to postmodern tradition, Coetzee’s text often 
associates poetry and philosophy with mere “talk,” but does so to construct a strong opposition between (literary) 
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Here, at the level of content, serious doubt is cast upon art’s ability to create change in the actual 
world. While in her youth Costello still believed in the guiding power of literary texts,2216 in her 
old age she is described as having grown to suspect their unquestioned moral benefits: “she no 
longer believes that storytelling is good in itself.”2217 In fact, at her talk in Amsterdam, she even 
reawakens the Ancient Quarrel, arguing that writing “has the potential to be dangerous,” as it risks 
making the reader complicit with the “evils” which it describes.2218 The claim about the impotence 
of literature is taken beyond mere disillusionment, its potential for moral degradation is repeatedly 
evoked, turning the argument in favor of its ethical power against itself: “if what we write has the 
power to make us better people then surely it has the power to make us worse.”2219 As we have 
seen in Chapter 2, this is precisely the sort of criticism addressed to hypnosis in conceptions which 
neglect the activity and responsibility of the hypnotic subject.2220 In the final Lesson, “At the Gate,” 
Costello transposes these moral “dangers” to her own position as a writer—and not merely as a 
reader—notifying her judges that she is open to “all voices, not just the victims. … If it is their 
murderers and violators who choose to summon me instead, to use me and speak through me, I 
will not close my ears to them, I will not judge them.”2221 Moral neutrality or skepticism, 
detachment from history and ethical dilemmas, seem to constitute the positions attributed to the 
 
discourse and (ethical) action: “If she, as she is nowadays, had to choose between telling a story and doing good, she 
would rather, she thinks, do good.” Ibid., 207; 167. 
2216 “In our truest reading, as students, we searched the page for guidance, guidance in perplexity… in how to live our 
lives.” Coetzee, 127.  
2217 Ibid., 167. 
2218 Ibid., 162. Costello’s discomfort emerges from the moral horror she experiences at having been “seduced” by the 
aestheticizing violence in Paul West’s description of the execution of Hitler’s failed assassins: “Obscene because such 
things ought not to take place, and then obscene again because having taken place they ought not to be brought into 
the light but covered up and hidden for ever in the bowels of the earth, like what goes on in the slaughterhouses of the 
world. … Scenes that do not belong in the light of day, that the eyes of maidens and children deserve to be shielded 
from.” Coetzee, 159. Here, the novel complicates the question even further, as the skeptical position is itself 
undermined by language reminiscent of simplistic and moralizing discourse advocating censorship, adding layer upon 
layer of doubt to the original claim. In this sense, the detailed—and disturbing—passage describing Elizabeth’s violent 
rape can then be considered as a potentially ironic performance of the very “evil” deplored by Costello a few pages 
before, once more complicating the claims that one might be tempted to extract from the novel. Ibid., 165.  
2219 Ibid., 171. 
2220 A similar criticism is addressed to hypnotism, as we have seen in Chapter 2. Keen makes a parallel claim: on the 
one hand she doubts the ability of art to impact the actual world yet she also underlines the moral dangers attributed 
to it: “Novels can be dangerous. They convey disturbing ideas. They awake strange desires. They invite identification 
with criminals and prostitutes and assassins. They give people, not just children, nightmares that they can’t forget. 
Years ago my parents put the hard cover first editions inside the bookcases with the leaded glass doors. These were 
banned books. The Updike with the three-way sex, the signed Isaac Singers, the valuable collection of Horatio Algers. 
You bet I read them” Keen. 64. 
2221 Coetzee, 204.  
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disillusioned and “autonomous” writer, who in this description is more reminiscent of the 
“possessed,” mimetic or passive hypnotic subject that merely channels an exterior discourse 
without exercising proper agency over it.  
Nevertheless, a clear distinction between authorial and character discourse shows that 
regardless of the “moral quality” of the voices or events which it bodies forth, literature preserves 
its ethical relevance, not by convincing us that a given perspective should be adopted, but by 
showing us, as does hypnosis, what it would be like to inhabit the world from that position. This 
then allows the reader-subject to emerge from the experience with an ability to better define their 
own worldview. Indeed, as Hilary Putnam argues: 
[When I read Céline], I do not learn that love does not exist, that all human beings are hateful and hating… 
What I learn is to see the world as it looks to someone who is sure that hypothesis is correct. I see what 
plausibility that hypothesis has: what it would be like if it were true; how someone could possibly think that 
it is true… This is a kind of knowledge. It is knowledge of a possibility. It is conceptual knowledge.2222 
 
Whether it depicts ordinary, everyday moral failures, or lets “murderers and violators” speak 
“through” it, the literary text still serves to enrich our conceptual map and provide ethical 
knowledge about the possibility it describes. The reader can then react to this possibility of a 
worldview which adopts problematic hypotheses—a process which, as I have suggested is not 
merely intellectual but also affective—thereby refining or strengthening their own worldview and 
value system. In this sense, novelistic description, regardless of its objects, is ethical in and of 
itself. Thus, despite Nabokov’s insistence on the purely aesthetic nature of artistic creation, his 
novelistic “practice,” as Rorty has shown, can be thought to disprove the claims made by 
“Nabokov the theorist.”2223 According to Rorty, Nabokov’s “greatest creations” are in fact “people 
whom [he] himself loathes,” and who “dramatize the particular form of cruelty about which [he] 
worried most—incuriosity.”2224 Nabokov’s novels are thus ethical in the same way as some of 
Coetzee’s novels, such as Disgrace, can be. They portray “cruelty from the inside, helping us see 
the way in which the private pursuit of aesthetic bliss leads us to be incurious” about others and 
their suffering, a process which not only Costello denounces, but also manifests herself towards 
others.2225 In this sense, the ethical value of the novel is to remind us that we too—both as readers 
 
2222 Putnam, “Literature, Science, Reflection.” In Meaning and the Moral Sciences (London: Routledge, 1979), 488. 
2223 167. Nabokov the theorist claims that the “effect produced by style as opposed to that produced by participative 
emotion—is all that matters.” Rorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity, 147. 
2224 Rorty, 158. 
2225 Ibid., 146. Rorty’s reading shows that Nabokov “knew quite well that ecstasy and tenderness… tend to preclude 
each other... This is the ‘moral’ knowledge that his novels help us acquire, and to which his aestheticism rhetoric is 
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and as individuals—are “only selectively curious.”2226 By portraying characters who, like Humbert 
Humbert or David Lurie, suffer from “lack of curiosity” and “inattentiveness to anything irrelevant 
to [their] own obsession,” the text reminds us that we are no different: “the reader, suddenly 
revealed to himself as, if not hypocritical, at least cruelly incurious recognizes his semblable, his 
brother.”2227 
By exposing us to the fictional world and its characters, without omitting any of the 
concerns that it might raise about itself, the text helps us exercise our discriminating thinking, 
which we may, if we wish, carry with us back into the real world, just as the hypnotic subject might 
apply the skills obtained during the session in their ordinary life. This knowledge, which literature 
provides by showing us what the world would look like from the perspective of a moral-other, can 
enrich our conceptual framework even if it is not conveyed by conceptual means. In Elizabeth 
Costello, it is moral outrage triggered by novel reading which leads Costello to “act” in the world 
and give her lecture in Amsterdam, despite the “fiasco” at Appleton college. Indeed, it is the act 
of reading Paul West’s novel—of being shocked by its “obscenity,” that is, of experiencing the 
disturbing “power” of literature—that dissolves the skepticism which leads to moral apathy: “what 
hope is there that the problem of evil … will be solved by more talk? But at the time the invitation 
came she was under the malign spell of a novel she was reading.”2228 It is the spell and its affective 
impact that lead Costello to accept the invitation. Once more, as in the therapeutic context, the 
affective power of reading—even unpleasant—here seems more efficacious than content to 
transform inertia into “action.” Conversely, if we as readers are persuaded by anything in the novel, 
it is not by the characters’ discourse, but by the experience of reading the novel qua novel, by 
being submitted to its content-form,2229 its body-soul, with the irreducible tensions, woundedness, 
difficulties and ambiguities which it expresses. As Costello tells the board of judges in “At the 
 
irrelevant. He knows quite well that the pursuit of autonomy is at odds with feelings of solidarity… that writers can 
obtain and produce ecstasy while failing to notice suffering, while being incurious about the people whose lives 
provide their material…. So he creates characters both ecstatic and cruel, noticing and heartless. … What he fears 
most is that one cannot have it both ways—that there is no synthesis of ecstasy and kindness.” Ibid., 159-160.  
2226 Ibid., 160. 
2227 Ibid., 163. 
2228 Coetzee, Elizabeth Costello, 157, emphasis added. 
2229 For Denham, stylistic form and affective reactions of the reader are all part of the “content” of a novel: “Like 
paraphrases of good metaphors, summaries of good novels… can fail to convey the very considerations which… 
constitute their distinctive content,” which is “in part constituted by the aspects it represents, for aspects are themselves 
in part constituted by our responses.” Denham, Metaphor, 351). Where the responses are absent (as in paraphrase or 
summary), “there will be no such distinctive content to discern.” Ibid., 351.  
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Gate,” beliefs are “not the only ethical supports we have. We can rely on our hearts as well. That 
is all. I have nothing more to say.”2230 
Although it claims not to, Coetzee’s novel does make a claim, even if it is not a 
philosophical argument about the lives, or rights, of animals.2231 As Coetzee notes himself in 
Doubling the Point, ending a novel necessarily involves “confronting head-on the endlessness of 
its skepticism.”2232 Rather than provide philosophical solutions, Coetzee “dramatize[s] the 
problem and gives it form in the novelistic universe, bodying-it forth in the various counter voices 
which inhabit it,” as does hypnotic narration.2233 The ambiguity of its “claim” is ethical as it 
manifests a greater consideration for the nuances and difficulties of a given situation, rather than 
a tendency to oversimplify in the name of clarification. Indeed, as Iris Murdoch writes: 
It is very well to say that one should always attempt a full understanding and a precise description, but to say 
that one can always be confident that one has understood seems plainly unrealistic…There are times when it 
is proper to stress, not the comprehensibility of the world, but its incomprehensibility…There are… moments 
when situations are unclear and what is needed is not a renewed attempt to specify the facts, but a fresh vision 
which may be derived from a ‘story’ or from some sustaining concept which is able to deal with what is 
obstinately obscure, and represents a ‘mode of understanding’ of an alternative type.2234  
 
Therefore, labelling Costello as “confused” demonstrates not only a misunderstanding of the 
nature of fictional discourse and ambiguity of the literary text, it also manifests ethical obtuseness 
in its failure to imaginatively project into the claim of the novel, into a worldview that admits 
ambiguity as an integral part of reality and its difficulty.2235 As I have suggested, this is a 
worldview shared by the novel and hypnosis alike. 
 
      *** 
 
 
2230 Coetzee, 203. 
2231 From this perspective, novels function in the same way as indirect hypnotic suggestions: they covertly do what 
they claim not to 
2232 Coetzee, Doubling the Point, 248. 
2233 Attridge, 103. Like therapeutic narratives, “the best fiction… seldom pronounces decisively on moral issues. It 
does not offer dogmatic or authoritative solutions to problems of value. Rather… fiction is often at its most exciting, 
and instructs us most adequately in matters of value, when it explores moral problems and brings its readers to see 
them in their fullness and complexity” Novitz, 355. 
2234 Murdoch 1956, 50-51. Similarly, the hypnotic narrative does not need to specify the facts or extract rational insight 
from the therapeutic material, but merely re-describes and reframes them in a new vision. 
2235 The philosophical power of the novel thus lies in the specificity of its genre and form, or as Vincent Descombes 
puts it, in “the express reasons the author would have given—had he been asked, and had he taken the trouble to 
formulate them—for his choice of the novel in preference to other forms.” Descombes, Proust, Philosophy of the 
Novel, trans. C. C. Macksey (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992), 14. 
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In The Good Story, Coetzee himself describes the “learning” one gets from books as a 
“quintessential” experience, a “feeling of growing beyond yourself, of leaving your old self behind 
and becoming a new, better self … a form of ecstasy or ek-stasis.”2236 The projective imagination 
is based on this movement of exiting the self, of opening up to the other, which unlike what is 
implied by the mimetic conceptions of hypnosis cited at the beginning of this chapter, cannot be 
reduced to a mere loss of self. On the contrary, in both hypnosis and novel reading, it constitutes 
an indirect, mediated way of finding one’s way back to the self, an imaginary detour which allows 
for its re-creation and re-definition—either with, or against, the lives that it invites us to 
temporarily embody. The relation between fictional lives and our actual life is thus not one of 
direct transposition—for example of a moral maxim or rule, or a therapeutic principle—but rather 
of cultivating our capacities to attend—to be attentive and to relate—which texts invite us to adopt 
toward fictional objects. Like indirect hypnosis, the novel’s “nonillustrative demonstration” thus 
operates as it “nudges or maneuvers people into a position in which something becomes apparent. 
It is more like a gesture than a statement.”2237 The ethical claim of the projective imagination is 
therefore made by showing us what it is like to temporarily become-other.2238 
As I have argued, this temporary embodying entails neither feeling sympathetic or 
empathetic toward other lives, nor does it involve adhering to a given worldview or value 
system.2239 Rather, it cultivates the reader-subject’s capacity to attend to previously unnoticed 
aspects of a particular situation, or individual life. As Nora Hämäläinen suggests, even when we 
are not empathetically moved by the “detailed perception” of a fictional character’s situation, “this 
‘mere’ perception may be relevant for real-life needs of ‘full’ moral perception.”2240 As I have 
shown, its ethical value is in great part linked to its ability to extend our concept of what it means 
to “know,” by incorporating attention to the irreducible particularity and complexity of reality into 
our modes of understanding. As Hilary Putnam notes: 
Literature does not … depict solutions. What especially the novel does is aid us in the imaginative re-creation 
of moral perplexities… If moral reasoning is the conscious criticism of ways of life, then the sensitive 
 
2236 Coetzee, The Good Story, 178. 
2237 Young, 371, emphasis added. 
2238 Just as the moral dimension of stories lies not in prescriptive content but in the capacities cultivated by the 
encounter with their aesthetic form, the power of hypnotic narratives lies in their ability to show rather than tell. 
Indeed, on the therapeutic level, refraining from imposing narratives onto the client, engaging in attentive listening 
and indirect communication similarly count as a moral act.  
2239 In this way, literature and hypnosis are preserved from accusations of encouraging moral corruption.  
2240 Hämäläinen, 28. 
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appreciation in the imagination of predicaments and perplexities must be essential to moral reasoning. Novels 
… (frequently) do something for us that must be done if we are to gain any moral knowledge.2241 
 
An ethics of the projective imagination emphasizes the moral value of this “sensitive appreciation” 
by revealing how “perplexities” can be explored imaginatively and concretely, as well as 
affectively, rather than merely argumentatively. Furthermore, it situates the very possibility of 
becoming-other as a central aesthetic-ethical perplexity, which deserves to be explored in practice, 
as in hypnosis, in addition to its theoretical, philosophical examination. 
It is therefore in the “hypnotic” re-centering—or ek-statis—created by the projective 
imagination that aesthetic absorption and the ethical level come together in the novel.2242 As 
Benson notes, the “surrender” involved in reading fiction allows one to:  
imagine and be helped to imagine what it is like being a different type of organizing centre within fields of 
experience which are different from those of which I have direct personal knowledge or acquaintance. By 
having my context of experience changed, and my intentionality or thought-content determined for me… if 
only for relatively short durations during a process of reading or viewing, ‘I’ can be changed.2243  
 
As I have argued, both the novelistic text and hypnotic discourse are means to “help us” achieve 
this specific kind of change. Although the effect of absorption is temporary, its ethical impact on 
the recipient can carry on once the fictional experience comes to a close, and manifest itself as do 
the therapeutic benefits of fictional narratives, by cultivating the forms of attention which are 





2241 Putnam, “Literature, Science, Reflection,” 89. Putnam does not restrict this claim to the novel but includes other 
literary genres. Arguing that reading about the lives of fictional characters may teach us something about our own 
implies that we do not consider the gap between their “world” and ours as unbridgeable. In this sense, one of the stakes 
of this chapter was to examine how “the problem of the relation between novelistic and real world is related to the 
problem of the character’s vs. our own life.” Ong, 155.  
2242 Emphasis on the importance of absorption for the ethical power of literature is an important part of my claim. See 
for example: “A novel… is the sensual experience of another world. If you don’t enter that world, … you won’t be 
able to empathize.” Azar Nafizi, Reading Lolita in Tehran (New York: Random, 2003), 111; “It is when readers 
become imaginatively ‘caught up in’ the fiction that it best allows them to explore and reassess their values.” Novitz, 
356. Conversely, one can also argue that “the deepening of our moral understanding and emotions may contribute 
dramatically to our intense absorption in a narrative… the moral defects and/or merits of a work may figure in the 
aesthetic evaluation of the work.” Noël Carroll, “Moderate Moralism,” in Contemporary Readings in the Philosophy 
of Literature, 410. In this way, aesthetics and ethics can mutually feed each other and deepen each other’s impact, 
develop each other’s possibilities, coexisting as aspects of the text as a whole.  
2243 Benson, 162. Benson argues that this ability to occupy perspectives of others is actually at the heart of the 
constitution of self: the “very sociality that enables the emergence of selves as centers of psychological life in the first 
place.” Ibid., 143. 
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In this chapter, I began by underlining the narrative dimension of hypnosis, suggesting that 
unlike what is often thought, it can be conceived as belonging to the ‘narrative oriented’ therapies 
described by Lewis in Narrative Psychiatry. Against conceptions that reduce the hypnotic 
experience to a mere dramatic-mimetic reliving of traumatic memories, my goal was to call 
attention to the numerous, other uses that can be made of hypnotic regression and futurization, 
beyond the recovery of traumatic material. As I suggested, these can be conceived as complex 
forms of storytelling, and, as they are intimately linked to narrative modes of looking at and being 
in the world, share important similarities with literary narratives, despite what initially seems to 
be the case.  
Hypnotic restorying, however, differs from more cognitively oriented and insight-based 
forms of therapy, as it creates immersive, affectively and imaginatively engaging narratives—as 
do novels. This immersion is made possible by the induction of hypnotic trance, which plays a role 
similar to the opening of a novel, where the subject agrees to temporarily suspend their ordinary 
relation to the world and crosses an imaginary threshold, opening up to new modes of picturing, 
understanding, believing, conceiving, relating, and so on. In addition to the active engagement that 
they encourage, the specific ethical and therapeutic potential of hypnotic and novelistic narratives 
also stems from the awareness of the fictionality and irreducible aesthetic distance at the heart of 
both forms of storytelling. Far from being a loss of self, hypnosis as aesthetic activity participates 
in enriching the experiential and imaginary activity of the individual. 
By using ethical criticism to illuminate the nature of novelistic-hypnotic narration, my 
purpose in this work was also to show that the immersive restorying and projective imagining 
found in both activities encourages ethically valuable forms of being in the world.2244 In 
“immersive restorying,” the individual is opened up to alternative, more “realistic” internal 
narratives, as described in Murdoch’s theory of the moral attention, and uses the imaginary, the 
vicarious and the virtual as preparation for actual life. In both novels and hypnotherapy, fictionality 
opens up ordinarily inaccessible realms—of the past, of the future, of the minds of others—and 
makes-visible new alternatives, which lie at the heart of the present as imaginative possibilities. In 
 
2244 Indeed, as the exploration of our interiority and evaluative worldviews is a moral activity in itself, our ethics of 
immersive restorying and projective imagination underlines the inseparable dimension of aesthetics and ethics. Both 
come into play in narratively oriented therapeutic models such as modern hypnotherapy, where “the new life-narrative, 
the problem-narrative and the therapy-narrative develop jointly and are inseparable in the therapeutic context.” Omer 
and Alon, 75. 
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“projective imagining,” the individual actively engages in a process of temporarily becoming-
other, which not only leads to increased and embodied moral understanding of other perspectives, 
but also to enriched modes of self-narration, which can be used in the actual world, when the book 
is closed or when the therapeutic session ends.  
 
     *** 
 
By sketching out this double ethics of temporarily becoming-other, centered on the 
attention and the imagination, I thus attempted to offer a reparative—rather than suspicious—
conception of what stories, and thus literature, can “do” in the world.  
As Perry and Doan inquire in Story Re-visions, “if narrative is intrinsically the language of 
therapy, is there yet hope in the power of narrative, when it lacks authority, to lift people’s lives 
and bring them together again?”2245 By proposing an affirmative reply to this question, I also hope 
to have offered a response to the disillusioned skepticism dramatized in certain passages of 
Coetzee’s texts. By underlining the transformative power of hypnotic-novelistic narration, I side 
with Arabella Kurtz’s emphasis on the importance of narrative truth, as she reminds Coetzee that 
“stories are all we have to work with,” an affirmation that need not be interpreted in a pessimistic 
manner.2246  
From this examination of the ethical value of fictional narratives, I also hope to have 
produced an enriched conception of the therapeutic efficacy of hypnosis. As I suggested 
throughout these chapters, rather than merely induce automatic behavior, hypnosis taps into the 
creative and transformative potential of stories in order to bring about therapeutic change. It does 
so by freeing the subject from their ordinary automatisms—the “trance” of the everyday—and the 
limiting narratives which compose it. After underlining the parallels between hypnosis and the act 
of reading, I can now conclude that hypnosis allows the subject to take on what might be 
considered as an aesthetic attitude towards life. Indeed, it leads the individual to become 
temporally removed from ordinary life, in order to creatively re-examine, re-imagine, and thus, 
transform it. Like “good” art, hypnosis invites and enables us to willfully open up to the “other,” 
not in a relation of submissiveness, but in order to draw out new potentialities—to produce 
 
2245 Parry and Doan, 26. 
2246 Kurtz, The Good Story, 63. 
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reframings and re-visions—sowing the seeds of their actualization in the imagination, rather than 
uncovering a single, predetermined, “truth.”2247 In hypnotherapy, one is not searching for the right 
interpretation, but letting oneself be modified by alternative modes of description, as is the case in 
novel reading.  
As Iser already underlined, like the hypnotic subject, the reader “must transcend that world, 
in order to be able to observe it from outside. And herein lies the true communicatory function of 
literature.”2248 If art enables us to “transcend that which we are otherwise so inextricably entangled 
in—our own lives in the midst of the real world,” then so does hypnotic discourse in the therapeutic 
setting.2249 Both novels and hypnosis, in this sense, offer a therapeutics of making visible through 
re-vision.2250 In the therapeutic setting, even when re-telling one’s story is not a sufficient condition 
for change, it remains a necessary one. Indeed, purely behavioral, external modifications, devoid 
both of affective engagement and significant change in “vision” or understanding, are less likely 
to be durably implemented than an internal—felt and internally narrated—change. 
Hypnotic immersion and suggestibility are thus therapeutically valuable when they occur 
in the context of a relation of trust, where the operator guides the subject toward a chosen direction, 
and the subject relinquishes a sense of self that no longer participate in the good life, as well as 
the—limiting and solidifying—narratives which accompany and uphold it.   
As I suggested in Chapter 1, a study of the therapeutic value of hypnosis also reveals the 
suggestive nature at the heart of all therapeutic relations. As it is practiced today, not only does 
hypnosis acknowledge, it also incorporates this fact into its therapeutic strategies. As Omer and 
Alon put it, “we must influence, but our influence will only be therapeutic if we learn to mold it to 
the client’s experience. …We are thus very active narrators, but we narrate most therapeutically 
when we are most guided by our clients’ promptings.”2251 Hypnosis in the extensive sense thus 
 
2247 Therapeutic change involves inserting a gap, a moment of openness, of undetermined potentiality which allows 
for the redirection and modification of the individual’s habitual story. In other words, without suggestibility, no 
modification can take place. In this sense all narrative approaches to therapy are “hypnotic” in that they take the patient 
out of one habitual “trance” and open them up to alternative, more creative or fitting alternatives. Hypnosis thus makes 
visible and capitalizes on the positive effects of suggestibility, and on the inevitability of influence in the therapeutic—
and generally, communicative—relation. As Omer and Alon put it, “in influencing our clients’ construction of 
personal narratives our task is precisely to search for a form of persuasion that participates most profoundly in the 
client’s truth.” Ibid., 4. 
2248 Iser, The Act of Reading, 230. 
2249 Ibid., 230. 
2250 “As one learns to see existing phenomena—even one’s own constituted meanings—they undergo a change, as 
observation adds a new dimension to the observed and thus begins to transform it.” Ibid., 230. 
2251 Omer and Alon, 4. 
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reveals how the “suggestive” permeate all levels of interaction and fields of human inquiry and is 
a valuable, rather than merely deceiving, transformative tool.2252 Like stories—and language in 
general—the dangers of hypnotism lie in its misuse rather than in its nature.2253 
In my examination of the therapeutic and poetic value of indirect, permissive hypnosis, as 
opposed to the traditional and authoritative techniques of direct suggestion, I reemphasized the 
importance of narrative in the pursuit of the good life, and thereby, the implicit claim for a greater 
value (both aesthetic and ethical) of indirect—evocative, metaphorical, particularistic, imaginative 
and affective—communication, over the “dryness” of abstract, theoretical thought.  
My analogy between hypnosis and the act of reading thus allowed for the emergence of a 
second parallel: hypnosis diverges from cognitive or behavioral therapeutic models in a way 
similar to how novelistic and literary texts differ from philosophical or theoretical discourse and 
the essay form. Since hypnotic, novelistic and moral particularistic discourse all value paying close 
attention to the formal and stylistic dimensions of linguistic expression, rather than mere content, 
they all participate in rehabilitating the absorptive, aesthetic power of poiesis as potentially 
educative and transformative, and the value of aesthetic description over non-aesthetic forms of 
discourse. The nodal link between ethics, novelistic texts and therapeutics that emerges from this 
study thus lies in the value of the specifically aesthetic properties of fictional narration. 
Conversely, modern hypnosis can also help remind literary critics that the “teachings” we receive 







2252 My analysis placed special emphasis on the “ethical” dimension of art, the “narrative” dimension of hypnosis, the 
“internal” dimension of our moral lives. This strongly aspectival dimension involved selecting certain elements and 
setting others aside, such as the aesthetic autonomy of art, the dramatic dimension of hypnosis, the rational and 
behavioral components of moral action, the general dimension of moral concepts, etc. This, however, need not be 
problematic. Indeed, as Felski notes about novelistic subjectivity, the limited nature of perspective is not necessarily 
an obstacle to “knowing”: “Once we relinquish the false picture of a reality “out there” waiting to be found, we can 
think of literary conventions as devices for articulating truth rather than as obstacles to its discovery.” Felski, Uses, 
84. Similarly, Perry and Doan note about the therapeutic context that “A therapy equal to the postmodern challenges 
we have described will have to forsake the temptation of taking the last remaining vestiges of an ‘objective’ or ‘neutral’ 
position that assumes there is still someplace of firm ground upon which to stand.” Parry and Doan, 22. 
2253 As Arthur Frank beautifully puts it, “those who seek to banish stories because of their dangers will never know 




Appendix A.  
(Im)Possible Reconciliations? Bringing Hypnosis and 
Psychoanalysis Together. 
 
As we showed in Chapter 1, psychoanalysis was born out of the Freudian rejection of 
hypnosis. Modern, indirect and permissive forms hypnotherapy which then developed in the 
second half of the twentieth century, did so in part against the psychoanalytic model. Nevertheless, 
this does not necessarily imply that a strong opposition between analysis and hypnosis is 
inevitable. In this appendix, I will examine various ways in which hypnosis, as a clinical or 
therapeutic tool, might be compatible with psychoanalytic theory. To do so, I will discuss several 
attempts at reconciliation made during the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, in order to show 
the further ways in which hypnosis can be said to have survived the Freudian deathblow. In this 
way, I follow Borch-Jacobsen’s argument according to which the prehistory of psychoanalysis 
“belongs to a certain future of psychoanalysis, rather to a long-dead past,” albeit in a reconciliatory 
mindset.2254 Indeed, rather than pitting fields against one another, this “(im)possible 
reconciliation” requires drawing out possible intersections, which are facilitated by the theoretical 
flexibility obtained once hypnosis is regarded as a tool which can be transposed across theoretical 
models, rather than an isolated practice or a rigid set of principles or doctrines. As I hope to show, 
there are several manners in which psychoanalysis and hypnosis can be thought to intersect or 
overlap despite their apparent opposition. As we will see in what follows, while some pull more 
toward the analytic pole, others pull more toward the hypnotic-suggestive; and while some occur 
on the level of meta-theoretical framework, others do on the clinical and technical levels of 
therapeutic practice.  
 
1. The Narrative Turn in Psychoanalysis. 
 
 
2254 Borch-Jacobsen, The Emotional Tie, 44. 
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First of all, once hypnosis is conceived as a complex form of storytelling or narration—as 
I argued in Chapter 4—it can be brought together with psychoanalysis, under a common umbrella, 
often referred to as the “narrative turn” in psychotherapy.2255 Indeed, once both hypnotic and 
analytic theory or concepts are conceived as narrative in essence, they can be integrated into the 
meta-narrative framework which considers all forms of psychotherapeutic theory as forms of 
complex, suggestive storytelling. The main interest of narrative approaches in psychoanalysis for 
us here is the way in which they influenced a discipline whose primary aim is to uncover hidden 
stories, and reveals the narrative structures at the heart of therapeutic processes.  
First of all, historians and critics have observed the importance of narrative in Freudian 
psychoanalysis. James Philips for instance writes that “narrative and narrative identity have been 
present in psychoanalysis from the beginning.”2256 In Reading for the Plot, Peter Brooks writes 
that in Beyond the Pleasure Principle—his “masterplot”—Freud also “lays out a total scheme of 
how life proceeds from beginning to end, and … confronts the question of whether the closure of 
an individual life is contingent or necessary,” which is to say, examines “the very possibility of 
talking about life—about its very "narratability.”2257  Nevertheless, positions regarding the role 
that Freud gave to narrative in his theorization of the analytic model diverge. For instance, on the 
one hand, Lewis objects to the idea of Freud being the first narrativist. For him, Freud “never 
embraced a narrative theory of psychoanalysis. He remained manifestly attached throughout his 
career to the more science-like models he inherited from neuropathologists.”2258 And indeed, in 
his Studies on hysteria, Freud himself indicates that “like other neuropathologists, I was trained to 
employ local diagnosis and electro-prognosis, and it still strikes me as strange that the case 
histories I write should read like short stories and that, as one might say, they lack the serious 
stamp of science.”2259 Other historians have pointed out that although Freud’s narrative insights 
 
2255 See Appendix B. 
2256 James Phillips, “The Psychodynamic Narrative,” in Healing Stories: Narrative in Psychiatry and Psychotherapy, 
ed. G. Roberts and J. Holmes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 28. 
2257 Brooks, Reading for the Plot, 96-97. 
2258 Bradley Lewis, Narrative Psychiatry, 33. 
2259 Sigmund Freud, Case of Frälein Elisabeth von R, in “Case Histories from Studies on Hysteria,” (1893) in SE, 
2:160. This affirmation, Mark Micale takes to be a way of “alerting his readers” to the literary aspects of his medical 
case histories. Micale, 5. Indeed, Freud’s remark can also be taken to establish the proximity between hysteria and 
literature, and the need to turn to literary prose to seize the specificity of the hysterical psyche, in the absence of a 
proper (psychoanalytic) theory. As Freud continues: “I must console myself with the reflection that the nature of the 
subject is evidently responsible for this,” since with hysteria “local diagnosis and electrical reactions read nowhere… 
whereas a detailed description of mental processes such as we are accustomed to find in the works of imaginative 
writers enables…. To at least obtain some kind of insight.” Ibid., 160-161, emphasis added.  
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were a key part of his early work, they were “not valued or respected.”2260 Lewis even argue that 
they were “repressed by Freud and a by century of struggle over specific psychotherapy 
models.”2261  
On the other hand, Perry and Doan for instance argue that “Freud must be counted as the 
first narrative therapist,” having created “a new literary genre, the case history.”2262 Graham 
Frankland describes psychoanalysis as a “‘science’ which simply cannot be properly understood 
or appreciated without reference to its creator’s literary culture.”2263  
In this section we will give a short overview of how the narrative approach came into play 
in psychoanalysis and how narrative can be considered to be integral, in a discipline which was 
born out of the rejection of the hypnotic, “magical” narrative for its lack of scientific rigor. This 
will allow us to then underline a possible common narrative approach shared by analysis and 
hypnosis alike.  
 
Analytic Storytelling 
In what sense can psychoanalysis be thought of as a narrative practice?  
 
2260 Lewis, Ibid., 33. 
2261 Ibid. As we have seen, for Lewis “This repression of narrative has started to thaw in recent times, allowing the 
return of narrative as a central concern for contemporary psychotherapy.” Ibid 
2262 Parry and Doan, Story Re-visions. Narrative Therapy in the Postmodern World, 8. The metaphor seems to be used 
quite loosely, as Parry and Doan go on to add that Freud gave voice to his patients, who “were no longer compelled 
to live as supporting characters in stories that had gone forward at their expense.” Ibid. 8 Similarly, as psychoanalysts 
Almond and Almond have noted in The Therapeutic narrative, (1996), analytic cure is comparable to the creative 
process of story production: “In treatment, a patient gradually learns to understand the factors that lead to concealment 
and inhibition. As these tensions become modified, the patient produces a more honest and revealing story with the 
therapist.” Almond and Almond, The Therapeutic Narrative. Fictional Relationships and the Process of Psychological 
Change, 170. 
2263 Graham Frankland, Freud’s Literary Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000),2. For the relations 
between psychoanalysis and the Humanities, see Lionel Trilling, Freud and the Crisis of our Culture and The Liberal 
Imagination (Boston: Beacon Press, 1955); Paul Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1970); Philip Rieff, Freud: The Mind of the Moralist (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 
1961). For postmodernist readings of Freud in relation to literature, see Jacques Lacan, “The Insistence of the Letter 
in the Unconscious,” Yale French Studies 36-37 (1966): 112-147; Jacques Derrida, “Freud and the Scene of Writing,” 
in Writing and Difference, (Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1978); Harold Bloom, “Freud and the Poetic 
Sublime” Poetics of influence: new and selected criticism (New Haven: H.R. Schwab, 1988); Geoffrey Hartman “The 
Interpreter’s Freud,” in The Geoffrey Hartman Reader (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004). See also Peter 
Brooks, Reading for the Plot (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984); Joseph Smith, The Literary Freud: 
Mechanisms of Defense and the Poetic Will (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980); Shoshana Felman (ed.), 




The first, most evident way in which narrative is present in psychoanalysis is by considering the 
talking cure—in which “a patient’s tales might provide etiological clues and even possess salutary 
power”—as a means for the analysand to “tell their story.”2264 In this first, somewhat evident sense, 
analysis is the process of giving voice to the analysand, letting them become the narrator of their 
own life, allowing them to “reproduce the story of her illness,” while the analyst acts as a mere 
recipient.2265 As Brooks has argued, “in the course of his use of the genre [of the case history], 
Freud encountered all the problems of narrative design and exposition faced by biographers, 
historians and novelists, and the issues of fictionality that have haunted literature since Plato.”2266 
Case histories are in this sense bound by similar narrative constraints as literary genres, and 
therefore face the same difficulties as novel writing would. Indeed, with the mass of material which 
Freud obtained from the analysand—of “what Freud unpacked”—“the shape of the individual and 
his biography become uncontrollable.”2267 Out of the narrated historical material, a second, more 
reliable narrative must be formed.2268 
Indeed, in a second sense, the “narrative” dimension of psychoanalysis can refer to the act 
of interpretation, by the analyst, of the analysand’s discourse, which involves a symptomatic mode 
of reading.2269 For example, as Freud wrote about Emmy Von. N., “I cannot evade listening to her 
stories in every detail to the very end.”2270 However, “her remarkably well-stocked memory 
showed the most striking gaps. She herself complained that it was a though her life was chopped 
in pieces.”2271 The analyst must therefore help produce a reconstruction of the story, filling in the 
gaps, identifying the hidden, latent story under the manifest narrative told by the analysand.2272 
 
2264 Thrailkill, Affecting Fictions, 123; 183. 
2265 Similarly, hysterical symptoms are “talked away.” Joseph Breuer, Case of Fräulein Anna O, in “Case Histories 
from Studies on Hysteria,” SE: 2:37.  
2266 Brooks, Reading for the Plot, 284. 
2267 Ibid., 278. 
2268 However, “not only must the analyst reinterpret, reorganize, and re-evaluate what the patient has already re-
presented but, like any reader of literary narrative, he can hope to recover only a primary narrative which is 
discontinuous and full of holes.” Riley, 2005, 97. 
2269 See Ricoeur’s notion of “hermeneutics of suspicion.” Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy, 27 and Frederic Jameson: 
“a ‘diagnostic’ form of criticism treats literature like a symptomatic body. Like a psychoanalytic subject, the text 
harbors clues (a manifest content) that lead to the latent, “ideological system” on which it is structured, which “remains 
unrealized in the surface of the text.” Jameson, The Political Unconscious, 48.  
2270 Freud, “Studies on Hysteria,” SE 2:61. 
2271 Ibid., 67. 
2272 Indeed, in the therapeutic setting, a patient’s body can “fill the ‘gap’ in the tale,” showing with gestures what is 
omitted in words. Thrailkill, 123. 
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This may involve having to inverse the ordinary relation between truth and fictive appearances. 
As Frederik Crews notes for example: 
Whereas psychoanalytic theory relies on a horizon of truthfulness, psychoanalytic praxis relies around an 
alert attention to the problematic fictiveness of the analysand’s truth (intentional statements, recovered 
memories) and the probable truthfulness of his or her fictions (performative acting-out, symbolic 
transferences). The manifest, apparent story or truth sometimes is only a communication about a hidden, 
more interesting truth … a ‘no’ may mean a ‘yes’ and a ‘yes’ almost certainly does not mean this particular 
‘yes’.2273  
 
In this sense, the analyst must “reauthor” the analysand’s untrustworthy narrative, and produce not 
only a coherent but also an insightful, interpreted, story from the initial material, which inescapably 
involves selecting and reorganizing. Indeed, as Roy Schafer argues, in the analytic cure, the 
analysand is considered as an “unreliable narrator” of sorts, in respect to his or her consciously 
constructed account.2274 In the analyst’s retelling of the analysand’s story, “certain features are 
accentuated while others are placed in parentheses, connected to others, or developed further.”2275 
Consequently, by introducing new, “though often contested or resisted questions that amount to 
regulated narrative possibilities,” the analyst's retellings progressively influence “the what and 
how” of the stories told by analysands, which  then creates a cluster of “more or less coordinated 
new narrations,” or in other words, a “jointly authored work.”2276 In a sense, the analysand's story 
is never good enough: “links are missing, chronologies twisted, and the objects of desire are 
misnamed.”2277 This is because, as Janet Malcolm puts it, “it isn’t the story [the patient] tries to 
tell but the story he tells in spite of himself that the analyst listens for. What he is really after is the 
 
2273 Frederick Crews, in A. Wolloch and P. Brooks, eds., Whose Freud? The Place of Psychoanalysis in Contemporary 
Culture (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008), 293. As Jonathan Lear notes in “Truth in Psychoanalysis,” 
the opposite temptation is that of creating a narrative that fits too well with that of the analysand: “The problem is how 
to avoid collaborating with the analysand in making things fit together too well. For there is a temptation to enter into 
a narcissistic collaboration in which both analyst and analysand implicitly congratulate each other on doing a good 
job…As Aristotle recognized, stories tend to have a beginning, a middle, and an end; as Nietzsche recognized, lives 
often do not. In facilitating the construction of a convincing life narrative, one may well be collaborating in the 
construction of a false self.” Lear, in Whose Freud? 306-307. [hypnosis escapes this problem because in a way truth 
is irrelevant: we work with emotional release and interpretations, not truth]. “Perhaps the core conception of truth in 
psychoanalysis should not be thought of as primarily directed toward contents but rather should be understood as a 
particular type of mental activity. Truth is a way of living with contents. I should like to suggest that within 
psychoanalysis, truth should be understood as a certain way of developing fantasy.” In analysis, truth is “a certain 
kind of elaboration of fantasy” which we could call “relatively nondefensive” … “in analysis, truth is free association.” 
Lear, Ibid, 307-308. 
2274 Roy Schafer, “Narration in the Psychoanalytic Dialogue.” Critical Inquiry 7, 1 (1980): 43. 
2275 Schafer, Ibid., 35. 
2276 Ibid., 36. 
2277 Brooks, Reading for the Plot, 227.  
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story behind the story.”2278 As Schafer notes, in analytic listening, the telling itself is treated as “an 
object of description” rather than, “as the analysand wishes, an indifferent or transparent medium 
for imparting information or thematic content.”2279 In this sense, unreliability itself is interpreted 
and “woven into the dialogue as an aspect of resistance.”2280 
Analysis thus involves retelling the patient’s incomplete, distorted, or chaotic story, and 
transforming it—or filtering it through—analytic interpretation. For example, the Freudian 
analyst: 
progressively organizes this retelling around bodily zones, modes, and substances, particularly the mouth, 
anus, and genitalia; and in conjunction with these zones, the modes of swallowing and spitting out, retaining 
and expelling, intruding and enclosing, and the concrete conceptions of words, feelings, ideas, and events as 
food, feces, urine, semen, babies, and so on. All of these constituents are given roles in the infantile drama 
of family life, a drama that is organized around births, losses, illnesses, abuse and neglect, the parents' real 
and imagined conflicts and sexuality, gender differences, sibling relations, and so on.2281 
 
This retelling is a process of form-giving which is comparable to other literary and narrative 
activities.2282 However, this “suspicious” mode of reading is the aspect of analytic interpretation 
which has been criticized for imposing authoritative narratives onto the patient’s initial material. 
For Parry and Doan for example, psychoanalysis became a new means of authoritative meaning-
making in a disenchanted modern world:  
What Freud gave away with one hand he took back with the other… the therapist became the expert on each 
client—the one a person went to when the emptied self of modernity’s pace became unbearably anxious 
because it no longer belonged to any meaning-lending story and had no story of its own.2283  
 
In this context, analytic narration risk taking away the subject’s voice by striving to liberate them 
via the talking cure. 
 
The Use of Stories for Their Therapeutic Value 
 
2278 Janet Malcolm, “Six Roses ou Cirrhose?” in The Purloined Clinic: Selected Writings (New York: Random House, 
1992), 46. 
2279 Schafer, Ibid, 43. 
2280 Ibid. 
2281 Ibid., 40. 
2282 About the synthesizing work involved in the case of the Wolf Man, Freud notes: “This task, which is not difficult 
in other respects, finds a natural limit when it is a question of forcing a structure which is itself in many dimensions 
onto the two-dimensional plane.” Freud, “History of an Infantile Neurosis,” SE, 17:72. 
2283 Parry and Doan, 8. 
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A second way in which narrative is involved in psychoanalysis is in making explicit use of 
stories or myths for their therapeutic value.2284 Indeed, as Micale points out, in creating 
psychoanalysis, Freud “drew key ideas and terms—catharsis, cathexis, the Oedipus Complex, 
narcissism—from Shakespeare and the Greek tragedians as well as from contemporary novels, 
such as Wilhelm Jensen’s Gradiva (1903) and Carl Spitteler’s Imago (1906).”2285 From the 
Freudian model onwards, literary myths were then used to explain analytic material and 
psychopathology on a theoretical level. 
Furthermore, the therapeutic value of stories in the analytic context can also be underlined 
in reverse, in the way in which narratives directly impact the human psyche by giving form to 
unconscious fantasies. A good example of this process is Uses of Enchantment, in which Bruno 
Bettelheim brought Freudian readings of fairy tales to the general public, underlining the value of 
these tales which make fantasies tolerable to the psychic apparatus of children.2286 
Indeed, for Bettelheim, fairy tales are beneficial to children as they help them “cope with 
the psychological problems of growing up and integrating their personalities.”2287 Fairy tales 
function much like dreams, providing similar benefits by disguising and fulfilling unconscious 
wishes: “as we awake refreshed from our dreams, better able to meet the tasks of reality, so the 
fairy story ends with the hero returning, or being returned to the real world, much better able to 
master life.”2288 Faire tales offer figures onto which the child can project, or “externalize what goes 
on in his mind.”2289 Furthermore, the tale is especially suited to infantile modes of being in the 
 
2284 See also Norman Holland, The Dynamics of Literary Response (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968) for 
whom core unconscious fantasies are made manageable through literary disguise—and in other forms such as film, 
theater, etc.—which explains the appeal it has for us. 
2285 Micale, The Mind of Modernism, 5. Micale also points out that later in Freud’s life, the city of Frankfurt awarded 
him the Goethe prize, for his German prose writing, whereas a Nobel Prize in medical science and physiology eluded 
him.  
2286 Dundes argues that Bettelheim in fact omitted (or borrowed without acknowledging) previous key analytic writing 
on folklore, such as Franz Ricklin's Wishfulfillment and Symbolism in Fairy Tales (1908), Julius E. Heuscher’s A 
Psychiatric Study of Fairy Tales: Their Origin, Meaning and Usefulness (1963), or “the many essays by Géza Róheim, 
perhaps the only psychoanalyst who began his career as a folklorist.” See Alan Dundes, “Bruno Bettelheim's Uses of 
Enchantment and Abuses of Scholarship,” The Journal of American Folklore 104, no. 411 (Winter, 1991): 76. 
2287 Bettelheim, 14. 
2288 Bettelheim, 64. For Bettelheim, fairy tales are in this sense more useful than myths, because they have their heroes 
“return to normal” after using potential supernatural powers to resolve the crisis: the return to the ordinary is important 
to meet the child on their own level rather than represent an exceptional or extra-ordinary character. 
2289 Ibid., 122. For example, “the wolf is a projection of the child’s badness” and the story tells how this can be “dealt 
with constructively.” Ibid., 44. Fairy tales also teach about the difference between the pleasure and reality principles, 
about fairness and injustice, depending on who gets punished, etc.  
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world, filling “the gaps in a child’s understanding … caused by the immaturity of his thinking.”2290 
According to  Bettelheim, depriving the child of fairy tales will lead to “an impoverishment of his 
creative faculties, to his inability to invent stories on his own, which help him cope with life’s 
problems.”2291 This is significant for our purposes, as it indicates the important role played by 
fictional narratives in establishing a solid relation between the individual and the actual world, 
which is also posited in the hypnotherapeutic use of fictional stories. According to Bettelheim, 
fairy tales will “get a point across or give comfort” in a much more appropriate manner  than “adult 
reasoning and viewpoints.”2292 Indeed, their pedagogical power lies in showing rather than telling, 
while encouraging autonomy and helping the child to find solutions within his own resources—
which is also a strong presupposition found in Ericksonian models of hypnotherapy.2293 As a 
specific kind of literary discourse, fairy tales—like hypnotic narratives and dreams—function in 
an indirect and suggestive, rather than explicit manner, and leave to the child’s the task of 
“fantasizing whether and how to apply to himself what the story reveals about life and human 
nature.”2294 The tale directs the child’s thinking “without ever telling what it ought to be,” a process 
which in itself “makes for true maturing.”2295 On the other hand, “telling the child what to do just 
replaces the bondage of his own immaturity with a bondage of servitude to the dicta of adults.”2296 
Like hypnotherapy, fairy tales thus allow for the playing out of fantasies outside of intellectual 
awareness, “without the child being consciously aware of the fact.”2297 For Bettelheim, one should 
indeed “let the fairy tale speak to his unconscious, give body to his unconscious anxieties… 
without this ever coming to conscious awareness.”2298 For him, this is because a child who is made 
aware of what the figures in fairy tales stand for in his own psychology will not be able to tolerate 
the anxiety of having the fantasies become conscious: he will be “robbed of a much needed outlet, 
 
2290 Ibid., 61. Our contention is that on the contrary, one need not be a child to benefit from the power of stories, and 
the development of fantasy does not correspond to a lack of understanding, but rather a creative capacity. 
2291 122. 
2292 Ibid., 55. This argument is similar to the one in favor of novelistic form, rather than abstract philosophical, essay, 
or journalistic prose, as well as that of the—hypnotic—imagination as a more efficient tool to convey therapeutic 
messages than conscious volition or intellectual understanding.  
2293 As Schafer notes, “there is no hard-and-fast line between telling and showing, either in literary narrative or in 
psychoanalysis, the competent psychoanalyst deals with telling as a form of showing and with showing as a form of 
telling. Everything in analysis is both communication and demonstration.” Schafer, 37. 
2294 Bettelheim, 45. 
2295 Ibid. 
2296 Ibid. 
2297 Dundes, 75. Whereas “the answers given by myths are definite, while the fairy tale is suggestive.” Bettelheim, 45.  
2298 Bettelheim, 15, emphasis added. 
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and devastated by having to realize the desires, anxieties and vengeful feelings that are ravaging 
him.”2299 Therefore, both the enchantment and the therapeutic or pedagogical goals of the fairy 
tale will be “destroyed” if their meaning is made explicit.2300 Bettelheim’s argument in this sense 
echoes those of the contemporary moral philosophers who underline the importance of literary 
narratives over theoretical arguments, and of hypnotherapists who stress the importance of 
engaging unconscious affective processes in addition to cognitive components of the therapeutic 
process. For Bettelheim, the advantage of the fairy tale is also linked to its form,2301 which unlike 
the dream has “a consistent structure with a definite beginning and a plot that moves toward a 
satisfying solution which is reached at the end,” and fits into our argument about the therapeutic 
value of fictional narratives made in Chapter 4.2302 
 
Analytic Theory as Narrative 
Thirdly, one can underline, not the explicit but rather, the implicit presence of narrative in 
analytic theory. Roy Schafer’s narrative approach to psychoanalysis clearly illustrates this 
position, by arguing that “it makes sense, and it may be a useful project, to present psychoanalysis 
in narrational terms.”2303  
As we indicated higher up, in “Narration in the Psychoanalytic Dialogue” (1980), Schafer 
argues that analytic interpretation is a form of “retelling” of the patient’s story “along 
psychoanalytic lines.”2304 In doing so, he then asks how, “in the post-positivist scheme of things,” 
we are to understand the “validity” of analytic interpretation.2305 Indeed, one of Schafer’s main 
points in this text is that all narratives are incomplete. A narrative can merely seize a single aspect 
of reality and “necessarily limits one to constructing some version or some vision of the subject in 
the world.”2306 This is why methodologically, analysis should start with the analysand’s response 
 
2299 Ibid., 57. 
2300 This is why one must “never explain to the child the meaning of fairy tales,” and even discourage the presence of 
illustrations in fairy tale books, which impose “unnecessary and detrimental” restrictions on the child’s pictorial 
imagination. Ibid, 155. 
2301 Which is the same as that of the hypnotic session. 
2302 Bettelheim, 57. 
2303 Schafer, 30. 
2304 Ibid., 30. 
2305 Ibid, 37. For him the concept of validity must replace that of truth, and “can only be achieved within a system that 
is viewed as such and that appears, after careful consideration, to have the virtues of coherence, consistency, 
comprehensiveness, and common sense.” Ibid., 50. 
2306 Ibid., 49. 
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to the analyst’s retelling, to the “narrative transformation” of the initial discourse. For Schafer it is 
on the narration of this “moment of dialogue” that analytic inquiry should center. Indeed, the 
patient’s “life-history” forms a second-order history compared to the analytic “dialogue,” which 
forms a present account of the transference and resistance: 
It is from this beginning that the accounts of early infantile development are constructed. Those traditional 
developmental accounts… may now be seen in a new light: less as positivistic sets of factual findings about 
mental development and more as hermeneutically filled-in narrative structures … that … control the telling 
of the events of the analysis, including the many tellings and retellings of the analysand's life history. The 
time is always present. The event is always an ongoing dialogue.2307  
 
Furthermore, for Schafer, multiple analytic “stories” can be told or derived from a single 
case. The primary narrative problem of the analyst is thus “not how to tell a normative 
chronological life history; rather, it is how to tell the several histories of each analysis.”2308 In other 
words, there is no such thing as an aboriginal body of evidence, or objective analytic “data.”2309 
There is no single, necessary or definitive account “of a life history and psychopathology, of 
biological and social influences on personality, or of the psychoanalytic method and its results.”2310 
This is why data must be “unfailingly regarded as constituted rather than simply encountered.”2311 
Analytic theory itself can thus be thought of as a collection of “narrative structures” which 
theorists use to explain human development.2312 For instance, Schafer identifies the two primary 
narrative structures at the heart of Freudian metapsychology, which he refers to as the story of the 
“beast” on the one hand, and of the “machine” on the other.2313 The first story “begins with the 
infant and young child as a beast, otherwise known as the id, and ends with the beast domesticated, 
tamed by frustration in the course of development in a civilization hostile to its nature.”2314 
 
2307 Ibid., 52. 
2308 Ibid., For Schafer, Freud’s major case studies follow this narrative form: “One has only to compare his notes on 
the case [of the Rat Man] with his official report on it to see what different tales he told and could have told about this 
man, that is, about his work with this man.” Schafer, 52. See Freud, "Notes upon a Case of Obsessional Neurosis," 
SE, 10:153-249. 
2309 Psychoanalytic theory must “accept the proposition that there are no objective, autonomous, or pure 
psychoanalytic data which, as Freud was fond of saying, compel one to draw certain conclusions.” Ibid., 30 
2310 Ibid. The material and techniques of analysis are thus are inseparable from the investigator's “precritical and 
interrelated assumptions concerning the origins, coherence, totality, and intelligibility of personal action.” Schafer, 
30. 
2311 Schafer, 30. 
2312 Ibid, 29-30. This implies that the analytic investigator is not an invisible presence who can observe his object from 
the outside: “The sharp split between subject and object must be systematically rejected.” Ibid., 30. 
2313 Ibid, 33. 
2314 Schafer specifics that the “filling in” of this narrative structure “tells of a lifelong transition,” the length of which 
reinforces the parallel between novelistic and “therapeutic” temporality, as opposed to other forms such as the short 
story, fairy tale, etc. Schafer, 30, emphasis added. 
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Although this story seems frightening,2315 in the case of successful analysis it becomes a “tale of 
human development, suffering, defeat, and triumph.”2316 The second narrative structure, which 
describes the mental apparatus as a machine, is “based on Newtonian physics as transmitted 
through the physiological and neuroanatomical laboratories of the nineteenth century,” and is just 
as deterministic as the first.2317  
The same can be applied to the core concepts of psychoanalysis that act as an interpretative 
grid for the otherwise “formless” material presented for analysis:2318 “transference and resistance 
themselves may be viewed as narrative structures” which “prescribe a point of view from which 
to tell about the events of analysis in a regulated and therefore coherent fashion.”2319 By 
underlining the narrative dimension of Freudian theory, Schafer thus emphasizes the limitations it 
imposes on the analysand’s sense of freedom.2320 As constructions, the interpretive concepts of 
psychoanalysis “must not be taken as the only possible means of understanding.”2321 
 
2315 Thus “the beast pervades, empowers, or at least necessitates our most civilized achievements.” Ibid, 31. 
2316 Ibid, 31. The qualification “story” is not necessarily pejorative. As Schafer specifies, in Freud’s time, the story 
was “extraordinarily illuminating in its psychological content, scientifically respectable in its conceptualization and 
formalization, dramatically gripping in its metaphorical elaboration, and beneficial in his work with his patients.” Ibid. 
2317 Ibid., 32. In this second narrative structure, “this machine is characterized by inertia; it does not work unless it is 
moved by force. It works as a closed system; that is, its amount of energy is fixed, with the result that storing or 
expending energy in one respect decreases the energy available for other operations: thus on purely quantitative 
grounds, love of others limits what is available for self-love, and love of the opposite sex limits what is available for 
love of the same sex. The machine has mechanisms, such as the automatically operating mechanisms of defense and 
various other checks and balances.” Ibid., 32. 
2318 “Transference, far from being a time machine by which one may travel back to see what one has been made out 
of, is a clarification of certain constituents of one's present psychoanalytic actions. This clarification is achieved 
through the circular and coordinated study of past and present.” Schafer, 36. 
2319 Ibid., 36.  
2320 The concept of self is thus inherently narrative: “the self is a telling” which varies in “the degree to which it is 
unified, stable, and acceptable to informed observers as reliable and valid.” Furthermore, “we narrate others just as 
we narrate selves.” Thus, layers upon layers of “telling” are built up”: “We are forever telling stories about ourselves… 
In saying that we also tell them to ourselves, however, we are enclosing one story within another. This is the story that 
there is a self to tell something to, a someone else serving as audience who is oneself or one's self.” Ibid., 35-36. 
Similarly, as J. M. Coetzee observes, “We can’t remember what is was like to be a neonate… when we sympathetically 
inhabit our neonate selves, we are inhabiting a fiction… Klein’s amount of neonate experience is a fiction. You happen 
to think that it is a true account, and I tend to agree. But it is nevertheless a fictional account, a story about what it is 
like to be a baby.” Coetzee, The Good Story, 135. Therefore, “to imagine being Klein’s infant is to “briefly, be such a 
baby,” a proposition which ties novelistic and therapeutic subjectivity together via their similar imaginative qualities. 
Ibid., 135.  
2321 For instance: Freudian resistance can be “retold” as transference (positive or negative), as “a project of 
preservation, even enhancement, of self or analyst or both,” as “something the analysand is [often unconsciously] 
doing rather than passively undergoing, etc. The “positivistic” conception conceives of reality as being either “'out 
there’ or ‘in there’ in the inner world, existing as a knowable, certifiable essence. At least for the analytic observer, 
the subject and object are clearly distinct.” Beyond Freudian and Kleinian descriptions of early development stages, 
today, “very early phases of infant development now include the phase of autism, symbiosis, and separation-
individuation; the phase of basic trust and mistrust; the phase of pure narcissism, in which there are no objects which 
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Furthermore, whereas in the “traditional” transference narration, the analysand’s life 
history is “static, archival, linear, reversible, and literally retrievable,” according to Schafer, 
analytic temporality in this narrative context functions in a spiraling, rather than linear motion.2322 
In this spiraling temporality, similar events are retold from different viewpoints as the cure unfolds, 
and “each recollection builds on previous ones.”2323 What “returns” thus invariably differs with 
every iteration or remembrance.2324 This is why Schafer argues that the “temporal circle” of 
analysis works both backward from the present (to “define, refine, correct, organize, and complete 
an analytically coherent and useful account of the past”) and forward from the past (to “constitute 
that present and that anticipated future which are most important to explain”).2325 Significantly, 
stories about the self always serve a specific function: “We change many aspects of these histories 
of self and others as we change, for better or worse, the implied or stated questions to which they 
are the answers.”2326  
Without going as far as Schafer (who argues that “viewing psychoanalysis as a therapy 
itself manifests a narrative choice” that tells the story of “a doctor curing a patient”), narrative 
approaches to psychoanalysis can help underline its similarities with novelistic subjectivity, which 
are illuminated by the notion of “narrative truth,” as opposed to “historical” truth.2327 Indeed, 
Freud’s revision of the seduction theory already established the notion that analysis is concerned 
with fantasy rather than historical truth, a crucial division which finds its modern counterpart in 
the divergence between “story-focused” and “life-focused” branches of psychotherapy.2328 In 
 
are not primarily part of the self; the mirror phase; and variations on the Kleinian paranoid-schizoid and depressive 
phases or ‘positions' of infancy.” Ibid., 46; 48; 49; 51), etc. 
2322 Schafer, 36. See also: “in classical psychoanalysis the past is deemed to be connected to the present by a straight 
causal chain.” Omer Alon, 215. 
2323 Omer and Alon, 126; 129.  
2324 Ibid., 126. 
2325 Schafer, 52. See “The Psychoanalytic Life History,” in Language and Insight (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1978), 3-27.  
2326 Schafer, 35. “Personal development” may thus be characterized as a “change in the questions it is urgent or 
essential to answer.” Ibid. 
2327 Schafer, 37. The very concept of “interpretation” is a story that “tells that each person is a container of experience 
fashioned by an independently operating mind and, that by the use of mental eyes located outside this container, the 
person may look in and see what is going on… The uncritical and pervasive use of this narrative form in daily life and 
in psychological theories shows how appealing it is to disclaim responsibility in this way.” Ibid., 39-40. 
Psychoanalysis as therapy tells the story “from the standpoint of consciousness: consciously, but only consciously, 
the analysand presents his/her problems as alien interferences with the good life,” which allows to "justify analysis on 
these highly defensive and conscious grounds of patienthood.” Ibid., 37. 
2328 “Some analysts have veered in one direction and then the other, as when Freud first attributed his patients' 
narrations of childhood seductions as representing actual events, then treated these experiences as creations of 
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story-focused, or narrative oriented therapeutic models, historical truth is considered not only to 
be secondary in bringing about change, but also to remain ultimately inaccessible to therapeutic 
inquiry:2329  
There are two ways to approach the concept of truth in psychoanalysis, ‘from the outside’ and ‘from the 
inside.’ In working ‘from the outside,’ we bring a conception of truth, developed, say, in philosophy, to 
psychoanalysis as an object of study. Truth, then, is deployed as a metatheoretical concept or predicate, 
applied to the assertions of psychoanalysis, and allowing us to see the conditions under which those assertions 
are true. By contrast, when we are working ‘from the inside,’ we are concerned with how the issue of truth 
arises within the analytic situation. There is value in each approach, but it is important not to confuse them: 
for that is ultimately to confuse what is grist with what is mill.2330  
 
Rather than import a correspondence theory of truth and impose it into a field which is 
concerned with a different, more subjective type of truth, the concept of narrative truth, as 
formulated in Donald Spence’s description (1982), allows to bring together hypnotic, novelistic, 
and psychoanalytic insight, under a common category.2331 As Omer and Alon describe it, narrative 
truth produces as a feeling in both analysand and analyst that “all elements of an account hang 
together,” giving a sense of inevitability, similar to what a reader might experience while reading 
a mystery tale: “its major criteria are coherence, comprehensiveness, and parsimony. Thus an 
elegant interpretation, a detailed reconstruction of past events a well-rounded case history, may be 
said to possess narrative truth.”2332 In the Freudian model, this “good fit” proved the historical 
truth of the analytic reconstruction: “the guarantor of psychoanalytic reliability is the objectivity 
and neutrality of the … method. … The therapist’s counterpart to the client’s natural free 
association is the attitude of evenly hovering attention. … The meeting of these two neutral 
attitudes makes for the validity of psychoanalytic data.”2333 As Spence argues, however, because 
 
narrative process entailed in psychoanalysis.” James Peacock and Dorothy Holland, “The Narrated Self: Life Stories 
in Process,” Ethos 21, no. 4 (Dec. 1993): 371. 
2329 “‘Story' is preferable to ‘history’ because it does not connote that the narration is true, that the events narrated 
necessarily happened, or that it matters whether they did or not.” Ibid., 368. 
2330 Lear, “Truth in Psychoanalysis,” 304. 
2331 See Donald Spence, Narrative Truth and Historical Truth: Meaning and Interpretation in Psychoanalysis (New 
York: Norton, 1982). Schafer’s critique emerged around the same time as Spence’s distinction between historical and 
narrative truth, which also suggests that the stories produced by analysis are reconstructions, which are “influenced 
by the beliefs and interests of the participants.” Omer and Alon, 220. 
2332 Omer and Alon, 217. See also: “When an interpretation is truthful in psychoanalysis … emotional vividness, a 
sense of being alive, that this really is who one is starts to pour back into what now seems to have been an empty shell 
of living. This is what truth as correspondence or coherence misses: The interpretations may well be getting the facts 
of psychological or historical reality right (correspondence), they may well be forming a compelling narrative with 
which to understand one’s life (coherence), but all of this can be done in a defensive, removed way—as though one 
were standing outside one’s life trying to understand it. The concept of truth in psychoanalysis must be an expression 
of life itself, not an evasion of it.” Lear, 310. 
2333 Omer and Alon, 218. 
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client and therapist alike “labor under constant pressure towards meaning,” “neutral” free-
association and hovering-attention are de facto impossible. Despite the original Freudian 
instructions, free association remains inevitably selective.2334 
This focus on story rather than history is also a safeguard which corrects a potential risk 
run by hypnotherapists who are often accused of confusing both categories and naively ascribing 
historical truth to the material which comes up during the trance state. In this sense, hypnosis is 
often represented as having not yet completely abandoned its own seduction theory, with the 
problematic epistemological and ethical consequences that this implies. Even in the analytic setting 
however, as Lear shows, “buying in” to the subject’s narrative can lead the therapist to become 
duped by their defenses, and become trapped in a “false” narrative which searches for historical 
truth as a means to evade reality, to avoid responsibility, or deflect away from difficult insight:2335  
Of course, I cannot say what did or did not happen to the person when he was an infant. But I do know that, 
in this case, the desire to find out the historical truth was the expression of a wish that something external to 
him would both legitimate and absolve him of his homosexuality. In effect, this analysand had invented his 
own seduction hypothesis and was using it for the same purpose that Freud used his. At its deepest, the 
seduction hypothesis is not about seduction per se but about the role reality is to play in psychological 
explanation. The seduction hypothesis treats the intrusion of external reality as an Archimedean point, an 
end-of-the-line of psychological explanation. … It tacitly assumes that historical truth is the one item within 
an analysis that is itself exempt from analysis. If the analyst were simply to go along with the search for 
historical reality or the attempt to recover a memory, he or she would in fact be collaborating with the 
analysand’s defenses.2336  
 
Thus, hypnotists and analysts alike, rather than concerning themselves with the truth of a 
(his)story, should “pay attention to what such a history does, within the context of the [therapy] as 
a whole, rather to only what it says.”2337 In other words, “fiction” can and should be put to 
therapeutic use. 
Therefore, beyond the classic analogy between case history and story, there are two other 
ways in which narration intervenes in psychoanalysis, which in underlined in this section: the 
 
2334 Indeed, not only do thoughts “move at a faster pace than words,” the client often needs to interrupt the flow to 
provide contextual information, without which the whole material would be meaningless: “The more free the 
associations, the more is the therapist compelled to supply her own context (usually created by theoretical 
presuppositions) to make sense of the material. Even hovering attention is thus possible only when the client supplies 
enough context to make understanding possible that ism when he is not free associating.” Ibid., 218-219. 
2335 “When the concept of truth emerges in the analytic situation it is as a resistance because if the analyst cannot find 
anything that the analysand can recognize as a distortion, there will be nothing to analyze… Because the analysand is 
so concerned with getting the facts right, he or she cannot see to what use he or she is putting this obsession …the 
concern for truth as correspondence to reality can serve as a massive obstacle to psychoanalytic understanding.” Lear, 
305.  
2336 Lear, 305. 
2337 Lear, 295. 
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explicit analytic use of stories or literary material on the one hand, and the narrative conception of 
analysis on the other. This latter dimension is what allows us to suggest that, regardless of 
theoretical schools, narrative structure can serve as a sort of “scaffolding for understanding the 




In Section 1 of this Appendix, I suggested that psychoanalysis and hypnosis are compatible 
on a theoretical level, provided we consider them under a common, “narrative” umbrella. In this 
section, I will shift from the theoretical to the clinical point of view, and examine dynamic uses of 
hypnotherapy which suggest that hypnosis, as a clinical tool, is not opposed to but on the contrary, 
can be compatible with, psychoanalytic theory. An especially telling example of this process is 
“hypnoanalysis,” a theory and practice which appeared during the mid-twentieth century, in which 
hypnosis serves as an adjunct to analysis.2338  
As Lewis Wolberg argues in Hypnoanalysis (1945) for instance, hypnosis can be used in 
an analytic framework, not in the use of direct suggestion as was the case with Bernheim, but by 
using the trance state itself as a catalyzer to access analytic material and produce insight. For him, 
the study of the patient’s unconscious material under hypnosis, but also of their reactions to 
hypnotic inductions, to the trance state itself, and to the therapist, all “make excellent grist for the 
analytic mill.”2339  
In hypnoanalysis, hypnosis is used first and foremost to cut through the analysand’s 
resistance and thus accelerate the cure: 
Hypnosis, properly applied, can shorten both phases of the therapeutic process [the uncovering and re-
educating phases] … By cutting through interpersonal defenses, it plunges the patient into a close relationship 
with the analyst… In addition to its effect on transference resistances…. One can circumvent and more easily 
resolve ego defenses that keep unconscious material from gaining access to awareness.2340  
 
 
2338 See Lewis Wolberg, Hypnoanalysis (London: William Heinemann medical Books Ldt., 1946). As Erika Fromm 
and Michael Nash observe, Wolberg was “the first ego psychologically oriented analyst who wrote extensively on 
hypnoanalysis.” Fromm and Nash, Psychoanalysis and Hypnosis (Madison CT: International Universities Press, 
1997), 24. 
2339 Lewis Wolberg, The Practice of Psychotherapy: 506 Questions and Answers (New York: Brunner/Mazel, 1982), 
116. 
2340 Wolberg, Hypnoanalysis, 162-163. 
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Indeed, although deep trance “is quite essential in attaining best results,” transference 
manifestations are “precipitated by the mere induction of hypnosis, without regard to its depth.”2341 
The ability to go into trance, even partially, will thus serve as analytic material: analytic 
interpretation can illuminate its inherent dynamics and use its driving principle for therapeutic 
aims. 
In hypnoanalysis, hypnotic rapport also acts both as a catalyst and magnifying glass for 
transference dynamics to appear, and thus is especially suitable to analytic investigation:  
There is usually a response to the hypnotist with the full range of characteriologic defenses and demands… 
There is also a mobilization of hostile and erotic impulses … in fact hypnosis acts as a catalyst to the 
experiencing of the deepest and most dynamic transference feelings, for it brings the patient immediately into 
a close relationship that he might have succeeded in avoiding in the waking state.2342  
 
Crucial, then, to the technique, is the analysis and working-through of the “hypnotic” 
transference. “The analysis refers not only to the transference attitudes and feelings that are a 
reaction to the analyst as a human being, but also to the very dependency strivings upon which the 
motive for being hypnotizable is based.”2343 According to Wolberg, interpreting these deep 
dependency strivings will avoid the development of an irrational positive transference, and “will 
prevent from maintaining the illusion that the analyst is a demigod whose edicts [the patient] must 
accept on the basis of faith.”2344 This is in part due to a certain degree of permissiveness on the 
part of the hypnoanalyst, to an absence of specific demands of compliance—unlike what was found 
in previous, authoritarian models of hypnosis. This permissive dimension can then be put to 
strategic, therapeutic use: “As soon as the patient understands that he is not expected to comply in 
any way, and realizes that his compliance is rooted in irrational inner feelings he will be less likely 
to falsify the material that he brings up.”2345 Significantly, Wolberg does not deny the risks inherent 
in the establishment of such a strong “hypnotic” transference, which can lead to illusory ego 
strength: 
Unfortunately, ego strength that results from the hypnotic transference per se must be held suspect. Based 
upon fusion relation with an overvalued magical personage, and imbedded in faith, it is wholly artificial. 
Once the hypnotic treatments are interrupted, the self is robbed of its illusory power. The more healthy 
standards introjected through identification with the hypnotist are displaced again by the habitual values and 
goals, which reanimate the neurosis.2346  
 
 
2341 Ibid., 164. 
2342 Ibid., 165. 
2343 Ibid. 
2344 Ibid. 
2345 Ibid., 167 
2346 Ibid., 258. 
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The reason for which hypnotic cures conducted in a superficial manner—as in mere 
symptom alleviation, for example—are temporary is that “they are wrought in the medium of an 
irrational dependency relationship.”2347 In the context of hypnoanalysis, however, this dependency 
is capitalized in the beginning of the treatment, and must not be avoided.  
In hypnoanalysis, hypnosis can thus act as a catalyst to the analytic process by facilitating 
an identification of the patient with the analyst and by “bringing out during the trance, in almost 
pure culture, the deepest strivings and attitudes.”2348 The very nature of the hypnotic process 
induces feelings of closeness which are not possible under other techniques, and the patient’s 
reactions to this intense relation, “with all his characteriologic defensive machinery and 
resistances,” far from remaining in a regressive mother-infant state, will then “precipitate fears, 
resentments, expectations, demands, and the full range of interpersonal attitudes, which are 
component parts of the character structure.”2349 In this way, hypnosis is used to reveal the 
transference, which can then be worked through.2350  
Furthermore, Wolberg’s use of hypnosis in the analytic setting also addresses the question 
of the impossibility of neutral analysis. Unlike therapeutic models based on the ideal of the 
neutrality of the therapist, hypnoanalysis works with the notion that “the analysis and working 
through of resistance necessitates an active rather than a passive approach.”2351 It takes into 
account the idea that “no matter how much the therapist may try to remain objective, he cannot 
help reacting to the patient.”2352 
Wolberg’s theory also has the merit of refuting misconceptions of the hypnotic subject 
which reduce him or her to a passive automaton. Indeed, hypnoanalysis mobilizes “tremendous 
activity on the part of the patient”: 
Will not display the passive, immobile attitude seen during the usual trance. This innovation removes the 
feeling in the patient that he is an automaton who cannot move except at the order of the hypnotist. It creates 
 
2347 Ibid. 
2348 Ibid., 268. 
2349 Ibid., 267. 
2350 As Wolberg specifies, the analysis of the hypnotic transference does not prevent the advent of hypnotic trance—
especially if the initial part of the treatment is used purely to train the subject and postpones the working through of 
the relation until the right moment. Indeed, hypnoanalysis is only advised once sufficient ego strength exists to tolerate 
the anxiety which appears “as defenses and resistances crumble and repressed unconscious impulses come to the 
surface.” Ibid., 170. 
2351 Ibid., 260. 
2352 Ibid. 172. Indeed, “hypnosis can light up neurotic drives in the hypnotist himself … especially sadistic exploitation 
because of the seeming passivity of the patient,” which establishes the necessity of the personal analysis of the analyst, 
like in classical analysis. Ibid. For a similar argument made by Roustang, see “The Ubiquity of Suggestion” in Chapter 
1. 
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an atmosphere in which the patient can express motor impulses that his repressions may inhibit in the waking 
state. The benefits of this activity are more than cathartic, for the patient begins to be assertive and to break 
through the superego restraints that are a determining factor in his neurosis.2353  
 
As Wolberg argues, in the procedure of “working with the patient during the trance to 
arouse him to alertness and productivity … cognitive, affective and motor functions are stimulated. 
The patient moves about freely and participates actively in the analytic work,” leading his 
“behavior to approximate his waking activity more or less.”2354 The hypnoanalytic framework thus 
preserves the patient’s autonomy and refutes arguments against the purported dependency induced 
by hypnosis, by establishing a relation which is both affective and horizontal: The change in the 
technique replacing hypnotic passivity by activity probably has an important effect with respect to 
the basic image of authority as restrictive, repressive and insisted upon being right at all times. It 
opens the way to self-expressiveness.2355  
Modern versions of Wolberg’s model can still be found today, in the work of Erika Fromm 
and Michael Nash, for instance.2356 As Fromm explains, modern hypnoanalysis employs the “four 
classical methods” derived from classic analysis: free association, dream interpretation, working 
with defenses and resistances, and transference analysis.”2357 According to Fromm, the ways in 
which hypnosis might be used in the analytic setting form a spectrum, ranging from more 
superficial symptom alleviation, to relatively short-term “hypnoanalytically oriented 
hypnotherapy,” to in-depth and long-term hypnoanalysis proper, which aims to uncover “all or 
most of the historical roots” of conflict in the subject.2358 
Like traditional analysis, hypnoanalysis encourages “uncovering, working through and 
new integration” in the subject, but also adds to analytic interpretation a “larger … arsenal of 
hypnotic techniques” which allow to access unconscious material, either faster or in more direct 
 
2353 Ibid., 176, emphasis added. 
2354 Ibid., 164-165. 
2355 Ibid., 165. 
2356 As Erika Fromm explains in Hypnotherapy and Hypnoanalysis, her version of hypnoanalysis is based on classic 
psychoanalytic libido theory and ego-psychology, to which it adds object relations theory and Self psychology. For 
Fromm, hypnoanalysis also contributes to the elaboration of analytic theory by “increasing the understanding of 
primary and secondary process operations, and the nature of ego receptivity.” Fromm, in Hypnotherapy and 
Hypnoanalysis (Hillsdale NJ; London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers, 1986), 224. 
2357 Fromm, Ibid., 219. As Fromm observes, while resistance in analysis is manifested in the analysand’s blocking and 
coming late to an appointment, in hypnosis it can be seen in the subject’s refusal or inability to go into trance, blocking, 
and producing images which symbolize resistance (walls, locks, iron curtains, etc.). Unlike psychoanalysts, rather than 
interpret resistance, hypnotherapists accept it and waits until it can be worked through or around. Ibid., 208. 
2358 Ibid., 223. 
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ways, and only occur in a “modified state of consciousness.”2359 It makes use of specifically 
hypnotic phenomena such as age regression, automatic writing, dissociation, hypermnesia, and 
heightened imagery, to further the analytic working-through of the  material that emerges during 
the hypnotic state.  
As in Wolberg’s model, for Fromm, the advantage of hypnoanalysis is that it “foster[s] 
transference regression,” as infantile patterns of object relationships are (re)established with the 
hypnotherapist, and the transferential qualities which emerge are “evident throughout the clinical 
material.”2360 Hypnotic technique also allows for a certain degree of maneuvering in the unfolding 
of the transference: it facilitates the “avoidance or circumvention” of transference resistances by 
directing the attention, increasing permissive suggestions, and so on.2361 Furthermore, although it 
is “no different in content” than in the psychoanalytic setting, hypnotic and analytic transference 
differ “in their manner of occurrence”: in hypnosis, “full blown transference can occur very 
rapidly, often immediately after induction,” and transference feelings “are much stronger” than in 
analysis, because the hypnotic situation “tends to foster infantile dependency transferences, 
especially in the beginning.”2362 Indeed, the hypnotist may be seen as “warm and nurturant,” 
“hostile and domineering,” or even “competitive.”2363 For example, as Ferenczi notes: 
The hypnotist with an imposing exterior, who works by frightening and startling, has certainly a great 
similarity to the picture impressed on the child of the stern, all-powerful father, to believe in, to obey. ... And 
the gentle stroking hand, the pleasant monotonous words that talk him/her to sleep: are they not a 
reimpressions of scenes that may have been enacted ... by a tender mother?2364 
As Fromm explains, the hypnotic transference will be influenced by the style of the operator, the 
mode of inducing hypnosis, and of course, the “salient and repetitive patterns of the patient’s object 
relations,” unless the hypnotherapist’s style “is so skewed toward being either domineering or 
nurturant” that it interferes with its “natural” unfolding.2365  
 
2359 Ibid., 224. 
2360 Ibid., 19; 18. 
2361 Fromm and Nash, Psychoanalysis and Hypnosis, 267. 
2362 Ibid., 19; 209. 
2363 Ibid., 18. 
2364 Sándor Ferenczi, “Comments on Hypnosis,” in Shor and Orne, (eds.), The Nature of Hypnosis, Selected Basic 
Readings, 177-182 (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1965), 177. 
2365 Fromm, 19. Countertransference is also involved in hypnoanalysis: as Gill and Brenman showed, hypnosis is the 
complex interaction between the unconscious fantasies of both parties. See Merton Gill and Margaret Brenman, 
Hypnosis and Related States: Psychoanalytic Studies In regression (New York: International Universities Press, 
1959), in Fromm 19. 
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According to Fromm, the good hypnoanalyst must nevertheless provide an adequate 
“holding environment,” establishing the boundaries of reality “as the good mother does when she 
holds the infant,” especially in borderline and psychotic patients.2366 The operator’s moral and 
therapeutic duties also consists in respecting ethical boundaries in terms of the pace of the 
treatment and the degree of conscious access to unconscious material: “the conscientious and 
permissive hypnoanalyst ... will not demand—as even Freud did—that the patient bring up into 
the waking state all the material that came into awareness in the waking state.”2367 As noted in 
Chapter 1, whereas Fromm believes the hypnotic state leads to actual regression to infantile states, 
Nash argues that the regression in question is merely topographic—facilitating access to primary 
process thinking—but is not temporal.2368 
 
3. Relaxation and Neocatharsis 
 
A third means by which analysis and hypnosis can be considered as potentially overlapping 
is in the spontaneous—rather than formalized and controlled—emergence of hypnotic phenomena 
into the non-hypnotic, therapeutic setting. Unlike the hypnoanalysts, who may be considered as 
having intentionally worked towards the compatibility of analytic principles and hypnotic 
technique—without denying hypnosis the ability to be used non-analytically—Sándor Ferenczi 
saw hypnosis emerge spontaneously in the psychoanalytic setting. In this third sense then, hypnosis 
works itself in from within the analytic clinical setting, rather than being transposed into it on a 
theoretical level. In Ferenczi’s work, this process is most clearly seen in the context of his 
“neocatharsis” technique, which emerged out of his dissatisfaction with the insight advocated by 
classical Freudian analysis in the spirit of the Aufklärung, and from his exploration of the 
therapeutic potential of “lived experience” (Erlebnis).2369  
 
2366 See Donald W. Winnicott, The Maturational Processes and the Facilitating Environment: Studies in the Theory 
of Emotional Development (New York: International Universities Press, 1965); Fromm 213. 
2367 Fromm, 143. 
2368 See Michael Nash, “What, if Anything, is Regressed About Hypnotic Age Regression?,” 42-52. 
2369 “Whereas formerly, one tried to obtain the therapeutic result as a reaction to the enlightenment of the patient, we 
now try to place the knowledge obtained by psychoanalysis directly in the service of our therapy, by directly provoking 
the corresponding personal experience (Erlebnis) on the basis of our insight, and explaining to the patient only this 
experience, which is naturally directly evident to him also.” Ferenczi and Rank, The Development of Psychoanalysis 
(New York: Nervous and Mental Disease Pub. Co, 1925), 56. As Thierry Bokanowski has shown, “it was the 
uncertainties related to the limits of analysis, and particularly the limits of remembering” that led Ferenczi to use 
“active techniques” in the clinical setting. However, because of the risk of “retraumatizing” the patient, Ferenczi then 
developed the technique of “elasticity,” where the flexibility and empathy of the analyst, and the adaptation to the 
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Indeed, in “The Principle of Relaxation and Neocatharsis” (1930), Ferenczi deplores a 
gradual shift in classic analytic technique—as well as in the analytic relation—from the affective 
to the intellectual: “The highly emotional relation between physician and patient, which resembled 
that in hypnotic suggestion, gradually cooled down to a kind of unending association-experiment; 
the process became mainly intellectual.”2370 To him, the analytic relation seemed so vertical and 
authoritative that he “could not escape the impression that the relation between physician and 
patient was becoming far too much like that between teacher and pupil,” which is to say, 
“didactic,” even “pedantic.”2371  
Although he concedes that Freud’s recommendation of the analyst’s neutrality is the only 
justifiable attitude, Ferenczi notes that even the cold neutral attitude creates reactions in the 
analysand: “We cannot deny that it is possible for even the cool objectivity of the physician to take 
forms which cause unnecessary and avoidable difficulties to the patient.”2372 In other words, 
analysis appears to have fallen into the trap it tried to avoid with the Freudian gesture of cutting 
the cord with hypnosis—uniting itself once more with suggestive methods. As Chertock and 
Stengers argue and as we have suggested in Chapter 1, the “suggestive” dangers usually attributed 
to hypnosis can thus be taken to lie at the heart of every therapeutic relation, and in this sense, “the 
questions that the therapist using hypnosis may ask himself have to do with traits that are not 
specific to him as using hypnosis.”2373  
Ferenczi thus replaces the Freudian ideal of neutrality with that of an empathetic analyst 
with an “unfailing friendly attitude.”2374 As he argues in “The Principle of Relaxation and 
Neocatharsis,” there “must be ways and means of making our attitude of friendly goodwill during 
the analysis intelligible to [the patient] without abandoning the analysis of transference-material 
 
patient’s expectations, become central components of the therapeutic arsenal. See Thierry Bokanowski, The Modernity 
of Sándor Ferenczi: His Historical and Contemporary Importance in Psychoanalysis (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2017), 48. As in modern hypnotherapy with Ferenczi’s concept of elasticity, the analyst “yield[s] to the 
patient’s pull.” Ferenczi, “The Elasticity of Psychoanalytic Technique,” (1928), in Final Contributions to the 
Problems and methods of Psychoanalysis (London: Hogarth, 1955), 95. 
2370 Ferenczi, “The Principle of Relaxation and Neocatharsis,” 430. This paper, published in 1930, is based on 
Ferenczi’s 1929 report presented at the 11th International Psycho-Analytical Congress in Oxford. 
2371 Ibid., 431. Furthermore, “a rigid and cold aloofness on the analyst's part represented to the patient a continuation 
of his infantile struggle with authority.” Ibid., 436. 
2372 Ibid., 435. 
2373 Chertock and Stengers, 203; 209. 
2374 Ferenczi, in Bokanowski, 50.  
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or falling into the errors of those who treat neurotics … with a simulation of severity or of love.”2375 
Ferenczi encourages the analyst’s flexibility and indulgence towards the patient, “regardless of the 
extremes to which the latter may go in his words and his actions.”2376  
In this atmosphere of “confidence between physician and patient” which “secur[es] a fuller 
freedom of affect” for the subject, Ferenczi then observed that hysterical physical symptoms would 
suddenly make their appearance in his patients, “often for the first time in an analysis extending 
over years,” and would sometimes be accompanied by spontaneous states of hypnosis: “Without 
any such intention on my part and without my making the least attempt to induce a condition of 
the sort, unusual states of consciousness manifested themselves, which might almost be termed 
autohypnotic.”2377 This leads Ferenczi to consider his neocatharsis—which he distinguishes from 
Freud and Breuer’s original method, or “paleocatharsis,” which only provided temporary relief—
as a sign of the success of analysis.2378 He thus reestablishes the therapeutic value of reliving 
fragments of the past in statu nascendi, as opposed to reconstructing them from an intellectual and 
conscious point of view:  
This time, the reconstructed past had much more feeling of actuality and concreteness about it than 
heretofore, approximated much more closely to an actual recollection, whereas till then the patients had 
spoken only of possibilities or, at most, of varying degrees of probability and had yearned in vain for 
memories. In certain cases, these hysterical attacks actually assumed the character of trances, in which 
fragments of the past were relived and the physician was the only bridge left between the patients and 
reality.2379 
In comparison, classical analysis then appears as one long detour: “Was it really worthwhile to 
make that enormous detour of analysis of associations and resistances, to thread the maze of the 
elements of ego-psychology and even to traverse the whole metapsychology in order finally to 
arrive at the good old friendly attitude' to the patient and the method of catharsis, long believed to 
 
2375 Ibid., 435. His justification for the relaxation-principle is its usefulness (it “has produced results valuable for both 
theory and practice,” especially in cases in which the analysis had “come to grief over the patient's apparently insoluble 
resistances” and a shift from frustration to relaxation was necessary. Ibid., 436. 
2376 In Bokanowski, 50. This was established so that the analyst would not be “tainted” with “professional hypocrisy,” 
and that “a personal, authentic and privileged relationship between the patient and his analyst,” much more focused 
on the maternal aspect of the analytic, could emerge. Ibid. 
2377 Ibid., 437. 
2378 See for instance: “There is all the difference in the world between the cathartic termination to a laborious psycho-
analysis and the fragmentary eruptions of emotion and recollection which the primitive catharsis could provoke and 
which had only a temporary effect. The catharsis of which I am speaking is, like many dreams, only a confirmation 
from the unconscious, a sign that our toilsome analytical construction, our technique of dealing with resistance and 
transference, have finally succeeded in drawing near to the etiological reality.” Ibid., 438.  
2379 Ibid., 437. 
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have been discarded?”2380 Because of its insistence on affect over intellect, in Ferenczi’s theory, 
the order of importance is reversed:  
The affective transformation is no longer the result of work carried out in the name of a truth whose only 
instrument is the ascetic requirement of that truth; control is no longer an ideal. Rather, the analytic work has 
as its purpose to evoke what is uncontrollable, to lead to the expression of something that is not 
measurable.2381  
With the reintroduction of hypnosis—albeit spontaneous or unnamed—at the heart of analysis, 
regression to older techniques is framed by Ferenczi as progress.2382 For him, this return to the 
“prehistory” of psychoanalysis can correspond to a move forwards: “even a retrograde movement, 
if it be in the direction of an earlier tradition, undeservedly abandoned, may advance the truth, and 
I honestly think that in such a case it is not too paradoxical to put forward an accentuation of our 
past knowledge as an advance in science. … A return to what was good in the teaching of the past 
most emphatically does not imply giving up the good and valuable contributions made by the more 
recent development of our science.”2383 The metaphor of the circle serves to suggest that, in a 
quasi-alchemical manner prompted by the passing of time, the “copper” of hypnosis has now, in 
its reuse, turned back into gold:  
Once more, a circle has been completed. Psycho-analysis began as a cathartic measure against traumatic 
shocks; it then devoted itself to a deeper study of neurotic phantasies and their various defense-mechanisms. 
Next, it concentrated rather on the personal affective relation between analyst and patient. … The sudden 
emergence in modern psycho-analysis of portions of an earlier technique and theory should not dismay us; it 
merely reminds us that, so far, no single advance has been made in analysis which has had to be entirely 
discarded as useless and that we must constantly be prepared to find new veins of gold in temporarily 
abandoned workings.2384 
 
As I hope to have shown in this Appendix, in its broad sense, hypnosis thus does not necessarily 
have to be opposed to psychoanalysis. Rather, as the hypnoanalysts and Ferenczi contend, it can 
also carry with it the hope of a simplified and shortened analysis which posits the primacy of the 
affective over the intellectual, experience over insight:  
 
2380 Ibid., 438.   
2381 Chertock and Stengers, A Critique of Psychoanalytic Reason, 93. As Bokanowski points out, in this highly 
regressive or “maternal” relationship, lived experience, interaction, infraverbal communication and “feeling with” 
(Einfühlung) are predominant over the more paternal, insight based Freudian model. Bokanowski, 51. 
2382 Indeed, certain aspects of Ferenczi’s method bear striking resemblance to how hypnosis is practiced today, namely 
with negotiating between parts of the personality: “Sometimes, as I said, we achieve direct contact with the repressed 
part of the personality and persuade it to engage in what I might almost call an infantile conversation.” Ferenczi, “The 
Principle of Relaxation and neocatharsis,” 440. 
2383 Ferenczi, “The Principle of Relaxation and Neocatharsis,” 428; 433. 
2384 Ferenczi, Ibid., 439. 
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When we have fully understood the nature of the hypnotic attachment to the physician … we may come to a 
point when the analyst can use hypnosis as a part of his technique, without being obliged to fear that he may 
not be able in the end to loosen the addictive umbilical cord which attaches the patient to him. This possibility 
of readmitting hypnosis, or other suggestive methods, into our analytic therapy would perhaps be the 
culmination of the simplification of the analytic technique. … The final goal of psycho-analysis is to 
substitute, by means of the technique, affective factors of experience for intellectual processes. It is well 
known that this is just what is achieved in an extreme way in hypnosis, in which conscious material is called 












The Narrative Turn in the Therapeutic Field. 
 
He who wishes to plumb and describe the mental cannot completely escape the creative 
writer’s methods of conceiving and describing, however rigorous the will to cool, sober 
objectivity—Freiherr von Berger, Review of Studies in Hysteria, (1896). 
 
As I argued in Chapter 1, the “hypnotic” dimension at the heart of the therapeutic relation 
can be described as an “affective tie,” as does Borch-Jacobsen in his discussion of analytic-
hypnotic transference. Nevertheless, as I suggested in Appendix A, the “narrative turn” constitutes 
another, more aesthetically oriented way of bringing hypnosis and analysis together, and offers a 
framework which emphasizes common ground between various disciplines and theoretical 
models, rather than focusing solely on their differences. In this Appendix, I will trace the broader 
development of this “narrative turn” and the integrative approach to psychotherapy that it enables. 
I will thus extend the scope of inquiry to examine the way in which the narrative turn affected 
medicine, psychiatry and psychotherapy as a whole during the twentieth century.   
 
2385 Ferenczi and Rank, The Development of Psycho-Analysis, 62. 
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1. The Narrative Turn in Medicine 
 
The narrative turn in medicine occurred mostly in reaction against biological models that 
strived to align the medical field with the natural sciences well into the twentieth century. In the 
United States, this process can be traced back to Abraham Flexner’s 1910 report on medical 
education,2386 which defined the goal of medicine as a “battle against disease” and established the 
biological sciences as the core content for all medical education.2387 In Flexner’s physiological-
materialist view, clinicians should be “impregnated with the fundamental truths of biology” and 
consider that “the human body belongs to the animal world. It is put together of tissues and organs, 
in their structure, origin, and development not essentially unlike what the biologist is otherwise 
familiar.”2388 Despite its institutional success, Flexner’s model was criticized during the second 
half of the twentieth-century for neglecting that human beings also “live meaning-centered lives 
and have complicated emotional and historical relations with their bodies,” that they cannot be 
“reduced” or treated in the same way as a nonhuman bodies.2389 Medicine in the 1970s and 1980s 
thus saw the emergence of models which emphasized social, psychological or person-centered 
dimensions and called into question this purely biological approach.2390 As Lewis argues, this was 
in great part due to the changes brought about by the bioethics movement at the end of the century, 
which created a shift from beneficence-centered models to autonomy-centered approaches.2391 
 
2386 In 1908, the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching chose Flexner to head a commission which 
aimed to assess U.S. medical education. According to Bradley Lewis in Narrative Psychiatry, the report was so 
successful that it “transformed U.S. medical schools and created the basic structure for medical education today.” 
Lewis, 19. 
2387 Abraham Flexner, Medical Education in the United States and Canada: A Report to the Carnegie Foundation for 
the Advancement of Science. (New York: Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, 1910), 23. 
2388 Flexner, Medical Education, 25. 
2389 Lewis, Narrative Psychiatry, 20. See for instance: “the body will not bend to ministrations from someone who 
cannot recognize the self within it, the self exposed to the new light of day by virtue of ruptures in its surface of 
health.” Rita Charon, Narrative Medicine: Honoring the Stories of Illness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 
182. 
2390 For the “biopsychosocial” approach which takes into consideration the patient’s psychic life and social context, 
see George Engel, “The Need for a New Medical Model: A Challenge for Biomedicine,” Science 196, no. 4286 (1977): 
129-36. For a definition of medicine as tending to human suffering, see Eric Cassell, “The Nature of Suffering and 
the Goals of Medicine,” Journal of Medicine 306, no.11 (1982): 639-45. See also Ian McWhinney’s defense of a 
person-centered approach which “should aim to understand the meaning of illness for the patient.” McWhinney, “Are 
we on the Brink of a Major Transformation in Clinical Method?” Canadian Medical Association Journal 135 (1986): 
873. 
2391 As Lewis explains, the major consequence of the bioethics movement in the 1960s and 1970s was creating the 
shift from a beneficence-centered model (in which the goal is “to do good for the patient based on the clinician’s 
judgment about the patient’s needs”) to an autonomy-centered model (where “the highest value for the clinician is to 
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During this time, medicine was reconceptualized as a “moral relationship” in which the patient as 
person became the new center of focus.2392 Medicine became “a special moral enterprise because 
it is grounded in a special personal relationship—between one who is ill and another who professes 
to heal.”2393 
This “moral” dimension lead to an increased attention towards the subjective experience 
of the patient and its phenomenology and shifted the focus away from organic “disease,” toward 
the experience of “illness.”2394 This central distinction is found in Arthur Kleinman in The Illness 
Narratives: Suffering, Healing, and the Human Condition (1988), which presents a series of 
“illness narratives” that study chronic illness in several patients.2395 For Kleinman, whereas disease 
refers to the clinical aspect of the problem—“reconfigured only as an alteration in biological 
structure or functioning”—illness designates the “innately human experience of symptoms and 
suffering.”2396 For Kleinman, the “moral core” of medicine necessarily involves both the control 
of disease and the care for the illness experience.2397 Significantly, this requires that paying 
attention to the “deeply felt emotions within intimate personal relationships” that can no longer be 
dismissed as “peripheral tasks of medicine.”2398  
With the shift towards the phenomenology of illness, medicine became reoriented towards 
the human sciences, without which it would remain cut off from its “moral core.”2399 For Edmund 
Pellegrino for instance, the only way that the physician can “legitimately enter into a healing 
relationship” with the patient is through “a phenomenological understanding” of moral 
woundedness, which extends the medical domain into that of ethics.2400 In this context, pathology 
 
respect the person’s wishes and informed choices about his or her body and life”). Unlike what is seen in the “deeply 
paternalistic” tendencies of the beneficence-model, once the patient’s autonomy became a priority, it becomes 
“imperative that clinicians know how to connect empathically with their patients,” if only to identify their “desires 
and goals.” Lewis, 152. 
2392 Lewis, 21, italics in original. 
2393 Edmund Pellegrino, Humanism and the Physician (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1979), 156. 
2394 As Lewis argues, “only with the turn to phenomenology and the experience of illness do the problems with this 
biomedical logic manifest themselves. With the turn to the phenomenology, it becomes clear that the challenge of 
being ill involves much more than biology alone.” Lewis, 23.  
2395 As Lewis explains, the disease vs. illness distinction, “is at the heart of important differences between the practices 
of narrative medicine, narrative psychotherapy integration, and narrative psychiatry” and can be traced back to 
cartesian dualism, as well as to Karl Jaspers’s distinction between scientific “explanation” and human 
“understanding.” Lewis, 68.  
2396 Arthur Kleinman, The Illness Narratives: Suffering, Healing and the Human Condition (New York: Basic Books, 
1988), 5. 
2397 Kleinman, Ibid., 253. 
2398 Ibid., 253. In fact, failure to address these issues constitutes a “fundamental flaw in the work of doctoring.” Ibid. 
2399 Ibid, 266. 
2400 Lewis, 24. 
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is defined not as bodily disease but as “an altered state of existence arising out of an ontological 
assault on the humanity of the person.”2401 In fact, rather than a secondary aspect of the clinical 
encounter, the patient’s wounded humanity constitutes the “bedrock of the healing 
relationship.”2402 Healing then becomes “a mutual act that aims to repair the defects created by the 
experience of illness.”2403 In this act, the ability to “meaningfully conceptualize” the illness 
experience became a condition of a truly effective healing.2404 As is the case for ethical force of 
literature, understanding the experience of the other is thus at the center of the therapeutic relation.  
Crucial to this conceptualization of illness is the process of narration. In Wounded 
Storyteller: Body, Illness, and Ethics (1995) for instance, Arthur Frank describes illness as the loss 
of the patient’s previous “life map,” which forces the ill person to learn how to “think 
differently.”2405 For Frank, ill people “need to tell their stories” in order to construct new “maps,” 
and “new perceptions of their relationships to the world.”2406 Narration thus plays an integral part 
in the healing process. 
In fact, upon closer examination, narration is involved in medical healing on a double level: 
not only is storytelling healing for the patient, it also reveals the suggestive power inherent to all 
therapeutic relation, in a way which does not reduce it to unethical notions such as trickery or 
manipulation. As Howard Brody puts it, this dual aspect is summarized in the expressions, 
“storytelling as healing” and “healing as storytelling.”2407 In the first case, the suggestive aspect of 
stories functions somewhat like the Placebo Effect: storytelling is intrinsically healing.2408 In the 
 
2401 Pellegrino, Humanism and the Physician, 157. Pellegrino distinguishes four areas which are compromised by 
illness and constitute this “wounded humanity”: loss of freedom of action, lack of information, loss of 
autonomy/increase in dependence, and forced transformation of self-image/increased vulnerability. In this view, the 
physician’s responsibility now engages moral virtues such as authenticity, and not merely curative techniques: “if the 
professional does not consciously remedy the four deficiencies which impair the patient’s expression of humanity, his 
‘profession’ is inauthentic.” Ibid., 127. 
2402 Ibid., 24. 
2403 Pellegrino, “Being Ill and Being Healed,” in The Humanity of the Ill: Phenomenological Perspectives (Knoxville: 
University of Tennessee Press, 1982), 156. 
2404 Ibid, 156. 
2405 Arthur Frank, The wounded storyteller: Body, Illness, and Ethics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 
1. 
2406 Frank, Ibid., 3, italics in original. This process of storytelling can be collective, carried out in a group setting: by 
“hearing themselves tell their stories, by absorbing other’s reactions to these stories, and by experiencing their stories 
being shared,” the ill can work together and “create a new life map.” Lewis, 26. 
2407 Brody, Stories of Sickness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 8. 
2408 For Brody, a “good story” provides three of the key elements found in the Placebo effect: “1) an explanation 
consistent with the person’s worldview, 2) a connection to a community of practitioners and concerned others who 
share this world-view, and 3) a sense of mastery and control over the experience.” Brody, Stories of Sickness, 13. As 
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second expression, the idea of “healing as storytelling” emphasizes the power of “doctor stories,” 
which also “use a narrative logic to understand and explain the person’s difficulties.”2409 Indeed, 
as we argued in Chapter 1, the clinician’s discourse acts like a suggestion which is transferred to 
the patient’s vocabulary, representations, and illness story. As Abraham Verghese notes, the 
clinician thus necessarily becomes a “character” in the patient’s therapeutic journey:  
As physicians, most of us become involved in the stories of our patient’s lives . . . we become players in these 
stories. Our actions change the narrative trajectory . . . and our patient’s stories come to depend heavily on 
repetition of what we say.2410  
 
This is why Verghese urges his fellow physicians to practice “storytelling craft,” to increase their 
sensitivity to the inescapable narrative dimension of the medical profession.2411  
This dual (suggestive and healing) aspect of storytelling is central to the practice of 
“narrative medicine,” the approach named by Rita Charon, which explicitly aims to incorporate 
narrative concepts and techniques into Western medical practice and education. 
Significantly, narrative medicine draws the parallel between “acts of healing and acts of 
reading,” positing that attentive reading can prepare medical practitioners to better “receive” 
clinical stories.2412 In this context, narrative “competency” is considered as “an empathy-inducing 
methodology” without which the physician lacks a full understanding of the patient’s 
experience.2413 As Charon puts it, “good readers make good doctors.”2414 Conversely, literature is 
thought to contribute to the education of the physician and “enable him to gain a better 
comprehension of the human values with which he deals daily,” by cultivating linguistic and 
 
Brody argues, “suffering is produced and alleviated by the meaning that one attaches to one’s experience,” and “the 
primary human mechanism for attaching meaning to particular experiences is to tell stories about them,” Ibid., 13. 
2409 Lewis, 27. As Bradley Lewis notes, these stories which take the form of diagnoses and case studies can sometimes 
be “chilling” and “scientific,” rather than comforting. Ibid. However, in Illness as Metaphor (1978), Susan Sontag 
cautions against the abuse of narrative categories, arguing that although illness is experienced in terms of metaphor, 
disease itself is not metaphor, but “truth.” For Sontag, the most “truthful” way to be ill is “to cleanse oneself of all 
metaphorical thinking and to rely solely on the nonmetaphorical disease thinking of medicine and science.” Sontag, 
in Lewis, 70. Lewis on the other hand, responds, “is disease thinking really free of metaphor, and is the meaning 
making of science really an exception to other forms of meaning making?”  For Lewis, “metaphor enters science at 
its core through science’s inescapable use of models to organize its research.” Ibid. 
2410 Abraham Verghese, “The physician as storyteller,” Annals of Internal Medicine 135, no. 11 (2001): 1012. 
2411 See Rita Charon, “Narrative medicine: Attention, representation, affiliation.” Narrative 13, no. 3 (2005): 261–
270; and Narrative Medicine: Honoring the Stories of Illness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). 
2412 Lewis, 29. 
2413 Keen, Empathy, 11. Indeed, clinicians must “learn how to listen to the multiple registers of the body, the self, and 
the storyline and how to respond ethically and dutifully to what we hear.” Charon, Narrative Medicine, 182. As 
sickness opens the door to the “knowledge of one’s self and one’s values,” and the person who cares for the sick must 
therefore be prepared to “midwife the life scrutiny that inevitably accompanies illness.” Ibid, 182. 
2414 Charon, Ibid., 113. 
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imaginative sensitivity.2415 The intervention of narrative into the medical field is thus first and 
foremost due to considerations of an ethical nature. Indeed: 
A language-sensitive physician might be enabled, by careful and imaginative word-choice, to impart more 
efficiently to patients and their families, and also to nurses and other co-workers, information they need to 
know. This more accurate and flexible comprehension and utilization of language is not separable from the 
awakened and functioning imagination. Empathy and compassion, functions of the imagination, lead to the 
‘inspired’ word or phrase, the verbal accuracy which leads to further enlightenment, and in turn to a deeper 
comprehension of the situation.2416 
 
Significant for the argument discussed in Chapter 4, Anne Scott advocates for the 
integration of Iris Murdoch’s moral philosophy into medical training, arguing that the imaginative 
capacity of the health practitioner plays “a central part in [their] ability to communicate with a 
patient and in the type of person which [they] become.”2417 For Scott, the practitioner cannot 
empathize without imaginatively entering “into the world of the particular patient with whom one 
is in contact.”2418 Here, imaginative capacity directly participates in therapeutic competency, as 
Scott takes into consideration the influence of both the practitioner’s “character” and behavior on 
the type of care which they provide.2419  
Because “language influences thought and it is difficult to see how verbal thought does not 
affect the boundaries of imaginative activity,” Scott argues that literary narratives may provide 
“first-order and also second-order concepts with which to enrich the language and thought 
 
2415 J. Trautmann, Healing Arts in Dialogue, (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1981), 
x. 
2416 Ibid, in Trautmann, 156. Conversely, linguistic sensitivity involves subtle listening and “reading” of the patient: 
“it is at least partially activity of the moral imagination" which allows the sensitive practitioner to “perceive the non-
verbal cues” and “attend to patients sufficiently to know when [they are] capable of coping with bad news, rather than 
merely stating news in a cold, factual way.” Scott, 45. 
2417 Anne Scott, “Imagination in Practice,” Journal of Medical Ethics 23 (1997): 45. “Rather than offer a staple diet 
of Aristotelian ethics in the undergraduate curricula, perhaps instead one should follow Murdoch's suggestion and 
help the practitioner to develop vision and moral imagination, because this has a practical rather than a theoretical 
aim.” Ibid. Scott defines the moral imagination as “a faculty directly relevant to the Aristotelian virtue of phronesis” 
Ibid., 47.  
2418 Ibid., 46. 
2419 As Scott notes, the behavior of the health care practitioner does have a moral impact on the patient, as “the 
dehumanising effects of being ignored or depersonalised by health care staff may not be readily evident to staff whose 
encounters with a patient are relatively brief. However, such encounters may harm the patient (and the staff involved 
for that matter); and they do carry moral evaluation.” Conversely, imaginative failure becomes a therapeutic failure 
“practitioners can and should be held responsible for lacking these qualities or characteristics when it causes harm to 
patients (or indeed themselves as persons).” Nevertheless, Scott admits that in the healthcare professions, “one may 
certainly witness events so painful that the desire in one not to look, not to see, is over whelming.” Nevertheless, she 
replies that repeated exposition should not lead to insensitivity, but encourage the cultivation of caring and careful 
attention: “It is also precisely because healthcare practitioners are almost daily faced with this reality in an 
unadulterated, undisguised way, that their ability to look, to see, to live with and grow from such experiences is all 
the more necessary.” Ibid, 46-47. 
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processes” of medical students—which is “not an unimportant consideration” in a context of 
“growing subsumption of the language of the market place into the thinking, writing and policy-
making about health care practice.”2420 This is why health professionals should be trained in a way 
that develops their moral vision and imagination, and become familiarized with narrative ways of 
looking at the world. 
Indeed, as Rita Charon contends, familiarity with narratives helps cultivate in the physician 
a nuanced capacity for “attentive listening,” adopting “alien perspectives,” being “curious about 
other people’s motives and experiences,” and “tolerating the uncertainty” of stories.2421 In this 
sense, narrative medicine “reminds mainstream medicine that it deals with more than 
pathophysiology; it deals with a whole persons.”2422 As Kathryn Hunter observes,  this imposes a 
reevaluation of any strict “objectivist” pretensions of the medical field.2423 It forces medicine to 
move away from the illusion of “objectivist, scientific reportage” and acknowledge that its case 
histories are “humanly constructed.”2424 This epistemological “loss” is nevertheless 
counterbalanced by an important gain on the level of the therapeutic relation, which is reorientated 
toward more humane modes of understanding and interacting, due to the ethical concern which 
extends beyond the bounds of concepts such as “disease” and “medical case.” 
 
2. The Narrative Turn in Psychiatry  
 
According to Lewis, although psychiatric ethics have been “less influential” than medical 
ethics, it is “only a matter of time until the bioethics movement affects psychiatry as well.”2425 
This is why in Narrative Psychiatry, Lewis urges psychiatrists to adopt the narrative turn which 
occurred in the medical field:  
 
2420 Ibid., 49. 
2421 Charon, “Narrative Medicine: Attention, Representation, Affiliation,” 262. 
2422 Lewis, Narrative Psychiatry, 68. 
2423 Kathryn M. Hunter, Doctors’ Stories: The Narrative Structure of Medical Knowledge (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1991), 166. 
2424 Hunter notes a tension in narrative medicine between a “literary” and a “scientific” or “rational” pole, in which 
“narrative of any length and fullness or speculative force inevitably pulls against medicine’s commitment to objective 
scientific study of human illness.” For Hunter it is “essential” that “first, both tellers and listeners must recognize the 
narrator of the case history as contextually conditioned, and, second, the lived experience of the patient must be 
experienced.” Ibid., 166. 
2425 Lewis, 152. 
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We are in a paradoxical moment when medicine is more open than psychiatry to the human and the storied 
aspects of clinical work. As counterintuitive as it may seem, by taking the narrative turn, psychiatry does not 
risk ‘getting away’ from medicine as much as it gains the possibility of ‘catching up’ to medicine.2426 
 
Anti-psychiatry 
During the end of the twentieth century, a rise in antipsychiatric discourse fragilized the 
positivist, rationalist discourse and psychopathological realism that had been operative in the 
mental health professions until then.2427 In what follows, I will sketch out the broad lines of such 
antipsychiatric arguments, before turning to the “narrative psychiatry” advocated for by Lewis. 
Several classic anti-psychiatric works were seminal in this shift leading to the narrative 
turn in the mental health professions, many of which describe mental illness as “a result, no less 
than as a cause,” of “the labels, the innuendos the rules, the secrets—in short, of the language 
games that surround it” in psychiatric discourse.2428  
For instance, in Asylums, Erving Goffman suggested that most of “mental illness” can be 
explained by the social interactions that develop when such a concept is put to use.2429 In 
Goffman’s account, the “mental patient career”  remolds the individual’s relation to the world, 
submitting patients to a transformation “parallel to the one undergone by the inmate.”2430 Secondly, 
David Rosenhan’s 1973 paper “On Being Sane in Insane Places” cast strong doubt on psychiatric 
institutions’ ability to distinguish “sanity” from madness.2431 Rosenhan’s famous study aimed to 
expose not only the dehumanizing treatment of patients in psychiatric wards, but also the self-
fulfilling prophecy in which the diagnosis of schizophrenia affects the future behavior of doctors 
 
2426 Ibid., 18. 
2427 Already at the beginning of the twentieth century, the birth of psychoanalysis and Karl Jaspers’ phenomenological 
psychiatry caused psychiatry to move away from the disease logics of the biological approach, which explained mental 
illness in neurological terms and prescribed its cure with pharmaceutical interventions. According to Jaspers, a 
“pluralistic” psychiatry would combine both “causal” research (studying neuroanatomical or genetic factors) and 
“meaning” research (as in psychoanalysis). See Lewis, 60.  
2428 Omer and Alon, 197. 
2429 See E. Goffman, “On the Characteristics of Total Institutions” (1957), in Asylums (New York: Doubleday, 1961) 
and Foucault, Histoire de la Folie à l’âge classique, (Paris, Gallimard, 1972).  
2430 As Omer and Alon point out, “if we ever conceived of language games as playful, Goffman’s work will certainly 
disabuse us.” Omer and Alon, 197. 
2431 In Rosenhan’s undercover study, eight pseudo-patients checked themselves into mental institutions, claiming to 
suffer from a single symptom: hearing a voice which said “thud, empty, hollow”—or as Susannah Cahalan has pointed 
out, “dull, empty, thud,” depending on whether one bases oneself on Rosenhan’s correspondence or published paper. 
All were diagnosed with schizophrenia and then eventually released—after 7 to 54 days, depending on the case—with 
the diagnosis of “schizophrenia in remission.” Cahalan examines the inconsistencies between Rosenhan’s paper and 
his correspondence and private notes for a manuscript which remained unpublished. See Susannah Cahalan, The Great 
Pretender (New York: Grand Central Publishing, 2019). 
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and patients alike.2432 Furthermore, in The Divided Self, Ronald Laing accused psychiatry, even in 
its more humane forms, of placing “the bars of Bedlam and the locked doors inside the patient.”2433 
Challenging the medical model of mental illness, he argued that, failing to grasp the experience of 
schizophrenic patients, psychiatrists define schizophrenia by its exterior symptoms, “irrespective 
of the context in which these symptoms are manifested,” and naively assume that the observer 
“add[s] nothing to the entity being diagnosed” or that they perceive more than an aspect of the 
observed reality.2434 In this way, they become the “dupes of a vocabulary that depicts the individual 
as a self-contained entity to be understood without reference to the relational world.”2435 For Laing, 
the experience and symptoms of mental illness “cannot be grasped through the methods of clinical 
psychiatry and psychopathology … but, on the contrary, require the existential-phenomenological 
method to demonstrate their true human relevance and significance.”2436 Finally, in The Myth of 
Mental Illness, Thomas Szasz famously argued that the behavior of mental patients has less to do 
with symptoms, illness or diagnosis than with “messages communication, symbolization and 
control.”2437 For Szasz, the very concept of mental illness is a form of “psychoimperialism” which 
overemphasizes the physical and neglects the communicative and symbolic aspect of 
“symptoms.”2438   
 
2432 For a critique of Rosenhan’s paper, see Robert Spitzer, “On Pseudoscience in Science, Logic in Remission, and 
Psychiatric Diagnosis,” Journal of Abnormal Psychology. 84, no. 5 (1975): 442-52. 
2433 Ronald D. Laing, The Divided Self. An Existential Study in Sanity and Madness (Harmondsworth UK: Penguin 
books, 1960), 12. Laing proposes instead an “existential” account of madness, which would be able to “see the case 
qua person.” 18. 
2434 Omer and Alon, 197. As Laing notes, “we have described the same line, which, if seen differently, can be the one 
side of a vase” or “the outline of a face.” Laing, The Divided self, 21. 
2435  Laing, The Divided self, 197. The words of psychiatric vocabulary are “specifically designed to isolate and 
circumscribe the meaning of the patient’s life to a particular clinical entity,” and “it is a form of self-deception to 
suppose that one can say one thing and think another…The thought is the language, as Wittgenstein has put it.” Ibid., 
18-19. 
2436 Ibid., 18. As he notes, “dualism cannot be avoided within the psychopathological frame of references except by 
falling into a monism that reduces one term to the other, and is simply another twist to a spiral of falsity.” For him, 
“only existential thought has attempted to match the original experience of oneself in relationship to others in one’s 
world by a term that adequately reflects this totality. Thus, existentially, the concretum is seen as a man’s existence, 
his being-in-the-world.” Therefore, “unless we realize that man does not exist without ‘his’ world nor can his world 
exist without him, we are condemned to start our study of schizoid and schizophrenic people with a verbal and 
conceptual splitting that matches the split up of the totality of the schizoid being-in-the-world.” Ibid., 24; 19; 20. 
2437 Thomas Szasz, The Myth of Mental Illness. Foundations of a Theory of Personal Conduct (New York: Harper & 
Row, 1961), in Omer and Alon, 201. 
2438 Gregory Bateson also emphasized the communicative dimension of disease, drawing attention to “meta-messages” 
and “metacommunication failures” in mental illness. His famous theory of the “double bind" with schizophrenic 
patients played an important role in the decline of psychopathological realism as it shifted attention from the illness 
to the “system of communication patterns” involved in the disease. For Bateson, mental illnesses are “typical examples 
of putative substances” that should be redescribed in nonessentialist terms. See Gregory Bateson, Steps to an Ecology 
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For example, defining hysteria as a mental illness involves “one in a series of language 
games that are linked to the concept if illness.”2439 In this process, the fact that “others are a part 
of this demonstration” is neglected, even though—as we saw in Chapter 1—“we can hardly 
conceive of hysteria without an audience.”2440 For Szasz, on the contrary, the hysteric’s behavior 
is better understood as “an attempt (albeit conflicted and unconscious) at influence,” rather than 
an illness.2441  
It is from anti-psychiatric critiques such as these that the narrative turn in psychiatry was 
then able to emerge.  
 
A Turn Away from Biopsychiatry 
More specifically, as Lewis shows in Narrative Psychiatry, narrative approaches emerged 
as a reaction against the second era of biopsychiatry, which was predominant in the 1980s and the 
DSM-III.2442 
As Eric Kandel explains, the biological model in psychiatry states that “all mental 
processes, even the most complex psychological processes, derive from operations of the 
brain.”2443 In this context, mental illness is explained by the “broken brain” model, a “key metaphor 
of contemporary psychiatric discourse” which during the second wave of biopsychiatry, came into 
play “at the subtle level of chemical functioning,” as seen in the now popular notions of 
“chemical—or biochemical—imbalance.”2444  
As Lewis argues, biopsychiatric “disease logics” become integrated into individuals’ 
conceptual systems, imposing themselves as the only possible model for self-understanding, or as 
 
of the Mind, (New York, Ballantine, 1972); Bateson et. al., “Toward a Theory of Schizophrenia.” Behavioral Science 
1, no. 4 (1956): 251-254; and Omer and Alon, 207. 
2439 Ibid, 203. “One is led to divide the phenomena of hysteria into symptoms and pathogens… conceptualized in 
terms such as energies, blocked libido, bound cathexes, and their like; symptom formation is viewed as a process of 
energy conversion, and cure of energy release.” Ibid. 
2440 Ibid. 
2441 Omer and Alon, 203. 
2442 Indeed, despite the antipsychiatric discourse of the previous decades, after the 1980s, “the tide had turned 
dramatically back toward biopsychiatry,” until psychiatry became, at the dawn of the twenty-first century, “fully in 
the grips of a second biological era.” Lewis, 61-63. Indeed, the 1980 DSM-III signaled a “turning of the page on 
psychoanalysis” and “a redirection of the discipline [of psychiatry] toward a scientific course.” Edwin Shorter, A 
History of Psychiatry: From the Era of the Asylum to the Age of Prozac (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1997), 
302. 
2443 Kandel 1998, 460. 
2444 Lewis, 89. See Nancy Andreasen, The Broken brain (1984). For Lewis, this is “a key metaphor of contemporary 
psychiatric discourse.” See its derivative descriptions in the social sciences: in anthropology, the “pharmaceutical 
person” (Emily Martin, 2006), or in sociology the “neurochemical self” (Nicholas Rose, 2003). Listed in Lewis, 89. 
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Tanya Luhrmann puts it, “seep into popular culture like the dye from a red shirt in hot water.”2445 
The “metaphors and plots” of neuroscience and psychopharmacology are thus transposed into the 
popular imagination and culture. This process, as Lewis observes, is strikingly captured in 
contemporary novelistic prose, as seen for example in a passage from Jonathan Franzen’s novel 
The Corrections (2001), where biopsychiatric tropes have become a core part of the main 
character’s “self-storying”:2446  
Although in general Gary applauded the modern trend toward individual self-management … he was less 
than thrilled to be given responsibility for his own personal brain chemistry, especially when certain people 
in his life, notably his father, refused to take any such responsibility. But Gary was nothing if not 
conscientious. As he entered the darkroom, he estimated that his levels of Neurofactor 3 (i.e., serotonin: a 
very, very important factor) were posting seven-day or even thirty-day highs, that his Factor 2 and Factor 7 
levels were likewise outperforming expectation, and that his Factor 1 had rebounded from an early-morning 
slump related to the glass of Armagnac he’d drunk at bedtime. He had a spring in his step, and agreeable 
awareness of his above-average height and his late summer suntan. His resentment of his wife, Caroline, was 
moderate and well contained. Declines led key advances in key indices of paranoia (e.g., his persistent 
suspicion that Caroline and his two older sons were mocking him), and his seasonally adjusted assessment 
of life’s futility and brevity was consistent with the overall robustness of his mental economy. He was not 
the least clinically depressed.2447 
 
What this example makes apparent (and is central for our argument about the suggestive dimension 
of the therapeutic relation) is that “like other metaphors,” medical metaphors “create a kind of 
‘seeing as’” which ultimately becomes internalized “in a deeply naturalized way, to the point 
where ‘seeing as’ becomes ‘being as’.” 2448 Once one adopts a metanarrative perspective however, 
the biomedical model becomes “a choice, just as a humanistic model or a cognitive behavioral 
model would be.”2449  
 
2445 Luhrmann, Of Two Minds, 20. Here Lewis is not trying to revoke this mode, but restate is as one mode among 
several means of self-fashioning: “Narrative identifications can use plots containing disease logics and disease 
metaphors as easily as they can use other logics and metaphors…Science and medicine can be brought into narrative 
identifications as well as any other story elements.” Lewis, 70-71. 
2446 “When models of mental illness seep from the clinic into the culture, they become part of our cultural metaphors 
of self-experience. …These culturally located self stories scaffold our narrative identity and provide us with a compass 
for living.” Lewis, 88. 
2447 Jonathan Franzen, The Corrections (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2001), 139–40. 
2448 Lewis, 148. See for instance the critique of the DSM’s “claim to atheoreticism,” and contention that scientific 
“assumptions and theories” are just as inescapable as “social, political, and moral philosophical ones.” Edwin Wallace, 
“Psychiatry and its Nosology: A Historico-philosophical Overview,” in Sadler et. al., eds., Philosophical Perspectives 
on Psychiatric Diagnostic Classification (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994). For Lewis, psychiatry’s 
pursuit of atheoretical simplification even “flies in the face of the twentieth century’s most respected philosophers of 
science,” for whom “idealized theoretical neutrality is a logical and empirical impossibility.” Lewis, 2.  
2449 Ibid., 148. Important to our argument is the selective, aspectival dimension of clinical interpretation: “none of 
these competing perspectives ‘discover’ the final reality … nor do they completely ‘construct’” it. Rather, each 
provides a perspective that “evokes, highlights, and foregrounds some aspect of her real situation while simultaneously 
backgrounding other aspects.” Ibid., 150, emphasis added. As Lewis eloquently shows, “both sides of the science 
wars appealed to the world, but each used a different metaphor to understand it. Defenders of science as discovery 
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Narrative approaches thus appeared in reaction to psychiatry’s “relentless disease 
mongering, its overuse of polypharmacy,”  its “knee-jerk medicating for relatively minor 
difficulties not only in adults but also in children and adolescents.”2450 For Lewis, not only is 
biopsychiatry reductive on a theoretical level, it is also responsible for the current “imbalance” in 
the field of psychiatry, now that the “hype and excitement of neuroscience, cognitive science, 
psychopharmacology, and cognitive therapy have begun to erode [its] the human dimension.”2451 
For him, “embrac[ing] the wisdom of narrative medicine” is thus a means for psychiatry to retrieve 
its lost balance, to turn away from excess focus on the physiological and toward “ethical and 
recovery-oriented clinical work.”2452  
 
Narrative Psychiatry 
Although the narrative turn made its entry in psychiatry at the same moment as critiques 
of biopsychiatry, for Lewis “narrative psychiatry” should be considered as “less of a critique, and 
more of a way forward.”2453 As he portrays it, narrative psychiatry is similar to narrative medicine 
and psychotherapy in that it is person-centered, stresses the importance of empathetic connection 
and listening, and considers that “the stories patients use to describe their lives also shape those 
lives.”2454 It specificity, however, is that it remains open to the use of psychiatric medication, and 
according to Lewis, that it brings “much more nuance and self-reflection to the disease/illness 
 
understood it in terms of an ultimate reality, independent of human cognition. Defenders of science as construction 
understood it in terms of phenomenology of experience—something much more akin to the idea of worldview or 
zeitgeist. The same term, world, brought up very different associations for the competing sides, and the metaphorical 
oscillation between world as ultimate reality and world as zeitgeist created the either/or conditions of a bitter science 
wars battle without compromise.” Ibid. 
2450 Lewis, 64. 
2451 Ibid., 31. For Lewis, students and practitioners are left with “limited conceptual tools,” since “knowledge about 
neurotransmitters and genetics does not help psychiatrists fully appreciate the interpretive dimensions of human 
problems.” Lewis, ix. For him such attempts to do away with human complexity in the name of theoretical clarity can 
even lead to a return of the repressed: “We should also remember that reductions ‘forget’ about the complex, which 
means that the complex is often surprising and disturbing when it inevitably reappears later on.” Lewis, 2. As we will 
note in the second part of this chapter, the form of “unknowing” inherent to accepting and integrating the complexity 
of reality thus turns out to be a valuable skill, both on therapeutic and ethical levels.  
2452 Ibid., xvi. 
2453 Ibid., 64. 
2454 Ibid., 164. It aims to show that “the root metaphors people use to understand and plot their troubles become the 
key elements of who they wish to be.” In narrative psychiatry, knowing “which consequences are best and which 
aspect of ultimate reality should be emphasized cannot be answered by the clinician. These questions must be 
answered by the client because, in the end, it is his or her life.” Ibid., 81; 164. 
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distinction” than both mainstream medicine and psychotherapy.2455 Indeed, narrative psychiatry is 
not opposed to using the disease model of mental suffering.2456 Rather, it considers the 
psychopharmacological frame as  “one of an array of possible tools” that can be woven into an 
“eclectic narrative of treatment.”2457 Narrative psychiatrists are thus “open to this [biological] form 
of self-making and respect it as much as they would other forms of self,” while remaining “aware 
of the often problematic power dynamics of this emerging” from it.2458 They remain open to 
“biopsychiatric stories of ‘chemical imbalances” and ‘genetic predisposition,’” but also to 
“psychoanalysis, humanistic psychotherapy, family therapy,” etc.2459 The narrative approach aims 
to provide psychiatry with a flexibility that allows it to “move with comfort in and between” these 
many logics, past the “long history of psychiatric factionalism and competing orientations.”2460 
According to Lewis, to achieve this flexibility the clinician must “learn about narrative 
theory and be able to apply that theory to thick literary case examples that allow that theory to 
come to life.”2461 The psychiatrist is therefore encouraged to “have read widely in the world of 
fiction, memoir, and biography, with an eye to their relevance for clinical work.”2462 For Lewis it 
is “better to turn to fictional presentations for narrative psychiatry cases,” because in non-narrative 
clinical approaches, the clinician’s story “comes to feel compelling” and the complex and subtle 
 
2455 For Lewis although both mainstream medicine and psychotherapy (including narrative therapy) can afford to leave 
the distinction untouched, psychiatry cannot. Indeed, mainstream medicine “focus[es] almost exclusively on disease—
to the point that the personal experience of illness all too often becomes lost in the clinical encounter. Even narrative 
medicine does not have to trouble the disease/illness distinction, and can work with an additive logic with regard to 
it, considering that “disease is important and also so is illness,” thus leaving the distinction intact. Psychotherapy on 
the other hand focuses on experience and illness, and most practitioners “would generally agree with Freud that 
people’s biological constitution matters, but they would also agree with his decision to bracket biology and keep the 
focus of psychotherapy on psychological, or experiential, variables,” and “even narrative psychotherapy integration 
… remains focused on illness.” Ibid., 194, note 4. 
2456 “Its “knowledge base” is also meant to include “not only the sciences and quantitative social sciences but also 
ethnography, philosophy, history, literature, the arts, and consumer perspectives.” Ibid., 74.  
2457 Ibid., 73. “Disease makes meaning one way, illness another way. But they are both meanings, and they both rely 
on the tools of language to shape their meaning.” Ibid., 69. 
2458 Ibid., 72. They are thus are encouraged towards caution and transparency, striving to “navigate their complicated 
relationship to pharmaceutical self-making by sharing with their clients their ambivalence during their discussion of 
drug treatment options… and they make it a point to discuss the side effect risks and questionable efficacy of many 
these medications.” Ibid. 
2459 Ibid., 47. 
2460 Ibid., 73. 
2461 Ibid., 82. For “thick” descriptions, see Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (1973; New York: Basic 
Books, 2017) and Gilbert Ryle, “The Thinking of Thoughts, What is ‘Le Penseur’ Doing?” Studies in Anthropology 
(1968) 11:11. 
  Here Lewis opposed thick stories to the “thin” diagnostic categories of the DSM. Indeed, “one of the most important 
outcomes of standard, non-narrative clinical training is to create clinicians who are able to sort through a thick story 
and turn it into the kind of thin story that shows up in medical records and in the clinical literature.” Lewis, 77. 
2462 Ibid., 147. 
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variables he or she has “abstracted out of it” come to seem irrelevant, thereby leading to 
oversimplification.2463 Literature, on the other hand, provides “a much thicker set of contextual 
variables” and thus become the “ideal place to gather case histories.”2464  
When presented with the story of a fictional character, the patient is then invited to imagine 
different interpretations and outcomes, which helps them develop an “experiential understanding 
of the considerable degrees of freedom and agency they have with regard narrating life stories.”2465 
Together with patients, the psychiatrist can then use a combination of literary examples and case 
histories to imagine “alternative stories,” revealing the broad range of treatment options that a 
single “reality” can lead to. On the other hand, clinicians who are never exposed to narrative 
theory, and who “never have the option to see [it] played out in literary case examples,” are reduced 
to working from within a single model.2466 Considering it “as truth rather than metaphor,” they 
remain unaware of the “multiple possibilities for interpreting illness,” failing to fully grasp the 
ethical dimension of their work.2467 Lewis’ narrative psychiatry is thus far from being immune to 
the antipsychiatry or recovery movement critiques mentioned higher up.  
Lewis would argue that narrative psychiatry is one step removed from such critiques, which 
remain stuck in the either/or dynamics of the science wars. For him, the narrative approach in 
psychiatry allows to move beyond binary logics, negotiating the contradictions in the field without 
developing “rigid” dichotomies such as “anti-psychiatry versus pro-psychiatry, or drug therapy 
 
2463 Ibid., 79. Memoir and autobiography can also be used, but as Lewis points out, “these genres also tend to reduce 
ambiguity in the process of the telling of the narrative.” Lewis does concede that examination of the clinical literature, 
although it is “not a good place to look for stories open to multiple interpretations,” is “excellent” for “finding 
resources for narrative meaning,” since the “root metaphors” of biopsychiatry, psychoanalysis, or cognitive therapy 
all reveal “different ways of perceiving, selecting, and understanding problems,” which can be exposed to the patient 
as interpretive options. Ibid., 79; 81.  
2464 Ibid., Furthermore, “key philosophical and conceptual terms from literary theory” can help psychiatrists achieve 
this “deep appreciation of narrative,” which comes into play in the production of “doctor stories.” Lewis, viii. As we 
shall see further down, these concepts often revolve around notions of characterization, focalization, narrative plot. 
2465 Ibid., 79. 
2466 Ibid., 82. 
2467 Ibid. Significant for the argument we defended in Chapter 4, Lewis indeed notes that choosing between different 
structures of understanding is a “deeply ethical and political choice,” which is “less about science and ‘truth' and more 
about personal preference and affinity… a choice about who one wants to become.” Ibid. He also notes the broader 
epistemological implications of his claim: “the hidden pedagogy of science contains an unstated ontology of one, and 
only one, true world. Clinicians identified within this ontology will find it hard to make sense of the possibility that 
[various] interpretations of [a case] could be “true.” For mainstream psychiatrists, “the idea that all these 
interpretations could be “true” borders on the absurd, even the insane.” For Lewis, narrative multiplicity “sidesteps 
the usual modernist dichotomy of realism verses relativism. It allows psychiatrists to embrace a flexible 
postpsychiatric ontology of semiotic realism and an epistemology of pluridimensional consequences.” Lewis, 144; 
191, note 18. 
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versus talk therapy.”2468 Lewis’ account is thus clearly in the service of the rehabilitation—via its 
narrative extension—of the psychiatric field, of an attempt to move beyond “equating awareness 
of the limits of biopsychiatry with the legacy of antipsychiatry.”2469 By sidestepping these 
alternatives, it aims to promote a “subtle appreciation of the many truths of psychiatry without 
overvaluing any of these truths as absolute.”2470 Whether narratively-oriented psychiatrists remain 
as open to the alternatives at their disposal as Lewis encourages them to remains uncertain. 
 
3. The Narrative Turn in Psychotherapy 
 
As we saw, during the twentieth century, postmodern and anti-psychiatric discourse caused 
“the precious identity between science and therapy” to be “deeply shaken.”2471 In response to the 
diversity of contemporary psychotherapeutic approaches that emerged from this upheaval, a 
“broadly integrative” approach to psychotherapy emerged, in an attempt to create unity in a 
discipline that became fragmented into a multiplicity of available models.2472 It is in this context 
that the turn toward narrative intervenes, as a metatheoretical solution that would satisfy the desire 
for more integrated approaches to psychotherapy. 2473 Indeed: 
 
2468 Ibid., 64. Also, “narrative theory provide(s) the optimal bridge between postpsychiatric cultural studies and clinical 
practice. Compared with postmodern theory and cultural studies, narrative theory not only “focuses much more 
detailed attention on individual stories and individual lives,” it “helps connect the dots between large paradigms, like 
biopsychiatry or psychoanalysis, and the intimate details of personal life stories,” allowing us to see how people “use 
and in some ways are used by available paradigms to make sense of their lives” and those of others. Lewis, xii.  
2469 Ibid., ix. 
2470 Ibid., 16. Rather than a means of encouraging confusion, it is even framed by Lewis as an antidote to dogmatism: 
“When simplicity multiplies, instead of becoming hegemonic, it becomes one of many. Through multiplication, each 
simplicity loses the violence of totalitarian control.” Ibid. 
2471 Omer and Alon, 232-235. In The Family Networker, Bill O’Hanlon suggests that after the Freudian and cognitive 
approaches, narrative therapy constitutes the “third wave” of therapeutic theory, corresponding to the mode of the 
“postmodern.” O’Hanlon, 1994, 19 in Abels and Abels, 2001, xi. In this context, science and research are no longer 
considered as being the exclusive and “final arbiters of absolute truth,” but simply “very well-tried procedures for 
multiple debate and consensual validation.” Omer and Alon, 235. In the most extreme postmodern conceptions of 
psychotherapy however, “standing either for or against a binding lineage with science involves one either in wishful 
thinking or irresponsibility.” However, more nuanced views are possible, such as considering, as Omer and Alon do, 
that the consensual aspect of scientific validity is its “strength,” that “research plays a vital role even under a pluralist 
dispension” and is, no less than before, “one of the most powerful antidotes against the anarchy of ‘anything goes’.” 
Ibid., 229; 235. 
2472 Lewis, 36.  
2473 Psychotherapeutic integration looks beyond single-school divisions and focuses on common approaches. See for 
instance the Journal of Psychotherapy Integration, founded in 1991, and the SEPI (Society for the Exploration of 
Psychotherapy Integration)’s mission statement: “In promoting dialogue between therapists of differing theoretical 
orientations and between clinicians and researchers, SEPI aims to advance our understanding of the sources of 
effective therapeutic change and to meet the needs of the growing ranks of integrative therapists.” 
https://www.sepiweb.org/page/3, accessed 05/20/2020. As Lewis notes, the banner “Narrative psychotherapy 
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Narrative theory provides not only an open-minded alternative to contemporary psychotherapy turf wars, but 
also a metatheoretical framework for integrating and making sense of the many available therapeutic options. 
The tremendous advantage of a narrative metatheoretical frame for psychotherapy integration is that it allows 
a renewed appreciation of the many forms of psychotherapy without having to choose one true and only 
correct method and without falling into an anything-goes relativism.2474  
 
According to Lewis, rather than a technique, the narrative approach is a view that can adapt 
to various school of thought. Indeed, “it is possible for a psychoanalytic humanist, systemic or 
cognitive therapist to work narratively within the framework of her own approach. The new 
narratives they would help to create would naturally be colored by their own theoretical 
inclinations.”2475 Nevertheless, because of the profound impact that ways of looking have on our 
ways of understanding, adopting the narrative “view” ultimately modifies the practitioner’s 
relation to theory, whose “propositions are no longer viewed as objective truths but provisional 
ways of organizing the therapeutic material.”2476  
Furthermore, as Lewis argues, narrative orientation in psychotherapy provides as a 
potential solution to the controversial “Dodo bird verdict,” according to which—as Lewis Carroll’s 
dodo puts it—everybody wins.2477 Whereas in classic conceptions, therapeutic cure was conceived 
as the natural outcome of the therapist’s scientific dedication to truth, the Dodo Bird verdict states 
that no theoretical approach in psychotherapy “can claim decided superiority over another.”2478 In 
this sense, as Saul Rosenzweig writes, “whether the therapist talks in terms of psychoanalysis or 
Christian Science is ... relatively unimportant as compared with the formal consistency with which 
the doctrine employed is adhered to, for by virtue of this consistency the patient receives a schema 
for achieving some sort and degree of personality organization.”2479 And indeed, later in the 
twentieth century, the “common factors approach” to research—which claims that factors such as 
the therapeutic alliance are more important than specific technical differences—showed that in 
 
integration” has recently appeared as a more formal approach to the otherwise “informal eclecticism” adopted by 
many therapists. Lewis, 41; 32. 
2474 Ibid., 32. 
2475 Omer and Alon, 180. 
2476 Ibid., 183. 
2477 The Dodo Bird Verdict essentially tells the therapists that “it is not important what you do, as long as you do it 
with full conviction and establish a good relationship with the client within a socially endorsed framework.” Omer 
and Alon, 231. See Rosenthal, Luborsky et. al., "The Dodo Bird Verdict Is Alive and Well—Mostly," Clinical 
Psychology: Science and Practice. 9, no. 1 (2002): 2-12. 
2478 Omer and Alon, 232. Indeed, “in the Freudian mode, psychoanalysis worked “through its very neutrality and 
objectivity,” behavioral therapy functioned by “transforming the clinic into a laboratory” and cognitive therapy by 
“extending scientific rationality to life.” Ibid. 
2479 Saul Rosenzweig, “Some Implicit Common Factors in Diverse Methods of Psychotherapy: At last the Dodo said, 
‘Everybody has won and all must have prizes,’” American Journal of Orthopsychiatry 6 (1936): 413–15. 
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psychotherapy, “different treatments work similarly well because they share the factors that 
determine change.”2480 This suggests that the positive effects of therapy have relatively little to do 
with the specific interventions of therapist and come largely from nonspecific factors: “nowadays, 
the answer to the question of ‘Who wins’ has a great deal to do with goals of therapy and the 
preferences of the client.”2481 
 
 Narrative Therapy 
Just as in the medical field, Rita Charon was responsible for the appellation “narrative 
medicine,” in the field of psychotherapy, the techniques which embodies the narrative turn 
explicitly is the “narrative therapy” introduced by Epston and White in family therapy during the 
second half of the twentieth century.  
Like modern hypnotherapy, “narrative therapy” corresponds to an attempt to reconcile 
therapeutic practice with the meta-psychological notion of a multiple, discursive, constructed 
self.2482 This is what leads Parry and Doan to argued that “narrative family therapy is for 
postmodernism, what psychoanalysis was for modernism.”2483 In Epston and White’s theory, the 
client comes to therapy with a “broken” or “problematic” story, constructed from a variety of 
 
2480 See J. D. Frank, Persuasion and Healing: A Comparative Study of Psychotherapy (1963; Baltimore, Johns Hopkins 
University press, 1973).  
2481 Lewis, 41. See M. Lambert, “Implications for outcome research for psychotherapy integration,” in Norcross and 
Goldstein, eds., Handbook of psychotherapy integration, (New York: Basic Books, 1992). 94–129. Lambert’s study 
based on an extensive psychotherapy research database, concluded that 40% of change is due to the client’s personal 
and environmental resources, 30 %t from common features of the therapist (such as warmth, empathy, acceptance, 
and encouraging taking risks), and 15% to the expectations and trust of the client, i.e. the Placebo effect. As Lewis 
points out, “that left only 15 percent of change coming from the therapist’s specific techniques and theoretical models.” 
Lewis, 37. 
2482 “In a time of different worlds and different languages, different selves will be called upon to perform the many 
different deeds expected of people in their different worlds.” Parry and Doan, Story Re-Visions, 27.  See also: “every 
person is many persons; a multitude made into one person: a corporate body, incorporated, a corporation.” N. O. 
Brown, Love’s Body (New York: Random House, 1996), 147. See also Coetzee: “There is a true sense in which writing 
is dialogic: a matter of awakening the counter voices in oneself and embarking upon speech with them,” which entails 
“step[ping] down from the position of what Lacan calls ‘the subject supposed to know’.” Coetzee, Doubling the Point, 
65. 
2483 Parry and Doan, 5. For them, Freud was a modernist, as “to the extent that therapists of any school continue to 
operate within assumptions of single-selfhood and its essential knowability, they remain steadfastly within a modernist 
sensibility.” Ibid., 13. The “epistemological hangover” of modernism—understood as a last attempt to preserve the 
“sacred and mythic narratives of the Western tradition”—is the assumption that “with understanding, with knowing, 
comes freedom.” For Freud this involved ”adhering to the faith that if his patients probed deeply enough they would 
find the answers they were looking for: in the unconscious” and that once restored to consciousness, the “interferences 
and resulting distortions… could end, and their perceptions would once again correspond to reality as it was.” Parry 
and Doan, Ibid., 11; 23; 8.  
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disempowering plots, metaphors, narrative identifications, and perspectives.2484 When the 
incidents in a client’s life-narrative become too constraining or threatening, the foundation is then 
“set for inquiry, which can lead to change.”2485 Narrative therapy is generally carried out in two 
phases: deconstruction—where the therapist look for gaps and breaks in the client’s internalized 
story—and “reauthoring”—where they help the client “restory” their narrative(s), by presenting or 
expanding future options and “question[ing] whether values and preferences are absolute or 
constructed.”2486 In order to do so, the client works with a therapist or social worker who must be 
“attuned to the philosophical and practical applications of narrative practice.”2487 
More specifically the initial process of “deconstruction” involves identifying “the terms, 
the shape and the plot of an individual’s childhood survival story,” in the hopes that “those 
involved in these narratives begin to see them as hermeneutics rather than as life itself.”2488 Indeed, 
until identified as such and modified, the “power” of a limiting story will keep the person “looking 
backward for direction … rather than facing forward to meet what is coming.”2489 Having become 
problematic, these limiting storylines must then be examined and exposed, as narratives.2490 Here 
 
2484 See for instance, Michael White, Re-authoring Lives: Interviews and Essays (Adelaide, South Australia: Dulwich 
Center Publications, 1995); Michael White and David Epston, Narrative Means to Therapeutic Ends (New York and 
London: Norton & Co, 1990). Like narrative medicine or psychiatry, narrative therapy works directly narratives that 
make up the “landscape of the person’s life.” Abels and Abels, Understanding Narrative Therapy, a Guidebook For 
The Social Worker (New York: Springer Publishing Company, 2001), 1. Here, a world view is thought to be 
constituted by “a set of fundamental beliefs, attitudes, values and knowledge that influence a person’s comprehensive 
outlook on life” and evolves into “a frame of reference that organizes the person’s perceptions of others and the world 
in general.” A world view is made up of a conceptual map, and “sets the parameters for what people accept as the 
truth.” Ibid., 60. 
2485 Abels and Abels, Understanding Narrative Therapy, 2. 
2486 Lewis, 50. Like hypnotherapy, narrative therapy is future-oriented, and aims to “discover still unformed, but 
preferred stories that lie dormant in the subtext of their life narrative.” Ibid., 3. However, unlike hypnosis, it involves 
mostly the conscious awareness of then client, and focuses on the content more than the form of the narrative. 
2487 Ibid., xi. 
2488 Parry and Doan, 42; 44. These past stories, which involve rigid and often unconsciously held beliefs, are 
considered as having been “once necessary” yet become “unworkable,” as no longer compatible with the client’s 
environment and desired lifestyle. Ibid, 43. 
2489 Ibid., 36. “Buying into” the problem narrative is a trap that many “authoritative” or “pathologizing” forms of 
therapy focused on diagnosis -namely psychiatric-overlook: “it is very easy for the therapist to fall prey to the problem 
story, to reify it, and to give it authenticity via labelling it and treating it… Rather than being trained to look for 
behaviors that are exceptions to the problem story, we have been traditionally trained to be experts to focus even more 
stringently on evidence supporting its existence.” Parry and Doan, 65. See also Borch-Jacobsen, Making Minds and 
Madness, From Hysteria to Depression, 2009. 
2490 “Unexamined stories remain not only unchanged, but powerful.” Parry and Doan, 71. Thus, the process of 
exposition involves a double gesture: a) moving to a meta-narrative level to be able to identify the problematic 
narrative, and b) examining their consequences: “The stories that people live by, and that shape their lives, “if they 
are destructive to the person,” the stories they live by “need to be exposed for the damage they do.” Abels and Abels, 
xi. Re-authoring thus involves reexamining “the real lived experiences these narratives provide, the hope for change, 
and the exploration of desired futures.” Ibid., 1. 
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the therapist can be thought to adopt a “suspicious” mode of “reading,” remaining aware that “the 
portion of life narrative a client presents… frequently leaves out important parts.”2491 Like the 
hypnotherapist or psychoanalyst, the narrative therapist or social worker “needs to be alert to 
obvious our puzzling omissions, ‘hearing’ them as attentively as she/he hears what is spoken.”2492 
Unlike traditional psychoanalysis however, the focus is placed on underlining the narrative nature 
of the story, rather than focusing solely on its content or signification. Narrative deconstruction 
thus reveals how the problematic story has been “living the client,” how it has grown to “inhabit 
him/her in the form of meanings and views of the world.”2493  
 “Reauthoring,” the second phase of Narrative therapy, is both the method and the goal of 
the therapeutic process itself. It involves taking into consideration the “otherwise” of the client’s 
story, which is to say, encouraging access to storylines which have been “subjugated by the 
family’s and culture’s dominant discourse as to what constitutes the right way of doing things.”2494 
Because some stories are “historical artifacts carried from centuries of racism, sexism, and ethnic 
hatred,” therapy can in this sense be the locus of a—social, even political—resistance against 
dominant narratives, and should not be reduced to mere wishful thinking.2495 Indeed, because it 
appeared with family therapy, narrative therapy places strong emphasis on the context of the 
problem, on the social forces which influence the individual’s views of the world, “cross[ing] the 
lines of individual, group, family, institutions and society.”2496 This does not necessarily imply 
social or political action on the part of the client, but rather an awareness of their suggestibility, of 
the processes of internalization to which they are subjected to in ordinary life: “more than most 
other therapy options, [narrative therapy] tends to be conscious of cultural power dynamics and 
 
2491 Abels and Abels, 2. 
2492 Ibid., 2. 
2493 Parry and Doan, 44. The parallel with suggestibility and hypnotic “possession” is evident here. Parry and Doan 
also cite Richard Rorty, who—himself referring to a remark of Nietzsche’s—notes: “To fail as a poet, and thus, for 
Nietzsche, to fail as a human being is to accept somebody else’s description of oneself, to execute a previously 
prepared program, to write, at most, elegant variations on previously written poems. So the only way to trance home 
the causes of being as one is would be to tell a story about one’s causes in a new language.” Rorty, 1989, 28. Here, 
the parallel between the good life and the work of art—examined in Chapter 4—begins to emerge. 
2494 Parry and Doan, 17. Dominant family narratives also establish themselves via suppression and silencing: “many 
families invite conformity, singularity, and unquestioning loyalty via the spoken and unspoken stories they share.” 
Ibid., 72. They also underscore the “often ‘unspoken’ mores” of the family—our “first culture,” which, “like all 
cultures, wants to make known its norms and mores.” Elizabeth Stone, Black Sheep and Kissing Cousins: How our 
Family Stories Shape Us (New York: Penguin Books, 1988), 7.  
2495 Abels and Abels, 28. This offers a potential response to Coetzee’s doubts about the “freedom” to reauthor one’s 
life. See the discussion of The Good Story further down. 
2496 Abels and Abels, 2001, xii. 
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the way that people’s problems often have to do with internalized hierarchies that they have 
adopted from mainstream culture.”2497 Conversely, it also implies an awareness of the limits of the 
“restorying” process itself, which avoids the dangers of engaging in naive, magical thinking. 
Indeed, as Parry and Doan write, “no one ever fully becomes the author of his/her own story; any 
such assumption can only lead back into the illusions of control, individual autonomy, isolated 
selfhood, and single truth.”2498  
This second, more reparative phase of narrative therapy is just important as the first, 
deconstructive one. Indeed, “to omit the re-vision process is to leave the client in a state of 
psychological ‘free fall’.”2499 Narrative therapy is thus especially sensitive to the groundlessness 
that would stem from a life devoid of coherent narrative: leaving a client “outside of a story” would 
be more detrimental than the psychological benefits of the safety which comes with a coherent, 
unified worldview.2500 
In its attempt to facilitate story re-visions, Epston and White’s narrative therapy aims 
principally to correct the process where an individual becomes defined as a “problem,” and risks 
becoming a “docile, self-doubting citizen and consumer.”2501 It also aims to minimize the 
therapist’s role as expert, and depathologize the client’s symptoms by using a technique referred 
to as the “externalization of the problem.”2502 This process involves considering the problem as an 
entity which is separate from the client, encouraging them to “objectify, and at times, personify” 
it.2503 The purpose is to reduce self-blame and guilt in persons who are often “problem saturated” 
when they enter the therapeutic setting. Insofar as it helps the individual understand “they are not 
 
2497 Lewis, 51. 
2498 Parry and Doan, 43. Ultimately, for the, the individual must “join with others in the universal human action of 
multiple authorship.” Ibid., 43.  
2499 Ibid, 45. 
2500 Ibid., 45. See Wilfred Bion’s work distinction between alpha and beta elements. W. R. Bion, "Attacks on Linking” 
in International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 40 (1959): 308-315.  
2501 Parry and Doan, 18. For Parry and Doan, such narratives produce a sense of “passivity and powerlessness” which 
can even in turn “account for much of the appeal of narratives of victimhood,” thereby maintaining a vicious narrative 
circle. Ibid, 26. 
2502 The problem is considered as exterior, “separate from the self,” and as influencing them—"it brought them there.” 
Nichols and Schwartz, Narrative Therapy (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1998), 410-411. 
2503 Abels and Abels 65. “Whether it’s an internal experience (guilt, self-hate), a syndrome (anorexia, schizophrenia), 
or a relationship pattern (rift), the externalized problem is always personified—portrayed as an unwelcome invader 
that tries to dominate the individual or family members’ lives. Nichols and Schwartz, Family Therapy, 411. 
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the problem,” externalization becomes a “freeing’ mechanism” which counters the harmful effect 
of its internalization and solidification in the person’s sense of self.2504 
In the restorying process, the therapist must not re-write the story himself. Rather, as in 
modern hypnotherapy, they must adopt a “know nothing” approach, mostly limiting themselves to 
asking questions that “arise out of the narrative,” and encouraging the client to “fill in the gaps.”2505 
Here too, the truth value of the story must be set aside, as the therapist merely “explores with the 
clients how their lives are shaped by the stories they believe about themselves, accurate or not.2506 
This is why, rather than the author—or co-author—of the narrative, Parry and Doan use 
the image of the therapist as editor, which according to them fits the postmodern context more 
adequately:2507  
Therapy involves the rearranging, cutting and pasting, word processing, and so forth… In this process the 
therapist/editor works with a story that has already been authored by someone else… the editor’s job is not 
to become the major author but to…provide space for the client to… rearrange the present story such that it 
suits him/her better. In narrative therapy this is accomplished by interacting with the client in such a manner 
that a better story is coevolved in the process.2508 
 
Rather than providing insight or interpretation, the central function of the therapist is to 
merely provide “space,” through a process of “careful listening” and “questioning conducted from 
an ‘editorial’ stance.”2509 Both individuals collaborate in an exercise in “visioning and re-
visioning,” working towards the production of an acceptable story for the “author” (client)—until 
it takes on a form that “the client agrees is more useful than the one he/she brought to therapy.”2510 
Once again, usefulness takes precedence over truth, and problem-solving mostly consists in 
 
2504 Abels and Abels, 65. Indeed, “The work with adults, particularly women and minorities, illustrates the importance 
of externalization. Time and time again researchers have demonstrated how language and values held by socially 
upper-class people are used to control, shape, and at times manipulate people along gender and ethnic lines.” 
Significantly, a patient can very well internalize a story “even when they don’t fully accept it.” Ibid., 89; 69. 
2505 Ibid., 85. As in hypnotherapy and other person-centered approaches, the very positioning of the therapist as a non-
knowing, non-expert is thought to be therapeutic in itself: “A great deal of helping that takes place is due to the style 
of questioning, and to the belief that the questions lead to reflection by the client, and are in the service of the client, 
rather than the helper.” Ibid., 97. 
2506 Ibid., 18, emphasis added. Or alternatively, as psychiatrist Allen Wheelis notes: “In reconstructing a life story, 
truth is necessary but not sufficient. Truth does not demarcate, and cannot determine whether we would dwell upon 
cause of choice. Two histories of the same life may be radically different, yet equally true… Truth does not here 
provide the criterion for selection; the way we understand the past is determined, rather by the future we desire.” Allen 
Wheelis, How People Change (New York: Harper, 1973), 115. As Abels and Abels note, “it is important to remember 
that these are the client’s stories, not stories that the worker tells the client to make them feel better, or to make a 
point.” Abels and Abels, 18. 
2507 This serves both to tone down the paternalistic connotations associated with the image of a “therapist as expert,” 
as well as the idealistic implications of the “client as author” metaphor. 
2508 Parry and Doan, 119. 
2509 Ibid., 12. 
2510 Ibid. 
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redescribing, or “having narrative conversations about the problem until it is no longer necessary 
to talk about a problem.”2511 
     *** 
 
As we have seen in this section, narrative approaches make visible or explicit the impact 
of storytelling on self-understanding, as well as the use of aesthetic-narrative concepts in 
therapeutic practice. Narrative approaches to psychotherapy thus consider fiction not as a mere 
collection of examples, but also as a way of looking at the world.2512 This implies the adoption of 
a meta-narrative perspective and an awareness of a “formal” dimension which often gets lost in 
therapeutic models that focus solely on behavior or physiology to the exclusion of the interiority 
of the subject. It is with these approaches that modern hypnotherapy can be brought together with 
other, narrative-oriented models, and can, in this way, participate in the psychotherapy integration 
described by Lewis. This narrative core (which, as I argued in Chapter 1, can also be called 
“hypnotic” in the extensive sense), that can be traced across such a wide variety of therapeutic 
models, places narrative, rather than historical truth at the heart of treatment2513—a “truth” which 
Lewis argues, is “as true in psychoanalysis as it is in cognitive behavioral, interpersonal, family, 
feminist, or even narrative psychotherapy.”2514 A strong version of my claim, in this context, would 
be that it is in the hypnotic-narrative dimension at the heart of all therapeutic models, that lies the 
“truth” of psychotherapy—just as it does at the heart of fiction. 
 
Conclusion: Narrative Truth and the Novel 
 
In The Good Story (2015), novelist J.M. Coetzee and psychoanalyst Arabella Kurtz discuss 
the consequences of the narrative turn in psychotherapy and psychoanalysis in relation to the 
contemporary novel, and draw out the consequences of narrative identity on both therapeutic and 
ethical levels. Their discussion is especially relevant to our argument in Chapter 4, where we 
examined the ethical and therapeutic potential of storytelling. In their discussion, Coetzee and 
 
2511 Ibid. 
2512 Indeed, as we will see in the second part of this chapter, this way of putting literature “to use” in psychotherapy is 
strikingly similar to the way in which contemporary post-Wittgensteinian moral philosophy claims literature should 
be used to reveal its ethical force. 
2513 “The content, or chosen approach of the therapy, being determined by the therapist and client depending on their 
goals.” Ibid, 53.  
2514 Ibid., 53. 
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Kurtz begin by acknowledging that both psychoanalysis and writing fiction consist in “finding or 
inventing linguistic and narrative structures within which to contain experience.”2515 In both 
literary and therapeutic fields, the narrative dimension emphasizes one’s freedom to redefine 
oneself, as opposed to conceptions of a life set in stone by the determining weight of the past:  
To think of a life-story as a compendium of memories which one is free to interpret in the present according 
to the demands (and desires) of the present seems to me characteristic of a writer’s way of thinking. I would 
contrast this with the way many people see their life-story: as a history that is forever fixed.2516 
 
However, Coetzee expresses strong doubts about this optimistic premise of narrative oriented 
therapies, which we have discussed throughout this Appendix. For Coetzee, because narratives 
can be self-serving, “retelling” or “rewriting” one’s (hi)story can lead to self-delusion, with 
devastating ethical and political consequences.2517 For him, rewriting one’s story risks placing one 
in opposition to historical truth, on both individual and collective levels. In response to these 
skeptical accusations, Arabella Kurtz proposes several arguments which help draw out the 
beneficial dimension of a narrative approach, stressing the ability of psychotherapy to dissolve 
limited/ing and self-serving fantasies, in order to construct more “truthful” ones, an argument 
which was also present in Iris Murdoch’s distinction between fantasy and imagination. Indeed, 
for both Kurtz and Murdoch, all narratives are not mask-stories or self-serving stories of denial. 
As I suggested in Chapter 4, both novelistic and therapeutic narratives can be used to expose self-
serving fantasies, whether those of fictional characters or unreliable narrators.2518 As tools in the 
actual world, they can help work through reality, rather than evade, deflect, or avoid it. According 
to Kurtz, the limitations of personal narratives are not to be condemned, but are merely a fact of 
subjective awareness. In fact, the genre of the novel is intimately linked with the interplay between 
these limitations and the process of self-transformation that is still possible from within their 
bounds. Herein lies the antidote to the argument according to which stories merely lead to 
 
2515 Coetzee, in The Good Story, vi. More specifically, Arabella Kurtz defines the aim of analysis is “setting free the 
narrative or autobiographical imagination.” Ibid., 3.  
2516 Coetzee, Ibid., 13. 
2517 “About every story we can legitimately ask, qui bono?” Ibid., 60. 
2518 Furthermore, both involve a form of imaginative creative “narrating” or thinking, which is crucial to analysis, 
especially in the role of the parent in the development of the child: “a newborn baby needs to be thought about by 
another in order to start to contemplate… they need words to be given to wordless experience, a frame to be put around 
raw, unmediated experience. The act of creative imagination that a parent or a care giver undertakes in order to think 
about what it is like to be a baby, and what it is like to be that particular baby, contributes to that baby’s earliest sense 
of the truth about themselves.” Kurtz, Ibid., 137. Thus naming, describing, putting to words are forms of creative 
thinking which help process or “think through” experience and transform it into knowledge. See W. Bion, Learning 
From Experience (London:  Tavistock, 1962). 
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escapism, or to an “anything goes” framework where they all become equal in value, and, 
consequently, valueless.  
Despite his doubts, Coetzee even concedes this point at the end of his discussion with 
Kurtz: 
It is hard, perhaps impossible to make a novel that is recognizably a novel out of the life of someone who is 
from beginning to end comfortably sustained by fictions. We make a novel only by exposing those fictions. 
As a genre the novel seems to have a constitutional stake in the claim that things are not as they seem to be, 
that out seeming lives are not our real lives. And psychoanalysis, I would say, has a comparable stake.2519  
 
In passages such as these, the paradoxical nature of fictional narrative truths begins to appear, 
which, as I have tried to argue in this dissertation, it shares with hypnotherapy and other narratively 
oriented psychotherapeutic models. Through “trickery,” fiction points us toward the 
uncomfortable truths which we persistently try to avoid. By presenting and exposing them, it revels 
the narrative (auto-suggestive) dimension of our worldviews, and its subtle interplay of 
transformative potential and limitations. 
At the end of The Good Story, Coetzee thus seems willing to grant Kurtz her argument 
about the therapeutic value of fiction, on the condition that a strict narrative approach be used:  
I would be in favor of a therapeutic psychology which, instead of trying to get beyond or through such 
projections or fictions, treating them as though they necessarily hide the truth, could instead easily and openly 
accept our fictionalizing of self and others as part of life.2520 
 
 As I have tried to show throughout this thesis, this is precisely what hypnotherapy is able 
to achieve. Working within the realm of “fictionality,” of the imaginary and suggestive 
representations of the subject, it fully acknowledges and accepts the “fictionalizing self” as an 
integral part of the functioning of everyday consciousness. Rather than authoritatively or covertly 
manipulating the subject into change, it unveils the underlying narrative dimension of identity and 
helps the subject reshape it, in ways that participate in their own conception of the good life. In 
other words, it works towards beneficial transformation by reworking and recreating the subject’s 
“good story.” In this sense, Coetzee’s concluding remark applies to the novel and hypnotherapy 
alike: the sense of “freedom or mastery” that emerges from of the act of self-narration—and, I 
would add, from  the ability to self-read on which self-narration relies—may “turn out to be more 
important than the story itself.”2521  
 
2519 Coetzee, Ibid., 191. 
2520 Ibid., 143. 
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